Appeals (Section 37) →

Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is the single statutory window through which orders made in arbitration-related proceedings can be carried up to an appellate court. It is deliberately narrow. The provision lists a closed set of orders that are appealable and adds the emphatic words "and from no others", signalling Parliament's intent to keep judicial interference minimal and arbitration swift. For a judiciary or CLAT-PG aspirant, Section 37 is a high-yield topic because it tests the interplay between the Arbitration Act, the Code of Civil Procedure, the Letters Patent of High Courts, the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and Article 136 of the Constitution. This article maps the text of Section 37, the orders that are and are not appealable, the bar on second appeals, the limitation regime, and the leading Supreme Court authorities that have shaped its contours.

The text and scheme of Section 37

Section 37 falls within Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and governs appeals in arbitrations seated in India. Sub-section (1) opens with the controlling phrase that an appeal shall lie from the orders specified "and from no others". This phrase is the heart of the provision: it converts the list into an exhaustive code rather than an illustrative one. The scheme reflects the object stated in the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the 1996 Act and reinforced by Section 5, which provides that no judicial authority shall intervene in arbitral matters except where so provided in Part I.

Section 37(1) makes three categories of court orders appealable: an order refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8; an order granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9; and an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. Section 37(2) extends the appellate remedy to two categories of orders of the arbitral tribunal itself: an order accepting the plea referred to in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3) of Section 16, and an order granting or refusing to grant an interim measure under Section 17. Sub-section (3) then bars any second appeal from an order passed in appeal, while expressly preserving the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. The provision must be read alongside the power of the court to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8 and the regime for setting aside awards under Section 34.

Appealable orders of the court under Section 37(1)

The first limb of Section 37(1) makes an order refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8 appealable. Significantly, the converse is not appealable: an order that refers parties to arbitration is not within the list, leaving the aggrieved party to raise jurisdictional objections before the tribunal itself under Section 16. This asymmetry mirrors the legislative policy of pushing disputes into arbitration and out of court.

The second limb makes an order granting or refusing any interim measure under Section 9 appealable, whether the order is passed before, during, or after arbitral proceedings but before enforcement. In Adhunik Steels Ltd. v. Orissa Manganese and Minerals (P) Ltd. (2007), the Supreme Court clarified that Section 9 relief can be sought even after an award is made but before enforcement, and in Firm Ashok Traders v. Gurumukh Das Saluja (2004) the Court underscored that Section 9 is not a tool to obstruct arbitration. Orders flowing from these applications are appealable under Section 37(1)(b).

The third and most litigated limb makes appealable an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34. This is the principal appellate route against the merits of an award, though the appellate court does not sit as a court of error; it reviews only whether the Section 34 court correctly applied the limited statutory grounds.

Refusal to condone delay: Chintels India v. Bhayana Builders

A recurring question is whether an order that does not decide the Section 34 challenge on its merits, but instead refuses to condone delay in filing the Section 34 petition, is appealable under Section 37(1)(c). The Supreme Court answered this in Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 602. A three-judge bench held that an appeal under Section 37(1)(c) is maintainable against an order refusing to condone delay in filing an application to set aside an award under Section 34.

The Court reasoned that the words "setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award" must be read together with the words that follow, namely "under section 34". Since Section 34 is not confined to the grounds in Section 34(2) but includes the limitation discipline of Section 34(3), an order refusing condonation effectively refuses to set aside the award and thereby falls within Section 37(1)(c). Critics, including commentators writing for Bar and Bench, observed that the ruling potentially prolongs proceedings by opening another appellate layer, but the reasoning is now settled law.

A useful contrast sharpens the rule. Where a Section 34 court condones the delay and proceeds to hear the challenge, the order condoning delay is interlocutory and does not refuse to set aside the award; no appeal under Section 37 lies at that stage. It is only the refusal to condone, which shuts out the challenge altogether and leaves the award intact, that is treated as a refusal to set aside and is therefore appealable. The dividing line drawn in Chintels India thus turns on whether the order finally disposes of the right to challenge the award, not on the label of the application.

Appealable orders of the arbitral tribunal under Section 37(2)

Section 37(2)(a) permits an appeal from an order of the arbitral tribunal accepting a plea under Section 16(2) or 16(3) that it lacks jurisdiction or is exceeding its authority. The structure is deliberately asymmetric. Where the tribunal accepts the plea and declines jurisdiction, the proceedings terminate and an immediate appeal lies under Section 37(2)(a). Where the tribunal rejects the plea and proceeds, no appeal is available; the aggrieved party must wait for the final award and raise the objection in a Section 34 challenge.

This was confirmed in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618, where the Constitution Bench held that unless a party has a right of appeal under Section 37, a party aggrieved by an interlocutory order of the tribunal must await the award. In Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 706, the Court reiterated that when a Section 16 plea is dismissed by the tribunal no appeal is provided, and that supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution must be exercised most sparingly, only for patent jurisdictional lapses, so as not to defeat the policy of minimal interference embodied in Section 5.

Section 37(2)(b) makes appealable an order of the tribunal granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 17. After the 2015 amendment, Section 17 orders carry the force of court orders and are enforceable as such, making the appellate route under Section 37(2)(b) the proper remedy rather than a writ petition.

The rationale for confining tribunal-level appeals to these two situations is structural. Section 16 embodies the doctrine of competence-competence, under which the tribunal is the first judge of its own jurisdiction. To permit an immediate appeal every time the tribunal upholds its jurisdiction would invite tactical interruptions and defeat the speed that arbitration is meant to deliver. By contrast, when the tribunal accepts the plea and downs tools, there is no award to await and the only meaningful remedy is an immediate appeal, which is why Section 37(2)(a) is confined to acceptance. The same logic explains why Section 17 interim orders, which can cause immediate and irreversible prejudice, are made directly appealable.

The exhaustive character: and from no others

The phrase "and from no others" has been repeatedly invoked to reject attempts to expand the list. In BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., (2020) 4 SCC 234, the Supreme Court held that an order returning a Section 34 application for presentation before the proper court (effectively a return of plaint for want of territorial jurisdiction) is not an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award, and therefore does not fall within any clause of Section 37. Consequently, no appeal lies against such an order under Section 37.

The same judgment is the leading authority on the seat-versus-venue debate, holding that the designation of a venue in an arbitration clause, absent a contrary indication, fixes the seat of arbitration and confers exclusive jurisdiction on the courts of that seat. For Section 37 purposes, the crucial takeaway is that the appellate gateway cannot be enlarged by creative characterisation of orders; if an order is not within the enumerated categories, it is simply not appealable under the Act.

This exhaustive character has a long pedigree. The predecessor provision, Section 39 of the Arbitration Act, 1940, also enumerated a closed list of appealable orders and likewise used the formula confining appeals to the listed orders and no others. The 1996 Act carried forward this restrictive philosophy but pruned the list further, consistent with the UNCITRAL Model Law's emphasis on finality and minimal court intervention. The continuity between Section 39 of the old Act and Section 37 of the new Act is precisely why decisions such as Fuerst Day Lawson draw on the consolidating and self-contained nature of the statute to reject attempts to widen the appellate gateway.

No Letters Patent appeal: the self-contained code

Because Part I is a self-contained code, litigants have sometimes sought to bypass Section 37 by invoking the Letters Patent of a High Court, which ordinarily permits an intra-court appeal from a single judge to a Division Bench. The Supreme Court closed this route in Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333. The Court held that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a consolidating and exhaustive statute, and that a Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable against an order that is not appealable under Section 37 (or Section 50 in the case of foreign awards).

The argument that Section 50, unlike Section 37, lacks the words "and from no others" and therefore left room for a Letters Patent appeal was rejected. The Court reasoned that the very nature of the Act as a complete code excludes the general appellate remedy under the Letters Patent. The effect is that the appellate structure created by Section 37 is the only intra-curial route available; there is no parallel Letters Patent jurisdiction.

Interface with the Commercial Courts Act, 2015

The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 channels arbitration appeals of a commercial nature to the Commercial Appellate Division, but it does not create any independent right of appeal. In Kandla Export Corporation v. OCI Corporation, (2018) 14 SCC 715, the Supreme Court held that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act merely provides the forum for filing appeals and cannot be used to make appealable an order that is not appealable under the Arbitration Act. There, an order allowing enforcement of a foreign award (not listed in Section 50) was held non-appealable, and Section 13 could not supply a fresh appellate right.

The same principle applies to Section 37. In BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd., the Court reiterated that only the orders specified in Section 37 are appealable and that Section 13(1) of the Commercial Courts Act gives no independent right of appeal. The Arbitration Act therefore controls the question of what is appealable, while the Commercial Courts Act controls only where a permissible appeal is filed.

Limitation and condonation of delay

The Arbitration Act does not prescribe a limitation period for Section 37 appeals, so the period is drawn from the Limitation Act, 1963 or, for commercial disputes, from the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The governing authority is Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460. The three-judge bench held that for Section 37 appeals governed by Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, the period is 90 days, while for appeals governed by Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act it is 60 days.

Crucially, the Court held that delay beyond these periods may be condoned only by way of exception and not as a rule, and only where the delay is short and the appellant has acted bona fide and with diligence. In doing so the bench overruled N.V. International v. State of Assam, (2020) 2 SCC 109, which had laid down a rigid additional-30-day outer limit, holding its foundation to be erroneous in law. The result is a discipline that favours finality: long delays in Section 37 appeals are not to be condoned, preserving the swiftness that arbitration promises.

Borse Brothers also resolved a doctrinal tangle about whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act (the general condonation provision) applies at all to commercial Section 37 appeals, given that Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act sets a 60-day period without an express condonation clause. The Court held that condonation is available but that its exercise must be calibrated to the object of speedy resolution; an appellant cannot treat the outer period as a routine extension. The right that accrues to the successful party once the appeal period lapses is a substantive consideration weighing against condonation, so courts must balance the appellant's explanation against that accrued right with appropriate caution.

The bar on second appeals under Section 37(3)

Section 37(3) provides that no second appeal shall lie from an order passed in appeal under Section 37. This gives a party a single appellate bite. The bar prevents a cascading series of appeals that would erode the finality of arbitral awards. In Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., the Supreme Court expressly noted that Section 37 grants only a first bite and precludes second appeals, and that this is part of the legislative design of minimal interference.

The bar on second appeals is, however, subject to two important qualifications discussed in the next section: the constitutional remedies under Articles 136 and 227, which operate outside the statutory appellate hierarchy and are not technically second appeals.

Preserved remedies: Article 136 and Article 227

The closing words of Section 37(3) expressly preserve the right to appeal to the Supreme Court. This is a reference to the discretionary power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution to grant special leave to appeal. The statutory bar on second appeals therefore does not touch the Supreme Court's constitutional jurisdiction, although that jurisdiction is exercised sparingly in arbitration matters consistent with the policy of finality.

The High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 also survives, but in a sharply confined form. In Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., the Supreme Court held that Article 227 petitions against orders in arbitral proceedings should be entertained only in exceptional cases involving patent lack of jurisdiction, and not as a disguised appeal on merits. Permitting routine Article 227 interference would defeat the object of Section 5 and the limited appellate scheme of Section 37. These constitutional remedies are thus available but heavily circumscribed.

The distinction matters in practice. A party who loses a Section 37 appeal cannot file a further statutory appeal, but may petition the Supreme Court for special leave under Article 136, which the Court grants only where a substantial question of law or manifest injustice is shown. Equally, a party aggrieved by an interlocutory tribunal order that is not appealable under Section 37(2) cannot manufacture an appeal through Article 227; the High Court will decline to interfere unless the tribunal has acted wholly without jurisdiction. The cumulative effect of Deep Industries and Section 37(3) is a tightly sealed appellate architecture in which finality, not endless review, is the governing value.

Scope of appellate review under Section 37

An appeal under Section 37(1)(c) against a Section 34 order is not a full re-hearing on the merits of the award. The appellate court's jurisdiction is co-extensive with, and no wider than, the limited grounds available under Section 34. The court cannot reappreciate evidence or substitute its own view of the dispute for that of the arbitrator. It examines only whether the Section 34 court correctly applied grounds such as incapacity, invalidity of the arbitration agreement, want of proper notice, an award beyond the terms of submission, improper composition of the tribunal, or conflict with the public policy of India.

The public policy ground itself has a layered history: Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co. (1994) confined it to fundamental policy of Indian law, the interests of India, and justice or morality; ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. (2003) added patent illegality; and the 2015 amendment, codifying these limits, restricted patent illegality to purely domestic awards. An appellate court under Section 37 polices the Section 34 court's application of these confined grounds rather than reopening the merits of the award.

The practical consequence is that an appellant under Section 37(1)(c) cannot succeed merely by persuading the appellate court that a different view of the evidence was possible. The appellate court asks whether the award suffers from a vice recognised by Section 34 and whether the first court was right in its conclusion on that limited question. If two views are possible on the facts, the arbitrator's view prevails, and neither the Section 34 court nor the Section 37 court may interfere. This deferential standard is the appellate expression of the same minimal-interference policy that animates the closed list of appealable orders.

A practical checklist for Section 37 appeals

For examination and practice, the following framework captures Section 37. First, ask whether the order falls within the closed list: refusal under Section 8, grant or refusal under Section 9, setting aside or refusing to set aside under Section 34, acceptance of a Section 16 plea, or grant or refusal under Section 17. If it does not, no appeal lies, as confirmed in BGS SGS Soma JV v. NHPC Ltd.

Second, identify the limitation period under Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers: 90 days under the Limitation Act or 60 days under the Commercial Courts Act, with condonation only by way of exception for short delays. Third, remember that there is no second appeal and no Letters Patent appeal (Fuerst Day Lawson), and that the Commercial Courts Act supplies only the forum, not the right (Kandla Export). Fourth, the only routes beyond the first appeal are Article 136 special leave and a tightly confined Article 227 supervisory jurisdiction (Deep Industries). Read this together with the broader scheme of the Act explained in the Arbitration and Conciliation Act notes hub and the foundational introduction to Part I.

Frequently asked questions

Which orders are appealable under Section 37 of the Arbitration Act?

Under Section 37(1) an appeal lies from an order refusing to refer parties to arbitration under Section 8, granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 9, and setting aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34. Under Section 37(2), an appeal also lies from a tribunal order accepting a plea under Section 16(2) or 16(3), and from an order granting or refusing interim relief under Section 17. The list is exhaustive: the statute says appeals lie from these orders and from no others.

Is an order refusing to condone delay in a Section 34 petition appealable?

Yes. In Chintels India Ltd. v. Bhayana Builders Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 4 SCC 602, the Supreme Court held that an order refusing to condone delay in filing a Section 34 application is appealable under Section 37(1)(c), because such an order effectively refuses to set aside the award under Section 34, which includes the limitation discipline of Section 34(3).

Can a Letters Patent appeal be filed if Section 37 does not allow an appeal?

No. In Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., (2011) 8 SCC 333, the Supreme Court held that the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is a self-contained, consolidating code, and a Letters Patent appeal is not maintainable against an order that is not appealable under Section 37 (or Section 50 for foreign awards).

What is the limitation period for filing a Section 37 appeal?

Per Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460, the period is 90 days under Articles 116 and 117 of the Limitation Act, 1963, or 60 days under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for commercial disputes. Delay may be condoned only by way of exception, for short delays, and where the appellant acted bona fide and diligently. The decision overruled the rigid rule in N.V. International v. State of Assam.

Is an order rejecting a Section 16 jurisdictional plea appealable under Section 37?

No. Section 37(2)(a) allows an appeal only where the tribunal accepts a plea under Section 16(2) or 16(3) and declines jurisdiction. If the tribunal rejects the plea and continues, no appeal lies; the party must await the award and challenge it under Section 34, as confirmed in SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618, and Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd., (2020) 15 SCC 706.

Does Section 37 permit a second appeal?

No. Section 37(3) expressly bars any second appeal from an order passed in a Section 37 appeal, giving a party only a single appellate bite. However, it preserves the right to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136, and the High Court's narrow supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 survives, to be used only in exceptional cases of patent jurisdictional error per Deep Industries Ltd. v. ONGC Ltd.