Sections 18 to 27 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 form the procedural heart of Part I. They govern everything that happens between the constitution of the tribunal and the making of the award: how parties are treated, what rules of procedure apply, where and in what language the arbitration is held, how claims and defences are pleaded, and how evidence is gathered. The unifying philosophy is party autonomy tempered by two non-derogable guarantees drawn from Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law - equal treatment and a fair opportunity to be heard. Master these provisions and you understand why Indian arbitration is deliberately freed from the rigours of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, while remaining anchored to natural justice. This note walks through each section with the leading authorities a judiciary or CLAT-PG aspirant must be able to cite.
The Scheme of Sections 18 to 27
Chapter V of Part I of the Act, captioned "Conduct of Arbitral Proceedings", spans Sections 18 to 27. The architecture is deliberate: Section 18 lays down the bedrock principle of fairness; Sections 19 to 22 confer wide procedural autonomy on the parties and, in default, on the tribunal (rules of procedure, place, commencement and language); Sections 23 to 25 deal with the pleadings and the consequences of default; and Sections 26 to 27 address expert evidence and court assistance in taking evidence. Read together they reflect the Model Law's central bargain - the parties are free to design their own process, but the tribunal must always honour due process.
These provisions presuppose that a validly constituted tribunal already exists, the threshold questions of an arbitration agreement's form and validity and the court's power to refer parties to arbitration having already been resolved under Sections 7 and 8. For the full statutory map, see the Arbitration and Conciliation Act notes hub. Crucially, most of Chapter V is default law: the words "subject to this Part" and "failing such agreement" recur throughout, signalling that the parties may contract out of nearly every rule except the fairness guarantee in Section 18.
Section 18: Equal Treatment of Parties
Section 18 is the cornerstone. It provides that "the parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given a full opportunity to present his case." Two distinct guarantees are packed into this single sentence: equality (neither party may be favoured or disadvantaged) and a full opportunity to be heard (each must be allowed to lead evidence, advance argument and answer the opponent's case). This is the statutory embodiment of audi alteram partem and is the one provision in Chapter V from which the parties cannot derogate, however wide their procedural autonomy under Section 19.
The legislative choice of language tracks the original Article 18 of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which speaks of a "full opportunity". The 2006 revision of the Model Law softened this to a "reasonable opportunity" to discourage dilatory due-process objections, but the Indian Parliament has retained the phrase "full opportunity", a point worth flagging in any comparative answer. A breach of Section 18 - for instance, an award that travels beyond the pleadings or rests on material the affected party was never shown - is a classic ground for setting aside under Section 34, since it offends the most basic facet of public policy and natural justice. The discipline imposed by Section 18 is what keeps the tribunal's otherwise sweeping procedural freedom within constitutional bounds.
Section 19: Determination of Rules of Procedure
Section 19 frees arbitration from the procedural straitjacket of ordinary litigation. Sub-section (1) declares in express terms that the arbitral tribunal "shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872." Sub-section (2) confers primacy on party autonomy: the parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed. Sub-sections (3) and (4) supply the default - failing such agreement, the tribunal may conduct the proceedings "in the manner it considers appropriate", and this power includes the power to determine the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of any evidence.
This liberation is purposive: it lets the tribunal adopt a streamlined, commercially sensible process and accept evidence that strict rules might exclude. But Section 19 does not licence arbitrariness. The procedural freedom is always exercised under the shadow of Section 18 - the tribunal may design any process it likes provided that process treats the parties equally and gives each a full opportunity to be heard. In practice many tribunals voluntarily adopt institutional rules (such as those of the SIAC, ICC or the Indian institutions) or the IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence, all of which Section 19 permits as a chosen "procedure". The tribunal that ignores its own agreed procedure, or that admits decisive evidence behind a party's back, converts a Section 19 freedom into a Section 18 violation.
Section 20: Place of Arbitration and the Seat-Venue Debate
Section 20 governs the "place" of arbitration. Sub-section (1) gives the parties freedom to agree on the place; sub-section (2) provides that, failing agreement, the tribunal shall determine the place having regard to the circumstances of the case, including the convenience of the parties; and sub-section (3) clarifies that, notwithstanding the chosen place, the tribunal may meet at any other location for consultation among its members, for hearing witnesses, experts or the parties, or for inspecting documents, goods or property. The word "place" in Section 20 has generated one of Indian arbitration law's most litigated questions - the distinction between the juridical seat (which fixes the supervisory court and the curial law) and the mere venue (a geographically convenient hearing location).
In Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (2018), a three-judge bench held that where the agreement designates only a "venue" (there, Kuala Lumpur) without expressly fixing a seat, the venue does not automatically become the seat; it acquires the status of seat only if "something else is added to it as a concomitant". Because neither the parties nor the tribunal had determined a seat, Indian courts retained jurisdiction to entertain a Section 34 challenge to an award made in Malaysia. Hardy Exploration must be read alongside the territoriality principle established in Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (the BALCO case), which confined Part I to arbitrations seated in India. Aspirants should note that the seat-venue jurisprudence remains contested and continues to evolve through later benches.
Section 21: Commencement of Arbitral Proceedings
Section 21 fixes the moment from which the arbitral clock starts ticking. Unless the parties have agreed otherwise, arbitral proceedings in respect of a particular dispute commence on the date on which a request for that dispute to be referred to arbitration is received by the respondent. The provision is short but consequential. The date of commencement is the reference point for computing limitation under Section 43 (which applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to arbitrations as it would to court proceedings), and it marks the dividing line for deciding whether the substantive or amended version of the Act applies to a given reference - a recurring question after the 2015 and 2019 amendments.
The trigger is the receipt of the request by the respondent, not its despatch, and what constitutes valid receipt is governed by the deemed-receipt rules for receipt of written communications under Section 3. A party who delays invoking arbitration cannot complain that limitation has run while it sat on its hands; equally, a respondent cannot defeat commencement by evading service, because the deeming provisions of Section 3 fix receipt at the last known place of business or residence.
Section 22: Language of the Proceedings
Section 22 leaves the language of the arbitration to party choice in the first instance. Sub-section (1) lets the parties agree on the language or languages to be used; failing agreement, sub-section (2) empowers the tribunal to determine them. Sub-section (3) provides that the agreed or determined language applies to any written statement by a party, any hearing, and any award, decision or other communication by the tribunal. Sub-section (4) permits the tribunal to order that documentary evidence be accompanied by a translation into the language of the proceedings.
Though rarely litigated, Section 22 has a fairness dimension that connects back to Section 18: forcing a party to litigate in a language it cannot follow, or admitting untranslated documents it cannot read, may compromise its full opportunity to present its case. In international commercial arbitrations seated in India the chosen language is frequently English; in purely domestic references the tribunal will often settle on the language of the contract or the parties' correspondence.
Section 23: Statements of Claim and Defence
Section 23 frames the pleadings. The claimant must state the facts supporting its claim, the points at issue and the relief sought; the respondent must state its defence in respect of these particulars - all within the period agreed by the parties or determined by the tribunal. Sub-section (2) allows the parties to submit, with their statements, all documents they consider relevant or a reference to such documents and evidence. Sub-section (3) permits a party to amend or supplement its claim or defence during the proceedings, unless the tribunal considers it inappropriate to allow the amendment having regard to the delay in making it.
The 2015 Amendment inserted sub-section (2A), which for the first time gave express statutory recognition to a respondent's right to advance a counterclaim or plead a set-off, provided it falls within the scope of the arbitration agreement; the tribunal must adjudicate such counterclaim or set-off. This was a deliberate codification aimed at curtailing multiplicity of proceedings, so that a respondent need not launch a separate arbitration to recover sums owed by the claimant. The 2019 Amendment added sub-section (4), prescribing that the statement of claim and defence shall be completed within six months from the date the arbitrators received notice of their appointment - a timeline that dovetails with the award deadline in Section 29A.
Section 24: Hearings and Written Proceedings
Section 24 deals with the conduct of hearings. Subject to any contrary agreement, sub-section (1) empowers the tribunal to decide whether to hold oral hearings for the presentation of evidence or for oral argument, or whether the proceedings shall be conducted on the basis of documents and other materials. The proviso, inserted by the 2015 Amendment, makes oral hearing the default in substance: the tribunal shall hold oral hearings, at an appropriate stage, on a request by a party, unless the parties have agreed that no oral hearing shall be held. A second proviso, also from 2015, exhorts the tribunal to hold oral hearings on a day-to-day basis as far as possible and to refuse adjournments without sufficient cause, with power to impose costs (including exemplary costs) on the party seeking the adjournment.
Sub-section (2) requires that the parties be given sufficient advance notice of any hearing and of any meeting of the tribunal for inspection of documents, goods or other property. Sub-section (3) reinforces transparency: all statements, documents and information supplied to the tribunal by one party must be communicated to the other, and any expert report or evidentiary document on which the tribunal may rely must be shared with both parties. Section 24(3) is, in effect, the procedural machinery that operationalises the Section 18 guarantee - it is the mechanism that prevents the tribunal from deciding on material that one side never had the chance to answer.
Section 25: Default of a Party
Section 25 supplies the sanctions for non-participation, and the differing consequences repay close study. Clause (a): if the claimant, without showing sufficient cause, fails to communicate its statement of claim under Section 23(1), the tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. Clause (b): if the respondent fails to communicate its statement of defence, the tribunal shall continue the proceedings without treating such failure in itself as an admission of the allegations by the claimant - the claimant must still prove its case. A proviso added in 2015 allows the tribunal to treat the respondent's forfeited right to file the defence as having been so forfeited. Clause (c): if a party fails to appear at an oral hearing or to produce documentary evidence, the tribunal may continue the proceedings and make the award on the evidence before it.
The asymmetry is principled. The claimant's default goes to the very existence of a claim, so the reference dies; the respondent's silence cannot manufacture a default award, because Section 25(b) preserves the burden of proof on the claimant and harmonises with the equal-treatment command of Section 18. A party who simply boycotts the arbitration cannot later complain of a denial of opportunity - it had the opportunity and chose not to use it; this is the obverse of the waiver of the right to object under Section 4.
Section 26: Expert Appointed by the Arbitral Tribunal
Section 26 lets the tribunal procure independent technical assistance. Unless the parties agree otherwise, sub-section (1) empowers the tribunal to appoint one or more experts to report on specific issues, and to require a party to give the expert relevant information or to produce or grant access to relevant documents, goods or property for inspection. Sub-section (2) safeguards the parties' right to be heard: if a party so requests, or the tribunal considers it necessary, the expert must, after delivering a written or oral report, participate in an oral hearing where the parties may put questions to the expert and present their own expert witnesses to testify on the points at issue.
Sub-section (3) entitles a party to examine any document, good or other property in the expert's possession that the expert was supplied with. The provision again reflects the Section 18 ethos - a tribunal may take expert evidence, but it may not insulate that evidence from challenge. A tribunal-appointed expert is distinct from party-appointed experts: the former assists the tribunal directly, but its report enjoys no immunity from cross-examination, and an award resting on an unchallenged tribunal expert report may be vulnerable under Section 34.
Section 27: Court Assistance in Taking Evidence
An arbitral tribunal is a creature of contract and lacks coercive power over witnesses or third parties; Section 27 fills that gap by lending it the arm of the court. Under sub-section (1) the tribunal, or a party with the tribunal's approval, may apply to the court for assistance in taking evidence. Sub-section (3) lets the court execute the request within its competence and according to its own rules on taking evidence - it may, for example, summon a recalcitrant witness, direct the production of documents, or order the inspection of property. Sub-section (4) permits the court to issue the same processes to witnesses as it would in suits before it, and sub-section (5) - the sting in the tail - provides that persons failing to attend, making default, or being guilty of contempt to the arbitral tribunal during the conduct of proceedings shall be subject to the like penalties by order of the court as they would incur in suits tried before the court.
The reach of Section 27(5) was authoritatively settled in Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017). There a party flouted an interim order of the tribunal restraining the transfer of disputed flats. The Supreme Court held that non-compliance with the tribunal's orders amounts to contempt of the arbitral tribunal, and that the aggrieved party's remedy is to approach the tribunal, which may then make a representation to the court under Section 27(5) for the contemnor to be dealt with. The Court rejected the cramped reading that Section 27(5) is confined to defaults in taking evidence, thereby giving the tribunal's orders practical teeth. The judgment must now be read together with Section 17(2), inserted by the 2015 Amendment, which deems interim orders of the tribunal to be orders of the court enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
Procedural Authority: Competence-Competence and the Tribunal's Mastery of Process
The tribunal's power to run its own proceedings under Sections 18 to 27 is reinforced by the jurisdictional autonomy conferred by Section 16. The principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz empowers the tribunal to rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objection to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement, and the allied doctrine of separability treats the arbitration clause as an agreement independent of the main contract, so that the invalidity of the matrix contract does not by itself destroy the clause. In Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics Pvt. Ltd. v. Chand Mal Baradia (2005), the Supreme Court affirmed that objections to the very existence of an arbitration agreement are, in the first instance, for the tribunal to decide.
A jurisdictional objection under Section 16 must be raised no later than the submission of the statement of defence under Section 23, and an objection that the tribunal is exceeding the scope of its authority must be raised as soon as the excess is alleged to have occurred. This timing rule interlocks directly with Section 23 - the pleading stage is not only when the parties join issue on the merits but also the deadline for challenging the tribunal's competence. The remedy against a tribunal that wrongly upholds its own jurisdiction is to await the award and then move under Section 34, not to interrupt the proceedings midstream.
Conduct, Natural Justice and the Bridge to Section 34
Sections 18 to 27 are not merely housekeeping rules; they are the procedural premises on which the enforceability of the eventual award depends. The most direct link is between Section 18 and the public-policy ground in Section 34. An award procured in violation of the principles of natural justice - where a party was denied a full opportunity to present its case, or the tribunal decided on material never disclosed to it, or travelled beyond the pleadings framed under Section 23 - is liable to be set aside. The Explanation to Section 34, refined by the 2015 Amendment, expressly captures conflict with "the most basic notions of morality or justice", a formulation that absorbs the fairness mandate of Section 18.
Aspirants should therefore see Chapter V as the upstream guarantee of award integrity. A tribunal enjoying the wide procedural latitude of Section 19 must spend that latitude carefully, because every procedural shortcut that compromises equality or the right to be heard re-emerges downstream as a setting-aside ground. The disciplined conduct of proceedings is thus not a formality but the price of an enforceable award - the through-line that connects the first procedural order to the final, unimpeachable decision.
Frequently asked questions
Which sections of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 govern the conduct of arbitral proceedings?
Chapter V of Part I, comprising Sections 18 to 27, governs the conduct of arbitral proceedings - covering equal treatment (Section 18), rules of procedure (Section 19), place (Section 20), commencement (Section 21), language (Section 22), pleadings (Section 23), hearings (Section 24), default (Section 25), tribunal experts (Section 26) and court assistance in taking evidence (Section 27).
Is the arbitral tribunal bound by the Code of Civil Procedure and the Evidence Act?
No. Section 19(1) expressly provides that the tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 or the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Subject to the parties' agreement, the tribunal may conduct the proceedings in the manner it considers appropriate, including ruling on the admissibility, relevance, materiality and weight of evidence - but always within the fairness limits of Section 18.
What is the difference between the seat and the venue of arbitration under Section 20?
The seat is the juridical home of the arbitration that fixes the supervisory court and the curial law, whereas the venue is merely a convenient hearing location. In Union of India v. Hardy Exploration and Production (India) Inc. (2018), the Supreme Court held that a designated venue (Kuala Lumpur) does not become the seat unless something else is added as a concomitant; absent a seat, Indian courts retained jurisdiction under Section 34.
What happens if a party defaults under Section 25?
The consequences differ by party. If the claimant fails to file its statement of claim, the tribunal shall terminate the proceedings. If the respondent fails to file its defence, the tribunal continues without treating the silence as an admission, so the claimant must still prove its case. If any party fails to appear at a hearing or produce documents, the tribunal may proceed and make the award on the evidence before it.
Can an arbitral tribunal compel a witness to give evidence?
Not directly - the tribunal lacks coercive power. Under Section 27 the tribunal, or a party with its approval, may apply to the court for assistance in taking evidence, and the court may summon witnesses, order production of documents and impose penalties for default or contempt. In Alka Chandewar v. Shamshul Ishrar Khan (2017), the Supreme Court held that Section 27(5) extends to contempt of the tribunal generally, not just defaults in taking evidence.
How does Section 18 relate to setting aside an award under Section 34?
Section 18 guarantees equal treatment and a full opportunity to be heard, and is the one provision in Chapter V that cannot be derogated from. A breach - such as deciding on undisclosed material or going beyond the pleadings - violates natural justice and becomes a ground to set aside the award under Section 34 as conflicting with the most basic notions of justice.