Of all the orders a presiding officer writes, the order on adjournment is the most frequent and the most casually drafted — a single word, "Adjourned", scrawled across the order sheet with a date. Yet it is precisely this order that the higher judiciary has policed most fiercely, because the accumulation of unreasoned adjournments is the single largest cause of the docket explosion that has made tareekh pe tareekh a national shorthand for justice denied. A properly drafted order on adjournment is a small but disciplined judicial act: it identifies who sought the adjournment, tests the cause against the statutory standard, records the reasons in writing, fixes terms as to costs, and protects witnesses who are present in court. This chapter, part of the Bail & Misc Order Drafting guide, shows you how to write that order so that it survives revision and reflects the mandate of Section 346 BNSS and Order 17 CPC.
What an order on adjournment actually decides
An adjournment is the postponement of a hearing or trial to a future date; the proceeding is not disposed of but the clock is moved. Unlike the substantive orders covered elsewhere in this guide — the structured bail order or the reasoned anticipatory bail order — an adjournment order disposes of nothing on the merits. But it is still an order: it is an exercise of judicial discretion that must be supported by reasons, and it is appealable to the conscience of the revisional court. The cardinal error of the novice judge is to treat the adjournment as an administrative housekeeping note rather than a judicial decision. The Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded trial courts that the grant of an adjournment is not the right of a party but a concession of the court, to be extended only on the party showing cause. The order, therefore, must show on its face that the court applied its mind to the request, weighed it against the competing interest in expeditious disposal, and reached a reasoned conclusion. Three distinct interests collide every time an adjournment is sought: the interest of the requesting party in adequate preparation, the interest of the opposite party (and any present witness) in not being made to attend repeatedly in vain, and the systemic interest in clearing the docket and honouring the constitutional promise of a speedy trial. The adjournment order is the instrument by which the presiding officer reconciles these competing interests, and a reader of the order should be able to see that reconciliation having been performed rather than assumed. Where the court grants the adjournment it should say why the cause outweighs the prejudice; where it refuses, it should say why the prejudice and the systemic cost outweigh the cause. An order that does neither is not merely terse; it is unreasoned, and an unreasoned order is the most fragile thing a trial court can produce.
The statutory framework: Section 346 BNSS (Section 309 CrPC)
For criminal proceedings the governing provision is Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced and substantially carried forward Section 309 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 with effect from 1 July 2024. Section 346(1) lays down the master rule: in every inquiry or trial, the proceedings shall be held as expeditiously as possible, and in particular, when the examination of witnesses has once begun, the same shall be continued from day to day until all the witnesses in attendance have been examined, unless the court finds the adjournment of the same beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded. The structure of the provision is deliberate: day-to-day trial is the rule, adjournment is the exception, and the exception operates only on recorded reasons. Section 346(2) empowers the court, after taking cognizance or during trial, to postpone or adjourn the proceedings from time to time on terms it thinks fit, for reasonable time, again for reasons to be recorded. The drafting takeaway is blunt: the statute itself commands a written reason for any adjournment beyond the next day, so an order that merely says "adjourned to [date]" is facially non-compliant.
The three provisos that bind the judge's hand
The real teeth of Section 346 BNSS (mirroring the post-2008 Section 309 CrPC) lie in its provisos, and a draftsman must internalise each because every one of them generates a distinct recital in the order. First, where the examination of witnesses has begun, no adjournment or postponement shall be granted without examining the witnesses who are in attendance, except for special reasons to be recorded in writing — a higher threshold than the ordinary "reasons". Second, no adjournment shall be granted at the request of a party except where the circumstances are beyond the control of that party. Third, the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another court is expressly declared not to be a ground for adjournment. A further proviso permits the court, where a witness is present but the party or his pleader is not present or is not ready to examine or cross-examine, to record the witness's statement and pass such orders as it thinks fit dispensing with the examination-in-chief or cross-examination. Each proviso is a trap for the unwary: if the witness is in attendance, the order cannot simply note "adjourned for cross-examination" — it must record the special reason for not completing the cross-examination that day.
"Sufficient cause" and the duty to record reasons
The hinge of every adjournment order is the finding of cause. The standard is not whether the request is convenient but whether the party has shown a cause sufficient and, where a witness is present, special. The leading authority remains State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh, (2001) 4 SCC 667, where the Supreme Court condemned the rampant practice of trial courts adjourning matters even when witnesses were present and ready, and held that once witnesses are in attendance the trial court is under a statutory obligation to examine them and cannot defer their evidence merely because counsel seeks time. The Court read the proviso as mandatory and observed that a witness, who is a responsible citizen with his own avocations, cannot be compelled to dance attendance on repeated dates for the convenience of advocates. The practical drafting consequence is that the order must articulate the cause in the party's own terms ("counsel submits that the principal witness is hospitalised, supported by a medical certificate dated…") and then record the court's evaluation ("the cause is found sufficient / not sufficient because…"). A bare conclusion without the underlying reasoning is exactly what the revisional courts strike down. It is worth distinguishing "sufficient cause" from "special reasons": the former is the ordinary standard for an adjournment under Section 346(2), while the latter is the elevated standard that operates the moment a witness is in attendance and his examination has begun. The two are not interchangeable, and a careful draftsman signals which standard he is applying. A request grounded in genuinely supervening events — the sudden hospitalisation of a witness, the death of a near relative of counsel, an unforeseen breakdown in the production of a custody-witness — will usually clear the "beyond the control of the party" threshold in the proviso. A request grounded in want of preparation, the convenience of a senior counsel, or the desire to study documents that could have been obtained earlier will usually fail it. The order should locate the request on one side or the other of that line and say so, because the revisional court's first question will be whether the trial court even identified the correct standard before applying it.
Deferred cross-examination: the Vinod Kumar warning
The most litigated species of adjournment is the one sought after examination-in-chief is over, to take up cross-examination on a later date. In Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 3 SCC 220, the Supreme Court dealt with a case where cross-examination of a witness had been deferred and ultimately conducted after a year and eight months. The Court held this to be a flagrant violation of Section 309 CrPC, reiterating that where the examination-in-chief is over, the cross-examination should ordinarily be completed on the same day, and that the routine grant of time for cross-examination, without recording special reasons, defeats the legislative scheme. Significantly, the Court directed that copies of the judgment be circulated to all High Courts for transmission to trial judges, with the command not to defer cross-examination at the pleasure of defence counsel. For the draftsman, Vinod Kumar means that an order deferring cross-examination must do more than note the request: it must record the special reason (illness of counsel, voluminous documents requiring study, a witness who has turned hostile mid-trial) and, ideally, fix the cross-examination for the immediately following day rather than a distant date.
When the witness is present: the strongest bar
The single situation in which a presiding officer must be most reluctant to adjourn is when the witness is physically present in court. The proviso to Section 346(2) BNSS, like its CrPC predecessor, forbids adjournment without examining a witness in attendance save for special reasons recorded in writing. In Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334, the Supreme Court, following Shambhu Nath Singh, reiterated that liberal adjournments where witnesses are present cannot be countenanced and that the trial court ought to examine such witnesses rather than send them back. The danger the courts guard against is concrete: every adjournment of a present witness opens a window for the witness to be threatened, won over, or worn down into turning hostile — a concern echoed in Gurnaib Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 7 SCC 108, where the Court warned that unnecessary adjournments give the accused scope to get over the witnesses and held that an application to cross-examine must be made within reasonable time and any delay explained with substantial and tangible reasons. An order that adjourns a present and willing witness should be regarded as exceptional and, if passed, must carry the special reason on its face.
Terms and costs: turning the adjournment into a sanction
Section 346(2) BNSS permits the court to adjourn "on such terms as it thinks fit", and the Explanation makes clear that the terms on which an adjournment may be granted include, in appropriate cases, the payment of costs by the prosecution or the accused. Costs are the court's primary tool to discipline the party who seeks an avoidable adjournment without penalising the case itself. The order should therefore not merely grant or refuse the adjournment but, where the cause is weak yet not frivolous, grant it subject to costs — quantified, payable to the opposite party or to a legal-aid fund, and made a condition precedent to the next hearing. This mirrors the civil practice under Order 17 Rule 1 CPC, where the court is expressly enjoined to impose costs occasioned by the adjournment, including higher costs where the adjournment was avoidable. A well-drafted criminal adjournment order in a contested matter reads: "Adjournment is sought by the accused for cross-examination. Cause is found weak. However, in the interest of fair trial, adjournment is granted subject to payment of costs of Rs. 5,000 to the witness for the wasted attendance, payable before the next date."
The civil mirror: Order 17 CPC and the three-adjournment rule
On the civil side the governing provision is Order 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Order 17 Rule 1, as amended in 2002, contains the celebrated proviso that no adjournment shall be granted more than three times to a party during the hearing of the suit — the so-called three-adjournment rule. In Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Constitution-adjacent Bench upholding the CPC amendments held that the grant of an adjournment — first, second or third — is not a matter of right but must rest on the party showing special and extraordinary circumstances, and that the three-adjournment limit is not absolute: in genuinely exceptional situations beyond a party's control (the Court instanced natural calamities and comparable catastrophes), the cap may yield. The judgment is the touchstone for any civil adjournment order: the draftsman must record which numbered adjournment this is for the party, and if it is the fourth or beyond, must record the extraordinary circumstance that justifies departing from the statutory limit.
The constitutional backdrop: adjournments and Article 21
The judicial hostility to casual adjournments is not merely procedural housekeeping; it is anchored in the fundamental right to a speedy trial. In Hussainara Khatoon v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1980) 1 SCC 81, the Supreme Court held that a speedy trial is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution. Section 346 BNSS / Section 309 CrPC is the procedural machinery through which that right is operationalised, which is why the Court in Noor Mohammed v. Jethanand, (2013) 5 SCC 202, lamented the havoc wrought by unjustified adjournments and requested the Chief Justices of the High Courts to evolve a mechanism to curb them. More recently, in Hussain v. Union of India, (2017) 5 SCC 702, the Court linked the right to speedy trial with bail and directed trial courts to ensure that trials proceed without avoidable adjournments. The consequence for the draftsman is conceptual: every adjournment granted without sufficient cause is, in a real sense, an infraction of the accused's (and the complainant's) Article 21 right, and the order should reflect an awareness that delay carries a constitutional cost.
Anatomy of a court-proof adjournment order
A defensible adjournment order, whether endorsed on the order sheet or typed, contains seven recitals in sequence. One, the appearance: who is present and who is absent (accused, complainant, counsel, witnesses). Two, the stage: what was listed for today (framing of charge, examination-in-chief of PW-2, arguments). Three, the request: who seeks the adjournment and the precise cause urged. Four, the witness position: whether any witness is present, and if so, why he cannot be examined today. Five, the finding: the court's reasoned conclusion on whether the cause is sufficient (or special, where a witness is present). Six, the terms: costs, if any, with quantum and payee. Seven, the operative direction and the next date, with a specific purpose attached to that date. This skeleton tracks the same discipline taught in bail order structure and components: the order must be self-explanatory to a reader who has never seen the file, because the revisional court reads only the order, not the judge's mind.
Model order: refusing an adjournment with a witness present
The following illustrates a compliant refusal. "Present: APP for the State; accused on bail with counsel; PW-3 (the injured) present in person. The matter is listed for examination-in-chief and cross-examination of PW-3. Learned counsel for the accused seeks adjournment on the ground that the senior counsel is engaged in the High Court. PW-3, an injured eyewitness, is present and has travelled from another district. In view of the proviso to Section 346(2) BNSS, engagement of counsel in another court is not a ground for adjournment, and a witness in attendance must be examined save for special reasons. No special reason is made out. The request is declined. PW-3 shall be examined and cross-examined today; if the accused's counsel does not cross-examine, the court will proceed under the proviso. List after recording PW-3 for the remaining prosecution witnesses on [date]." The order survives revision because it identifies the proviso, applies it to the facts, and records why the cause fails — precisely the discipline that Shambhu Nath Singh and Vinod Kumar demand.
Model order: granting an adjournment subject to costs
Where the cause is genuine but the inconvenience to the other side is real, the balanced order grants the adjournment on terms. "Present: counsel for both parties; witness PW-4 present. Counsel for the plaintiff seeks adjournment as the documents required for cross-examination of PW-4 were received only this morning owing to a delayed certified-copy application. This is the second adjournment sought by the plaintiff. The cause, though attributable in part to the plaintiff's own delay, is not mala fide. Adjournment is accordingly granted, but PW-4 having attended in vain, costs of Rs. 3,000 are imposed on the plaintiff, payable to PW-4 before the next date as a condition of the adjournment. Cross-examination of PW-4 shall positively be completed on the next date; no further adjournment shall be granted for this purpose save in extraordinary circumstances within the meaning of Salem Advocate Bar Association (II). List on [date]." Note the explicit count of adjournments and the conditional structure, both of which insulate the order against challenge.
Common drafting errors and how to avoid them
Five errors recur in adjournment orders and each is avoidable. The bald order: "Adjourned to [date]" with no reason — facially void under Section 346(1)/(2). The phantom reason: "For sufficient reasons, adjourned" — reciting the conclusion without the reason is no better than silence, as the appellate courts have repeatedly held. The ignored witness: adjourning while a witness sits in the gallery without recording the special reason — the direct vice condemned in Shambhu Nath Singh and Mohd. Khalid. The open-ended date: adjourning "to be listed in due course" without a fixed date or purpose, which lets the matter drift. The costs that are never recovered: imposing costs without making payment a condition precedent, so the defaulting party simply ignores them. The corrective in every case is the same discipline urged throughout this guide and in the introduction to misc order drafting: write the order as if the revisional judge is reading it cold, because that is exactly what will happen. A sixth, subtler error deserves mention: the order that grants a series of adjournments to the same party without ever acknowledging the pattern. Each individual order may look defensible in isolation, but the order sheet read as a whole reveals a party who has been indulged four, five, six times while a witness or the opposite party waits. The remedy is for the court to keep a running awareness of the adjournment history and to record it — "this is the fourth adjournment sought by the accused for cross-examination of PW-2" — so that the escalating reluctance the law demands is visible in the order itself. Once the pattern is recorded, the court is naturally pushed toward conditions, costs, or refusal, which is precisely the discipline the three-adjournment rule and Vinod Kumar were designed to enforce.
Adjournment and remand: a linked but distinct order
When the accused is in custody and the proceedings are adjourned, the adjournment order necessarily carries a remand component, and the two must not be conflated. Section 346(2) BNSS permits the court, by a warrant, to remand the accused in custody for the period of adjournment, but the Explanation cautions that remand is justified only where there is sufficient evidence raising suspicion and where it appears likely that further evidence may be obtained. A magistrate's power to remand in this manner is capped at fifteen days at a time. The drafting point is that the order should separately record the remand: "For the reasons aforesaid the matter is adjourned to [date]; the accused, being in judicial custody, is remanded to custody till the next date by warrant." This dovetails with the custody analysis the draftsman performs when writing an order in a non-bailable offence, where the question of continued detention is itself a reasoned judicial decision and not an automatic consequence of the adjournment.
Frequently asked questions
Which provision now governs adjournment of criminal proceedings after the BNSS came into force?
Section 346 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which replaced Section 309 CrPC with effect from 1 July 2024. It retains the same scheme: day-to-day trial once witness examination begins, with adjournment as a reasoned exception. Cases decided under Section 309 CrPC, such as State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh and Vinod Kumar v. State of Punjab, continue to govern the interpretation of the parallel provisions of Section 346.
Can a court adjourn a case when the witness is present in court?
Only for special reasons recorded in writing. The proviso to Section 346(2) BNSS (formerly Section 309 CrPC) forbids adjournment without examining a witness in attendance except on special reasons. In State of U.P. v. Shambhu Nath Singh, (2001) 4 SCC 667, and Mohd. Khalid v. State of W.B., (2002) 7 SCC 334, the Supreme Court held that liberal adjournments where witnesses are present cannot be countenanced and that such witnesses must be examined.
Is engagement of a party's counsel in another court a valid ground for adjournment?
No. A specific proviso to Section 346(2) BNSS, mirroring the post-2008 Section 309 CrPC, declares that the fact that the pleader of a party is engaged in another court shall not be a ground for adjournment. An order granting an adjournment solely on this basis is liable to be set aside in revision.
What is the three-adjournment rule in civil cases?
Under the proviso to Order 17 Rule 1 CPC, inserted by the 2002 amendment, no party may be granted more than three adjournments during the hearing of a suit. In Salem Advocate Bar Association (II) v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Supreme Court held the rule is not absolute and may yield in genuinely extraordinary circumstances beyond a party's control, but that an adjournment is never a matter of right.
Must a court impose costs when it grants an adjournment?
On the civil side, Order 17 Rule 1 CPC expressly enjoins the court to impose costs occasioned by the adjournment, including higher costs where it was avoidable. On the criminal side, Section 346(2) BNSS allows adjournment "on such terms as it thinks fit" and the Explanation permits costs payable by the prosecution or accused. Best practice is to make payment of costs a condition precedent to the next hearing so the direction is actually enforced.
What are the essential recitals of a defensible adjournment order?
Seven: the appearance of parties and witnesses; the stage of the case; the precise cause urged and by whom; the witness position and why a present witness cannot be examined; the court's reasoned finding on sufficiency of cause; the terms as to costs; and the operative direction with a next date carrying a specific purpose. A bald "adjourned to [date]" is facially non-compliant with Section 346(1) and (2) BNSS.