Few chapters of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959 generate as much litigation per section as Chapter X, "Boundaries and Boundary Marks, Survey Marks" (sections 124 to 136). It answers a deceptively simple question that splits villages and ruins families: exactly where does one holding end and the next begin? The Code's scheme is administrative and summary by design. It vests the fixing, demarcation and maintenance of boundaries in revenue officers, makes the Tahsildar the primary adjudicator of boundary disputes, criminalises the destruction of boundary and survey marks, and through section 257(g) ousts the civil court from "any question regarding the demarcation of boundaries or fixing of boundary marks under Chapter X." For the judiciary aspirant the recurring trap is the boundary between this revenue jurisdiction and the civil court's enduring power over title.
The scheme of Chapter X
Chapter X runs from sections 124 to 136 and is a self-contained code on the physical marking of land. Section 124 deals with the construction of boundary marks of villages, towns and survey or plot numbers; section 125 with the settlement of boundary disputes by the Tahsildar; section 126 with the consequential ejectment of persons found in wrongful possession; sections 127 and 128 with the demarcation, maintenance and repair of boundary marks at the holder's cost; section 129 with demarcation of a survey or plot number on a party's application; and section 130 with the penalty for destroying, injuring or removing boundary or survey marks. Sections 131 to 136 carry the scheme into survey marks, the duty to maintain them, and the powers of survey officers. The chapter mirrors Chapter X of the parent Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code, 1959, from which Chhattisgarh's Code was carried over on the State's formation, so authorities on the M.P. Code apply with full force. The architecture flows directly from the revenue survey and settlement process, which first fixes the survey numbers that boundary marks then make visible on the ground. Two policy ideas run through the whole chapter. The first is permanence: a boundary, once fixed, must be expressed in a durable physical mark so that the line does not drift with memory or with the loss of the original surveyors. The second is summariness: because boundary quarrels are endemic, frequent and capable of escalating into breaches of the peace, the Code routes them to a quick, local, officer-led inquiry rather than to a protracted civil trial, reserving the slower civil process only for the deeper question of who actually owns the disputed strip.
Construction of boundary marks: section 124
Section 124 empowers the State Government to direct that boundary marks be constructed on the boundaries of villages and survey or plot numbers, and prescribes the description of such marks. The boundary mark is the legal embodiment of the line entered in the survey records; once a boundary has been fixed and demarcated under this section, the physical mark becomes the reference point for every later dispute. The provision is deliberately preventive: by reducing an abstract entry to a permanent, visible structure, it removes the principal cause of agrarian quarrels, namely uncertainty about where a holding stops. The marks contemplated are durable earthen mounds, stones or pillars, and the standardisation of their form is a matter of subordinate rules. Section 124 thus supplies the factual foundation on which the adjudicatory powers of sections 125 and 126 operate, because those sections speak of boundaries that have already been "fixed" under the chapter.
Settlement of boundary disputes: section 125
Section 125 is the operative adjudicatory provision. All disputes regarding the boundaries of villages, towns, survey numbers and plot numbers are to be decided by the Tahsildar after a local inquiry, at which every person interested has an opportunity to appear and produce evidence. Three features deserve emphasis. First, the forum is the Tahsildar, a revenue officer, not a civil judge. Second, the procedure is a "local inquiry", which contemplates an on-the-spot examination of the marks, the records and the physical features rather than a purely documentary trial. Third, the inquiry must observe natural justice: notice to and a hearing for all interested persons, including neighbouring land-holders, is mandatory, and a demarcation carried out behind the back of an adjoining owner is void. In practice the Tahsildar relies heavily on the cadastral map and field-measurement book prepared at settlement, treating the recorded measurements as the surest guide to the true line where the physical marks have been disturbed.
Ejectment of wrongful occupants: section 126
Section 126 supplies the teeth. Once a boundary has been fixed under the chapter, the Tahsildar may summarily eject any person found to be in wrongful possession of land that has been determined not to appertain to his holding. The remedy is summary and possessory; it restores the line on the ground without a full title trial. To protect the ejected party against error, the section preserves a right to sue in a competent civil court within one year to establish title to the disputed strip, while expressly barring the Tahsildar from being made a party to that suit. This is the statutory hinge on which the entire jurisdictional debate turns: demarcation and consequential possession are revenue functions, but the ultimate question of ownership remains justiciable in the civil court. The Supreme Court's insistence in Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, 2024 INSC 8, that a suit for possession must describe the property with accurate measurements and boundaries, shows why the demarcation record produced under sections 124 to 126 is often decisive evidence in the very civil suit section 126 preserves.
Demarcation, maintenance and repair: sections 127 and 128
Sections 127 and 128 distribute the burden of keeping boundaries visible. Section 127 obliges land-holders to construct, maintain and keep in repair the boundary marks of their holdings, and where they default, empowers the revenue authority to do the work and recover the cost as an arrear of land revenue. Section 128 reinforces this through an enforcement mechanism: the village functionary reports defective or destroyed marks, the holders are called upon to repair them within a fixed season, and on continued default the Tahsildar may carry out the repairs and recover the cost together with a penalty extending to one hundred rupees. The combined effect is that the State never bears the long-run cost of maintaining private boundaries; the owner who benefits from a clear line must pay for it. These provisions also feed back into the record of rights, because a properly maintained mark keeps the map and the ground in agreement and forestalls the very disputes Chapter X exists to resolve.
Demarcation on a party's application: section 129
Section 129 is the provision most frequently invoked in practice. On the application of any interested party, the Tahsildar may depute a Revenue Inspector, Nagar Sarvekshak or Patwari to demarcate the boundaries of a survey number, a sub-division of a survey number, a block number or a plot number and to construct boundary marks thereon. The deputed officer must give notice to all interested persons, including the neighbouring land-holders, before demarcating, and must submit a demarcation report in the prescribed manner; the report records the measurements taken and the particulars of any possession found on the demarcated land. A party dissatisfied with the demarcation may carry the matter in appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who can direct a fresh demarcation. Section 129 is therefore the everyday engine of boundary settlement: most field disputes reach the revenue machinery through an application under this section rather than through a contested proceeding under section 125.
Penalty for destroying boundary or survey marks: section 130
Section 130 protects the integrity of the marks by penal sanction. Any person who wilfully destroys, injures, removes or otherwise impairs a boundary mark or survey mark may be ordered by the revenue authority to pay a fine for each mark so affected, and the cost of restoring the mark is recoverable in addition. The penal provision recognises that the marks are not private property but a public registration of the land's geometry; tampering with them defeats the settlement record and reopens settled questions. The provision operates alongside, and does not displace, the general criminal law against destruction of landmarks, so a single act of obliteration can attract both a revenue penalty under section 130 and prosecution under the Penal Code. The deterrent purpose is plain: a boundary system is only as reliable as the permanence of the marks that express it, which is why sections 124 to 130 form an interlocking whole of construction, maintenance and protection.
Survey marks and the residue of Chapter X: sections 131 to 136
The closing sections carry the same logic from boundary marks to survey marks, the reference points used to locate and reconstruct the cadastral survey. They place survey marks in the charge of the Collector after a settlement is introduced, impose duties of maintenance, empower survey officers to enter upon land and construct or repair marks, and provide for the recovery of costs and penalties on the pattern of sections 127, 128 and 130. The unifying principle is continuity: the survey conducted once at great public expense must remain capable of being retraced decades later, and that is possible only if both boundary marks and survey marks are preserved. Sections 131 to 136 therefore complete the chapter by ensuring that the State's own reference framework, not merely the individual holder's boundary, is permanently protected.
Revenue court versus civil court: the section 257(g) bar
The crucial examination point is the jurisdictional line. Section 257(g) of the Code bars any civil court from entertaining a suit or application on "any question regarding the demarcation of boundaries or fixing of boundary marks under Chapter X." Pure demarcation is thus the exclusive province of the revenue authorities. The Madhya Pradesh High Court applied this in Seva Ram v. Sugan Bai (2009 RN 192), holding that a dispute confined to demarcation of survey numbers falls within the Revenue Court's exclusive jurisdiction. But the bar is read narrowly. Where the real controversy is one of title or ownership, the civil court's jurisdiction survives, because the determination of title has never been entrusted to the revenue officer; demarcation is an administrative act, title is a judicial one. The two coexist: section 126 itself preserves a title suit after summary ejectment, and Chhattisgarh and Madhya Pradesh courts have repeatedly allowed a civil court to order a local commission under Order XXVI Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to clarify boundaries where that clarification is merely ancillary to a suit for declaration of title or injunction. The test, therefore, is one of substance over form: the court looks at the dominant relief sought. If the plaintiff truly asks the court only to draw a line between two survey numbers, the suit is barred and he must go to the revenue authority; if he asks for a declaration that the disputed land is his and seeks demarcation only as a consequential step to give effect to that title, the civil court retains seisin. Casting a demarcation dispute in the language of title to escape section 257(g) will not succeed, because the court pierces the pleadings to find the real question in issue.
Evidentiary value of demarcation and revenue records
Boundary adjudication leans heavily on documentary evidence: the settlement map, the field-measurement book, mutation entries and the record of rights. These carry a presumption of correctness, but it is rebuttable. In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, AIR 1977 SC 1712, the Supreme Court held that there is no universal rule that whatever appears in the record of rights must be presumed correct when there is evidence to the contrary; an entry's presumptive value yields to proof. For boundaries this means that a demarcation report under section 129 or a finding under section 125 is strong but not conclusive evidence of the true line, and it can be displaced by superior evidence such as the original settlement measurements. The practical lesson, reinforced by Mary Pushpam v. Telvi Curusumary, is that a litigant who cannot tie his claim to accurate, recorded measurements and boundaries will struggle whether he is before the Tahsildar or the civil court. A point of frequent confusion is the difference between possession and ownership in this context. A demarcation report records what the measurements show and who is in possession of the land demarcated; it does not, and cannot, adjudicate title. That is why the report under section 129 expressly notes the particulars of any person other than the recorded Bhumiswami found in possession. The revenue process fixes the line and protects possession along it; the civil court, applying the ordinary law of evidence and limitation, decides whether the person in possession is also the rightful owner. Keeping these two enquiries distinct is the single most important analytical move in any boundary problem.
Appeals, revision and the place of the writ
Orders passed in boundary matters travel up the ordinary revenue hierarchy. A demarcation under section 129 is appealable to the Sub-Divisional Officer; orders of the Tahsildar under section 125 are subject to the Code's general appellate and revisional provisions, carrying the matter to the Collector, the Commissioner and ultimately the Board of Revenue. Because section 257(g) closes the civil court to pure demarcation disputes, the aggrieved party who has exhausted the revenue remedies may approach the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, but only for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice or perversity, not for a re-appreciation of the boundary on facts. The aspirant should therefore hold two propositions together: demarcation is a revenue function with its own appellate ladder and a civil-court bar, while the question of title remains open to the civil court under the saving in section 126 and the narrow reading of section 257(g).
Frequently asked questions
Which sections of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code deal with boundaries and boundary marks?
Chapter X, comprising sections 124 to 136, deals with "Boundaries and Boundary Marks, Survey Marks." Section 124 covers construction of marks, 125 settlement of disputes, 126 ejectment, 127 and 128 maintenance and repair, 129 demarcation on application, 130 the penalty for destroying marks, and 131 to 136 survey marks.
Who decides a boundary dispute under the Code?
Under section 125 the Tahsildar decides disputes about the boundaries of villages, towns, survey numbers and plot numbers after a local inquiry at which all interested persons, including neighbouring land-holders, are heard. It is a revenue function, not a civil-court trial, although the order is appealable within the revenue hierarchy.
Can a civil court hear a boundary dispute?
Section 257(g) bars civil courts from any question regarding demarcation of boundaries or fixing of boundary marks under Chapter X, as applied in Seva Ram v. Sugan Bai (2009 RN 192). But where the real dispute is about title or ownership, the civil court retains jurisdiction, and section 126 itself preserves a title suit after summary ejectment.
What happens if someone is found in wrongful possession after a boundary is fixed?
Section 126 allows the Tahsildar to summarily eject a person found in wrongful possession of land determined not to belong to his holding. The ejected party may sue in a civil court within one year to establish title, but cannot make the Tahsildar a party to that suit.
What is the penalty for destroying or removing a boundary mark?
Section 130 empowers the revenue authority to impose a fine for each boundary or survey mark wilfully destroyed, injured or removed, in addition to recovering the cost of restoring the mark. The same act may also attract prosecution under the general criminal law for destruction of landmarks.
How conclusive is a demarcation report as evidence?
It carries a presumption of correctness but is rebuttable. In Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra Nago Patil, AIR 1977 SC 1712, the Supreme Court held there is no universal rule that record-of-rights entries must be presumed correct against contrary evidence; a demarcation report can be displaced by superior proof such as the original settlement measurements.