Few exercises test a judicial aspirant more than writing a clean injunction judgment. The suit looks deceptively simple — the plaintiff wants the defendant restrained from doing something — yet it forces the writer to weave together the substantive law of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the discretionary equity governing temporary orders under Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the burden of proof on possession and title, and the disciplined skeleton of a civil judgment. This chapter walks through one complete sample judgment in a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, pausing at each limb to explain why the court writes what it writes. Read it alongside the civil judgment writing hub and you will be able to reproduce the structure under examination pressure.

What an Injunction Suit Asks of the Judge

An injunction is an order of the court restraining a party from doing, or compelling him to do, a particular act. A perpetual (or permanent) injunction is granted by the decree at the end of the trial and is governed by Sections 38 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; a temporary injunction operates only during the pendency of the suit and is governed by Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The sample judgment in this chapter disposes of a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction, so the operative law is Section 38 read with Section 41.

Writing such a judgment is not a mechanical recital. The judge must decide three connected questions: does the plaintiff hold an enforceable right or possession that the law protects; has the defendant invaded or threatened to invade it; and is injunction the appropriate remedy, or is the plaintiff barred by one of the disqualifications in Section 41. Because injunction is an equitable and discretionary relief, the reasoning must show that discretion was exercised judicially. This is precisely the structure built up in the statutory basis chapter, and the present sample puts it to work on facts.

The Substantive Law: Section 38

Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 tells the court when a perpetual injunction may be granted. Sub-section (1) allows it to prevent the breach of an obligation existing in the plaintiff's favour, whether express or implied. Sub-section (2) directs that where the obligation arises out of contract, the court is guided by the rules in Chapter II of the Act. Sub-section (3) is the heart of the property and possession cases: where the defendant invades or threatens to invade the plaintiff's right to, or enjoyment of, property, the court may grant a perpetual injunction in four situations — (a) where the defendant is trustee of the property for the plaintiff; (b) where there exists no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused or likely to be caused by the invasion; (c) where the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief; and (d) where the injunction is necessary to prevent a multiplicity of judicial proceedings.

For a possessory injunction suit the workhorse clauses are (b) and (c): repeated trespass on land cannot be measured in a fixed sum, and damages are an inadequate substitute for quiet enjoyment. A judgment that grants injunction must locate the case within one of these clauses rather than asserting the relief in the abstract. The disciplined judge therefore states the right, states the invasion, and then ties the facts to a specific clause of Section 38(3).

When Injunction is Refused: Section 41

Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 lists the situations in which an injunction cannot be granted. The bars most often pleaded in defence are: clause (a), to restrain a person from prosecuting a pending judicial proceeding, unless to prevent multiplicity; clause (b), to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; clause (e), to prevent the breach of a contract the performance of which would not be specifically enforced; clause (h), where an equally efficacious relief can certainly be obtained by any other usual mode of proceeding (except in cases of breach of trust); and clause (i), where the conduct of the plaintiff or his agents has been such as to disentitle him to the assistance of the court.

The classic illustration of clause (b) is Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank, AIR 1983 SC 1272, where the Supreme Court held that a court cannot grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a court that is not subordinate to it, and that the inherent power of the court cannot be invoked to nullify this statutory bar. A well-written injunction judgment expressly records that no Section 41 disqualification applies before it grants relief, because an injunction granted in the teeth of Section 41 is liable to be set aside on appeal.

The Possession and Title Question

Most injunction suits turn on possession. The leading authority on the interplay of possession, title and the form of the suit is Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594. The Supreme Court there laid down that where a plaintiff is in lawful or peaceful possession of property and there is a threat of dispossession or interference by a person without title, a suit for injunction simpliciter will lie. But where the plaintiff's title is itself in dispute or under a cloud, or where the defendant raises a serious dispute about title and there is a threat of dispossession, the plaintiff must sue for declaration of title and consequential injunction; a bare injunction suit is not the proper remedy. Further, even where title is pleaded and an issue is framed, if the matter involves complicated questions of title the court should relegate the parties to a comprehensive suit for declaration rather than decide title in a suit for mere injunction.

This principle controls how the sample judgment frames its issues and confines its findings. In a suit for injunction simpliciter the court decides who is in possession; it does not pronounce conclusively on title unless title is genuinely incidental and capable of clean determination. The companion chapters on the plaintiff's case and the defendant's case show how the rival pleadings on possession are summarised before the issues are cast.

Protecting Settled Possession

Even a person without perfect title is entitled to protection of settled possession against forcible dispossession. In Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a person in settled possession of property cannot be dispossessed except by due process of law, even by the true owner. This was elaborated in Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, where the Court explained that settled possession protected by injunction means possession that is effective, undisturbed and to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment, and distinguished a permissive occupant or caretaker, who acquires no possessory right against the owner.

These authorities matter to drafting because they tell the judge what to find. If the plaintiff proves settled, peaceful possession and the defendant is a stranger or a mere licensee threatening forcible entry, injunction follows almost as of course. If the defendant shows the plaintiff was only a caretaker or licensee, the possessory foundation collapses. The sample judgment below records a clear finding on the nature of possession precisely because the remedy hinges on it.

The Discretion and Temporary-Injunction Overlay

Although the final decree rests on Section 38, the file usually carries an interlocutory order under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, and examiners expect the candidate to know the governing tests. The three settled requirements — a prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury that cannot be compensated in money — were authoritatively stated in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276. The Court explained that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and a decision on the merits; and that injunction is not a matter of right but a discretion exercised judicially having regard to the comparative hardship and the chance of success at trial.

The discretionary and equitable character of the relief was emphasised in M/s Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. v. Coca Cola Co., (1995) 5 SCC 545, where the Court held that the object of an interlocutory injunction is to protect the plaintiff against injury for which damages would not be an adequate remedy, and that the party seeking the equitable jurisdiction must come with clean hands. On the standard of a prima facie case, Seema Arshad Zaheer v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, (2006) 5 SCC 282, clarified that the existence of a prima facie right and an infraction is the foundation, and that an order resting on no relevant material is liable to interference. The final-stage judgment, by contrast, decides the right on a full trial, so its findings are conclusive rather than tentative.

Anatomy of the Sample Judgment

The sample that follows tracks the skeleton required by Order 20 Rules 4 and 5 CPC, which direct that a judgment of a court other than a Court of Small Causes shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision on each point, and the reasons for the decision. The same skeleton is dissected in the structure chapter, so here the focus is on how each limb is filled in an injunction matter.

The order of the limbs is: cause-title and suit number; a concise statement of the plaintiff's case; the defendant's case as pleaded in the written statement; the issues framed; issue-wise discussion of oral and documentary evidence with reasoning; the findings; and the operative decretal portion. Each limb below is written exactly as it would appear in a trial court judgment, with bracketed notes removed.

Cause-Title and Statement of the Case

The judgment opens with the formal cause-title, mirroring what is explained in the cause-title chapter:

IN THE COURT OF THE CIVIL JUDGE (SENIOR DIVISION), [PLACE]
Civil Suit No. 245 of 2023
Ramesh Chandra Sharma ... Plaintiff
versus
Suresh Kumar Verma ... Defendant

JUDGMENT

The plaintiff has filed this suit for a permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendant, his agents and servants, from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property, and from raising any construction thereon. The suit property is a residential plot bearing Municipal No. 14/3, measuring about 200 square metres, situated at Ward No. 6, [Place], described in the schedule to the plaint. The court fee has been paid on the relief of injunction and the suit is within limitation.

The Plaintiff's Case

The plaintiff pleads that he purchased the suit plot by a registered sale deed dated 5 March 2015 from one Mahesh Gupta, that mutation was effected in the municipal records in his name, and that he has been in continuous, peaceful and settled possession since the date of purchase, paying house tax and electricity charges. He pleads that on 12 August 2023 the defendant, who owns the adjoining plot No. 14/4, attempted to encroach upon the western strip of the suit plot and to lay a foundation for a boundary wall, thereby threatening to dispossess the plaintiff and interfere with his enjoyment. He asserts that the defendant has no right, title or interest in the suit plot, that the threatened interference is wrongful, and that he has no other equally efficacious remedy, the loss of quiet possession being incapable of compensation in money. He therefore prays for a perpetual injunction.

This summary is deliberately confined to the material facts constituting the cause of action and the relief, as required of a concise statement of the plaintiff's case. Evidentiary detail is reserved for the issue-wise discussion.

The Defendant's Case

The defendant, in his written statement, denies that the plaintiff is in possession of the western strip. He pleads that the strip measuring about 20 square metres has always formed part of his own plot No. 14/4, that he and his predecessors have been in possession of it, and that the plaintiff's sale deed does not cover the disputed strip. He raises a preliminary objection that the suit for bare injunction is not maintainable because the real dispute is one of title to the strip, and that the plaintiff ought to have sought a declaration. In the alternative he contends that even if the plaintiff has any grievance he is barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 because an equally efficacious remedy of a title suit is available, and that the plaintiff has suppressed material facts and so is disentitled under Section 41(i).

By framing the defence this way the judgment squarely raises the Anathula Sudhakar question — is this truly an injunction simpliciter resting on possession, or a disguised title dispute. The answer determines both maintainability and the scope of findings.

Issues for Determination

On the pleadings the court framed the following issues. Issue framing follows Order 14 Rule 1 CPC, arising from the material propositions affirmed by one party and denied by the other.

1. Whether the plaintiff is in lawful and settled possession of the suit property including the disputed western strip, as alleged?
2. Whether the defendant has threatened to interfere with or dispossess the plaintiff from the suit property?
3. Whether the suit for permanent injunction simpliciter is maintainable, or whether the plaintiff ought to have sued for declaration of title?
4. Whether the suit is barred under Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a permanent prohibitory injunction as prayed?
6. Relief.

Note that possession is cast as Issue 1 and maintainability as Issue 3, reflecting that the court must first decide what kind of suit this really is before it can grant possessory relief.

Discussion and Findings

Issues 1 and 3 (taken together). The plaintiff (PW-1) deposed to his purchase and continuous possession and produced the registered sale deed (Ex. P-1), the mutation entry (Ex. P-2), house-tax receipts (Ex. P-3 to P-7) and electricity bills (Ex. P-8 to P-12), all in his name and covering the whole plot of 200 square metres. The Commissioner's report and site plan (Ex. C-1), prepared after local inspection, showed the plaintiff's residential structure and a kitchen garden extending up to the western edge, including the disputed strip, with no structure or cultivation by the defendant on it. The defendant (DW-1) asserted ownership of the strip but produced no document of title to it and admitted in cross-examination that the strip is shown within the plaintiff's boundary in the municipal record. On this material the plaintiff has established peaceful, settled possession of the entire suit property including the strip, within the meaning of Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131, and Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370. The defendant's claim of title to the strip is bald and unsupported, so this is not a case where title is seriously in dispute or under a cloud; applying Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, a suit for injunction simpliciter is maintainable and no declaration is required. Issues 1 and 3 are decided in favour of the plaintiff.

Issue 2. The threat of interference is proved by the Commissioner's report recording a freshly dug foundation trench along the western boundary, corroborated by the plaintiff and by a neighbour (PW-2). The attempt of 12 August 2023 stands established. Issue 2 is answered in the affirmative.

Issue 4. The Section 41 bars do not apply. Clause (b), illustrated by Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank, AIR 1983 SC 1272, is not attracted as no proceeding in a non-subordinate court is sought to be restrained. Clause (h) does not apply because, the plaintiff being in possession and title not being genuinely in cloud, a possessory injunction is itself the efficacious remedy; a declaratory suit is neither necessary nor more efficacious. No suppression disentitling the plaintiff under clause (i) was made out. Issue 4 is answered against the defendant.

Issue 5. Once settled possession and a wrongful threat from a person without title are proved, the case falls squarely within Section 38(3)(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 — the invasion is such that compensation in money would not afford adequate relief. The loss of quiet enjoyment of one's home cannot be reduced to a monetary figure. The plaintiff is therefore entitled to a perpetual injunction. Issue 5 is decided in favour of the plaintiff.

The Decretal Order

The operative portion must be precise, executable and confined to the relief found due. A vague injunction is unenforceable and invites appeal. The sample concludes:

ORDER

In the result, the suit is decreed. The defendant, his agents, servants and persons claiming through him are permanently restrained by a prohibitory injunction from interfering with the plaintiff's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property bearing Municipal No. 14/3, including the western strip described in the schedule, and from raising any construction thereon or dispossessing the plaintiff therefrom otherwise than in due course of law. Having regard to the conduct of the defendant, the parties shall bear their own costs. Let a decree be drawn up accordingly. The judgment is pronounced in open court this day and signed and dated.

The order names the parties bound, identifies the property, specifies the acts restrained, and preserves the lawful route of due process. That precision, traceable to Order 20 Rule 6 CPC, is what makes an injunction decree capable of execution and resistant to challenge.

Drafting Checklist for the Examination

To reproduce this under timed conditions, internalise a sequence. First, open with the cause-title and a two-line statement of the relief and the suit property. Second, give the concise plaintiff's case and the defendant's case, each in a tight paragraph confined to material facts. Third, frame issues that put possession and maintainability before relief. Fourth, discuss the evidence issue by issue, citing the registered documents and the commissioner's report, and decide each issue with a one-line reason. Fifth, anchor the grant in a specific clause of Section 38(3) and clear the Section 41 bars expressly. Sixth, close with a tightly worded decree.

Always cite the controlling authorities — Anathula Sudhakar for maintainability, Krishna Ram Mahale and Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes for settled possession, Dalpat Kumar and Gujarat Bottling for the discretionary tests, and Cotton Corporation of India for the Section 41(b) bar — and you will produce a judgment that reads like the real thing. Return to the civil judgment writing hub to practise the same method on contract and recovery suits.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between a perpetual and a temporary injunction in the judgment?

A perpetual injunction is granted by the final decree after trial under Sections 38 to 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, and conclusively determines the parties' rights. A temporary injunction operates only during the pendency of the suit under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC and rests on the tentative tests of prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable injury laid down in Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh, AIR 1993 SC 276.

When can a plaintiff sue for injunction simpliciter without seeking a declaration of title?

Per Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, a suit for injunction simpliciter lies where the plaintiff is in lawful possession and faces a threat of interference from someone without title. But if the plaintiff's title is itself disputed or under a cloud, or the matter involves complicated questions of title, the plaintiff must sue for declaration with consequential injunction.

Which clause of Section 38 should the judgment rely on in a possessory injunction?

In a typical possession suit the court relies on Section 38(3)(b) or (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 — there is no standard for ascertaining the actual damage caused by the invasion, and compensation in money would not afford adequate relief. The loss of quiet enjoyment of property is treated as incapable of monetary measurement.

How does Section 41 affect an injunction judgment?

Section 41 lists situations where an injunction must be refused. The judgment should expressly clear the relevant bars. Notably, clause (b), explained in Cotton Corporation of India v. United Industrial Bank, AIR 1983 SC 1272, prohibits restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting proceedings in a court not subordinate to the one granting the injunction, and the court's inherent power cannot override this bar.

Does a person without title get injunction against the true owner?

A person in settled possession is protected against forcible dispossession even by the true owner, who must resort to due process of law. This follows from Krishna Ram Mahale v. Shobha Venkat Rao, (1989) 4 SCC 131, and Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira, (2012) 5 SCC 370, though a mere licensee or caretaker acquires no such possessory right against the owner.

What makes an injunction decree liable to be set aside on appeal?

A decree is vulnerable if the operative order is vague and unexecutable, if it grants relief barred by Section 41, or if discretion was exercised arbitrarily or contrary to settled principle. On appellate interference with discretionary injunction orders, Wander Ltd. v. Antox India (P) Ltd., 1990 Supp SCC 727, holds that the appellate court will not substitute its own discretion unless the trial court acted perversely or ignored settled principles.