Union and Its Territory (Articles 1–4)

Articles 1 to 4 of the Constitution form the opening Part of the document and answer four questions in sequence — what India is, what its territory comprises, how new States can be admitted or established, and how the boundaries, areas and names of existing States may be altered. The architecture is famously captured in the description of India as an indestructible Union of destructible units: the Union itself cannot be dissolved, but its constituent States can be carved up, merged, renamed and re-drawn by an ordinary law of Parliament. That single design choice distinguishes Indian federalism from the United States model, where the federating units carry an inherent indestructibility of their own.

For the judiciary aspirant, the chapter is small in text but heavy in doctrine. Almost every question asked on it turns on three points — the scope of Parliament's power under Article 3, the consultative (and not binding) character of the Proviso, and the constitutional treatment of acquired and ceded territory. The leading authorities are Re Berubari Union, Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry and Ramkishore Sen v. Union of India. Read together, they describe how India absorbs new territory, how it parts with territory, and how it rearranges its internal map. The rest of the chapter is the statutory machinery that gives those doctrines effect.

Article 1 — “India, that is Bharat” and the territory of the Union

Article 1(1) declares that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. Article 1(2) makes the States and their territories those specified in the First Schedule, and Article 1(3) lays out the three components of the territory of India — (a) the territories of the States, (b) the Union territories specified in the First Schedule, and (c) such other territories as may be acquired. Three concepts in this clause carry exam weight.

“Union of States.” The Constitution deliberately uses “Union” in preference to “Federation”. The States did not come together by treaty; they did not retain a right to secede; and they did not negotiate the terms of their entry into the Union. The Drafting Committee adopted the expression to indicate that the Union was a federal union but with a strong centripetal pull — the units have no independent sovereignty and the Judiciary is the interpreter of the distribution of powers. The contrast with the older Government of India Act framework is sharp, and a fuller account is given in the historical-background chapter on the road from the Government of India Acts to the Constituent Assembly.

“Territory of India”. The expression in Article 1(3) is broader than the “Union of States” in Article 1(1). Wherever the Constitution refers to the “territory of India”, it means whatever for the time being falls within Article 1(3) — States, Union Territories, and acquired territories alike. The Supreme Court fixed this reading in N. Masthan Sahib v. Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, AIR 1962 SC 797. The point matters because several constitutional provisions — the right to move freely, the application of laws made by Parliament, and the reach of the writ jurisdiction discussed under Article 32 and the writ jurisdiction — attach not to the narrower “Union of States” but to the wider “territory of India”.

Sub-clause (c): “such other territories as may be acquired”. This sub-clause does not confer the power on India to acquire foreign territory. India has the inherent power to do so by virtue of its sovereignty under international law. What sub-clause (c) does is recognise the automatic absorption or assimilation of any territory that is so acquired — the moment the legal transfer is complete in international law, the area becomes part of the territory of India. Foreign territories so absorbed may then be admitted into the Union as a new State under Article 2, merged into an existing State under Article 3, or constituted into a Union Territory by appropriate legislation.

Two classes after the 7th Amendment — States and Union Territories

The original Constitution divided the units into four classes. Parts A, B and C of the First Schedule each described a different category of State, and Part D listed a single “territory” (the Andaman and Nicobar Islands). The States Reorganisation Commission's report and the consequent Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 swept the four classes away. The Amendment reduced the categories to two — a single class of States, and a new class of “Union Territories” that absorbed the erstwhile Part C States and the Part D territory. After several subsequent reorganisations the Union now comprises 28 States and 8 Union Territories. The internal sub-division of the Constitution itself responds to this binary: the State executive under Part VI applies to the States, and Part VIII governs the Union Territories.

The status difference between the two classes is not merely nominal. A State has a Council of Ministers responsible to a Legislative Assembly, a Governor as constitutional head, and a High Court of its own. A Union Territory is, in principle, governed by the President acting through an Administrator he appoints; Parliament may by law create a legislature for a Union Territory, but the structural baseline is administration from the Centre. Acquired territories, by virtue of Article 366(30), fall within the definition of Union Territory until separately classified.

Article 2 — admission and establishment of new States

Article 2 empowers Parliament, by law, to admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. The two verbs are doing different work. “Admit” contemplates the entry of a pre-existing political entity into the Union — typically a foreign territory whose acquisition has been completed in international law and which India now wishes to constitute as a State. “Establish” contemplates the creation of a State on territory that does not yet form part of any State — again, typically acquired territory.

Article 2 was the route through which the territories acquired from Portugal (Goa, Daman and Diu) and from France (Pondicherry) were initially absorbed. The Sikkim chapter is its most prominent application: Sikkim was first associated with the Union under Article 2A and the Tenth Schedule, and was finally admitted as a full-fledged State by the Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1975, with Article 2A and the Tenth Schedule simultaneously repealed.

Acquired territory and the role of constitutional amendment

Acquisition of foreign territory is governed by international law and validated by municipal legislation. Once acquisition is complete, Articles 2 and 3 read with Article 4 are sufficient to admit the territory into the Union, constitute it into a new State, or merge it with an existing State. In practice, however, Parliament has often resorted to constitutional amendment to put the matter beyond doubt — the Tenth, Twelfth and Fourteenth Amendments are familiar examples — even though the Chandernagore Merger Act, 1954 and the Acquired Territories (Merger) Act, 1960 proceeded without one. The cautious practice does not narrow the legal scope of Articles 2 to 4: were it otherwise, those Articles “would lose their efficacy if they did not cover territory acquired from a foreign State.”

Article 3 — internal reorganisation of States

Article 3 is the operative provision for what most students remember as “internal map-making”. Parliament may by law —

1. form a new State by separating territory from any State, or by uniting two or more States or parts of States, or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;
2. increase the area of any State;
3. diminish the area of any State;
4. alter the boundaries of any State; or
5. alter the name of any State.

The Proviso lays down two preconditions. First, no Bill for any of these purposes may be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President. Second, where the proposal affects the area, boundaries or name of any State, the Bill must first be referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for its views, within a period that the President may specify. The Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1955 introduced this time-limit so that delay by a recalcitrant State Legislature could not stall reorganisation indefinitely — if the period expires without the views being received, the Bill may be introduced even so.

Babulal Parate — the Proviso is consultative, not concurrence

The most important authority on Article 3 is Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC 51. The case arose out of the bifurcation of the bilingual State of Bombay into Maharashtra and Gujarat. Two propositions emerge from it. First, once the original Bill is referred to the State, the purpose of the Proviso is exhausted; no fresh reference is required every time an amendment to the Bill is moved and accepted in Parliament. Second, Parliament is not bound by the views the State Legislature expresses. The reference is consultative, not concurrent. The same view was reaffirmed in Pradeep Chaudhary v. Union of India, (2009) 12 SCC 248, where the Supreme Court held that even substantively amended versions of a parliamentary Bill need not be re-referred to the State Legislature for fresh views.

The doctrine has obvious political consequences — it explains why the carving out of Telangana from Andhra Pradesh in 2014 went through despite the negative resolution of the Andhra Pradesh Assembly. It also has constitutional consequences. Because the consultation is not concurrence, Article 3 cannot be invoked to argue that a State has a veto over its own existence. India is, in the words quoted in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha, (2007) 3 SCC 184, an indestructible Union of destructible units. The contrast with American federalism is instructive and is developed further in the discussion of centre-State legislative relations and the broader distribution of legislative powers.

Explanations I and II — Union Territories within the reorganisation power

The Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 1966 added two Explanations to Article 3. Explanation I codifies what Re Berubari Union overlooked and Ramkishore Sen v. Union of India, AIR 1966 SC 644, acknowledged — namely, that the word “State” in Article 3 includes a Union Territory, by reason of the definition in section 3(58)(b) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The second part of the Explanation, however, takes the Union Territory out of the Proviso. The result is that Parliament may form a new Union Territory, alter the boundaries of an existing one, or merge a Union Territory (in whole or in part) with a State, without referring the Bill to the legislature of that Union Territory at all. Explanation II clarifies that the power to “form a new State” under clause (a) carries with it the power to form a new State or Union Territory by uniting a part of any State or Union Territory to any other State or Union Territory.

Re Berubari Union and the cession of territory

Re Berubari Union, AIR 1960 SC 845, is the chapter's defining authority. The case arose out of the Indo-Pakistan agreement of 1958 (the Nehru-Noon agreement) which contemplated the transfer of part of the Berubari Union, a small enclave in West Bengal, to East Pakistan. A Presidential Reference under Article 143 was made to the Supreme Court asking whether the agreement could be implemented by an ordinary law under Article 3 or whether a constitutional amendment was necessary.

The Court drew a sharp distinction. Article 3, including clause (c) which speaks of “diminishing the area of any State”, is concerned only with the internal adjustment of the territories of the constituent States of India — it is the provision for redrawing the map within the family. It does not, and cannot, authorise the cession of any part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State. Cession of territory is a transfer of sovereignty, not merely a redistribution of administrative jurisdiction. To accomplish it, the territory of India as defined in Article 1(3) and the First Schedule must be reduced; that requires an amendment of the Constitution itself, which can be carried out only under Article 368. The route the doctrine of basic structure laid down in Kesavananda Bharati later imposed on Article 368 came much later — Berubari was decided when Article 368 still appeared unlimited — but the principle survives unimpaired. A cession requires an amendment, not a mere law under Article 3.

The Constitution (Ninth Amendment) Act, 1960, was passed in direct compliance with the opinion to give effect to the Berubari transfer. The Court was equally careful to mark the limits of its ruling. In Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, AIR 1969 SC 783, the Supreme Court held that the mere settlement of a boundary dispute with a neighbouring State — even one that involves a degree of give and take of small disputed pockets — is not a cession of territory and does not call for a constitutional amendment. The line is sometimes thin in practice; the test is whether the territory in question was indisputably Indian sovereign territory before the agreement.

Effect of reorganisation on existing laws

When a State is reorganised under Article 3, the laws and administrative orders in force in the affected territory continue to bind the successor State until they are altered, amended or repealed by it. The international-law principles relating to a change of sovereignty have no application to an internal reorganisation: the people, the laws and the legal relations all carry across into the successor State. The Supreme Court applied this rule in Ramkishore Sen v. Union of India and again in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh, AIR 1977 SC 629, holding that pre-existing law continues to operate after reorganisation as long as the successor government does not unequivocally displace it.

The same principle informs the application of penal and procedural statutes in the post-reorganisation State — a point that occasionally surfaces in Article 19 challenges to inherited statutes and in disputes about the equal application of pre-reorganisation laws across new State boundaries. The larger body of constitutional law notes situates these doctrines within the wider constitutional scheme.

The Article 3 Proviso applied to Jammu and Kashmir (historical position)

Until the abrogation of Article 370 in 2019, Article 3 applied to Jammu and Kashmir in an altered form. A second Proviso, added by the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, required the consent of the State Legislature — not merely its views — before any Bill increasing or diminishing the area of the State, or altering its name or boundary, could be introduced in Parliament. This was a unique status: every other State has only the consultative right described in Babulal Parate; Jammu and Kashmir alone enjoyed a concurrent right amounting to a veto. The position was discussed by the Supreme Court in Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J. & K., AIR 1959 SC 749, in the context of Part VI not applying to that State. The detailed treatment of the special-status framework belongs to the chapter on special provisions relating to certain States under Articles 370 and 371; for the purpose of Article 3, the salient point is that the consent requirement was the single sharpest exception to the indestructible-Union-of-destructible-units principle.

Article 4 — supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions

Article 4 is short and easy to overlook, but it does the heavy lifting of every reorganisation. Clause (1) provides that any law referred to in Article 2 or Article 3 shall contain such provisions for the amendment of the First Schedule (the list of States and Union Territories) and the Fourth Schedule (allocation of Rajya Sabha seats) as may be necessary to give effect to the law, and may also contain such supplemental, incidental and consequential provisions as Parliament thinks fit. Clause (2) provides — critically — that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purposes of Article 368.

Reach of “supplemental, incidental and consequential”

The Supreme Court has read the expression generously. In Mangal Singh v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 944, it held that the expression is wide enough to cover the setting up of legislative, executive and judicial organs of the new State; the apportionment of revenue, assets and liabilities; the application and adaptation of laws; the transfer of pending judicial proceedings; and provisions as to services. In State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik, AIR 1982 SC 1198, the Court extended the same view to the constitution of a new High Court. In Jamshed N. Guzdar v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 591, the Court held that Article 4 itself is an independent source of power for vesting a High Court with jurisdiction — not referable to Entry 78 of List I of the Seventh Schedule — and that Parliament may use it to invest the High Court of a newly formed State with the necessary jurisdiction and power of every description. The doctrinal hook for these cases lies in centre-State administrative relations and in the High Court framework under Part VI.

Two limits temper the breadth of Article 4. First, the supplemental power cannot override the constitutional scheme — it does not extend to the abolition of any organ of the State altogether. Second, the words “as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law” have a temporal edge: the supplemental and incidental provisions cease to operate when the purpose of the reorganisation law is exhausted. In Smt. Swaran Lata v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 165, the Supreme Court applied this reasoning to hold that directions issued by the Central Government under section 84 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966, divesting the State of its services-related powers, ceased to operate once the reorganisation of the services was complete.

Article 4(2) — a self-contained dispensation from Article 368

The most consequential single sentence in the entire chapter is Article 4(2). A reorganisation law under Articles 2 or 3 amends the First and Fourth Schedules — in the literal sense, it is an amendment of the Constitution — but the Constitution itself declares that it shall not be deemed to be an amendment for Article 368 purposes. Two doors open as a result. First, no special majority and no ratification by half the States is needed; an ordinary parliamentary majority is sufficient. Second, the law is insulated from challenge under Article 368. The Supreme Court underlined the point in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1, observing that the expression “representation in Parliament” in Article 4 specifically excludes amendments under Articles 2 and 3 from the procedure prescribed in Article 368. The companion chapter on the amendment of the Constitution under Article 368 develops the contrast.

Plenary nature of the Article 3–4 power

The law-making power under Articles 3 and 4 is paramount and is neither subject to nor fettered by Article 246 or the Lists in the Seventh Schedule. The Supreme Court has held that while creating new States by reorganisation, Parliament may legislate on the division of land, water and other resources; on the apportionment of assets and liabilities; on contracts and other legal rights and obligations — all without being asked whether the subject falls in the State List. It would, the Court said, be incongruous to argue that the very provision which gives birth to a State is ultra vires of a legislative entry which the State may operate only after it has come into existence. The plenary nature of the power is the doctrinal companion to the indestructibility of the Union.

Boundary disputes and Article 131

A subtle but important point distinguishes Article 3 from the original-jurisdiction power of the Supreme Court under Article 131. In State of Orissa v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2010) 5 SCC 674, the Supreme Court held that only Parliament under Article 3 is competent to alter the boundary of a State. Article 131 enables the Supreme Court to entertain a suit by one State against another for a declaration that a particular disputed area falls within its administrative jurisdiction; but a decree to that effect does not, and cannot, alter the boundary fixed by the First Schedule. The decree is binding inter partes — it tells the parties where the line currently runs — but the line itself can be moved only by parliamentary law under Article 3. The position is closely linked to the broader treatment of original jurisdiction in the chapter on the Union Judiciary and the Supreme Court's jurisdiction.

Putting the four Articles together

The four Articles work as a single mechanism. Article 1 declares the existence and composition of India. Article 2 brings in new territory or new units from outside the existing Union. Article 3 redraws the map within. Article 4 carries each reorganisation into operative effect by amending the Schedules and supplying the supplemental provisions — and does so without invoking Article 368. The simplicity of the design is what makes the Indian Union “indestructible” as a Union and the States “destructible” as units.

For the exam, three propositions deserve to be carried out of the chapter intact. First, the territory of India in Article 1(3) is wider than the Union of States in Article 1(1) and includes acquired territory automatically, by force of sub-clause (c). Second, the Proviso to Article 3 is a consultative requirement and not a concurrence — Babulal Parate is the authority. Third, cession of Indian territory to a foreign State requires a constitutional amendment under Article 368 — it cannot be done by an ordinary law under Article 3 — and that is the lasting legacy of Re Berubari Union. The same propositions are tested again and again, and a clean grasp of them — supplemented by the ancillary doctrines on acquired territory, the 7th Amendment's two-class scheme, and the plenary nature of the Article 4 power — will carry an aspirant comfortably through the chapter. For revision of the larger framework, the Preamble and its components chapter provides the philosophical underpinnings of the federal arrangement, and the citizenship chapter under Articles 5 to 11 picks up immediately where Article 4 leaves off.

Frequently asked questions

Is the Proviso to Article 3 mandatory or directory?

The Proviso is mandatory in form but consultative in effect. The Supreme Court in Babulal Parate v. State of Bombay (AIR 1960 SC 51) held that the President must refer the Bill to the affected State Legislature for its views, and the Bill cannot be introduced before that reference is made or the time fixed for views expires. But once the reference is made, Parliament is not bound by the views received and may pass the Bill in any form. No fresh reference is required even if Parliament substantially amends the Bill. The Proviso is mandatory as to procedure, but the State has no power of concurrence and no veto.

Why is India described as an "indestructible Union of destructible units"?

The expression captures the asymmetry between the Union and its States. The Union itself cannot be dissolved — no State has a constitutional right to secede. But Parliament may, under Article 3, alter the boundaries, area or name of any State, separate territory from a State, or merge States together, by ordinary law. The States have no right of self-preservation against this power. The phrase was approved by the Supreme Court in Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha (2007) 3 SCC 184, while discussing the plenary nature of the Article 3 power.

Can India cede a part of its territory to a foreign country by ordinary law under Article 3?

No. The Supreme Court in Re Berubari Union (AIR 1960 SC 845) held that Article 3 deals only with the internal adjustment of the territories of the constituent States and cannot be used to cede any part of the territory of India in favour of a foreign State. A cession reduces the territory of India as defined in Article 1(3) and the First Schedule, which requires an amendment of the Constitution under Article 368. The Ninth Amendment of 1960 was passed precisely to give effect to the Berubari transfer to East Pakistan.

What is the difference between a settlement of boundary dispute and cession of territory?

In Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India (AIR 1969 SC 783), the Supreme Court held that the mere settlement of a boundary dispute — where the territory in question was itself disputed and never indisputably part of India — is not a cession of territory. It is the resolution of an uncertainty about where the border already runs. A cession, by contrast, involves the transfer of territory that was indisputably Indian sovereign territory. A boundary settlement may be effected by an executive agreement; a cession requires a constitutional amendment.

Does Article 3 apply to Union Territories?

Yes. Explanation I to Article 3, added by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 1966, makes clear that the word "State" in clauses (a) to (e) of Article 3 includes a Union Territory — reflecting the position acknowledged in Ramkishore Sen v. Union of India (AIR 1966 SC 644). Parliament may form a new Union Territory, alter its boundaries or merge it with a State. But the second part of Explanation I excepts Union Territories from the Proviso — no reference to the Union Territory's legislature is required, even where the Union Territory has one.

Why are laws under Articles 2 and 3 not treated as constitutional amendments?

Because Article 4(2) expressly says so. Although a reorganisation law amends the First and Fourth Schedules and is in literal terms a constitutional amendment, Article 4(2) provides that it shall not be deemed to be an amendment for the purposes of Article 368. The result is that Parliament may carry out reorganisation by ordinary majority, without the special majority and State ratification that Article 368 demands. The Supreme Court in Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India (2006) 7 SCC 1 confirmed that the expression "representation in Parliament" in Article 4 specifically excludes Article 2–3 amendments from the Article 368 procedure.