Plaint — Drafting, Particulars, Rejection (Order VII)

Order VII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 governs the plaint — every particular it must carry, the documents that must accompany it, the grounds on which the court may return it for presentation to the proper court, and the eight grounds on which the court must reject it altogether. The Order is the procedural follow-on of the discipline laid down in Order VI on the rules of pleading: every plaint is a pleading, and every pleading must contain only material facts. Order VII tells the pleader what those material facts must include in a plaint, and what happens when the plaint falls short.

The architecture of the Order has three layers. Rules 1 to 8 prescribe the contents of the plaint. Rules 9 to 10B govern its admission and return. Rules 11 to 13 govern its rejection at the threshold and the consequences for a fresh suit. Rules 14 to 17 govern the documents that must be produced with the plaint. The most heavily-tested rule is Rule 11 — the eight grounds for rejection — which the Supreme Court has read narrowly to confine the court's threshold-stage power to a focused inquiry on the plaint as it stands.

Rule 1 — particulars to be contained in the plaint

Rule 1 lists the particulars that every plaint shall contain. They are: (a) the name of the court in which the suit is brought; (b) the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff; (c) the name, description and place of residence of the defendant, so far as they can be ascertained; (d) where the plaintiff or defendant is a minor or a person of unsound mind, a statement to that effect; (e) the facts constituting the cause of action and when it arose; (f) the facts showing that the court has jurisdiction; (g) the relief which the plaintiff claims; (h) where the plaintiff has allowed a set-off or relinquished a portion of his claim, the amount so allowed or relinquished; and (i) a statement of the value of the subject-matter of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction and of court-fees, so far as the case admits.

Each of these particulars is jurisdictional in a soft sense — failure to plead one of them is liable to be cured by amendment under Order VI Rule 17 if the omission is bona fide, but the omission of paragraph (e), the cause of action, will lead to rejection under Rule 11(a). Cause of action means every fact which it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to obtain a decree. The plaintiff must plead each constituent fact. The connection runs back to the chapter on the place of suing under Sections 15 to 21 — the territorial-jurisdiction averment under Rule 1(f) is the gateway through which place-of-suing facts enter the record.

Rules 2 to 6 — special particulars

Rule 2 governs money suits: the precise amount claimed must be stated, except in suits for mesne profits, for accounts and for movable property in the possession of the defendant. Rule 3 governs suits relating to immovable property: the plaint must contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it, including boundaries, numbers in a record of settlement or survey. Rule 4 governs suits where the plaintiff sues in a representative character: the plaint must show that the plaintiff has an actual existing interest in the subject-matter and has taken the steps (if any) necessary to enable him to institute a suit concerning it. Rule 5 says the plaint shall show that the defendant is or claims to be interested in the subject-matter and that he is liable to be called upon to answer the plaintiff's demand. Rule 6 governs suits in which the cause of action arose at a date that would, on the face of it, be barred by limitation: the plaint must show the ground on which exemption from the law of limitation is claimed.

Rules 7 and 8 — relief

Rule 7 requires every plaint to specifically state the relief which the plaintiff claims, either simply or in the alternative. The court will not normally grant a relief that has not been claimed (Bachhaj Nahar v Nilima Mandal, (2008) 17 SCC 491). The closing words of Rule 7 — that it shall not be necessary to ask for general or other relief which may always be given as the court may think just — empower the court to mould the relief to the proved cause, but only within the four corners of the case actually pleaded. Rule 8 governs the case where reliefs are founded on separate and distinct grounds: each ground must be stated separately. The discipline supports the analytical work that follows in the chapter on the frame of suit and cause of action under Order II, where the rule against splitting a cause of action is taken up in detail.

Rule 9 — procedure on admitting plaint

Where the court orders the plaint to be admitted, it shall direct the plaintiff to present a copy of the plaint on plain paper, with as many copies as there are defendants. The 1976 Amendment removed the earlier requirement that the plaintiff also pay the process-fee and produce summonses for service; the present scheme is governed by the chapter on issue and service of summons under Order V, which takes up the next procedural step after the plaint is admitted.

Rules 10 and 10A — return of plaint

Rule 10 is one of the two principal threshold-stage powers of the court. The plaint shall, at any stage of the suit, be returned to be presented to the court in which the suit should have been instituted. The endorsement on the returned plaint records the date of presentation and return, the name of the party presenting it, and a brief statement of the reasons. The proviso to sub-rule (1), inserted by the 1999 Amendment, says that the court may, if the plaintiff so desires, return the plaint at the appellate stage on its conclusion that the trial court had no jurisdiction.

Rule 10A, inserted by the 1976 Amendment, governs the procedure where the court is going to return the plaint. Before the order is passed, the court may, if the plaintiff makes an application, fix a date on which the plaintiff shall appear before the court in which the suit is to be re-presented; intimate the defendants of the date so fixed; and pass such order as it thinks fit on the question of payment of court fees on the plaint when re-presented. The object is to spare the plaintiff a fresh round of summons-service and to keep the proceeding moving. The connection runs back to the chapter on civil-court jurisdiction under Section 9: a return of plaint follows from a finding that the court before which the plaint was presented lacked territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction.

Rule 11 — rejection of plaint: the eight grounds

Rule 11 is the most heavily-tested provision in Order VII. It lists the grounds on which the plaint shall be rejected. The verb is mandatory — once the court is satisfied that any of the listed grounds is made out, it has no discretion to keep the plaint on the record. The grounds, as they now stand after the 1976 Amendment, are:

1. Clause (a) — where it does not disclose a cause of action.
2. Clause (b) — where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time fixed by the court, fails to do so.
3. Clause (c) — where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time fixed by the court, fails to do so.
4. Clause (d) — where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law.
5. Clause (e) — where it is not filed in duplicate (added in 1999).
6. Clause (f) — where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9 (added in 1999).

Clause (a) — disclosure of cause of action

The test for clause (a) is whether the averments in the plaint, taken as a whole and assumed to be true, disclose a cause of action. In T Arvindandam v T V Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467, the Supreme Court held that the clause is meant to defeat suits which are clueless and meritless on their averments. The court is to read the plaint, ignore averments that are incidental or argumentative, and ask whether what remains discloses a triable cause. The plaint must be read meaningfully, not formally; clever drafting that creates illusions of cause cannot defeat the clause. In Saleem Bhai v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557, the Court held that for the purposes of Rule 11 the court is to look only at the averments in the plaint; the written statement of the defendant cannot be considered. The threshold inquiry is unilateral.

Clauses (b) and (c) — undervaluation and insufficient stamp

Clauses (b) and (c) are the curative clauses. They do not call for an immediate rejection. The court must first call upon the plaintiff to correct the valuation or to supply the requisite stamp-paper within a time fixed by the court. Only on the plaintiff's failure to comply does the plaint stand rejected. The discipline is meant to spare the plaintiff who has miscalculated the court-fee from being thrown out without a chance to fix it. Where the plaintiff complies, the proceeding continues without further consequences for the date of institution.

Clause (d) — barred by any law

Clause (d) is the most heavily-litigated of the eight grounds. The plaint shall be rejected where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. The classic instances are: a suit barred by limitation on the date of institution as appears from the plaint itself; a suit barred by Section 11 — res judicata where the former judgment is set out in the plaint; a suit barred by Section 9 read with a special-statute ouster of civil-court jurisdiction; a suit barred by Section 80(1) for want of statutory notice; and a suit barred by Section 12 of the Code where the plaintiff has failed to comply with rules precluding institution of a fresh suit.

The Supreme Court has emphasised that the inquiry under clause (d) must proceed on the averments of the plaint alone. If the plaint, on its face, makes out a case that is barred by law, the rejection follows. But where the existence of the bar turns on disputed facts that the plaintiff has not pleaded, the proper procedure is to frame an issue and try it; rejection at the threshold is not appropriate (Liverpool & London S P & I Association v M V Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512). The procedure on rejection is governed by Rule 12: the court shall record an order to the effect that the plaint is rejected, and shall record the reason for such order.

Rule 13 — rejection does not preclude a fresh suit

Rule 13 is the saving rule. The rejection of a plaint on any of the grounds in Rule 11 shall not, of its own force, preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. The fresh plaint is, however, subject to the law of limitation. If the cause of action is, by the date of the fresh plaint, barred by limitation, the fresh plaint will be dismissed as time-barred — the rejection of the earlier plaint does not stop the limitation clock (Mukesh v Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, (2006) 5 SCC 729). The rule is therefore a procedural saver, not a substantive one. The chapter on limitation interfaces in CPC takes up the limitation question more fully.

Rules 14 to 17 — documents to be produced with the plaint

Rule 14 directs that the plaintiff shall enter in a list, and shall produce in court at the time of presentation of the plaint, a document on which he sues or relies. Where any document is not in the plaintiff's possession, he must state in whose possession it is. The 2002 Amendment added a sub-rule that documents not produced or entered in the list at the time of presentation cannot, without the leave of the court, be received in evidence on the plaintiff's behalf. The discipline closes off the practice of holding back documents to spring at trial. The corresponding rule for the defendant appears in Order VIII, which the chapter on the written statement takes up in detail.

Rules 15 to 17 deal with the consequences of failure to produce, the return of documents that have been impounded for want of requisite stamp-paper, and the duty of the parties to produce, on the day fixed for production of documents, every document the party intends to rely on at the trial. The connected discipline of production, impounding and return is taken up in the chapter on production, impounding and return of documents under Order XIII.

Order VII Rule 11 and the common drafting trap

The Supreme Court in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, summarised the law on Rule 11. The plaint must be read as a whole; it cannot be read clause by clause. The court must not pick up a single sentence and proceed on it; it must examine the entire plaint. The defendant's written statement is irrelevant. The clever-drafting principle from T Arvindandam applies: the court must not allow ingenious drafting to keep alive a plaint whose core has been hollowed out. Conversely, where the plaint discloses a cause of action that needs to be tried, the court should not, on a Rule 11 application, anticipate the trial.

Plaint, written statement and the closure of the pleading stage

The plaint is one half of the pleading stage; the written statement, governed by Order VIII, is the other. Once both pleadings are on the record, the court proceeds to examination of parties under Order X, then to discovery, admissions, and the framing of issues. Rule 11 is the screen at the beginning of the journey — a plaint that does not pass the screen need not travel further. The eight grounds are exhaustive; no rejection is permissible on any ground not listed in Rule 11 (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v Asst Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137). Where the court is invited to reject on a ground outside Rule 11 — for example, on the ground that the suit is frivolous or vexatious — the proper course is to entertain a Rule 16 application under Order VI to strike out the offending pleading, not a Rule 11 rejection.

Order VII Rule 11 and the time-bar — limitation on the face of the plaint

The most heavily-litigated head of clause (d) is limitation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that where the plaint, on its face, shows that the suit is barred by limitation, the plaint must be rejected — the plea need not even be raised by the defendant. The court has the duty under Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to dismiss every suit that is time-barred, irrespective of whether limitation has been set up as a defence (Ramesh B Desai v Bipin Vadilal Mehta, (2006) 5 SCC 638). The plaintiff who is aware that his cause of action arose at a date that, on the face of it, is beyond the limitation period must plead the ground for exemption under Order VII Rule 6, failing which the plaint stands liable to be rejected on a Rule 11(d) application.

The corollary is that limitation is a question of mixed law and fact only where the plaintiff has pleaded the saving facts. Where he has not, and the dates appearing on the face of the plaint show a time-barred claim, the question becomes one of pure law and is fit for Rule 11 disposal. The principle has been applied repeatedly to suits where the plaintiff has slipped on the date of accrual — for example, in suits for specific performance where the plaintiff relies on Article 54 of the Limitation Act and pleads no fixed date of performance.

The application of Rule 11 in commercial suits

The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 has overlaid Order VII with stricter time-lines for commercial disputes of "specified value". A plaint filed in the commercial court must additionally comply with Rule 9A, and a Rule 11 application in a commercial suit is governed by accelerated procedural rules. The substantive standard, however, remains the same — the eight grounds in Rule 11 are exhaustive, the inquiry is unilateral, and the plaint must be read as a whole. The connection runs to the chapter on disposal of suit at first hearing under Order XV, where the court's power to dispose of the suit at the threshold on admitted facts is taken up.

The MCQ angle

Three propositions surface again and again. First, Order VII Rule 11 lists the eight grounds for rejection of a plaint exhaustively; the court has no jurisdiction to reject on a ground outside the list. Second, for a Rule 11 inquiry the court is to look only at the averments in the plaint, not at the written statement (Saleem Bhai v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557); the inquiry is unilateral and is not the trial. Third, rejection of a plaint under Rule 11 does not preclude the institution of a fresh plaint on the same cause of action (Rule 13), but the fresh plaint must be filed within the period of limitation, since the date of rejection does not stop the limitation clock. A reader of the Code of Civil Procedure who has internalised these three propositions has the framework into which every later question on threshold-stage attacks on the plaint will fit. The companion chapter on the written statement under Order VIII takes up the defendant's side of the same equation.

Frequently asked questions

What are the grounds for rejection of a plaint under Order VII Rule 11?

Rule 11 lists six grounds (after the 1999 amendment): (a) where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action; (b) where the relief claimed is undervalued and the plaintiff fails, after being required, to correct the valuation; (c) where the plaint is written on insufficiently stamped paper and the plaintiff fails, after being required, to supply the requisite stamp; (d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law; (e) where the plaint is not filed in duplicate; and (f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with Rule 9. The list is exhaustive — the court cannot reject a plaint on any ground outside Rule 11 (Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v Asst Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137).

Can the court look at the written statement when deciding a Rule 11 application?

No. The Supreme Court in Saleem Bhai v State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557 held that for the purposes of Order VII Rule 11 the court is to look only at the averments in the plaint. The defendant's written statement is irrelevant at the threshold stage. The inquiry is unilateral — the court reads the plaint, takes its averments at face value, and asks whether the listed ground is made out on the plaint alone. The Supreme Court re-iterated this position in Madanuri Sri Rama Chandra Murthy v Syed Jalal, (2017) 13 SCC 174, which also added that the plaint must be read as a whole, not clause by clause.

Does the rejection of a plaint under Rule 11 bar a fresh suit?

No, on its own force. Rule 13 is the saving rule: the rejection of a plaint on any of the grounds in Rule 11 shall not, of its own force, preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action. The fresh plaint is, however, subject to the law of limitation. If by the date of the fresh plaint the cause of action is time-barred, the fresh suit will be dismissed as time-barred. The rejection of the earlier plaint does not stop the limitation clock. Rule 13 is therefore a procedural saver, not a substantive one (Mukesh v Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd, (2006) 5 SCC 729).

What is the difference between the return of a plaint under Rule 10 and the rejection of a plaint under Rule 11?

Return under Rule 10 is the consequence of a finding that the court before which the plaint was presented lacks jurisdiction — territorial, pecuniary or subject-matter. The plaint is returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the proper court; the suit is not on the merits dismissed. Rejection under Rule 11 is the consequence of a finding that the plaint, on its face, fails one of the eight statutory tests — most often that it does not disclose a cause of action or that the suit is barred by law. Rejection brings the suit to an end at the threshold, although Rule 13 lets the plaintiff present a fresh plaint. Return preserves the proceeding; rejection terminates it.

When does the cause-of-action ground in Rule 11(a) defeat a plaint?

When, on a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole and assuming all averments to be true, the plaint discloses no triable cause. The Supreme Court in T Arvindandam v T V Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467 held that Rule 11(a) is meant to defeat clueless suits — clever drafting cannot keep alive a plaint whose core has been hollowed out. Where the averments, even if proved, would not entitle the plaintiff to a decree, the plaint is rejected. Where the averments do disclose a triable cause but the defence may negative it, the proper course is to frame an issue and try the suit, not to reject the plaint at the threshold (Liverpool & London S P & I Association v M V Sea Success I, (2004) 9 SCC 512).