Review (Section 114; Order XLVII)

Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, read with Order XLVII Rule 1, allows a person aggrieved by a decree or order to apply to the same court that passed it for a review of judgment. It is the only remedy in the Code of Civil Procedure that asks the same bench to reconsider its own decision — neither an appeal upward nor a revision sideways, but a self-correcting power exercised by the very court whose judgment is in question.

Review sits between two more familiar remedies. Above it lies appeal, which transfers the dispute to a higher court for a fresh look. Below it, in a different sense, lies the amendment of judgments, decrees and orders under Sections 152 and 153, which is concerned with accidental slips. Review is broader than amendment and narrower than appeal: it permits reconsideration on three closed grounds, and it does not transfer the case anywhere — the same judge, if available, hears the application.

Statutory anchor

The substantive opening — "Subject as aforesaid" — links Section 114 to Section 113 and Section 115. The procedural detail of the remedy is supplied by Order XLVII. The substantive section confers the power; the Order prescribes the conditions, the limits and the procedure.

Scheme — review as the same-court remedy

The Code's scheme on post-judgment correction is built on three concentric rings. Outermost is appeal — first appeal under Section 96 (read with Order XLI), second appeal under Section 100, and appeal from orders under Order XLIII. Next is revision — Section 115 in the High Court for jurisdictional errors. Innermost is review — Section 114 in the same court, on three closed grounds.

The architecture protects two competing values. Finality of judgments demands that a decree once pronounced should not be lightly disturbed. Justice between parties demands that a glaring mistake should be open to correction. Review, hedged tightly by Order XLVII Rule 1, holds the line: it is available, but only on grounds the law itself names.

Three negatives follow from the same-court rule. First, review cannot be sought in a court superior to the one that passed the decree — for that, the appropriate channel is appeal, revision, or a writ. Second, the High Court cannot review on its own a decree passed by a subordinate court on the strength of Section 114 — the power belongs to the court that passed the decree. Third, review is not part of the inherent powers of the court under Section 151; the power must be conferred by statute, and where the statute is Section 114, the conditions in Order XLVII Rule 1 govern.

Who can apply — the three categories of decree

Section 114 identifies three categories of aggrieved person:

1. A person aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed but has not been preferred. Here the party has chosen not to appeal. The right to review is alive until the time for appeal expires, and even afterwards if no appeal has actually been filed — but with one important caveat.
2. A person aggrieved by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by the Code. Here the party has no appellate remedy at all; review is the only post-judgment route.
3. A person aggrieved by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes. A specialised category for small-cause references that are not otherwise appealable.

The caveat for category (a) is procedural and frequently tested. If, before an application for review is made, an appeal from the same decree has already been preferred and is pending, the court whose decree is sought to be reviewed has no jurisdiction to entertain the review application. If, however, the review application is filed first and the appeal is preferred later, the court may dispose of the review application — provided the appellate court has not disposed of the appeal before the review is taken up.

The reason is doctrinal. Once an appeal is preferred, the doctrine of merger begins to operate; the decree of the trial court starts shading into the appellate decree, and the trial court loses control over the matter. Review is a power exercised on the trial court's own decree, and that decree must still belong to the trial court when review is taken up.

The three grounds for review under Order XLVII Rule 1

Order XLVII Rule 1 narrows Section 114 to three grounds:

1. Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made.
2. Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record.
3. Any other sufficient reason.

Each ground has its own test. Together they describe the entire field of review.

Ground 1 — Discovery of new and important matter or evidence

Three conditions must concur. First, the matter or evidence must be new — that is, not before the court when the decree was passed. Second, it must be important — material enough that, had it been produced, the judgment would or might have been different. Third, the applicant must show that, despite the exercise of due diligence, the matter was not within his knowledge or could not be produced at the trial.

The discipline matters because review is not a second chance to fill the evidentiary gaps of the trial. A party who failed to lead evidence that was available, or who knew of a witness but did not call him, cannot reopen the decree by producing the same evidence later. The Privy Council in Brown v. Dean (1910) supplied the foundational test: the new evidence must be such that, had it been before the court at the original hearing, it would probably have led to a different decision. The Indian courts have adopted the same standard.

Ground 2 — Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record

This is the most litigated ground. "Error apparent on the face of the record" is, by its nature, indefinable in the abstract; it is a question of degree and must be determined judicially on the facts of each case. Two propositions hold the doctrine together:

1. An error apparent on the face of the record is one which strikes the eye on a mere reading and does not need a long-drawn process of reasoning to establish.
2. An error which requires examination of evidence or argument to make out is not an error on the face of the record. If two views are reasonably possible on the same material, the existence of the second view is not an error apparent on the record.

The line has been drawn in many cases. An error in the construction of a statute that is plain on its face may be an error apparent on the record. A wrong decision on a debatable question of law is not. An obvious mathematical mistake — adding wrongly, applying the wrong rate of interest where the decree itself records the correct rate — is on the face of the record. A finding of fact that the applicant disagrees with is not. The Supreme Court has been firm: review is not an appeal in disguise, and an erroneous decision on the merits of a question of law is not, without more, an error apparent on the face of the record.

One further restriction is statutory. The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 records that the fact that the decision on a question of law has been reversed or varied by a subsequent decision of a superior court in another case shall not be a ground for review of the earlier judgment. The reason is plain: every change of view by an appellate court would otherwise reopen every decree decided on the earlier view.

Ground 3 — Any other sufficient reason

The third ground is residuary. The Supreme Court has read it as a ground analogous to the first two — that is, a reason of comparable seriousness, not a roving discretion. "Any other sufficient reason" has been held to cover, among other things, a misconception of fact or law on the part of the court, the application of the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no one), and a glaring omission or palpable mistake by judicial fallibility. It does not cover dissatisfaction with the result, the discovery of an authority that one's counsel did not cite, or a desire for a fresh hearing on the same record.

Who hears the review — Order XLVII Rule 5

The same-court rule has a same-judge corollary. Order XLVII Rule 5 directs that, ordinarily, the application for review shall be heard by the very judge who passed the decree or made the order. The corollary respects the rationale of review: only the judge who decided the matter knows what was, and what was not, in his mind when he wrote the judgment.

The rule has two relaxations. If the judge has retired, been transferred, or is otherwise unavailable, the review may be heard by his successor. The unavailability of the judge for six months is the threshold typically applied. Beyond six months, the Chief Justice may allocate the review to another bench. Within six months, the review must wait — unless the parties consent or there is a high-court rule that displaces Order XLVII Rule 5.

Procedure — Order XLVII Rules 2 to 9

1. Application (Rule 2). The review application is filed in the same court that passed the decree or made the order. Where two or more judges sat originally, all of them must hear the review if available.
2. Form of application (Rule 3). The application is to be supported by an affidavit setting out the grounds. It is to be presented in the form prescribed for memoranda of appeal under Order XLI, so far as applicable.
3. Court's first decision (Rule 4). The court may reject the application in limine, or grant it. If the court grants the review, notice is to be given to the opposite party, who has the right to be heard before the decree is reviewed. The court may then alter, vary or set aside the decree under review.
4. No second review (Rule 9). No application to review an order made on an application for review, or a decree or order passed or made on a review, shall be entertained. The bar is absolute: review of review is not permitted under the Code.

Two further procedural points often appear in MCQs. An order rejecting an application for review is not appealable. An order granting a review is appealable under Order XLIII Rule 1(w), but only on the limited ground that the review was granted contrary to Order XLVII Rule 4. And the order finally passed on the merits after the review is heard stands on the same footing as the original decree — it can be appealed against if the original decree was appealable, and reviewed again is barred.

Leading authorities

The Supreme Court has shaped the law of review around six recurring propositions: the limited scope of the power, the ban on appeals in disguise, the meaning of error apparent on the face of the record, the discipline of due diligence on new evidence, the exclusion of subsequent reversals as a ground, and the role of actus curiae neminem gravabit.

In Sow Chandra Kanta v. Sheikh Habib, AIR 1975, the Supreme Court held that a review of a judgment is a serious step and a reluctant resort to it is called for only where a glaring omission, patent mistake or grave error has crept into the judgment. The Court warned that greater care, seriousness and restraint are needed in review applications because review is not a virgin ground but a reconsideration of a decision that already has the normal feature of finality.

In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, (1997), the Supreme Court explained the limit: a review petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an "appeal in disguise". The same proposition was reaffirmed in Lily Thomas v. Union of India, AIR 2000, where the Court underlined that the power of review is not to be confused with appellate power, which enables the appellate court to correct all errors committed by the subordinate court.

In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmed Ishaque, AIR 1955, the Supreme Court explained "error apparent on the face of the record". The expression cannot be defined precisely or exhaustively; it must be determined judicially on the facts of each case. The Court emphasised that the error must be self-evident and not require an examination or argument to establish it.

In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR 1979, the Supreme Court held that an erroneous decision on the merits is not, without more, an error apparent on the face of the record. The same proposition was applied in Tungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1964 — an erroneous view of law is not an error apparent on the record.

In Board of Control for Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club, AIR 2005, the Supreme Court held that the power of review under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 is wide enough to take into consideration a subsequent event for the purpose of correcting the court's own mistake, and that the words "any other sufficient reason" are wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by the court or even by an advocate. The decision read the third ground generously, while keeping the analogy test intact.

In Hari Singh v. Seth, AIR 1996, the Supreme Court drew the procedural line on parallel remedies between review and the first-appeal route under Section 96: where an appeal is preferred before the review application is filed, the trial court loses jurisdiction to entertain the review; where the review is filed first, the trial court may dispose of it provided the appellate court has not already disposed of the appeal.

In Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013), the Supreme Court held that review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. The decision discourages a party from using the review as a second platform to argue the same case.

The Privy Council in Brown v. Dean, (1910), is the foundation for the new-evidence test: the evidence must be such that it would probably have produced a different result, and the applicant must satisfy the court that, with reasonable diligence, the evidence could not have been produced at the trial.

What review cannot do — the recurring negatives

1. It cannot reopen findings of fact. A review is not a re-trial; the court does not reweigh the evidence on the same record.
2. It cannot correct an erroneous view of law. A wrong reading of a statute is not an error on the face of the record unless the wrong reading is itself self-evident.
3. It cannot be invoked because a superior court has later varied the law. The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 forecloses this expressly.
4. It cannot be a vehicle for fresh arguments. Counsel's failure to cite a case at the original hearing is not a ground; the law presumes that all available authority was placed before the court.
5. It cannot be reviewed itself. Order XLVII Rule 9 bars a review of a review.
6. It cannot be entertained where an appeal is pending. The merger doctrine takes the matter out of the trial court's hands.
7. It cannot be made under Section 151. Review is a creature of statute; the inherent procedural power does not supply it.

Distinguishing review from appeal, revision and reference

The remedies of reference under Section 113, review under Section 114, and revision under Section 115 are tested in MCQs through their differences. The principal distinctions:

1. Forum. Appeal lies to a higher court. Revision lies to the High Court. Review lies in the same court.
2. Initiator. Appeal and review are initiated by the aggrieved party. Reference is initiated by the subordinate court. Revision is usually initiated by the aggrieved party but the High Court may also act suo motu.
3. Trigger. Appeal lies on questions of law and fact. Review lies on the three closed grounds of Order XLVII Rule 1. Revision lies on the jurisdictional grounds of Section 115. Reference lies on a question of law on which the subordinate court entertains a reasonable doubt.
4. Concurrence with appeal. Review is barred where an appeal is pending. Revision lies only where no appeal lies. Reference is barred where the decree is appealable.
5. Effect on the decree. An appeal can affirm, vary or set aside the decree. A review by the same court can do the same to its own decree. A revision can vary or reverse only on jurisdictional grounds. A reference results in an opinion that the trial court must follow.
6. Bar on second exercise. A second appeal lies on a substantial question of law (Section 100). No second review lies (Order XLVII Rule 9). A second revision is generally barred on the same point.

Review and the doctrine of merger

The doctrine of merger says that the decree of an inferior court merges into the decree of the superior court when the superior court hears the matter on appeal or revision. Once merger occurs, the inferior court's decree no longer has independent legal life, and the trial court cannot review it.

Two propositions follow. First, while an appeal is pending, the trial court cannot review the same decree, because merger has begun to operate. Second, where the appeal is dismissed or the review petition itself is dismissed, the doctrine has no application; the original decree remains the operative decree, and review continues to be available within the limits of Order XLVII. The interaction is procedural and routinely tested.

Review and Section 151

The argument is sometimes made that, where Order XLVII Rule 1 does not in terms cover a situation, the court should exercise its inherent power under Section 151 to review. The Supreme Court has rejected the route. Review is a creature of statute. Where Section 114 read with Order XLVII does not authorise the review, Section 151 cannot fill the gap; otherwise the careful limits in Rule 1 would be circumvented every time.

Two qualifications survive. First, where the court has made an obvious procedural error — pronouncing a decree against a dead party, or against a party not properly served — Section 151 may be invoked to recall the decree, but the recall is not classified as review. Second, in a manifestly erroneous order under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court has held that it may review under Section 151 read with the powers under Article 226 — that is a constitutional jurisdiction, not the Section 114 power.

Limitation

An application for review is governed by the Limitation Act, 1963. The period prescribed is thirty days from the date of the decree or order in respect of which review is sought. The court has the usual power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on sufficient cause being shown. The Supreme Court has held that where the delay is sufficiently explained, the High Court ought to condone it rather than dismiss the review on technical grounds.

MCQ angle — what gets tested

1. Same-court rule. A review lies only in the court that passed the decree, never in a higher court.
2. Same-judge rule. Order XLVII Rule 5 directs that the same judge hear the review, with the six-month relaxation for unavailability.
3. Three grounds. New evidence (with due-diligence requirement), error apparent on the face of the record, any other sufficient reason analogous to the first two.
4. Limitation. Thirty days from the decree or order; condonable under Section 5.
5. Bar on second review. Order XLVII Rule 9 — absolute.
6. Pending appeal bar. Where an appeal is preferred before the review is filed, the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the review.
7. Subsequent reversal Explanation. A later contrary decision of a superior court is not a ground for review.
8. Appealability. Order XLVII Rule 7 allows an appeal against an order granting a review on the limited ground that it was granted contrary to Rule 4. An order rejecting a review is not appealable.
9. Section 151. Cannot be used to circumvent the limits of Order XLVII Rule 1.

The cleanest mental model is to treat review as the law's grudging concession to its own fallibility — a same-court remedy for self-evident mistakes, hedged by three closed grounds, one absolute bar against second review, and a strict refusal to act as an appeal in disguise.

Frequently asked questions

Can a review be filed in the High Court against a decree of a subordinate court?

No. Section 114 confers the power of review only on the court that passed the decree or made the order. A High Court cannot, on a review application under Section 114, sit in review of a decree passed by a subordinate court. The aggrieved party's remedies against a subordinate court's decree are appeal, revision under Section 115, or, in appropriate cases, a writ. The High Court can review its own orders, but on the same conditions imposed by Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1, and not on someone else's decree.

Is a wrong decision on a question of law an error apparent on the face of the record?

No, except in the rare case where the wrong reading is self-evident. The Supreme Court has consistently held — in Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma (1979) and Tungabhadra Industries v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1964) — that an erroneous view of law is not, without more, an error apparent on the record. The error must strike the eye on a mere reading and not require a long-drawn process of reasoning. A debatable view, even if wrong, is not reviewable; the remedy is appeal.

What is the difference between review under Section 114 and amendment of decree under Section 152?

Review reconsiders the merits of the decision on three closed grounds. Amendment under Section 152 corrects clerical or arithmetical mistakes, or errors arising from accidental slips or omissions, in the decree itself. Review is broader in subject-matter but narrower in availability — it must satisfy Order XLVII Rule 1. Amendment is narrower in subject-matter — it does not alter the substance of the judgment — but is exercised more freely, even suo motu by the court. The two remedies operate in different fields and are not interchangeable.

Can a review be filed if an appeal is pending against the same decree?

Generally no, but the timing matters. If an appeal is preferred before the review application is filed, the trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain the review — the doctrine of merger has begun to operate and the matter is no longer in the trial court's hands. If, however, the review application is filed first and the appeal is preferred later, the trial court may continue to dispose of the review provided the appellate court has not already disposed of the appeal. This is the procedural rule from Hari Singh v. Seth (1996).

Is a review of a review permitted under the Code?

No. Order XLVII Rule 9 expressly bars a second review. No application to review an order made on an application for review, or a decree or order passed or made on a review, can be entertained. The bar is absolute and is one of the cleanest MCQ points on the topic. The aggrieved party's only further remedy after a review decision is the remedy that lies against the original decree — that is, appeal where appeal is allowed, or revision where it lies.

Can the inherent power under Section 151 be used to review a decree?

No. The Supreme Court has held that review is a creature of statute and Section 151 cannot be used to enlarge it beyond Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1. If the case does not fall within one of the three grounds — new evidence on due diligence, error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason analogous to those two — the court has no power to review. Section 151 may be invoked for recall in cases of obvious procedural error such as decrees against dead parties, but recall is not the same as review.