Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 bundles together the special procedure for litigants whose representational capacity, sovereign status, or institutional form does not match the ordinary template of an individual citizen. Sections 83 to 87B and Orders XXVII-A, XXVIII, XXIX, XXX and XXXI constitute that bundle. They govern aliens, foreign States, foreign Rulers and Ambassadors, military and naval and air force personnel, corporations, registered firms, persons trading in assumed names, and trustees, executors and administrators. Each set of rules carves out a tailored procedure to recognise that the litigant in question is either a sovereign that the municipal court must approach with diplomatic care, an artificial person that cannot itself depose, or an individual who must act through a fiduciary or representative.
For the judiciary aspirant, two clusters dominate exam papers. The first cluster — Sections 83 to 87B — is rich short-answer territory: who is an alien enemy under Section 83; when can a foreign State sue under Section 84; the consent of the Central Government required to sue a foreign State or Ruler under Section 86; the immunity from arrest and execution conferred by Sections 86(3) and 86(5); and the application of these rules to former Indian-State Rulers under Section 87B. The second cluster — Orders XXIX and XXX — is rule-by-rule exam material: signing of pleadings by a corporation through its secretary or director; service of summons on a corporation; suing partners in the firm name; disclosure of partners' names; service of summons on the firm; appearance of partners individually; appearance under protest by a person served as partner; and the execution consequences of a decree against a firm read with Order XXI Rule 50.
Why special procedure for these litigants
Three rationales animate Part IV and its associated Orders. First, the doctrine of sovereign immunity: a foreign State and its head — the Ruler — are not ordinary suitors before a municipal court. International comity requires that the municipal forum should not assume jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign without the diplomatic consent of the executive. The Central Government's consent under Section 86 is the procedural device that translates this principle into the law of the Code. Second, the principle that artificial persons must be represented by natural ones: a corporation, a firm, or a trust cannot itself sign a pleading, swear an affidavit, or appear in court. Order XXIX Rule 1 (corporations), Order XXX Rule 1(2) (firms), and Order XXXI Rule 1 (trustees) supply the rules of representation. Third, the protection of disability — military and naval personnel cannot always obtain leave of absence to prosecute or defend a suit in person, and Order XXVIII permits them to authorise a substitute.
The interaction with the chapter on parties to a suit under Order I is constant. Order I states the general rules of joinder; Part IV and its associated Orders state the special departures. Where the two are inconsistent, the special rule prevails. The interaction with the chapter on suits by or against the Government is also direct: that chapter handles Sections 79 to 82 and Order XXVII; this chapter completes the picture of suits by or against the State, by adding the foreign-State and former-Indian-State machinery of Sections 83 to 87B.
Section 83: When aliens may sue
Section 83 distinguishes three classes of aliens. An alien friend — a national of any State not at war with India — may sue without restriction, in any court competent to try the suit. An alien enemy residing in India with the permission of the Central Government enjoys the same right; the permission is the licence that converts an enemy national into a permitted suitor. An alien enemy residing in India without permission, or residing in a foreign country, is barred. The Explanation to the section deems any person residing in a country at war with India and carrying on business there without a licence from the Central Government to be an alien enemy abroad — and therefore disabled.
The case law refines who is an "alien enemy". Mere internment without a declaration of war does not make a person an alien enemy (Prem Pratap v Jagat Pralate AIR 1944). Persons carrying on business in a friendly country temporarily occupied by an enemy do not automatically become alien enemies (Manasseh Film Co v Gemini Picture Circuit AIR 1944). A casual visitor on a valid visa from a country at peace with India is competent to sue (Anil v Rimchan AIR 1958). A resident of Pakistan visiting India is not an alien enemy (Nizamuddin v Hussain AIR 1960). Where a suit was already filed before the political event creating the disability, the right to prosecute is generally preserved — the Delhi High Court in Feroza v Daulat AIR 1975 held that subsequent acquisition of alien-enemy status does not bar continuation; the Calcutta High Court in Sudhander v Bhupati AIR 1976 took the alternative view that the trial may be suspended rather than dismissed.
An English-law residue continues to inform the Indian definition: a company is an alien enemy if it is controlled by alien enemies (Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd [1916]). The 1965 Indo-Pak conflict and subsequent emergency proclamations gave rise to a line of cases addressing limitation: where the right to sue is suspended by an order of the Government, the suspension period is not excluded from the limitation period (Deutsch Asiatische Bank v Hira Lall 1919) — a settled but harsh rule that has invited reform proposals.
Sections 84 to 87B: Foreign States, Rulers and Ambassadors
Section 84 confers the right on a foreign State to sue in any competent Indian court, provided the object is to enforce a private right vested in the Ruler of such State or in any officer of such State in his public capacity. The right is to be read with Section 87 — the suit is to be instituted in the name of the State, not in the personal name of the Ruler. The Supreme Court in Ali Akbar v United Arab Republic AIR 1966 held that the suit must be in the name of the State, and Sections 84, 86 and 87 are to be read together.
Section 85 supplies the recognised-agent machinery: the Central Government may, at the request of a foreign Ruler, appoint persons to prosecute or defend any suit on his behalf, and such persons are deemed to be recognised agents within the meaning of the Code. Sub-section (3) permits the appointed person to authorise others to make appearances and applications. The framework parallels the recognised-agent regime of Order III, but the appointment is by the Central Government rather than by the litigant.
Section 86 is the gatekeeper for suits against foreign States. Sub-section (1) bars any such suit without prior written consent of the Central Government certified by a Secretary. Sub-section (2) lists the four grounds on which consent may be granted — the foreign State has itself instituted a suit against the person desiring to sue it, trades within the local limits, is in possession of immovable property within those limits and is to be sued with reference to it, or has waived the privilege expressly or impliedly. The proviso to sub-section (1) carves a single exception: a tenant of immovable property may sue a foreign-State landlord without prior consent. Sub-section (3) requires Central Government consent for execution against the property of a foreign State. Sub-section (4) extends the protections of sub-sections (1) to (3) to Rulers, Ambassadors, Envoys, High Commissioners of Commonwealth countries, and specified members of staff. Sub-section (5) confers immunity from arrest under the Code on these same persons. Sub-section (6) requires the Central Government to give a reasonable opportunity of being heard before refusing consent.
The doctrinal significance of Section 86 is that it modifies the customary international-law doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity. Once the Central Government's consent has been given, a foreign State cannot claim immunity in the municipal court — the court is bound by the statutory regime, not by the broader principle (Ali Akbar v United Arab Republic AIR 1966). The plea of sovereign immunity is to be decided as a preliminary issue (New Central Jute Mills v VEB Rostock AIR 1983). The definition of "foreign State" is purposive: Kenya Airways v Jinibai B Kheshwal AIR 1998 held that a corporation wholly owned by a foreign Government is itself a "foreign State" for the purposes of Section 86. But the Supreme Court in Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011) held that the section applies only to suits in courts under the Code; consumer-fora proceedings are independent and require no Section 86 consent.
Section 87 governs the style of foreign Rulers as parties — the Ruler sues and is sued in the name of his State. Section 87A defines "foreign State" as any State outside India recognised by the Central Government, and "Ruler" as the person for the time being recognised by the Central Government to be the head of that State. Sub-section (2) directs every court to take judicial notice of recognition — the question is therefore conclusively resolved by the Central Government's act of recognition, not by independent judicial inquiry. Section 87B extends Sections 85 and sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 86 to the Rulers of former Indian States in respect of any suit based wholly or in part on a cause of action which arose before the commencement of the Constitution. The protection is therefore time-limited — pre-26-January-1950 causes of action only — and applies only to former Indian States specified by Central Government notification.
Order XXVII-A: Notice to the Attorney-General
Order XXVII-A — inserted by the 1976 Amendment — governs suits involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution or the validity of any statutory instrument. Rule 1 is mandatory: in any suit involving such a question (as referred to in Article 132(1) read with Article 147 of the Constitution), the court shall not proceed to determine that question until after notice has been given to the Attorney-General for India where the question concerns the Central Government, and to the Advocate-General of the State where it concerns a State Government (Heman Santlal v State of Bombay 1951). The rule is a procedural safeguard that ensures the executive is heard before a constitutional question is decided in a private suit.
Rule 1A — inserted in 1976 — extends the notice requirement to suits involving the validity of any statutory instrument that is not a question of the nature mentioned in Rule 1: notice to the Government Pleader if the question concerns the Government, or to the authority that issued the instrument if the question concerns another authority. Rule 2 empowers the court to add the Government as a defendant where the Attorney-General or Advocate-General applies and the addition is necessary for satisfactory determination of the question. Rule 2A confers a parallel power for statutory-instrument suits under Rule 1A. Rule 3 deals with costs — the Government or other authority added as defendant is not entitled to or liable for costs unless the court otherwise orders for special reasons. Rule 4 extends the Order to appeals.
The interface with Section 80 is significant: Order XXVII-A does not supersede Section 80, and a notice under Order XXVII-A does not cure non-compliance with Section 80 where the latter is otherwise applicable (Babu Rameshwar Prasad v Mahomad Ayyub AIR 1950). The Order does not in terms apply to writ proceedings under Article 226. Where the suit is at the appellate or final-hearing stage, the court can still order addition of the Government as a defendant (Mahabir Prasad v KC Thaper & Bros AIR 1985).
Order XXVIII: Military, naval and air force men
Order XXVIII contains a small but practically important set of rules for serving officers, soldiers, sailors and airmen who cannot obtain leave of absence to prosecute or defend a suit in person. Rule 1 permits any such person who cannot obtain leave to authorise any person to sue or defend on his behalf. Sub-rule (2) requires the authority to be in writing, signed in the presence of the commanding officer (or the next subordinate officer if the party is the commanding officer), and countersigned by the commanding officer. The authority is to be filed in court. Sub-rule (3) makes the countersignature sufficient proof both that the authority was duly executed and that the officer could not obtain leave.
Rule 2 empowers the authorised person to act personally or to appoint a pleader. Rule 3 makes service on the authorised person, or on any pleader he appoints, as effectual as service on the party in person. The Indian Soldiers (Litigation) Act, 1925 supplies an additional layer of protection in respect of civil and revenue litigation involving Indian soldiers serving under special conditions — most importantly, automatic stay of suits and proceedings in specified circumstances.
Sections 83 to 87B and Orders XXIX–XXX — the special-procedure cluster.
Topic-tagged MCQs from previous-year papers and original mocks — calibrated to actual judiciary-exam difficulty, with explanations grounded in C.K. Takwani.
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Order XXIX has only three rules, but each is heavily examined. Rule 1 deals with the subscription and verification of pleadings: in suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary, by any director, or by any other principal officer who is able to depose to the facts of the case. The rule is permissive, not mandatory: it does not exclude Order VI Rule 14, and a corporation can authorise some other person to sign on its behalf for good cause shown (Calico Printers Assn v Karim 1930). Where the pleading has been signed by an officer without prior formal authority, the corporation can ratify the act — expressly or impliedly — and the court can come to that conclusion on the conduct of the trial (United Bank of India v Naresh Kumar AIR 1997).
The expression "principal officer" is broad. It covers a secretary holding a general power of attorney even where the articles of association require the consent of the directors before filing a suit (TM & Co v HI Trust Ltd AIR 1972). It does not however authorise a District Manager of a corporation to conduct a suit — Rule 1 is limited to signing and verification, and confers no power to conduct litigation (Food Corporation of India v Sardarni Baldev Kaur AIR 1981). A foreign corporation can claim the benefit of Rule 1 even if it is not registered in India (Singer Manufacturing Co v Baijnath 1904); a plaint by a foreign company may be verified by an agent holding a general power of attorney as a "principal officer" within the meaning of the rule (Singer Manufacturing Co v Yar Muhammad 1912).
Rule 2 governs service on a corporation. Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, summons may be served on the secretary, on any director, or on any other principal officer of the corporation, or by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office, then at the place where the corporation carries on business. Rule 3 governs appearance: where a corporation is a defendant, the court may at any stage of the suit require the personal appearance of the secretary, director, or any other principal officer who is able to answer material questions relating to the suit.
The interaction with the Companies Act, 2013 must be noted: a registered company is a juristic person and must be sued in the name of the company, not in the name of its directors (FCI v Baldev AIR 1981). An unregistered or unincorporated society is not a juristic person — a suit by such an association must be brought in the names of all its members, or under Order I Rule 8 with leave of the court if the members are numerous (GIP Railway Senior Institute v Mohit Kumar AIR 1954). A registered trade union is, by virtue of the Trade Unions Act, 1926, authorised to sue and be sued in the name of the union (NW Rly Administration v NW Rly Union 1933).
Order XXX: Suits by or against firms
Order XXX is the dense ten-rule code for suits by or against partnership firms. Rule 1 is enabling: any two or more persons claiming or being liable as partners and carrying on business in India may sue or be sued in the name of the firm of which such persons were partners at the time the cause of action accrued. Sub-rule (2) provides that for any pleading required to be signed, verified or certified by the plaintiff or defendant, it suffices if signed, verified or certified by any one of the partners. The rule is permissive, not mandatory — partners can still sue jointly in their individual names if they wish (Chaudhari Atma Ram v Miam Umar AIR 1940). The foundational principle is that a firm is not a juristic person — it is a compendious name for the collection of individuals who are members of the firm (Firm Ram Naraindas v Anand Behari 1959). Order XXX does not apply to a joint Hindu family firm (Motilal v Giridharilal 1942), but Rule 10 (added in 1976) extends the Order to a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name.
Rule 2 deals with disclosure of partners' names. Where a suit is instituted by partners in the firm name, the plaintiffs must, on demand in writing by any defendant, declare in writing the names and places of residence of all partners. Failure to comply may result in a stay of proceedings. Where the names are declared, the suit proceeds as if the partners had been named as plaintiffs in the plaint, but the proceedings continue in the firm name and the names of the partners are entered in the decree.
Rule 3 governs service of summons on a firm. The two modes are alternatives — service on a partner, or service at the principal place of business on the person in control or management. Either is good service on the firm whether the partners are within or without India. Where the partnership has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before institution, the proviso requires service upon every person within India whom it is sought to make liable. The choice of mode has direct execution consequences (Topanmal Chhotamal v Kundonmal Gangaram AIR 1960). Rule 5 requires every person served to be informed in writing whether he is served as a partner, as a person in control of the business, or in both characters; in default of such notice, the person is deemed served as a partner. Rule 4 deals with the right of suit on the death of a partner — the suit by or against the firm survives without joinder of the legal representative of the deceased.
Rule 6 governs appearance: where persons are sued as partners in the firm name, they shall appear individually in their own names, but all subsequent proceedings continue in the firm name. The rationale is straightforward — a firm cannot itself appear in court (Lysaght Ltd v Clark & Co 1891). The decree must be in the firm name and not against any partner personally (Taylor v Collier 1882). Rule 7 supplies the corollary: a person served as a manager of the partnership business need not appear unless he is a partner. Rule 8, redrafted in 1976, sets out the procedure for appearance under protest by a person served as a partner who denies that he was a partner at any material time. Sub-rule (2) permits either side to apply for determination of the question; sub-rule (3) preserves the right to defend the firm's liability even if held to be a partner; sub-rule (4) allows the plaintiff to re-serve and proceed if the disputant is held not to have been a partner.
Rule 9 deals with suits between co-partners, or between firms with one or more common partners — the Order applies, but no execution may issue without leave of the court, on which application accounts and inquiries may be directed. Rule 10 extends the Order to any person carrying on business in a name or style other than his own, or to a Hindu undivided family carrying on business under any name. The rule applies only to suits against — not by — such a person; a person trading under a firm name may be sued in that name but cannot sue in it (Bhagwan v Hiraji 1932).
Order XXX must be read together with Order XXI Rule 50, which governs execution of decrees against firms. The Supreme Court in Topanmal Chhotamal v Kundonmal Gangaram AIR 1960 summed up the position: a decree against a firm can be executed without leave against partnership property, against any person who appeared in the suit individually, against any person who admitted in the pleadings that he is a partner, and against any person served individually as a partner who failed to appear. Against any other person, leave of the court is required, and that person has a right to deny that he was a partner before execution issues against his separate property.
Order XXXI: Trustees, executors and administrators
Order XXXI is short — three rules — and supplies the rules for representation in suits concerning property vested in a trustee, executor or administrator. Rule 1 provides that in all such suits, where the contention is between the persons beneficially interested and a third person, the trustee, executor or administrator shall represent the persons so interested, and it is not ordinarily necessary to make them parties. The court may, however, order them to be made parties if it thinks fit. The rule does not apply where the contention is between beneficiaries inter se, or between beneficiaries and the trustees themselves (Ardeshir v Hirabai 1884; Pramathanath v Suprakash 1932). Where the trustees have an interest adverse to the beneficiaries, or have fully administered the estate, beneficiaries should be added as parties (Clegg v Rowland 1866; Beresford v Ramasubba 1890).
Rule 2 deals with joinder where there are several trustees, executors or administrators: all must be made parties to a suit against one or more of them. The proviso exempts executors who have not proved the testator's will, and trustees, executors or administrators outside India. The rule is in suits against — not by — such persons (Hafizabai v Kazi Abdul 1895). Where there are several trustees, all must be impleaded; if not, no decree can be passed against any of them (Ram Ghulam v Shyam Sarup 1934). Rule 3 declares that, unless the court directs otherwise, the husband of a married trustee, administratrix or executrix shall not as such be a party to a suit by or against her — a small but tellingly archaic survival from the Code's 1908 origins.
Key cases at a glance
| Case | Provision | Principle |
|---|---|---|
| Ali Akbar v United Arab Republic AIR 1966 | Sections 84, 86, 87 | Suit by or against a foreign State must be in the name of the State; Sections 84, 86 and 87 read together. |
| Kenya Airways v Jinibai B Kheshwal AIR 1998 | Section 86 | A corporation wholly owned by a foreign Government is a "foreign State" for the purposes of Section 86. |
| Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011) | Section 86 | Section 86 applies only to suits in courts under the Code; consumer-fora proceedings require no Central Government consent. |
| New Central Jute Mills v VEB Rostock AIR 1983 | Section 86 | The plea of sovereign immunity is to be decided as a preliminary issue. |
| Anil v Rimchan AIR 1958 | Section 83 | A casual visitor on a valid visa from a friendly country is competent to sue in an Indian court. |
| Heman Santlal v State of Bombay 1951 | Order XXVII-A Rule 1 | Notice to the Attorney-General or Advocate-General is mandatory in any suit involving a substantial constitutional question. |
| United Bank of India v Naresh Kumar AIR 1997 | Order XXIX Rule 1 | A corporation can ratify, expressly or impliedly, the signing of pleadings by an officer; ratification cures want of prior authority. |
| Singer Manufacturing Co v Baijnath 1904 | Order XXIX Rule 1 | A foreign corporation can claim the benefit of Rule 1 even without registration in India. |
| Topanmal Chhotamal v Kundonmal Gangaram AIR 1960 | Order XXX Rule 3 with Order XXI Rule 50 | Defines the four categories of persons against whom a firm-decree may be executed without leave. |
| Bhagwan v Hiraji 1932 | Order XXX Rule 10 | A person trading by himself in an assumed or trading name may be sued in that name but cannot sue in it. |
| Daimler Co Ltd v Continental Tyre and Rubber Co Ltd [1916] | Section 83 | A company is an alien enemy if it is controlled by alien enemies. |
| Ram Ghulam v Shyam Sarup 1934 | Order XXXI Rule 2 | Where there are several trustees, all must be impleaded; if not, no decree can be passed against any of them. |
Frequently asked questions
Can an alien enemy sue in an Indian court?
Section 83 draws a sharp line. An alien enemy residing in India with the permission of the Central Government, and an alien friend, may sue in any competent court as if a citizen of India. But an alien enemy residing in India without such permission, or residing in a foreign country, is barred. The Explanation deems any person residing in a country at war with India and carrying on business there without a Central Government licence to be an alien enemy abroad. The mere fact that a person has been interned does not make that person an alien enemy unless war has been declared (Prem Pratap v Jagat Pralate AIR 1944). A casual visitor on a valid visa from a friendly country can sue (Anil v Rimchan AIR 1958), and where a suit was already filed before the plaintiff acquired the disability, the right to prosecute it is generally preserved (Feroza v Daulat AIR 1975), the trial being suspended rather than dismissed.
When can a foreign State be sued in an Indian court under Section 86?
Only with the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary to that Government. Consent shall not be given unless the foreign State has itself instituted a suit, trades within the local limits, is in possession of immovable property within those limits and is to be sued with reference to it, or has waived the privilege. The proviso to Section 86(1) carves out an exception: a tenant of immovable property may sue the foreign State landlord without prior consent. The provision modifies the doctrine of sovereign immunity: once the Central Government's consent is given, the foreign State cannot take refuge in customary international-law immunity (Ali Akbar v United Arab Republic AIR 1966). Section 86 applies only to suits in courts under the Code; it does not apply to consumer fora, where the Supreme Court in Ethiopian Airlines v Ganesh Narain Saboo (2011) held that no Section 86 consent is required.
How is a pleading signed and verified on behalf of a corporation under Order XXIX Rule 1?
Order XXIX Rule 1 permits any pleading in a suit by or against a corporation to be signed and verified by the secretary, by any director, or by any other principal officer who is able to depose to the facts of the case. The rule is permissive, not mandatory, and does not exclude Order VI Rule 14 — a corporation can authorise some other person to sign on its behalf for good cause (Calico Printers Assn v Karim 1930). Even where there is no formal authority and the pleading has been signed by an officer, the corporation can ratify expressly or impliedly (United Bank of India v Naresh Kumar AIR 1997). The rule covers signing and verification only — it does not by itself authorise the signatory to conduct the suit (Food Corporation of India v Sardarni Baldev Kaur AIR 1981). A foreign corporation can claim the benefit of Rule 1 even without registration in India (Singer Manufacturing Co v Baijnath 1904).
How is summons served on a firm sued in the firm name under Order XXX Rule 3?
Rule 3 authorises two modes — service on any one or more of the partners, or service at the principal place at which the partnership business is carried on within India upon the person having the control or management of the partnership business there, as the court may direct. Either is good service upon the firm whether all or any of the partners are within or without India. Where the partnership has been dissolved to the knowledge of the plaintiff before institution, the proviso requires service upon every person within India whom it is sought to make liable. Rule 5 requires that every person served be informed in writing of the capacity in which he is served — partner, person in control, or both — and in default of notice the person served is deemed served as a partner. The mode of service has direct execution consequences under Order XXI Rule 50 (Topanmal Chhotamal v Kundonmal Gangaram AIR 1960).
What is the effect of a decree passed against a firm sued in the firm name?
Under Order XXX Rule 6 partners must appear individually in their own names but all subsequent proceedings continue in the firm name; the decree itself is in the firm name. Order XXI Rule 50 read with Order XXX Rule 3 governs execution. The decree may be executed without leave of the court against partnership property, against any person who appeared in the suit individually, against a person who has admitted in the pleadings that he is or has been adjudged a partner, or against any person who was served individually as a partner but failed to appear. Against any other person — for example, a partner not served and who did not appear — leave of the court is required, and the court will give that person an opportunity to deny that he was a partner before allowing execution against his separate property (Topanmal Chhotamal v Kundonmal Gangaram AIR 1960).
Is notice to the Attorney-General mandatory in suits involving a substantial constitutional question under Order XXVII-A?
Yes. Rule 1 of Order XXVII-A is mandatory: the court shall not proceed to determine any such question until after notice has been given to the Attorney-General for India where the question concerns the Central Government, and to the Advocate-General of the State where it concerns a State Government (Heman Santlal v State of Bombay 1951). The rule does not however supersede Section 80 — an Order XXVII-A notice does not cure non-compliance with Section 80 where that section is otherwise applicable (Babu Rameshwar Prasad v Mahomad Ayyub AIR 1950). The rule does not in terms apply to writ proceedings under Article 226. Rule 2 empowers the court to order the addition of the Government as a defendant if the Attorney-General or Advocate-General applies and the addition is necessary for satisfactory determination of the question.
Are foreign Rulers and ambassadors immune from arrest under the Code?
Yes. Section 86(5) provides that no Ruler of a foreign State, no Ambassador or Envoy of a foreign State, no High Commissioner of a Commonwealth country, and no specified member of the staff or retinue, shall be arrested under the Code. Section 86(3) further requires the consent of the Central Government certified in writing by a Secretary before any decree may be executed against the property of a foreign State. Section 87 governs the style as a party — the Ruler of a foreign State sues and is sued in the name of his State. Section 87A defines "foreign State" as any State outside India recognised by the Central Government, and "Ruler" as the person for the time being recognised by the Central Government to be the head of that State; courts take judicial notice of recognition. Section 87B extends Sections 85 and 86(1) and (3) to Rulers of former Indian States in respect of pre-Constitution causes of action.