Summoning and Attendance of Witnesses (Order XVI)

Order XVI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 governs how a litigant procures the attendance of witnesses for trial. The rules collected here open the second phase of the trial: once issues are settled under Order XIV, the parties must put their witnesses on record, obtain summons through the court (or bring witnesses without summons under Rule 1-A), pay the prescribed expenses, and ensure attendance for examination. Order XVI-A, inserted in 1976, supplies the parallel scheme for witnesses confined or detained in prisons. Together, the two Orders supply every procedural lever a civil court holds over a reluctant witness.

This chapter sets out the statutory anchor, the fifteen-day list-filing rule, the consequences of failure to apply within time, the distinction between Rule 1 and Rule 1-A, the diet-money mechanism under Rules 2 to 4, the service rules under Rules 5 to 9, the coercive process under Rules 10 to 13, the distance restriction under Rule 19, and the prisoner-witness procedure under Order XVI-A. Throughout, the focus is on the procedural fine points that recur in judiciary prelims and in trial-court practice.

Statutory anchor and scheme

Order XVI sits between Order XIV — examined in our chapter on the settlement of issues — and Order XVIII (hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses). The architecture is sequential: issues are settled, then witnesses are listed and summoned, then the trial opens with examination-in-chief. Rule 1 anchors the chronology — the list of witnesses must be presented "on or before such date as the Court may appoint, and not later than fifteen days after the date on which the issues are settled." Where a party seeks summons through the court, Rule 1(2) requires it to file an application stating the purpose for which the witness is proposed to be summoned. Where it brings the witness without court process, Rule 1-A applies.

The scheme assumes that the trial court has issued a list of witnesses, fixed the diet-money scale, served summons in time, and is in a position to coerce a defaulting witness through fine, attachment and arrest. The Code's theory of trial — examined in our wider chapter on the Code of Civil Procedure — is that the parties drive the proof; the court's role is to compel attendance where a party's own efforts will not suffice.

Rule 1 — list of witnesses and summons within fifteen days

Rule 1, as recast by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 and further refined by the 1999 and 2002 amendments, is the gateway provision. Sub-rule (1) requires every party to present in court a list of witnesses, on or before a date the court appoints, and in any event not later than fifteen days after issues are settled. Sub-rule (2) requires a party seeking summons to file an application stating the purpose of the summons. Sub-rule (3) permits the court, for reasons recorded, to allow a party to call a witness whose name is not in the list, on sufficient cause being shown for the omission. Sub-rule (4) requires the application for summons to be made within five days of presenting the list.

The Supreme Court's reading of the rule in Lalitha Rai v. Aithappa Rai, AIR 1995 SC 1766, is the operative one. The Court held that a party who fails to obtain summons through the court within the prescribed time is at liberty to bring the witness without court assistance under Rule 1-A; where it nonetheless seeks the court's process, it must give reason for not having moved within time. The fifteen-day rule is therefore not a bar to leading evidence — it is a discipline that requires reasons for delay. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Balraju v. G. Vidyadhar, AIR 2004 AP 516, took the same view, holding that the fifteen-day requirement is not mandatory and that summons may be issued even where no list has been filed, if the court is satisfied with the reason for delay.

Rule 1(2) — purpose of the witness must be stated

The application under Rule 1(2) must state "the purpose for which the witness is proposed to be summoned." The object, as the Kerala High Court explained in N. Yovas v. Immanuel Jose, AIR 1996 Ker 1, is to enable the court to decide whether the examination of the witness will be of material benefit to the dispute. Where the court is not satisfied that the proposed evidence will assist the inquiry, it is not obliged to issue summons. The provision is therefore a screen against fishing expeditions; it requires the party to commit, on the record, to the relevance of every witness it wishes to call.

Two situations recur. The first is where the party seeks to summon the opposite party's advocate. The Supreme Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi, (2011) 12 SCC 600, held that a party cannot be allowed to deprive the opposite party of the services of his advocate without indicating how the advocate's testimony was relevant to the case. Indian courts have, as a matter of consistent practice, refused to summon advocates as witnesses when they are not shown in the list — a position reaffirmed in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Thakar Hasmukhbhai Khelshanker, AIR 2006 Guj 16. The second is where the party seeks to summon the opposite party itself. The Supreme Court has cautioned that, while there is no bar in principle, such an application must be bona fide and not vexatious. Summoning the opposite party with the object of putting pressure on him to abandon his claim is an abuse of process and may be refused under Section 151.

Rule 1-A — production of witnesses without summons

Rule 1-A, inserted in 1976, allows any party to bring a witness to give evidence or to produce documents without applying for summons under Rule 1. The Supreme Court in Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan, AIR 1983 SC 925, held that the right under Rule 1-A is independent of the list-filing requirement: a party may produce a witness without court assistance whether or not the witness is named in the list. The position was qualified by the 1976 amendment itself — Rule 1-A is "subject to the provisions of sub-rule (3) of rule 1" — and the Rajasthan High Court in Shimbhuram v. Lakbaram, AIR 1980 Raj 184, read this to require that the witness be on the list. The two readings have not been formally reconciled; the Mange Ram position commands wider acceptance because it preserves the litigant's freedom to bring witnesses without court coercion.

The Salem Advocate Bar Association decision — Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2003) 1 SCC 49, and the follow-up at (2005) 6 SCC 344 — supplied the procedural complement. Reading Order XVI Rule 1-A together with Order XVIII Rule 4(1), the Supreme Court held that where a party brings a witness under Rule 1-A without applying for summons, examination-in-chief is not to be recorded in court but shall be in the form of an affidavit. The architecture therefore links Rule 1-A directly to the affidavit-led examination-in-chief, which we examine in detail in the chapter on the hearing of the suit and examination of witnesses. The Rule 1-A route also intersects with the affidavit regime under Order XIX, since the chief examination so recorded must comply with Order XIX Rule 3.

Rules 2, 3 and 4 — diet money

Rule 2 requires the party applying for a summons to deposit, before the summons issues, a sum sufficient to defray the witness's travelling and other expenses for one day's attendance. The 1999 Amendment, brought into force on 1 July 2002, fixed the period for deposit at not later than seven days from the date of the application under Rule 1(4). For expert witnesses, sub-rule (2) permits reasonable remuneration for the time occupied both in giving evidence and in performing any expert work necessary for the case. Sub-rule (3) leaves the scale to High Court rules where the court is subordinate; sub-rule (4) requires the witness to be paid directly where summons is served by the party itself.

Rule 3 governs tender — the sum is to be tendered to the witness at the time of personal service of the summons. Rule 4 governs the consequences of an insufficient deposit: the court may direct further deposit; in default, the movable property of the party may be attached and sold; alternatively, the witness may be discharged without giving evidence. The Calcutta High Court in Md. Warns v. Rahman, AIR 1921 Cal 430, held that under Rule 4 only movable property may be attached and sold — immovable property is outside the rule's reach. Sub-rule (2) extends the same architecture to witnesses detained in court for more than one day; the party at whose instance the witness was summoned must defray the additional expense.

The witness's right is limited to travelling and similar expenses; he cannot claim compensation for loss of time as such, as the early decision in Nazim v. Prosonarain, (1865) 2 Hyd 236, made clear. The right is not lost merely because the witness did not apply for the expenses before giving evidence; he may demand them at any time, including after deposition. Where the deposit fails through negligence, the court has discretion to allow the deposit later if no injustice is caused to the other side, as the Punjab High Court held in Balwant Singh v. Raj Singh Baldev, AIR 1969 P&H 197.

Rules 5 to 9 — service of summons

Rule 5 requires every summons to specify the time and place at which the witness is required to attend, and whether the attendance is required for evidence, for production of documents, or for both; any document called for must be described with reasonable accuracy. Rule 6 enables the court to summon a person to produce a document without giving evidence — and the witness so summoned is deemed to comply if he causes the document to be produced through another person, instead of attending personally. The provision distinguishes Order XVI Rule 6 (documents in the possession of a stranger to the suit) from Order XIII (production, impounding and return of documents), which governs documents in the parties' own possession or power.

Rule 7 supplies the in-court power: any person present in court may be required by the court to give evidence or to produce any document then and there in his possession. Rule 7-A, inserted in 1976, is the dasti-summons rule: the court may, on application, permit a party to effect service of the summons itself, and is to deliver the summons to the party for that purpose. Service is effected by delivering or tendering a signed and sealed copy to the witness personally; the rules in Order V relating to refusal and proof of service apply by reference. Where the dasti summons cannot be served, the party may apply for the court to re-issue the summons in the ordinary manner. Importantly, no service fee is chargeable under Rule 7-A — the procedural cost of dasti is borne by the party itself.

Rule 8 prescribes the manner of service: every summons under the Order, not being a dasti summons, is to be served as nearly as may be in the same manner as a summons to a defendant under Order V. Rule 9 supplies the timing rule — service must be made sufficiently in advance to allow the witness reasonable time for preparation and for travel to the court. The Punjab and Haryana High Court in Balwant Singh v. Firm Raj Singh, AIR 1969 P&H 197, observed that Rule 9 is intended for the benefit of the witness; tardy service is therefore a ground for refusing to coerce attendance under Rule 10.

Rules 10 to 13 — coercive process for default

Rules 10 to 13 supply the court's coercive armoury. Rule 10(1) requires the court, where a witness fails to attend or produce, to examine the serving officer or the party who effected service touching the service or non-service of the summons. Examination is mandatory where the certificate has not been verified by affidavit, or where service was by the party itself; it is discretionary where the certificate has been verified. Sub-rule (2) authorises the court, on being satisfied that the witness's evidence is material and that the failure was without lawful excuse, to issue a proclamation requiring the witness to attend at a future date; a copy of the proclamation is to be affixed to the witness's residence. Sub-rule (3) authorises the court, in lieu of or together with the proclamation, to issue a warrant — with or without bail — for the arrest of the witness, and to order attachment of his property to the value of the costs of attachment and of any fine that may be imposed under Rule 12. Small Causes courts cannot order attachment of immovable property.

The provisions are penal and require strict compliance, as the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Duwarka Prasad v. Raj Kunwar Bai, AIR 1976 MP 214, repeatedly emphasised; once the court issues a process to compel attendance, it has a duty to see that the witness appears, unless the party is shown to have committed such negligence as falls within the definition of abuse of process. Rule 11 supplies the relief safety-valve: where the witness, after attachment, appears and satisfies the court that he had no lawful excuse failure or had no notice of the proclamation, the court directs the property to be released, with such order as to costs as it thinks fit.

Rule 12 supplies the fine: the court may impose a fine not exceeding five hundred rupees on a defaulting witness, having regard to his condition in life and the circumstances of the case, and may order his property to be attached and sold to satisfy the costs of attachment and the fine. The 1976 amendment added sub-rule (2): even without a proclamation under Rule 10(2) or a warrant under Rule 10(3), the court may impose the fine after giving the witness notice to show cause. Rule 13 makes the attachment and sale provisions of execution law applicable to attachments under this Order, treating the witness as if he were a judgment-debtor for procedural purposes.

Rule 14 — court's own motion to summon a witness

Rule 14, as recast by the 1976 Amendment, allows the court of its own motion to summon any person — including a party to the suit — as a witness, where it thinks it necessary to examine such person and the person has not been called by either party. The power is discretionary. The Privy Council in K.S. Agha Mir Ahmed Shah v. Mir Mudassir Shah, AIR 1944 PC 100, held that the discretion will not be exercised to remedy a party's intentional or negligent omission to call its own witness. The Supreme Court has nonetheless emphasised that, in appropriate cases, the court ought to invoke Rule 14 in the interests of justice — the power was so applied in R.M. Seshadri v. G.V. Rai, AIR 1969 SC 692, and again in Hussain Khan v. Nijalingappa, AIR 1969 SC 1034, where the Court spoke of "compelling reasons." The 1976 amendment, by adding "including a party to the suit," settled an earlier doubt about the court's power to summon a party suo motu.

Rules 15, 16 and 17 — duty of the witness and right to depart

Rule 15 imposes the duty: a person summoned to appear and give evidence must attend at the time and place named, and a person summoned to produce a document must either attend to produce it or cause it to be produced. Rule 16 governs departure: a witness who has attended must remain at each hearing until the suit is disposed of, unless the court otherwise directs. On application of either party and payment of necessary expenses, the court may require the witness to furnish security to attend at the next or any other hearing; in default, the court may order detention in civil prison. Rule 17 makes the coercive provisions of Rules 10 to 13 applicable to a witness who, having attended, departs without lawful excuse in contravention of Rule 16.

Rule 18 supplies the procedure where a witness apprehended under a warrant is brought before the court but cannot, owing to the absence of the parties, give evidence: the court may require him to give reasonable bail or other security for his appearance at a future date, and on failure may order detention in civil prison.

Rule 19 — the distance restriction

Rule 19 is one of the most-tested provisions of the Order. It provides that no one shall be ordered to attend in person to give evidence unless he resides within the local limits of the court's ordinary original jurisdiction, or — outside such limits — at a place less than one hundred kilometres distance from the court-house, or less than five hundred kilometres where there is railway, steamer or other established public conveyance for five-sixths of the distance. The proviso, inserted by the 1976 Amendment, allows the court to require personal attendance even beyond these distances where transport by air is available between the two places and the witness is paid the air fare.

The Madras High Court in Ramasayee Agro Industries Ltd v. India Sugar Refineries Ltd, AIR 1983 Mad 194, read the proviso as applying only to witnesses residing beyond five hundred kilometres — within the existing distance bands, the discretion under clauses (a) and (b) continues to govern. The Andhra Pradesh High Court in Jayashanker Mills Ltd v. Haji Zakaria, AIR 1962 AP 405, drew the conceptual line between Rule 19 and Order XXVI: where Rule 19 prevents the court from compelling personal attendance, the parties' remedy is to seek examination on commission under Order XXVI. The two provisions are complementary — Rule 19 sets the outer limit of the court's coercive power; Order XXVI supplies the alternative. As the Orissa High Court in Manoharlal v. Atma Prakash, AIR 1980 Ori 57, observed, a witness residing five hundred kilometres or more from the court-house cannot be compelled to appear, even where five-sixths of the distance is covered by rail or road, unless the proviso applies.

Rules 20 and 21 — the party as witness

Rule 20 supplies the consequence of a party's refusal to give evidence when called by the court: the court may pronounce judgment against him or make such order as it thinks fit. Rule 21 applies the rules as to witnesses to a party who is required to give evidence or produce a document. The two rules, read together, make the party-as-witness an integral part of the trial scheme; the party who refuses to depose suffers an adverse inference at the very least, and may suffer judgment under Rule 20.

The Privy Council in Lal Kunwar v. Chiranji Lal, (1909) ILR 32 All 104, condemned the practice of advocates withholding their own client's testimony in the hope of forcing the opposite party to call him. The Court called the practice "vicious" and "unworthy of a high-toned or reputable system of advocacy"; it embarrassed judicial investigation and enabled fraud and chicanery to baffle justice. The Bombay High Court in Pirgonda v. Vishwanath, AIR 1956 Bom 251, applied the same principle to permit an adverse inference where a party in a position to give evidence does not enter the witness box. The Rajasthan High Court in Moti Lal v. Sardar Mal, AIR 1976 Raj 40, extended the inference to parties who appear but evade cross-examination.

Order XVI-A — witnesses confined or detained in prisons

Order XVI-A was inserted in 1976, drawing its provisions from the Prisoners (Attendance in Courts) Act, 1955 (now repealed). Rule 1 supplies the definitions: "detained" includes preventive detention, and "prison" includes any subsidiary jail and any reformatory or borstal institution. Rule 2 confers the substantive power: where it appears to a court that the evidence of a person confined or detained in a prison within the State is material in a suit, the court may make an order requiring the officer in charge of the prison to produce that person before the court to give evidence. The proviso is the doctrinally important one: where the distance from the prison to the court-house is more than twenty-five kilometres, no such order shall be made unless the court is satisfied that the examination of the person on commission will not be adequate.

Rule 3 requires the party at whose instance or for whose benefit the order is made to deposit a sum sufficient to defray the expenses of the order's execution, including the travelling and other expenses of the escort provided for the witness. Rule 4 empowers the State Government, by general or special order, to direct that any person or class of persons shall not be removed from prison; in making such an order, the State Government must have regard to the nature of the offence, the likelihood of public-order disturbance on removal, and the public interest generally. Rule 5 lists the situations in which the prison officer must abstain from carrying out the court's order — medical unfitness; committal for trial or remand; custody expiring before the order can be complied with; or a State Government direction under Rule 4. Rule 6 supplies the modalities: the officer in charge causes the witness to be taken to court, kept in custody, and returned after examination. Rule 7 is the alternative: where attendance cannot be secured under the preceding provisions, the court may issue a commission for the examination of the witness in prison; the provisions of Order XXVI apply to such examination so far as may be.

Distinguishing Order XVI from cognate provisions

Three procedural distinctions recur in prelims and in trial-court practice. First, the line between Rule 1 and Rule 1-A: Rule 1 is the route through court process; Rule 1-A is the route by direct production. The Supreme Court in Salem Advocate Bar Association ((2003) 1 SCC 49) anchored the consequence of choosing Rule 1-A — the chief examination of a Rule 1-A witness must be on affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4(1). Second, the line between Order XVI Rule 6 and Order XIII: Rule 6 reaches documents in the possession of a stranger to the suit; Order XIII reaches documents in the parties' own possession or power. Third, the line between Order XVI Rule 19 and the parent regime on commissions: Rule 19 sets the outer limit of personal attendance; the rule on examination on commission supplies the alternative for witnesses beyond the distance bands or otherwise unable to attend. The same line reappears in our treatment of the examination of parties under Order X, where the court's preliminary examination of the parties may identify witnesses to be summoned under this Order.

A fourth distinction is doctrinally important. Order XVI Rule 1-A operates without court process; discovery under Order XI, by contrast, is a court-driven mechanism for the production of documents and answers to interrogatories from the opposite party. The two are not interchangeable. A party seeking discovery from the opposite party invokes Order XI; a party bringing a third-party witness with documents invokes Rule 1-A read with Rule 6.

Refusal of summons and the appellant's remedy

Where a party applies for summons under Rule 1 and the application is refused, no appeal lies from the order of refusal — there is no specific entry in Order XLIII. The remedy is to await the decree, then take the refusal as a ground of objection in the memorandum of first appeal under Section 105. As the Oudh Chief Court held in Mohammad Asad Ali Khan v. Sadiq Ali Khan, AIR 1943 Oudh 91, the appellate court can interfere only if the refusal has injuriously affected the decision on merits — in which case the decree is set aside and the suit remanded for the summons to issue. Where the refusal does not affect the merits, the decree stands. The Madhya Pradesh High Court in Rabul Jain v. Smt. Nampata Jain (WP No. 705/2017) held that a refusal under Rule 1 cannot be cured under Article 227.

The position confirms the Code's general architecture: interlocutory rulings on procedure are reviewable in appeal under Section 105, not by separate appeal under Order XLIII; revision under Section 115 is available only where the conditions of that section are satisfied — jurisdictional error or material irregularity occasioning failure of justice — and is rarely available against a refusal of summons.

MCQ angle — the recurring distinctions

Three propositions are tested with regularity. First, the fifteen-day rule under Rule 1(1) is directory, not mandatory: the court may permit a list to be filed beyond fifteen days where sufficient cause is shown, and may issue summons where reasons are recorded under Rule 1(3). Second, the diet-money deposit under Rule 2 must be made within seven days of the application under Rule 1(4), as fixed by the 2002 amendment; failure to deposit may result in attachment of movable property under Rule 4 — but immovable property is outside the rule. Third, the maximum fine for non-attendance under Rule 12 is five hundred rupees, regardless of the witness's status; Rule 12(2), inserted in 1976, allows the court to impose the fine after notice even without first issuing a proclamation or warrant under Rule 10.

Two further distinctions deserve emphasis. The distance band under Rule 19 is one hundred kilometres without rail/steamer, and five hundred kilometres with rail/steamer for five-sixths of the distance; the air-transport proviso applies only beyond five hundred kilometres, and only where the witness is paid the fare. Under Order XVI-A Rule 2, the proviso bars an attendance order where the prison-to-court distance exceeds twenty-five kilometres unless the court is satisfied that examination on commission will not be adequate — the default for distant prisoners is therefore commission under Order XXVI, not personal production.

Practical takeaways for the trial-court practitioner

Three practical steps follow from the case law and the rules. First, file the witness list within fifteen days of issue settlement and apply for summons within five days of the list — even where the rule is read as directory, courts treat compliance as a marker of bona fides. Second, wherever possible, prefer Rule 1-A: bringing a witness without summons avoids the diet-money mechanism, the service-of-summons procedure and the risk of refusal under Rule 1(2); the only consequence is that the chief examination must be on affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4(1). Third, where personal attendance is doubtful — distance, prisoner status, illness — move under the commissions regime for examination on commission rather than under Order XVI for summons; the court's discretion is wider, and the witness's deposition is more reliably obtained.

Order XVI is the procedural skeleton on which the trial — covered substantively in our chapter on the examination of witnesses at the hearing stage — is hung. Default in the witness machinery, like default in appearance under Order IX, has consequences that are calibrated to the gravity of the omission and the prejudice caused. The next chapter, on adjournments under Order XVII, addresses what happens when, despite the machinery of summons, attendance, and coercive process, the trial cannot proceed on the appointed day.

Frequently asked questions

Is the fifteen-day period for filing a list of witnesses under Order XVI Rule 1 mandatory or directory?

Directory. The Supreme Court in Lalitha Rai v. Aithappa Rai, AIR 1995 SC 1766, and the Andhra Pradesh High Court in N. Balraju v. G. Vidyadhar, AIR 2004 AP 516, held that the fifteen-day period is not a bar to leading evidence. Where a party fails to file the list within time, it must show sufficient cause; the court may then permit the list to be received under Rule 1(3). The provision is a discipline, not a forfeiture. The contrary reading would amount to procedural tyranny, throttling the course of justice — a result the Legislature could not have intended.

What is the difference between Order XVI Rule 1 and Rule 1-A?

Rule 1 governs witnesses summoned through the court — the party files a list, applies for summons, deposits diet money, and the summons issues from the court. Rule 1-A allows the party to bring a witness directly, without applying for summons. The Supreme Court in Mange Ram v. Brij Mohan, AIR 1983 SC 925, held that Rule 1-A operates independently of the list-filing requirement. The procedural consequence — drawn from Salem Advocate Bar Association v. UOI, (2003) 1 SCC 49 — is that the chief examination of a Rule 1-A witness must be on affidavit under Order XVIII Rule 4(1).

What is the maximum fine that can be imposed on a defaulting witness under Order XVI?

Five hundred rupees, under Rule 12(1). The fine must be calibrated to the witness's condition in life and the circumstances of the case. Rule 12(2), inserted by the 1976 Amendment, allows the court to impose the fine after notice to show cause, even without first issuing a proclamation under Rule 10(2) or a warrant under Rule 10(3). The court may also order attachment and sale of the witness's property to satisfy the costs of attachment and the fine. Rule 13 imports the execution-law provisions on attachment and sale, treating the witness as a judgment-debtor for procedural purposes.

What is the distance limit for compelling a witness to attend in person under Order XVI Rule 19?

One hundred kilometres without public conveyance, and five hundred kilometres where there is railway, steamer or other established public conveyance for five-sixths of the distance. The proviso, inserted in 1976, allows the court to compel attendance even beyond five hundred kilometres where transport by air is available between the two places and the witness is paid the air fare. Beyond these limits, the court must resort to examination on commission under Order XXVI, as held in Manoharlal v. Atma Prakash, AIR 1980 Ori 57, and Ramasayee Agro Industries Ltd v. India Sugar Refineries Ltd, AIR 1983 Mad 194.

When can a prisoner be ordered to attend court as a witness under Order XVI-A?

Where the court is satisfied that the prisoner's evidence is material in the suit, it may order the officer in charge of the prison to produce him before the court under Rule 2 of Order XVI-A. The proviso to Rule 2 is the doctrinally important one: where the prison-to-court distance exceeds twenty-five kilometres, no such order may be made unless the court is satisfied that examination on commission under Rule 7 will not be adequate. The party at whose instance the order is made must deposit the expenses of execution under Rule 3, including the travelling expenses of the escort.

Can a party summon the opposite party's advocate as a witness?

Only in exceptional circumstances and only where relevance is shown. The Supreme Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha v. K.D. Ganapathi, (2011) 12 SCC 600, held that a party cannot deprive the opposite party of the services of his advocate without indicating how the advocate's testimony was relevant to the case. The Gujarat High Court in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Thakar Hasmukhbhai, AIR 2006 Guj 16, refused to summon a legal adviser whose name did not appear on the list. The consistent practice is to refuse such summons unless the relevance is patent and the application is bona fide.