For the judiciary aspirant, the criminal judgment-writing paper is won or lost not on the verdict but on the architecture. Examiners do not award marks for guessing whether the accused is guilty; they award marks for marshalling the cause-title, the prosecution case, the charge, the plea, the evidence, the reasoned discussion and the operative order into the precise sequence the statute commands. Section 393 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (the successor to Section 354 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) is not a vague exhortation to write well — it lays down the mandatory contents of a judgment, and a script that omits a limb is a script that loses the limb's marks. This chapter dissects the skeleton of a criminal judgment component by component, anchoring each to its statutory source and to the case law that has put flesh on the bare bones, so that you can reproduce the structure under examination pressure with the confidence of a trial judge.
What the Statute Demands: Section 393 BNSS / Section 354 CrPC
The starting point is the bare provision. Section 393(1) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — reproducing almost verbatim Section 354(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — commands that every judgment referred to in Section 392 (Section 353 CrPC) shall be written in the language of the Court, and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. That single clause is the spine of every criminal judgment: it converts the judge's private satisfaction into a public, reasoned, reviewable document. Sub-section (1)(b) requires the judgment to specify the offence of which the accused is convicted and the section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (or the Indian Penal Code, under the old Code) or other law under which he is convicted, together with the punishment. Where it is an acquittal, the judgment must state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.
Two propositions of universal application flow from this. First, a judgment is a composite document — it must travel logically from the question to be decided, through the evidence, to the reasoned conclusion and finally the sentence. Second, the duty to give reasons is not decorative: it is the difference between a judgment and a decree. For the place of this provision within the larger scheme — and why these contents are mandatory rather than directory — see our chapter on the introduction, importance and statutory basis of judgment writing and the subject Criminal Judgment Writing hub.
Pronouncement and Language: The Frame Around the Components
Before the components themselves, the aspirant must grasp the procedural frame in which they sit. Section 392 BNSS (Section 353 CrPC) governs how a judgment is delivered: it must be pronounced in open court immediately after the trial or at a subsequent time of which notice is given, either by delivering the whole judgment, by reading out the whole judgment, or by reading out the operative part and explaining the substance. The judge must date and sign the judgment in open court at the time of pronouncing it.
The constitutional significance of this act was settled in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 194), where the Supreme Court held that a judgment is the final, conclusive expression of the Court's mind reached only when it is pronounced or delivered in open court; until then, a judge is entitled to change his opinion. In that case a judgment signed by two judges but delivered after the death of one was held to be no judgment at all. The lesson for the examinee is that the limbs you write are not loose notes — they are the considered expression of a judicial mind that becomes irrevocable only on pronouncement. On language, Section 393(1) (and Section 367 CrPC on the language of courts generally) requires the judgment to be in the language of the court; a judgment in the prescribed local language with the operative order intelligibly recorded satisfies the mandate.
Component One: The Cause-Title, Court and Parties
Every criminal judgment opens with its cause-title — the formal heading that identifies the court, the case number, the date and the parties. This is not mere clerical decoration. The cause-title fixes the jurisdiction of the court, the identity of the lis, and the persons bound by the operative order. A judgment of the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge will be headed accordingly, followed by the Sessions Case number and year, the date of judgment, the name of the State as prosecutor, and the name, parentage and address of the accused.
The discipline matters because the operative portion that ultimately convicts or acquits must be traceable to a precisely identified accused on a precisely numbered charge-sheet. An error in the cause-title — wrong case number, mis-described accused — can render the judgment unintelligible and invite remand. The granular rules for drafting this limb, including how to render the array of parties and the case number, are developed fully in our chapter on the cause-title, court, case number and parties. In the examination, marks are lost not for an inelegant heading but for a heading that omits the case number or mis-identifies the prosecuting agency.
Component Two: The Statement of the Prosecution Case
Once the parties are identified, the judgment must narrate, neutrally and concisely, the case the prosecution has brought. This limb sets out the story of the First Information Report, the date, time and place of the alleged occurrence, the role attributed to the accused, the manner of investigation, and the offences alleged. It is the factual foundation against which the evidence will later be tested. Crucially, the prosecution case must be stated as an allegation — the judge has not yet decided anything — and not coloured by the eventual finding.
A well-drafted statement of the prosecution case answers the implicit question "what is the accused said to have done, and how did the matter reach this court?" without lapsing into either advocacy or premature conclusion. This sequencing — allegation first, evidence next, finding last — mirrors the statutory demand in Section 393 for "the point or points for determination" to be framed before "the decision thereon". The drafting technique for this limb, and the common pitfall of importing the verdict into the narrative, are treated in detail in our chapter on the statement of the prosecution case.
Component Three: The Charge Framed Against the Accused
The judgment must record the charge that was framed and read over to the accused. The charge is the formal accusation that crystallises the offence into specific sections and gives the accused notice of precisely what he must meet. Its reproduction in the judgment is not a formality: it fixes the scope of the trial and the boundaries of the eventual conviction. A conviction for an offence not charged, where the accused was not put on notice and was thereby prejudiced, is liable to be set aside.
The leading authority on the consequence of a defective or omitted charge is the Constitution Bench decision in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116), where the Court drew the enduring distinction between an illegality that vitiates a trial and a mere irregularity curable under Section 465 CrPC (now Section 511 BNSS), holding that the omission to frame a charge does not by itself vitiate a conviction unless it has occasioned a failure of justice or real prejudice to the accused. The test is prejudice, not technical perfection. Because the charge controls what the operative order may convict for, the aspirant must reproduce it accurately; the conventions for doing so are explained in our chapter on the charge framed against the accused.
Component Four: The Plea of the Accused
Following the charge, the judgment records the plea — whether the accused pleaded guilty or claimed to be tried. This short limb has large consequences. A plea of guilty, if voluntary and unambiguous, may found a conviction without a full trial; a plea of not guilty sets the prosecution to proof on every ingredient. The judgment must reflect that the charge was read over and explained and that the plea was recorded.
That an admission of guilt can sustain a conviction was reaffirmed in State of Maharashtra v. Sukhdev Singh (AIR 1992 SC 2100), where the Supreme Court observed that a conviction may rest on a confession or admission of guilt made by the accused at any stage of the trial, including in his statement under Section 313 CrPC, provided it is established that the admission was made. But the judge must be vigilant: a plea of guilty must be recorded in the accused's own words and must be shown to be informed and voluntary, for the liberty of a person is at stake. The recording conventions and the safeguards around an accused's plea — including the treatment of a qualified or equivocal plea — are developed in our chapter on the plea of the accused.
Component Five: The Prosecution Evidence and Witness Listing
The heart of the contested judgment is the marshalling of evidence. The judgment must list and discuss the prosecution witnesses (PW-1, PW-2 and so on), the documentary exhibits, and the material objects. This is not a mere catalogue: the judge must summarise what each witness deposed, identify the ocular, medical, forensic and circumstantial strands, and then weigh them against the cross-examination and the defence version. The mandate of Section 393 — "the reasons for the decision" — is satisfied only when the judgment demonstrates a conscious application of mind to the evidence, witness by witness and issue by issue.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that reasons are the soul of a judgment. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 — a civil appeal whose principle the criminal courts have adopted — the Court held that the judgment must reflect the conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on all the issues arising, the giving of reasons being the heart and hinge of the judicial process. A criminal judgment that merely lists the witnesses and announces a conclusion, without engaging the evidence, is a non-judgment. The systematic method of listing and numbering prosecution witnesses, and of organising the evidentiary discussion, is set out in our chapter on prosecution evidence and PW listing.
Component Six: Framing the Points for Determination
Section 393(1) expressly requires the judgment to contain "the point or points for determination". In a criminal trial these are the questions the court must answer to dispose of the case: typically, whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the act constituting the offence charged, and any subsidiary questions of identity, intention, or applicability of an exception. Framing these points crisply is the analytical hinge of the judgment, because the discussion of evidence that follows must be organised around answering them, and the operative order must dispose of each.
The discipline of framing and then sequentially answering the points for determination is what distinguishes a structured judgment from a rambling narrative. The points operate as the skeleton on which the reasons hang; an examiner can see at a glance whether the candidate has identified the real controversy. A judgment that frames a point but never answers it, or that decides a matter no point covers, betrays a failure of the very application of mind that Section 393 and Santosh Hazari demand. Frame fewer, sharper points rather than many overlapping ones, and ensure every point is answered in the operative portion.
Component Seven: The Reasons — The Soul of the Judgment
If the points for determination are the skeleton and the evidence the flesh, the reasons are the soul. The reasoned discussion is where the judge tests each strand of evidence against the standard of proof, resolves contradictions, accepts or rejects witnesses with stated grounds, and arrives at a conclusion on each point. The constitutional importance of self-contained reasons was emphasised by the Constitution Bench in State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi (AIR 1984 SC 444), where the Court deprecated the practice of pronouncing a final order while reserving the reasoned judgment for later, observing that the operative order and the reasons should ordinarily issue together so that the parties and the appellate court are not left in suspense as to the grounds of decision.
The requirement of reasons also has a temporal dimension. In Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318, the Supreme Court, confronted with a two-year delay between reserving and delivering judgment, laid down guidelines requiring courts to pronounce reasoned judgments within a reasonable time — ordinarily six weeks, and at the outermost three months — failing which administrative intervention was directed. The BNSS has now statutorily reinforced this, Section 392 requiring judgment within thirty days of the conclusion of arguments, extendable to forty-five days for reasons recorded in writing. For the examinee the message is plain: a conclusion without reasons is worthless, and reasons must be contemporaneous, structured and complete.
Component Eight: The Finding of Conviction or Acquittal
Having answered the points for determination, the judgment must record a clear finding. Where the accused is convicted, Section 393(1)(b) requires the judgment to specify the offence and the precise section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (or other law) of which he is convicted; where the offence is doubtful as between two sections or two parts of a section, Section 393(2) permits the court to express the doubt and pass judgment in the alternative. Where the accused is acquitted, the judgment must name the offence of which he is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.
This precision is not pedantry. In a Sessions trial the finding of conviction or acquittal is recorded under Section 248 BNSS (Section 235 CrPC): after hearing arguments and points of law, the judge gives judgment, and on conviction proceeds to hear the accused on sentence. The finding must be unambiguous — the operative order cannot leave it uncertain whether the accused stands convicted under one section or another, for that uncertainty would defeat both the right of appeal and the execution of sentence. A finding of acquittal must equally be explicit, for it triggers the immediate liberty of the accused and the bar against re-trial.
Component Nine: The Hearing on Sentence
A conviction is not the end of the judgment. Section 248(2) BNSS (Section 235(2) CrPC) creates a distinct, mandatory stage: after recording conviction, and unless the court proceeds under the probation provisions, the judge must hear the accused on the question of sentence and only then pass sentence. This bifurcation — guilt first, sentence second — is one of the most heavily examined points in judgment writing.
Its mandatory character was settled in Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190, where the Supreme Court held that Section 235(2) is not an empty formality but a real and substantial opportunity to place before the court all material bearing on sentence, and that its denial is not a mere irregularity curable under Section 465 but a serious failure that ordinarily requires the matter to be remitted for a proper sentence hearing. The principle was reinforced in Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (AIR 1989 SC 1456), which stressed that the sentencing court must consciously bring on record the facts and circumstances relevant to sentence, particularly in capital cases. The judgment must therefore show, on its face, that the convict was afforded this hearing before sentence was pronounced.
Component Ten: The Sentence and Special Reasons
The sentence is recorded as a distinct component, and where it is severe, the statute demands heightened reasoning. Section 393(3) BNSS (Section 354(3) CrPC) provides that when the conviction is for an offence punishable with death or, in the alternative, with imprisonment for life or for a term of years, the judgment shall state the reasons for the sentence awarded, and in the case of a sentence of death, the special reasons for such sentence. The ordinary rule is thus life imprisonment for a capital offence; death is the exception that must be specially justified.
The content of "special reasons" was authoritatively expounded in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684, where the Constitution Bench upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty and crystallised the "rarest of rare" doctrine: death may be imposed only when the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed after a balanced weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The judgment must therefore not merely announce a death sentence but record the special reasons that bring the case within the rarest-of-rare category. For lesser sentences the judgment should still indicate the reasoning, and where it imposes a term shorter than the statutory norm for certain offences, Section 393 requires reasons to be recorded. A sentence stated without the statutorily mandated reasons is vulnerable on appeal.
Component Eleven: The Operative Order and Ancillary Directions
The operative portion is the dispositive command of the judgment — the part that actually convicts and sentences, or acquits and releases. It must be self-contained, intelligible on its own, and capable of execution by the jail authorities without reference to the body of the judgment. It states the section of conviction, the quantum and nature of sentence (rigorous or simple imprisonment, fine, default sentence), any set-off for the period already undergone under Section 468 BNSS (Section 428 CrPC), and the consequential directions.
Ancillary directions form part of this limb and are routinely tested: the disposal of property and material objects under Section 497 BNSS (Section 452 CrPC), the disposal of any case property, directions as to bail bonds, and, on acquittal, the cancellation of bonds and the direction that the accused be set at liberty if not required in any other case. The judgment closes with the date and the signature of the presiding officer, satisfying the pronouncement requirement of Section 392. A judgment that reasons impeccably but leaves the operative order vague — failing to specify whether sentences run concurrently or consecutively, or omitting the default sentence on a fine — is an incomplete judgment, and incompleteness here is precisely where examination marks are forfeited.
Abridged Judgments: Magistrate and Summons Cases
Not every criminal judgment carries the full architecture described above. The Code recognised a lighter form for the Court of a Metropolitan Magistrate: Section 355 CrPC permitted such a magistrate, instead of a full judgment, to record only the prescribed particulars — the serial number, the date of commission of the offence, the name of the complainant, the particulars of the accused, the offence complained of and proved, the plea and examination, the final order, the date of the order, and, where an appeal lay, a brief statement of reasons. Notably, the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 has abolished the category of Metropolitan Magistrate and the metropolitan area, so this abridged form has been discontinued under the new scheme, and magistrates now write judgments in the ordinary form.
Even so, the aspirant should appreciate the underlying principle: the depth of reasoning expected is calibrated to the gravity of the case and the existence of a right of appeal. A summons-case judgment is shorter than a Sessions judgment, but it must still record the point for determination, the decision and the reasons — Section 393 brooks no exception to that core. Whatever the form, the omission of a statutorily required particular is not automatically fatal: under the prejudice test of Willie Slaney and Section 465 CrPC (Section 511 BNSS), a curable irregularity that has occasioned no failure of justice will not by itself unseat the judgment. The structural discipline, however, remains the surest route to a judgment that survives appeal and earns full marks.
Frequently asked questions
What does Section 393 BNSS (Section 354 CrPC) require a criminal judgment to contain?
It requires that every judgment be written in the language of the court and contain the point or points for determination, the decision thereon, and the reasons for the decision. On conviction it must specify the offence and the section of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (or other law) and the punishment; on acquittal it must name the offence acquitted of and direct that the accused be set at liberty. For a death sentence it must record the special reasons under Section 393(3).
Are reasons truly mandatory, or can a judge just record a conclusion?
Reasons are mandatory and are treated as the soul of the judgment. In Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) the Supreme Court held that a judgment must reflect a conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons on every issue. In State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh Talwandi (AIR 1984 SC 444) the Court deprecated pronouncing an operative order while deferring the reasons, holding that the two should ordinarily issue together.
Is a separate hearing on sentence after conviction compulsory?
Yes. Section 248(2) BNSS (Section 235(2) CrPC) requires the court, after recording conviction, to hear the accused on the question of sentence before passing sentence. In Santa Singh v. State of Punjab (1976) 4 SCC 190 the Supreme Court held this is mandatory and not a mere formality; denial is generally not a curable irregularity and requires the matter to be remitted for a proper sentence hearing. Allauddin Mian v. State of Bihar (AIR 1989 SC 1456) reinforced the duty to place sentencing material on record, especially in capital cases.
What are the 'special reasons' required for a death sentence?
Section 393(3) BNSS (Section 354(3) CrPC) makes life imprisonment the norm for a capital offence and death the exception, requiring the judgment to record special reasons for a death sentence. In Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 the Constitution Bench laid down the 'rarest of rare' doctrine: death may be imposed only where the alternative of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed after weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The special reasons must demonstrate that the case falls in that category.
When does a defect in structure — like an omitted charge — vitiate a judgment?
Not automatically. In Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh (AIR 1956 SC 116) the Constitution Bench distinguished an illegality that vitiates a trial from a mere irregularity curable under Section 465 CrPC (Section 511 BNSS). The omission or defect of a charge does not by itself unseat a conviction unless it has occasioned a failure of justice or real prejudice to the accused. The governing test is prejudice, not technical perfection.
When does a judgment become final, and within what time must it be delivered?
Under Surendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (AIR 1954 SC 194), a judgment becomes the final, conclusive act only when pronounced or delivered in open court; until then the judge may change his mind. As to timing, Anil Rai v. State of Bihar (2001) 7 SCC 318 laid down guidelines for prompt delivery after reserving judgment, and Section 392 BNSS now statutorily requires judgment within thirty days of conclusion of arguments, extendable to forty-five days for reasons recorded in writing.