Filing of Complaints, FIRs and Charge Sheets — Practice Directions

Every criminal prosecution is born from a piece of paper — a complaint handed to a Magistrate, a First Information Report recorded at a police station, or a charge sheet laid before the court at the close of investigation. The Criminal Rules of Practice, read with the Code of Criminal Procedure (now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), prescribe how each of these documents must be received, registered, scrutinised and forwarded. This chapter traces that paper trail from the informant’s doorstep to the committal court, weaving together the bare-statute framework, the practice directions that govern the ministerial side of the courthouse, and the line of Supreme Court authority — from Lalita Kumari to Vinubhai Malaviya — that has shaped how complaints, FIRs and charge sheets are treated in practice.

Three gateways: complaint, police report, and information

Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 210 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) recognises three distinct gateways through which a Magistrate may take cognizance of an offence: upon a complaint of facts, upon a police report of such facts, and upon information received from any person other than a police officer (or upon the Magistrate’s own knowledge). The filing rules differ for each gateway, and the Criminal Rules of Practice exist precisely to standardise how the court’s ministerial establishment receives, numbers and processes each kind of initiating document. A student must keep the three streams analytically separate because the procedural consequences — examination of the complainant, scrutiny of the charge sheet, the informant’s right to be heard — all turn on which gateway is in play.

A “complaint” is defined in Section 2(d) of the CrPC (Section 2(1)(h) of the BNSS) as any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action, that some person has committed an offence — but the definition expressly excludes a police report. A “police report”, by contrast, is the report forwarded by the investigating officer under Section 173(2) CrPC (Section 193 BNSS) at the conclusion of investigation. The third route — a First Information Report under Section 154 CrPC (Section 173 BNSS) — is not itself a mode of taking cognizance but the trigger that sets investigation in motion. Understanding where each document sits in the architecture is the foundation for everything that follows, and the constitution and sittings of criminal courts chapter explains which tier of court is competent to receive each.

Filing a private complaint and examination of the complainant

When a private person approaches a Magistrate directly rather than the police, the document filed is a complaint petition. The Criminal Rules of Practice in most States require that the complaint be presented in writing, signed by the complainant, set out the facts constituting the offence, name the accused where known, and be accompanied by a list of witnesses and documents relied upon. On presentation, the ministerial officer assigns it a Criminal Miscellaneous or Calendar Case number and places it before the Magistrate, who must then decide whether to take cognizance.

If cognizance is taken on a complaint, Section 200 CrPC (Section 223 BNSS) obliges the Magistrate to examine the complainant and the witnesses present, on oath, and to reduce the substance of that examination to writing, signed by the complainant, the witnesses and the Magistrate. This examination is the filter that separates genuine grievances from vexatious ones. The BNSS has introduced a significant practice-altering proviso to Section 223(1): no cognizance of an offence shall be taken without giving the proposed accused an opportunity of being heard — a departure from the CrPC scheme, under which the accused had no locus at the pre-cognizance stage. The procedure for what follows examination — dismissal under Section 203, issue of process, or postponement of issue of process for inquiry under Section 202 — dovetails with the rules on issuance of summons and warrants.

The FIR under Section 154: mandatory registration

The First Information Report is the cornerstone of cognizable-offence investigation. Section 154(1) CrPC (Section 173(1) BNSS) provides that every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given orally, shall be reduced to writing, read over to the informant, and signed by the person giving it, and the substance entered in a book kept for that purpose — the station house diary. The use of the word “shall” settled the long-running debate over whether registration is mandatory or discretionary.

In Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1, a Constitution Bench held that registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 if the information discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, and that no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. The Court did, however, carve out categories — matrimonial and family disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence, corruption cases, and cases of abnormal and unexplained delay — where a preliminary inquiry, limited to ascertaining whether a cognizable offence is disclosed, may precede registration; such inquiry was to be completed expeditiously (the judgment indicated seven days). The Court was careful to add that registration of an FIR does not mean automatic arrest, arrest being separately governed by Section 41 CrPC. The practice direction flowing from Lalita Kumari — register first, investigate later — is the single most important rule a station house officer must observe, and refusal to register attracts the supervisory remedies discussed below.

What constitutes an FIR — and what does not

Not every scrap of information recorded at a police station is an FIR. The report must be the first information of a cognizable offence that sets the investigative machinery in motion. In Superintendent of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh, (2003) 6 SCC 175, the Supreme Court held that an FIR is not meant to be an encyclopaedia of every detail of the occurrence; a General Diary (GD) entry recording information disclosing a cognizable offence can, in a given case, be treated as an FIR, and the police have jurisdiction to investigate on that basis. The information need not be detailed or precise so long as it discloses the commission of a cognizable offence.

The evidentiary character of the FIR is equally important for filing practice. In Aghnoo Nagesia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1966 SC 119, the Court held that where the FIR is given by the accused himself and amounts to a confession, the whole confessional statement is barred by Section 25 of the Evidence Act (now Section 23 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), save to the limited extent that Section 27 lifts the ban — and the confession cannot be split into admissible and inadmissible parts. This is why the rules insist that the informant’s status be recorded with care. The function of an FIR was classically explained in Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 3 SCC 393: it is a vital piece of evidence for corroborating the oral testimony at trial, and prompt lodging is insisted upon so as to obtain early information about the circumstances, the culprits and the witnesses, before memories fade and embellishment creeps in. Delay, the Court warned, must be satisfactorily explained.

Zero FIR, jurisdiction and the cross-station problem

A recurring practical difficulty is the refusal of a police station to register an FIR on the ground that the offence occurred outside its territorial jurisdiction. The answer, now placed beyond doubt, is the “Zero FIR”. Section 173(1) BNSS gives statutory recognition to what had earlier been an administrative innovation: information relating to a cognizable offence may be given at any police station irrespective of where the offence was committed, and the station receiving it must register the FIR (initially with a “Zero” serial number) and transfer it to the station having jurisdiction. Section 154 CrPC had been judicially read to the same effect, but the BNSS now makes the obligation explicit, and the proviso machinery for women victims and for offences under specified provisions reinforces it.

The practice direction is straightforward: territorial jurisdiction is no answer to a demand for registration of a cognizable offence. A station that turns away an informant on jurisdictional grounds acts contrary to both Lalita Kumari and the express words of Section 173(1) BNSS. Once registered, the file is transmitted to the competent station, and the question of which court will ultimately try the case is governed by the place-of-inquiry-and-trial rules examined in the constitution and sittings chapter.

Transparency directions: uploading FIRs and supply of copies

Filing practice today is shaped not only by the Code but by transparency directions issued by the Supreme Court. In Youth Bar Association of India v. Union of India, (2016) 9 SCC 473, the Court directed that copies of FIRs, save in sensitive categories such as sexual offences, offences under the POCSO Act, and matters affecting the security of the State, be uploaded on the police or State website within twenty-four hours of registration (and within seventy-two hours in areas with connectivity difficulties), so that an accused or any aggrieved person may obtain a copy and approach the appropriate forum. The directions also reinforced the right of the first informant to a free copy of the FIR under Section 154(2) CrPC (Section 173(2) BNSS).

For the court’s ministerial establishment, these directions translate into concrete filing obligations: the FIR must be promptly forwarded to the jurisdictional Magistrate under Section 157 CrPC (Section 176 BNSS), and the date and time of its receipt by the Magistrate must be recorded — a detail that often becomes decisive when the defence alleges that the FIR was ante-timed or fabricated after deliberation. Where an FIR is registered, the GD reference, the FIR number, the sections invoked and the despatch particulars to the Magistrate are all entries that the Rules of Practice require to be maintained with precision.

Remedy when the police refuse to register or investigate

When a station house officer refuses to register an FIR, the informant is not without remedy. Section 154(3) CrPC (Section 173(4) BNSS) permits the aggrieved person to send the substance of the information in writing to the Superintendent of Police. If that too fails, Section 156(3) CrPC (Section 175(3) BNSS) empowers a Magistrate competent to take cognizance to direct registration and investigation. In Sakiri Vasu v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 2 SCC 409, the Supreme Court held that Section 156(3) is wide enough to include all incidental powers necessary to ensure a proper investigation — including ordering registration of an FIR and monitoring the investigation — and that an aggrieved person should ordinarily exhaust these hierarchical remedies rather than rush to the High Court under Article 226.

This filing route, however, came to be abused. In Priyanka Srivastava v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 6 SCC 287, the Court, alarmed at the flood of frivolous Section 156(3) applications filed to harass adversaries in what were really civil or commercial disputes, directed that every application under Section 156(3) must be supported by an affidavit duly sworn by the applicant, so that the applicant is made responsible and exposed to prosecution for a false affidavit. The BNSS has gone further: Section 175(3) now statutorily requires that an application to the Magistrate be made only after the Section 173(4) route to the Superintendent has been exhausted, supported by an affidavit, and after the Magistrate considers the police officer’s submissions on the refusal. These are practice directions that have crystallised into filing pre-conditions.

From investigation to the charge sheet under Section 173

When investigation is complete, the officer in charge forwards a report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance — the document popularly called the charge sheet (or, where no offence is made out, the final or closure report). Section 173(2) CrPC (Section 193(3) BNSS) prescribes the contents of this report: the names of the parties, the nature of the information, the names of persons acquainted with the circumstances, whether an offence appears to have been committed and by whom, whether the accused has been arrested, and whether he has been released on bond. Section 173(5) requires that the documents and statements on which the prosecution proposes to rely be forwarded along with the report, and Section 207 CrPC (Section 230 BNSS) obliges supply of copies to the accused.

The Rules of Practice require the charge sheet to be scrutinised on receipt for completeness — whether the statements under Section 161, the seizure memos, the medical and forensic reports and the list of material objects are annexed — before it is numbered and registered as a Calendar or Sessions Case. The BNSS has added timelines and a digital dimension: investigation in specified cases must be completed within fixed periods, and the report may be forwarded through electronic communication. Once the charge sheet is taken on file and cognizance taken, the case proceeds to the framing of a charge, a stage governed by the rules examined in the charge framing chapter.

The Magistrate’s options on receiving a police report

The Magistrate is not a post office. On receiving a report under Section 173(2), he exercises a judicial discretion. The classic enumeration of his options is found in Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, (1985) 2 SCC 537. Where the report states that an offence appears to have been committed, the Magistrate may (i) accept it and take cognizance, (ii) disagree and drop the proceeding, or (iii) direct further investigation. Where the report states that no offence appears to have been committed — a closure or negative final report — the Magistrate may (i) accept it and drop the proceeding, (ii) disagree and take cognizance, or (iii) direct further investigation under Section 156(3).

Crucially, Bhagwant Singh held that where the Magistrate proposes to accept a closure report and drop the proceeding, he must give notice to the first informant and afford him an opportunity of being heard, because the informant’s interest is directly affected. This is the genesis of the “protest petition” practice: on receiving such notice, the informant may file a protest petition, which the Magistrate may treat as a complaint and proceed under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC. The filing and listing of protest petitions, and the recording of the informant’s notice, are matters the Rules of Practice regulate so that the informant’s statutory right is not defeated by ministerial oversight.

Limits on the Magistrate: he cannot compel a charge sheet

While the Magistrate may decline to accept a closure report and may himself take cognizance, there is a clear limit on his power over the form of the police report. In Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, AIR 1968 SC 117, the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate has no power, express or implied, to direct the police to submit a charge sheet when the investigating officer, after investigation, has formed the opinion that no case is made out and has filed a report under Section 169. The Magistrate may disagree with the police conclusion and take cognizance on the material before him, or he may direct further investigation — but he cannot dictate the opinion the investigating officer must record. The separation of the investigative function from the judicial function is thereby preserved.

This principle complements the rule in State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554, that Section 173(8) CrPC (Section 193(9) BNSS) enables the investigating officer to carry on further investigation even after a report under Section 173(2) has been submitted, and that the power of superintendence may, in appropriate cases, comprehend a direction for further investigation. Together, Abhinandan Jha and Saldanha mark out the respective domains of police and court at the charge-sheet stage — the police control the content of the report; the court controls cognizance and may order further inquiry but cannot author the police’s conclusion.

Further investigation after cognizance: Vinubhai Malaviya

For decades it was debated whether a Magistrate’s power to order investigation under Section 156(3) survived the taking of cognizance. The question was authoritatively answered in Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat, (2019) 17 SCC 1, where the Supreme Court held that a Magistrate has the power to order further investigation under Section 156(3) even at the post-cognizance stage, up to the commencement of trial, so as to ensure a fair and proper investigation in aid of the accused’s right under Article 21. The expression “such investigation” in Section 156(3) was read to include further investigation under Section 173(8).

The practical filing consequence is that a supplementary charge sheet filed after further investigation must be received, scrutinised and tagged to the principal case file, and the additional statements and documents supplied to the accused. The Rules of Practice require the supplementary report to cross-reference the original FIR and charge-sheet numbers so that the record remains coherent. The shape of the eventual charge — and how the accused is confronted with the totality of the material at the stage of examination of the accused under Section 313 — may turn on what the supplementary charge sheet brings in.

Defects in investigation and their effect on the charge sheet

A charge sheet is sometimes attacked on the ground that the investigation preceding it was tainted — conducted by an officer of insufficient rank, or in breach of a mandatory provision. The governing principle was laid down in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, AIR 1955 SC 196. The Court held that a defect or illegality in investigation, however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial; if cognizance is taken on a police report despite a breach of a mandatory investigative provision, the result cannot be set aside unless the illegality is shown to have occasioned a failure of justice. Where, however, the breach is brought to the court’s notice at a sufficiently early stage, the court should not decline cognizance but should order the defect to be cured by such reinvestigation as the case requires.

The lesson for filing practice is that scrutiny of the charge sheet on receipt is not an idle formality. If the scrutinising officer or the Magistrate detects that a mandatory step — say, investigation by an officer of the rank required under a special statute — has been omitted, the proper course is to have the defect cured early rather than to allow a trial to proceed on a flawed foundation and unravel on appeal. Rishbud thus supplies the doctrinal warrant for the early, careful scrutiny that the Rules of Practice mandate.

Timelines, default bail and the incomplete charge sheet

The filing of a charge sheet is governed by hard deadlines that protect the liberty of an undertrial. Section 167(2) CrPC (Section 187(3) BNSS) provides that an accused in custody must be released on “default” or “statutory” bail if the investigation is not completed and the charge sheet not filed within ninety days (for offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of ten years or more) or sixty days (in other cases). This right is part of the procedure established by law under Article 21 and accrues the moment the period expires without a charge sheet, provided the accused applies and is prepared to furnish bail.

A persistent abuse is the filing of an “incomplete” charge sheet shortly before the deadline merely to defeat the accrual of default bail. The courts have repeatedly held that a charge sheet filed without the documents and reports necessary to enable the Magistrate to take cognizance, or filed only to stop the clock, does not satisfy the statutory requirement and will not defeat the right to default bail. For the court’s establishment, this means the scrutiny of a charge sheet on the eve of a deadline must verify that it is genuinely complete — that the statements, forensic reports and material objects are in fact annexed — because the adequacy of the filing is the very fact on which the accused’s liberty may depend.

Filing mechanics: numbering, scrutiny and the register

Beyond the substantive law sits a layer of ministerial practice that the Criminal Rules of Practice exist to standardise. On presentation, every complaint, FIR forwarded under Section 157, and charge sheet must be entered in the appropriate register, assigned a serial number, and dated with the precise time of receipt. The scrutinising officer checks that the document is properly stamped where required, that the prescribed annexures are present, that the sections of law are correctly cited, and that copies for service on the accused under Section 207 (Section 230 BNSS) are available. Defective filings are returned with an endorsement of the defects, and the date of re-presentation is recorded.

These mechanics are not bureaucratic ornament. The exact time at which a Magistrate receives an FIR can decide whether an ante-timing defence succeeds; the completeness of a charge sheet decides whether default bail accrues; the recording of notice to a first informant decides whether a closure report is validly accepted. The Rules of Practice translate the constitutional and statutory commands into the daily discipline of the registry. A practitioner who understands both the case law surveyed above and the registry routine that gives it effect will draft, present and defend these documents with far greater confidence. For the foundational vocabulary and the place of these rules in the overall scheme, see the introduction to this series and the Criminal Rules of Practice hub.