Jagannath sued Sarwani Devi in the court of the Senior Sub-Judge, Una, for specific performance of an agreement to sell land for ₹4,000. The plaint was filed on 3 June 1986 and the court granted an interim injunction against alienation the same day. Also on 3 June 1986, Sarwani Devi's attorney sold 5 marlas of the land to Gian Chand for ₹300 by a deed written, executed and registered that day. In October 1987 he sold another 2 kanals 17 marlas to Pritam Singh. The suit was decreed in 1992, and the purchasers resisted execution.
On 29 October 2026, forty years after the plaint, Justice Rakesh Kainthla dismissed the purchasers' second appeal. The October 1987 sale was an easy case of lis pendens. The interesting part is the sale made on the same day the suit was filed.
Two transactions on one date: which came first?
The Explanation to Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act says pendency begins from "the date of the presentation of the plaint" and runs until the decree is fully satisfied or becomes unenforceable by limitation. The purchasers argued that nobody had proved the sale deed was executed after the suit was filed rather than before it.
The High Court answered from the certified copy of the plaint, which recorded "Box No. 1" above the date. That reference led to Rule 7 of Volume 1, Chapter 1, Part C of the Punjab and Haryana High Court Rules and Orders, as applied in Himachal Pradesh, which governs how plaints are received:
A plaint found in the first opening was therefore instituted on or before 10:15 am. The sale deed was written, executed and registered the same day. The Court held that the deed came after the plaint and was hit by lis pendens. It also relied on Siddamsetty Infra Projects v. Katta Sujatha Reddy, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3214, where the Supreme Court held that the doctrine applies from institution of the proceeding, not from when the court issues notice, so it applies even to a petition still lying defective in the Registry.
Lis pendens starts when the plaint is presented, not when the other side finds out.
The Court did not have to decide one question, and it is worth thinking about. The Explanation uses the word "date", and the law usually ignores fractions of a day. Read literally, pendency begins on the date of presentation, which would catch any transfer made that day whatever its hour. Read with an eye to purpose, it begins at the moment of presentation, and a transfer completed earlier the same morning escapes. Here the petition-box rule placed the plaint first on either reading. Where it doesn't, an answer should state both readings and note that Section 52 is a rule of public policy. Courts construe it to stop parties defeating a pending suit, which favours the plaintiff when the order of events on the day is unclear.
Good faith and no notice do not help a purchaser pendente lite
The Executing Court had protected the purchasers because there was no evidence they knew of the interim injunction. The High Court held that this missed the point. Section 52 does not depend on notice. The transfer is valid between the seller and the purchaser, but it cannot affect the rights of the other party to the suit under the eventual decree.
The purchasers' real argument was Section 19(b) of the Specific Relief Act. A decree for specific performance cannot be enforced against a transferee for value who paid in good faith and without notice of the original contract. The High Court held that Section 19(b) gives way to Section 52 once a suit is filed. It relied on:
- Ram Peary v. Gauri, AIR 1978 All 318: when the two provisions conflict, Section 19(b) yields to Section 52.
- Alka Shrirang Chavan v. Hemchandra Rajaram Bhonsale, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 55: Section 19(b) protects a purchaser who buys before the suit; once a suit is instituted and the property is transferred, the doctrine of lis pendens takes over, so Section 19(b) cannot apply to a purchaser pendente lite.
- Raj Singh v. Maharaj Mal, 1996 (2) Civil Court Cases 326 (HP): the bona fide purchaser plea is unavailable to a transferee pendente lite, and Section 41 TPA on ostensible owners must also yield to lis pendens.
| Provision | Protects | When it stops working |
|---|---|---|
| Section 19(b), SRA | A transferee for value, in good faith, without notice of the earlier contract | Once a suit on that contract is instituted; a buyer after institution takes subject to the decree |
| Section 41, TPA | A transferee from an ostensible owner, after reasonable inquiry | Yields to lis pendens for transfers made during pendency |
| Section 52, TPA | The party to the suit, against transfers pending litigation | Only when the suit is collusive, the property is not directly in question, or the court authorises the transfer |
| Order XXI Rule 102, CPC | The decree-holder at execution | Not at all against a transferee after institution; Rules 98 and 100 do not help that transferee |
A state-specific footnote that suits Himachal: in Maharashtra and Gujarat, a local amendment to Section 52 dating from the Bombay Amendment Act of 1939 requires notice of the pending suit to be registered before lis pendens affects a purchaser. There is no such requirement in Himachal Pradesh, which is why notice did not matter in Pritam Singh. In Pune, a same-day purchaser could have escaped if no notice of the suit had been registered by then.
Bound by a decree without being a party, and shut out at execution
The purchasers' last argument was procedural: they were never made parties to the suit, so the decree could not be executed against them. The Court relied on Lakshmanan v. Kamal (Kerala, 1958). A transferee pendente lite need not be brought on record and is bound by the decree as if a party. Section 52 lets the decree-holder ignore the transfer altogether.
At execution the purchasers had filed objections under Order XXI Rules 97 and 98. The High Court pointed to Rule 102, which says Rules 98 and 100 do not apply to resistance or obstruction by a person to whom the judgment-debtor transferred the property after the suit was instituted. In Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, (2008) 7 SCC 144, the Supreme Court explained why. Without the rule, every decree could be defeated by a fresh transfer and a fresh objection, and a purchaser of property under litigation is expected to inquire before buying.
Answering a lis pendens problem: the order of questions
- Is Section 52 attracted? A suit in a competent court, not collusive, with a right to specific immovable property directly in question.
- When did pendency start? Presentation of the plaint (Explanation). Use the filing record, such as the petition-box entry, if the timing is disputed on the same day.
- Was the transfer during pendency? If yes, notice, good faith and consideration are irrelevant; Sections 19(b) SRA and 41 TPA yield.
- Effect: the transfer is valid between the parties to it but subject to the decree; the transferee is bound without impleadment.
- Execution: Order XXI Rule 102 closes Rules 98 and 100 to the transferee pendente lite.
- Local law: check for the Bombay-amendment registration requirement in Maharashtra and Gujarat.
MCQs on lis pendens
- The date of service of summons on the defendant
- The date the court issues notice after admission
- The date of presentation of the plaint
- The date the defendant files a written statement
Answer
(c). This follows the Explanation. Siddamsetty Infra Projects (2024) adds that the doctrine applies from institution even while the filing is defective in the Registry.
- Is bound by the decree, since Section 19(b) SRA yields to Section 52 TPA
- Is protected by Section 19(b) SRA as a bona fide purchaser without notice
- Is protected because he was not impleaded in C's suit
- Can resist execution under Order XXI Rule 98 CPC
Answer
(a). Alka Shrirang Chavan (2026); Pritam Singh (2026). Impleadment is unnecessary, and Rule 102 excludes Rules 98 and 100.
- A tenant of the judgment-debtor holding under a lease that predates the suit
- A person to whom the judgment-debtor transferred the property after the suit was instituted
- A co-owner claiming an independent title
- A stranger claiming adverse possession
Answer
(b). The rule codifies lis pendens at the execution stage (Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, 2008).