Dr. N. Sridhar Reddy married in Sattenapalli on 18 April 2003 under Hindu rites. When his divorce case failed in Guntur he withdrew his High Court appeal, took British citizenship, and sued again in Cambridge. The decree was made absolute on 29 January 2014 and he married again in Norfolk on 3 March 2014, 33 days later. On 3 November 2026 the Supreme Court held that the bigamy case against him stays, and quashed it against his parents and his second wife.
A divorce he had already lost, won again abroad
- 2003-2013 Marriage; the Narasaraopet divorce case is dismissed and the appeal withdrawn. The Hindu marriage subsists.
- 1 Feb 2013 British citizenship by naturalisation.
- 16 Aug 2013 Cambridge petition; the wife objects to jurisdiction.
- 27 Nov 2013 / 29 Jan 2014 Decree nisi, then absolute, on irretrievable breakdown.
- 3 Mar 2014 Second marriage in Norfolk.
- 1 Feb 2016 First wife complains under Sections 494 and 120B read with 34 IPC.
The chargesheet named the husband and his parents and dropped the second wife, but the Magistrate rejected that closure and took cognizance against her "without assigning any reason". The Andhra Pradesh High Court refused to quash for all four, saying it could not decide the validity of a foreign decree under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court split the result: one case stays, two go.
Why the Cambridge decree does not count in an Indian bigamy case
Everything for the husband turned on one question: was the first marriage subsisting on 3 March 2014? Bigamy under Section 494 IPC (now Section 82(1) BNS) needs a valid first marriage, its subsistence, and a second marriage solemnised with due ceremonies; our chapter on offences relating to marriage lists them. This case concerned only the second ingredient.
The Court read Section 13 CPC with Y. Narasimha Rao v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi, (1991) 3 SCC 451. A matrimonial decree is recognised if the forum's jurisdiction and the ground of relief follow the law under which the parties married, with three exceptions: the respondent lives in that forum and the ground exists in the marriage law; the respondent submits voluntarily and effectively and contests on such a ground; or the respondent consents.
A ground "not even recognized statutorily" under the Hindu law that governed the marriage cannot be borrowed from a foreign forum to end it.
The Cambridge decree failed twice. Irretrievable breakdown is not a ground under the Hindu Marriage Act, and the wife had objected to jurisdiction, which the Court would not equate with "unconditional submission". It added Satya v. Teja Singh, (1975) 1 SCC 120, on "limping marriages", and Kishorekumar Mohan Kale v. Kashmira Kale, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 448, which refused to recognise a US breakdown decree.
The Section 14 point the husband leaned on
He argued that the decree was presumed valid until an Indian civil court set it aside. The text of Section 14, quoted in the judgment, presumes only that the foreign court was competent; the presumption is rebuttable by proving want of jurisdiction, and Section 13 stays in force. So a prosecutor need not wait for a civil declaration: show in the criminal case that the decree falls inside an exception to Section 13. Our chapter on foreign judgments sets out the six exceptions.
Citizenship and the place of the second marriage
The husband said that, as a British citizen married in Norfolk, Section 4 IPC (now Section 1(5) BNS) put him outside Indian criminal law. The Court rejected the argument "in the manner canvassed". The first marriage was solemnised in India under Hindu rites, so the enquiry cannot be confined to where the second ceremony happened, and a change of nationality cannot defeat consequences flowing from the first marriage.
The Court did not say that Indian courts can try any bigamy abroad. It anchored jurisdiction in the status created in India and spoke only of the "limited scrutiny permissible at the present stage". Frame it in a mains answer as a prima facie rejection of the Section 4 defence, not a settled rule; our chapter on extent and application lists the heads under which the Code reaches beyond India.
Thirty-three days: what Indian law itself would have said
Suppose the decree had been an Indian one on a recognised ground. Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act lets divorced persons remarry only when there is no right of appeal, or the time for appealing has expired, or an appeal has been dismissed. Section 28(4) gives 90 days, as our Hindu-law commentary records. He remarried on day 33, well inside that window. The Court did not reach this, since the decree was not entitled to recognition at all, but it shows the question was lost twice: by the wrong ground and the wrong timing.
Bigamy has an exception the Court did not discuss: Section 82(1) BNS excludes a person whose first marriage was declared void by a competent court, or whose spouse has been absent seven years and unheard of, if the new spouse is told. Neither applies. The notes also mention Krishna Gopal Divedi v. Prabha Divedi, AIR 2002 SC 389, where an ex parte divorce operative at the second marriage was a defence though later set aside. There the decree was good when acted on; here, on the Court's view, the Cambridge decree was never conclusive in India.
Under the Hindu Marriage Act, Section 5(i) requires that neither party has a spouse living; a marriage in breach is void under Section 11, and Section 17 punishes it under Sections 494 and 495 IPC. See our chapter on void marriages.
"Continuing offence" and the 23-month delay
The complaint came nearly two years after the second marriage. The Court declined to quash for delay at this stage because "bigamy is a continuing offence". Treat that with care: it appears in a judgment confined to the present stage, and it does not discuss Section 468 CrPC (now Section 514 BNSS). That bar applies only to offences punishable with up to three years, and Section 82(1) BNS carries up to seven, so limitation could not have helped in any case.
Parents: knowing is not conspiring
The chargesheet said the parents conspired to execute property in the husband's favour, thereby encouraging the second marriage. The Court found no overt act and no material of any agreement to commit bigamy. Even if they knew of it, "that itself cannot make them liable for conspiracy". It relied on Sivaraman Nair v. State of Kerala, 2026 INSC 412, applying S. Nitheen v. State of Kerala, (2024) 8 SCC 706: the complainant must show an overt act or omission in the second marriage ceremony, and inferred knowledge is not enough.
| Charge against relatives | What must be shown | Gap here |
|---|---|---|
| Conspiracy (s.120B IPC, now s.61 BNS) | An agreement to commit the offence | Property transfers, with nothing linking them to an agreement on bigamy |
| Abetment (s.107 IPC, now s.45 BNS) | Instigation, conspiracy with an act, or intentional aid | No participation or facilitation in the ceremony |
| Common intention (s.34 IPC, now s.3(5) BNS) | A shared plan and participation | Awareness cannot supply it |
Our chapter on criminal conspiracy explains why: the agreement is itself the offence, while abetment by conspiracy under Section 45(b) BNS needs an act in pursuance. The marriage chapter says conspiracy and abetment may be added where family members or a priest knowingly facilitated a bigamous ceremony. That word is the gap in this chargesheet.
The second wife: a victim's seat turned into the dock
The first wife said she found, from the Cambridge electoral directory, that the two lived as husband and wife from 2012, and that the second wife called herself "only a companion". The Court held that apart from alleged cohabitation or marriage, no overt act showed she participated knowingly or even knew the first marriage subsisted. "Criminal liability must be established qua each accused separately", and continuing would abuse the process of law.
Contrast Section 82(2) BNS (IPC 495), which punishes concealing the earlier marriage from the new spouse and so treats her as the deceived party; under A. Subhash Babu v. State of A.P., AIR 2011 SC 3031, she can herself complain as an "aggrieved person". Section 218 BNSS (earlier Section 198 CrPC) confines cognizance to such complaints.
Why a quashing petition could still be decided on the papers
The High Court said the foreign decree's validity and the date of the second marriage were for trial. The Supreme Court separated the cases. For the husband, recognition was a question of law the record already answered against him at this stage, so the trial stays. For the parents and second wife there was nothing for a trial to find, so it quashed on the abuse-of-process head of Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS). Our chapter on inherent powers explains that the section preserves a power and does not create one.
What the judgment leaves open
- It does not decide whether the second marriage was "solemnised" with the ceremonies the offence needs. The notes cite Kanwal Ram v. H.P. Administration, AIR 1966 SC 614, for strict proof of essential ceremonies, and a Norfolk ceremony may have been civil.
- The High Court said the real date of the second marriage could be fixed only after trial, and the first wife alleged cohabitation since 2012; the Supreme Court worked from 3 March 2014 and did not resolve it.
Then and now: the provisions in this case
- Offences: IPC s.494 → BNS s.82(1); s.495 → s.82(2); s.120B → s.61(2); s.107 → s.45; s.34 → s.3(5); s.4 → s.1(5).
- Procedure: CrPC s.482 → BNSS s.528; s.198 → s.218.
- Civil law: ss.13 and 14 CPC unchanged; HMA ss.5(i), 11, 15, 17.
Three questions to test the three outcomes
1. Following Y. Narasimha Rao, a foreign decree of divorce between persons married under the Hindu Marriage Act is recognised in India when:
- the husband is a citizen of the country whose court passed it, whatever the ground
- it is granted on irretrievable breakdown, since that ground is now universally accepted
- the respondent habitually resides in that forum and relief is granted on a ground available under the law under which the parties married
- the petitioner has resided in that country for one year before filing
Answer
(c) That is the first exception to the rule. Options (a), (b) and (d) ignore the rule that jurisdiction and ground must follow the matrimonial law under which the parties married.2. A husband's parents knew that he had remarried while his first marriage subsisted, but did nothing at the ceremony. In N. Sridhar Reddy, the Supreme Court held that:
- mere knowledge does not make them liable for conspiracy to commit bigamy or abetment, without an overt act of facilitation
- knowledge makes them liable for abetment, but not for conspiracy
- they are liable as the husband's relatives, as Section 494 IPC extends to the household
- they can be tried only if the second marriage took place in India
Answer
(a) Knowledge and inferred awareness are not enough; the complainant must show an overt act or active participation, as in S. Nitheen, applied through Sivaraman Nair.3. Which of the following correctly maps bigamy from the old law to the new, and identifies the personal-law provision that makes a second marriage punishable?
- IPC s.494 → BNS s.81; Hindu Marriage Act s.11
- IPC s.494 → BNS s.83; Hindu Marriage Act s.16
- IPC s.494 → BNS s.85; Hindu Marriage Act s.5(i)
- IPC s.494 → BNS s.82(1); Hindu Marriage Act s.17
