Landmark Cases — Indra Sarma, Hiral Harsora, Lalita Toppo

The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was drafted in deliberately broad, civil-law language, and three Supreme Court decisions have done most of the work of fixing its outer limits. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma decides which live-in arrangements count as a "relationship in the nature of marriage"; Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora decides who can be made a respondent; and Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand decides that the Act's maintenance remedy can reach women whom Section 125 CrPC will not. Together they shape the answer to the three questions every DV petition raises — who may complain, against whom, and for what relief. This chapter sets out each judgment against the bare statute, traces the reasoning, and connects them to the wider Domestic Violence Act notes.

Why these three cases anchor the Act

The DV Act is a remedial statute. Its key terms — "aggrieved person" in Section 2(a), "domestic relationship" in Section 2(f), "respondent" in Section 2(q) and "domestic violence" in Section 3 — were written to be inclusive rather than tightly defined, so most of the contested questions of scope have been settled by judicial interpretation rather than by the text itself. Three Supreme Court judgments do the bulk of that work and recur in every judiciary and CLAT-PG paper on the subject.

Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, fixes the meaning of a "relationship in the nature of marriage" within Section 2(f) and tells us which live-in partners are protected. Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, strikes down the words "adult male" in Section 2(q) and thereby reopens the category of persons who may be made respondents. Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796, holds that a woman who cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may nonetheless obtain a monetary remedy under the Act. Read against the definitions and the definition of domestic violence, they map the entry points to the entire scheme.

Indra Sarma: the facts and the question

Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma was decided on 26 November 2013 by a bench of K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, JJ. The appellant, Indra Sarma, had left her job and lived with the respondent for around eighteen years. Crucially, the respondent was a married man with a wife and children, and the appellant was aware of his marital status when the relationship began. When he eventually withdrew from the relationship and stopped supporting her, she invoked the DV Act, contending that the relationship was a "domestic relationship" under Section 2(f) and that his failure to maintain her amounted to economic abuse — a form of "domestic violence" under Section 3.

The precise question framed by the Court was whether a live-in relationship with a man who is already married amounts to a "relationship in the nature of marriage" within Section 2(f), so as to bring the woman within the definition of "aggrieved person" under Section 2(a). The case therefore turned on the boundary between an ordinary live-in arrangement and a "relationship in the nature of marriage" — a distinction the statute names but does not define.

The factual matrix mattered to the result. The relationship had endured for nearly two decades, the parties had lived under one roof, and the appellant had given up her own employment in reliance on the arrangement. On a purely sympathetic view she had every appearance of a long-term partner who had been abandoned. The legal difficulty, however, was structural rather than evidentiary: the respondent's subsisting marriage meant the couple could never have been lawfully wedded, and the Act's protection for live-in partners is keyed to a relationship that resembles a valid marriage, not to mere duration or dependence. The Court had to decide whether the protective object of the statute could override that structural disqualification.

The Velusamy foundation: four ingredients of a marriage-like relationship

Indra Sarma builds on the earlier decision in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 (Markandey Katju and T.S. Thakur, JJ). Borrowing from the American concept of "palimony" and the idea of a common-law marriage, Velusamy held that not every live-in relationship qualifies as a "relationship in the nature of marriage." The Court laid down four cumulative requirements: the couple must (i) hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses; (ii) be of legal age to marry; (iii) be otherwise qualified to enter a legal marriage, including being unmarried; and (iv) have voluntarily cohabited and presented themselves to the world as akin to spouses for a significant period of time.

The third requirement is decisive for Indra Sarma. Because the respondent was already married, the parties were not "otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage," so on the Velusamy test the relationship could not be one "in the nature of marriage." Velusamy also cautioned that a relationship maintained merely for sexual purposes, or a "keep" who is financially supported, would not ordinarily qualify. Indra Sarma adopts this framework and develops it into a fuller set of guidelines.

Indra Sarma's guidelines for a relationship in the nature of marriage

To give content to Section 2(f), the Court in Indra Sarma set out illustrative indicia of a "relationship in the nature of marriage." These include the duration of the relationship; a shared household as contemplated by Section 2(s); pooling of financial and other resources; domestic arrangements such as entrusting responsibility for running the home; a sexual relationship not merely for pleasure but as an emotional and intimate bond; the presence of children, including a shared intention regarding bearing and rearing them; socialisation in public, holding themselves out to friends and relatives as akin to spouses; and the intention and conduct of the parties, including their common understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

The Court stressed that these are guidelines, not an exhaustive checklist, and that no single factor is conclusive; courts must weigh the totality of facts. Importantly, the judgment clarified that a "relationship in the nature of marriage" is distinct from a relationship of marriage and also distinct from a casual or purely sexual relationship, occupying a middle space that the Act deliberately chose to protect. For the analytic structure of Section 2(f), see the definitions chapter.

The five categories of live-in arrangements

One of the most frequently cited passages of Indra Sarma is its taxonomy of live-in relationships. The Court identified, by way of illustration, five categories in which men and women may live together: first, a relationship between an unmarried adult man and an unmarried adult woman — the clearest case of a relationship in the nature of marriage; second, a relationship between a married man and an adult unmarried woman, entered into knowingly; third, a relationship between an adult unmarried man and a married woman, entered into knowingly; fourth, a relationship between an unmarried adult woman and a married man, entered into unknowingly; and fifth, a relationship between same-sex partners.

The Court observed that the second, third and fifth categories generally fall outside a "relationship in the nature of marriage," because in the second and third the parties are not legally qualified to marry, and in the fifth the parties cannot, in the Court's view at the time, contract a marriage under the prevailing law. Indra Sarma's own case fell squarely within the second category — she had knowingly entered a relationship with a married man — and so was held not to be a "relationship in the nature of marriage."

The holding and the legislative gap

Applying its guidelines, the Court held that the appellant's eighteen-year cohabitation, entered into with full knowledge that the respondent was married, was not a "relationship in the nature of marriage" within Section 2(f). She therefore did not qualify as an "aggrieved person," and her petition under the DV Act was not maintainable. The appeal was dismissed.

The decision is not, however, simply restrictive. The Court was alive to the hardship caused to a woman who is deceived into such a relationship — the fourth category, where she enters unknowingly — and observed that denying her any remedy could be unjust. It noted that the existing definitions left a gap and expressly commended the matter to Parliament, suggesting that the legislature consider broadening the protection so that women in vulnerable but technically disqualified relationships are not left remediless. Indra Sarma thus stands both as a limiting decision on the meaning of Section 2(f) and as a judicial signal that the protective net may be too narrow.

Hiral Harsora: the challenge to "adult male"

Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165, also reported as AIR 2016 SC 4774, was decided on 6 October 2016 by Kurian Joseph and Rohinton Fali Nariman, JJ. Kusum Harsora and her mother Pushpa filed a DV complaint arising out of alleged ill-treatment within the family. Among those they sought to proceed against were female relatives — the brother's wife and the sisters/daughters of the family. The difficulty was that Section 2(q), as enacted, defined "respondent" to mean "any adult male person" who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, with a proviso allowing an aggrieved wife or a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage to also file against a "relative of the husband or the male partner."

On the literal language, a complaint could be directed primarily at an adult male, and only by way of the proviso could it reach his relatives. The respondents argued, and the Bombay High Court had partly accepted, that the female relatives could not be impleaded as principal respondents because of the words "adult male." The constitutional validity of this restriction in Section 2(q) was the central issue before the Supreme Court.

Hiral Harsora: the Article 14 reasoning

The Court held that the words "adult male" in Section 2(q) created a classification that bore no rational nexus to the object of the Act. The statute's purpose, gathered from its Preamble and from Section 3, is to protect women from violence occurring within the domestic sphere; that violence can be perpetrated by women as well as by men, and by minors as well as by adults — for instance, a mother-in-law, a sister-in-law or a daughter-in-law acting within a shared household. To shield female and minor perpetrators from being made respondents was, the Court found, an under-inclusive classification that defeated the very object of the legislation and therefore violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

The Court rejected the argument that the proviso adequately filled the gap, noting that the proviso only assisted a narrow class of aggrieved persons (a wife or a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage) and only in respect of "relatives," leaving other configurations of domestic violence unaddressed. The classification by gender and age was held to have "no rational nexus" with the object sought to be achieved.

Hiral Harsora: what the Court actually struck down

The operative direction is precise and worth memorising. The Court declared that the words "adult male" in Section 2(q) stand deleted, as they do not square with Article 14. As a consequence, the proviso to Section 2(q) — which had been necessary only because the main clause was confined to adult males — was rendered otiose and also stood deleted. The rest of Section 2(q) survives. After Hiral Harsora, the definition of "respondent" reads, in effect, as "any person" who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person.

The practical effect is that a DV complaint is now maintainable against female relatives and against persons who are not adult males, so long as the requirement of a "domestic relationship" within Section 2(f) is satisfied. The aggrieved person must still be a woman, and the respondent must still stand in a domestic relationship with her; but the respondent need no longer be an adult male. This significantly widens the field of potential respondents and is the modern starting point for any question on Section 2(q). The mechanics of impleading and proceeding against such respondents are dealt with in the procedure for obtaining reliefs.

Lalita Toppo: maintenance beyond Section 125 CrPC

Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796, was decided on 30 October 2018 by a three-judge bench of Ranjan Gogoi, C.J., and U.U. Lalit and K.M. Joseph, JJ. The appellant was not a legally wedded wife of the respondent; she had been in a live-in relationship with him. Maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is, on a long line of authority, available only to a legally wedded "wife," and the appellant therefore risked being denied maintenance under that provision.

The reference before the Court was concerned with whether a woman who is not a legally wedded wife — and so falls outside Section 125 CrPC — is nonetheless entitled to claim maintenance. The interplay between the general criminal-law maintenance remedy and the special remedy created by the DV Act was squarely in issue.

The setting is important because Section 125 CrPC has long been the principal summary route to maintenance, and a settled body of authority confines the word "wife" in that provision to a legally wedded wife. A woman in a live-in relationship who is deserted thus faces a real risk of falling between two stools — outside the strict "wife" requirement of the criminal code, yet plainly in need of support. The reference invited the Court to consider whether the DV Act, enacted later and in deliberately wider terms, supplies the remedy that the older provision withholds.

Lalita Toppo: the holding on monetary relief

The Court observed that even assuming the appellant was not a legally wedded wife, and therefore not entitled to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, she would have an efficacious remedy under the DV Act. The Act's monetary reliefs under Section 20 — which may include maintenance — and the broader scheme of protection under Sections 18 to 22 are available to an "aggrieved person" in a "domestic relationship," a category that, after Velusamy and Indra Sarma, can include a woman in a relationship in the nature of marriage. The Court went so far as to observe that the remedy provided under the DV Act could be regarded as a more efficacious remedy, since estranged partners and even children born of such relationships could claim relief, and that the failure to provide for economic needs may itself amount to "economic abuse" and hence domestic violence within Section 3.

The significance of Lalita Toppo is that it confirms the DV Act as an independent and self-contained source of maintenance. A woman who cannot satisfy the strict "wife" requirement of Section 125 CrPC is not left without a remedy; she may pursue monetary relief under Section 20 of the DV Act, provided she establishes a domestic relationship and an act of domestic violence. The scope of the monetary and ancillary reliefs is examined in the procedure for obtaining reliefs chapter.

Reading the three judgments together

The three decisions interlock. Indra Sarma defines the entry gate of Section 2(f): only a woman in a marriage or a relationship in the nature of marriage (or other enumerated domestic relationship) is an "aggrieved person." Hiral Harsora then widens the exit gate of Section 2(q): once a woman qualifies as an aggrieved person, she may proceed not only against an adult male but against any person in a domestic relationship with her, including female and minor relatives. Lalita Toppo completes the picture on relief: the woman who clears both gates may obtain maintenance under the Act even where Section 125 CrPC would deny it.

There is a productive tension worth flagging in an exam answer. Indra Sarma is restrictive on entry — it excludes the knowing partner of a married man — while Hiral Harsora and Lalita Toppo are expansive on respondents and relief. The unifying theme is fidelity to the object of the Act: the Court reads the protective provisions generously and the disqualifying conditions strictly, but only within the bounds the statute permits. Where the text genuinely excludes a claimant, as in Indra Sarma, the Court declines to rewrite it and instead refers the gap to Parliament.

How the cases interact with the wider scheme

These judgments do not operate in isolation. The "aggrieved person" recognised by Indra Sarma approaches the system through a complaint that may be assisted by a Protection Officer or a registered service provider; the duties of those functionaries are set out in the powers and duties of Protection Officers and in the service providers chapters. The reliefs whose availability Lalita Toppo confirms — protection orders under Section 18, residence orders under Section 19, monetary relief under Section 20, custody orders under Section 21 and compensation under Section 22 — are obtained through an application under Section 12 before the Magistrate.

For the constitutional and policy backdrop against which all three cases were decided, including the Act's status as a civil remedy with criminal enforcement, see the introduction, object, background and scheme chapter and the analysis of the definition of domestic violence in Section 3.

Exam pointers and common traps

First, be exact with the holdings. Indra Sarma did not hold that all live-in relationships are protected; it held the opposite on its facts — a knowing relationship with a married man is not a relationship in the nature of marriage. Second, in Hiral Harsora the Court struck down only the words "adult male" and the now-redundant proviso; it did not strike down Section 2(q) as a whole, and the requirement of a domestic relationship survives. A common error is to say the whole definition was invalidated.

Third, Lalita Toppo does not overrule the Section 125 CrPC "wife" requirement; it holds that the DV Act offers a parallel and arguably more efficacious remedy where Section 125 does not apply. Fourth, remember the supporting authority: the four Velusamy conditions are the analytical backbone of Indra Sarma and are themselves examinable. Finally, note the chronology — Velusamy (2010), Indra Sarma (2013), Hiral Harsora (2016), Lalita Toppo (2018, reported 2019) — because questions often test whether candidates can sequence the development of the law correctly.