Relevancy of Facts — Concept, Logical vs Legal Relevancy

Section 3 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA) — re-enacting in identical form the rule of Section 5 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) — is the gateway provision of the entire law of evidence: evidence may be given of every fact in issue and of every fact declared relevant by the Adhiniyam, and of no others. Everything that follows in Chapter II BSA — res gestae, motive, conduct, conspiracy, state of mind, admissions, confessions — is the working out of that single permission. A fact that does not pass through one of these gateways is simply inadmissible, however logically probative it may seem.

The chapter therefore sits at the intellectual centre of the syllabus. The student who memorises the relevancy sections one at a time but never grasps the underlying architecture will be unable to answer the most common cross-examination question in the trial court and the most common essay question in the mains paper: is this fact relevant, and if so, under which section?

Concept — relevancy as the legislative permission

Relevancy in the BSA is a term of art. It does not mean what it means in ordinary speech. A fact is logically relevant whenever it has a natural and rational tendency to make the existence of another fact more or less probable. The Supreme Court captured this idea in Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1850, where it held that the probative value of evidence is the weight to be given to it, judged on the facts and circumstances of each case. Logical relevancy is therefore a question of common-sense inference.

Legal relevancy is narrower. A fact is legally relevant only when one of the relevancy sections of the BSA so declares. As the Bench observed in Magraj Patodia v. R. K. Birla, AIR 1971 SC 1295, facts which are relevant to the fact in issue or relevant fact — that is, logically probative of the fact in issue — are in general admissible, but the channel through which they enter the record must always be a section of the Act. The Adhiniyam, like the Indian Evidence Act before it, refuses to leave the question of relevancy to judicial intuition. It enumerates the categories. The judge applies them.

This is the famous distinction between logical and legal relevancy. The student who treats the two as synonyms will lose marks every time. Many facts that are logically relevant are excluded — hearsay being the most familiar example. A few facts that look only marginally relevant are admitted by force of statute. The relevancy chapter of the BSA therefore performs two functions at once: it admits and it excludes. For the doctrinal architecture and history of this scheme, see our introduction and scheme of the Evidence Act.

Statutory anchor — Section 3 BSA and the relevancy chapter

Section 3 BSA (previously Section 5 IEA) is in two limbs. The first limb permits evidence of every fact in issue. The second limb permits evidence of every fact declared by the Adhiniyam to be relevant. The corollary, set out in the closing words "and of no others", is the exclusionary rule that gives the chapter its bite.

The definition of "fact in issue" is in Section 2 BSA (previously Section 3 IEA). A fact in issue is any fact from which, either by itself or in connection with other facts, the existence, non-existence, nature or extent of any right, liability or disability asserted or denied in any suit or proceeding necessarily follows. The pleadings in a civil suit and the charge in a criminal trial settle what the facts in issue are. For a deeper treatment of these foundational definitions, see our chapter on definitions and interpretation under the Evidence Act and BSA.

The relevancy chapter then proceeds in a rational sequence. Sections 4 to 14 BSA (previously Sections 6 to 16 IEA) declare relevant the facts that are part of the same transaction, that are the occasion or cause or effect of facts in issue, that show motive or preparation or conduct, that explain or introduce facts in issue, and that show the existence of any state of mind or body. Sections 15 to 23 BSA (previously Sections 17 to 31 IEA) deal with admissions. Sections 24 to 30 BSA (previously Sections 24 to 30 IEA renumbered) deal with confessions. The architecture is therefore: general relevancy first, special relevancy of statements next, special relevancy of judgments and opinions afterwards.

The student must not lose sight of the overall plan. Each individual section is an answer to a question of the form: may evidence be given of fact X to prove fact Y? The Adhiniyam answers either yes — under this section, on these conditions — or no.

Ingredients — what makes a fact relevant under Section 3 BSA

1. The fact sought to be proved must either be a fact in issue or a fact declared relevant by some other section of the Adhiniyam.
2. The fact must not be barred by an exclusionary rule — it must not be hearsay, it must not be a confession to a police officer, it must not violate the rules in Sections 91 to 100 BSA on the exclusion of oral by documentary evidence, and so on.
3. The proponent must be able to show the section under which the fact enters the record. The court is not bound to receive a fact merely because the proponent considers it logically probative.
4. The judge decides as the gatekeeper: the responsibility of deciding both relevancy and admissibility falls on the court, and the court will admit the evidence only if it thinks that the fact, if proved, would be relevant under some provision of the Adhiniyam.

Illustrations from the bare Act

The illustrations to Section 3 BSA (previously Section 5 IEA) make the concept concrete. A is accused of the murder of B by beating him with a club with the intention of causing his death. The facts in issue are: A beat B with a club; A caused B's death by such beating; A intended the death. Evidence may be given of these facts. Evidence may also be given of facts declared relevant by other sections — for example, the fact that A, immediately before the beating, sharpened the club (preparation, Section 6 BSA), or that A, immediately after the beating, fled (subsequent conduct, Section 6 BSA), or that B made a dying declaration (Section 26 BSA). But evidence may not be given of A's general bad character, except as Section 52 BSA permits.

The second illustration to the section, dealing with the contract for the supply of indigo, shows the same scheme in a civil setting. The pleadings define the facts in issue. The relevancy sections then admit a controlled set of supporting facts. Any other fact, however interesting, is shut out.

Why the Adhiniyam refuses an open-ended test of relevance

An open-ended test would have placed every relevancy decision in the hands of the trial judge, with no statutory guidance. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, who drafted the original 1872 Act, was emphatic that the rule of relevancy must be capable of statement in advance. He believed that a closed list of relevant categories was indispensable to consistency between courts. The BSA preserves that drafting choice. The relevancy chapter remains a closed list of categories: same-transaction, occasion-cause-effect, motive-preparation-conduct, things said or done by a conspirator, state of mind or body, course of business, similar facts, custom, opinion, character, judgment, and the relevancy of statements treated as admissions or confessions. A fact that does not fit one of those categories is not relevant under the Adhiniyam.

The closed-list method has costs. A judge faced with a fact that is logically powerful but does not fit any category must exclude it. Some commentators have urged a residual relevancy clause; the Adhiniyam, like the IEA, refused to add one. The cost of occasional exclusion is paid for by the gain in predictability. The trial bar can prepare its case in advance because the categories of relevancy are fixed and known.

This is why a candidate preparing for the mains paper must learn the categories as a list, not as a set of unconnected provisions. The list is the law; each section is a worked-out application of an item on the list. The relevancy chapter therefore rewards memorisation but only in the structured form of category-by-category mastery.

Logical and legal relevancy — the central distinction

The leading judicial articulation is in R. M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1973 SC 157, where the Supreme Court held that facts which have a natural and logical tendency to prove or disprove a fact in issue are in general admissible, and that recourse may be had to circumstantial evidence as well as direct evidence of facts in issue: see State (Delhi Administration) v. Laxman Kumar, AIR 1986 SC 250. The court is therefore alert to logical relevancy, but does not equate it with legal relevancy.

The classical illustration of the gap between the two is the rule against hearsay. The statement of an absent person — "X told me Y did it" — is logically relevant to the question whether Y did it, since the statement increases the probability that Y did it. Yet it is excluded as hearsay because the absent person cannot be cross-examined. Conversely, a fact that may seem only weakly relevant logically — for example, that the accused had access to poison three weeks before the death — is admitted by force of Section 5 BSA (occasion, cause, effect) as a relevant fact.

The case-law test for relevancy is therefore not "is this fact logically probative?" but "does some section of the Adhiniyam declare this fact to be relevant?" If the answer is no, the fact is excluded, however strong its rational pull. This is the sense in which legal relevancy is the operational concept.

Relevancy and admissibility — never confuse the two

Relevancy and admissibility are often confused in answer scripts. They are distinct. As Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184, makes clear, the notion of relevancy deals with what is relevant under the Adhiniyam, while the notion of admissibility deals with what is expressly barred by the provisions of the Adhiniyam. A fact may be relevant — that is, falling within one of the relevancy sections — and yet inadmissible because of an exclusionary rule. A confession to a police officer is the standard example: it would be relevant under Section 15 BSA (previously Section 17 IEA) as an admission, but is rendered inadmissible by Section 23 BSA (previously Section 25 IEA) because of the bar on confessions to a police officer. The chapter on confessions and the bars under Sections 24 to 30 develops this point.

Conversely, a fact may be admissible — entered into evidence after surviving every exclusionary rule — and yet of so little weight that the judge gives it no probative effect. Admissibility is a threshold; weight is what the judge does after the threshold is crossed.

For the same reason, the responsibility of deciding admissibility belongs exclusively to the judge. As the early decision in Abinash Chandra Chatterjee v. Paresh Nath Ghose (1905) 9 CWN 402 emphasised, no presumption of legal relevancy attaches to facts that are merely logically relevant, and it is for the person tendering the evidence to show the section under which it is relevant.

The exclusionary rule in "and of no others"

The closing words of Section 3 BSA — "and of no others" — are the operational heart of the section. Indian evidence law is therefore an exclusionary system: facts are inadmissible unless declared relevant by the Adhiniyam. This is the inverse of the common-law starting point in some jurisdictions, where any logically relevant fact is admissible unless excluded by a specific rule.

The student should appreciate the consequence. The first question for the trial judge faced with an objection to evidence is not "is this fact useful?" but "under what section is this fact relevant?" If counsel cannot point to a section, the evidence does not come in. This is why the relevancy chapter of the BSA repays close, section-by-section study — and why the standard textbooks devote so many pages to the precise scope of each provision.

Categories of relevancy under the BSA

The relevancy chapter then unfolds in seven broad clusters that the student should commit to memory:

1. Same-transaction facts (res gestae) — Section 4 BSA (previously Section 6 IEA). Facts that form part of the same transaction as the fact in issue. The doctrine is fully developed in our chapter on the doctrine of res gestae.
2. Causal and conduct facts — Sections 5 and 6 BSA (previously Sections 7 and 8 IEA). Occasion, cause, effect, motive, preparation, previous and subsequent conduct. Treated in our chapter on facts connected with the fact in issue.
3. Explanatory and introductory facts — Sections 7 to 9 BSA (previously Sections 9 to 11 IEA).
4. Common-design facts — Section 8 BSA (previously Section 10 IEA). Things said or done by a conspirator. Treated in our chapter on statements by conspirators.
5. State-of-mind and similar-fact relevancy — Sections 12 to 14 BSA (previously Sections 14 to 16 IEA). Treated in our chapter on facts showing state of mind, body or bodily feeling.
6. Admissions and confessions — Sections 15 to 30 BSA. Voluntary statements as a special class of relevant fact, treated in our chapters on admissions and confessions.
7. Judgments, opinions, character — Sections 34 onwards BSA, treated in our chapters on judgments of courts when relevant, expert and opinion evidence and character when relevant.

Distinguishing relevancy from probative value

A fact may be relevant and yet of negligible probative value. Probative value is a question of weight, decided after the fact is admitted. The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasised that the weight of evidence depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and on the assessment of the judge of fact: Ram Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1998 SC 1850. The student should therefore avoid the common error of arguing that a fact is irrelevant because it is weak. Weakness goes to weight; relevance is a binary classification.

Nor should relevance be confused with sufficiency. A single relevant fact is rarely sufficient to discharge a burden of proof. The concept of burden of proof under Sections 101 to 114 IEA / corresponding BSA provisions is a separate question that arises only after relevant evidence has been received.

BSA-specific changes — what is genuinely new

For the relevancy gateway provision itself, the BSA reproduces the IEA in substance. Section 3 BSA is the verbatim re-enactment of Section 5 IEA. The relevancy chapter that follows is also substantively identical — Section 4 BSA = Section 6 IEA, Section 5 BSA = Section 7 IEA, Section 6 BSA = Section 8 IEA, Section 7 BSA = Section 9 IEA, Section 8 BSA = Section 10 IEA, with only minor cosmetic changes (modernised illustrations, "advocate" replacing "vakil", "currency" replacing "coin").

The genuine BSA innovations lie elsewhere — in the expanded definition of "document" to include electronic records natively, in the rewritten Section 63 BSA on electronic evidence, and in the new explanation to Section 30 BSA on joint trials. None of those innovations affects the relevancy gateway. For a side-by-side mapping see our IEA to BSA section-mapping table.

The student should therefore not be misled by exam-prep blogs into thinking that the relevancy chapter has been radically rewritten. It has not. The renumbering matters; the conceptual structure does not.

Common pitfalls in answer scripts

Three errors recur. First, equating logical and legal relevancy — a fact is not relevant merely because it is logically probative. Second, confusing relevancy with admissibility — a fact may pass the relevancy gate yet be barred by an exclusionary rule, or vice versa. Third, treating Section 3 BSA as a standalone provision — it is the gateway, but it operates only by reading it together with the substantive relevancy sections that follow.

The mains aspirant who keeps these distinctions clear, and who can move confidently between the gateway provision and the substantive sections, will not be surprised by any relevancy question. For the procedural side of how relevancy is raised and decided in court — objections, voir dire, the judge's role under Section 165 BSA — see our chapter on the judge's power to put questions and decide admissibility.

For the broader topic-cluster of Evidence Act and BSA notes — covering relevancy, admissions, confessions, dying declarations, documentary evidence, witness examination and the BSA-specific innovations — the chapter index links to every other unit in the syllabus.

Practice-court application — how relevancy is raised at trial

In the trial court, the relevancy question rarely comes up as a clean abstract objection. It arises when a witness is asked a question and opposing counsel objects that the answer would not be relevant. The judge then has to make a quick ruling on the spot, often without the benefit of full argument. The discipline of the relevancy chapter is what enables that quick ruling. The judge asks: what is the fact in issue, and which section of the Adhiniyam declares the witness's answer to be relevant to it? If counsel cannot identify the section, the objection is sustained and the question disallowed.

Two practical consequences follow. First, examination-in-chief should be planned with the relevancy sections in mind, so that every line of questioning can be defended by reference to an enumerated category. Second, cross-examination on a collateral matter is not unlimited; the cross-examiner who strays beyond the relevancy categories will be stopped by the judge under Section 165 BSA. The chapter on examination of witnesses develops these procedural points.

Conclusion — relevancy as the law's filter

Relevancy is the filter through which every fact must pass before it becomes evidence. The filter is statutory, not intuitive. The Adhiniyam enumerates the categories of relevant fact, the judge applies them, and the closing words of Section 3 BSA — "and of no others" — exclude everything else. Mastering the relevancy chapter is therefore not a matter of memorising a list. It is a matter of internalising the logic: a fact in issue plus a relevancy section equals admissible evidence. Anything less is irrelevant and excluded.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between logical relevancy and legal relevancy?

Logical relevancy is the common-sense inference that one fact makes another more or less probable. Legal relevancy is the narrower statutory category: a fact is legally relevant only when one of the relevancy sections of the BSA (Sections 3 to 50) so declares. Many logically relevant facts — most notably hearsay — are legally irrelevant and therefore excluded. The Supreme Court in Magraj Patodia v. R. K. Birla, AIR 1971 SC 1295, treats this as the central distinction in the law of evidence.

Is relevancy the same as admissibility under the BSA?

No. Relevancy is concerned with whether a fact falls within one of the relevancy sections of the Adhiniyam. Admissibility is concerned with whether some other rule — for example the bar on confessions to a police officer in Section 23 BSA — excludes an otherwise relevant fact. Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184, draws the line clearly: relevancy is what the Act admits, admissibility is what it forbids. A fact may be relevant and yet inadmissible.

What does 'and of no others' in Section 3 BSA mean for the trial judge?

The clause makes Indian evidence law an exclusionary system. The trial judge cannot admit a fact merely because it appears useful or probative; counsel must point to the specific section of the Adhiniyam under which the fact is relevant. If no section can be identified, the fact is shut out. The provision therefore puts the burden on the proponent of evidence to identify the statutory channel through which it enters the record.

Has Section 3 BSA changed anything compared to Section 5 IEA?

Substantively, no. Section 3 BSA is a verbatim re-enactment of Section 5 IEA. The relevancy chapter that follows reproduces the IEA architecture with only cosmetic changes — modernised illustrations, 'advocate' replacing 'vakil', 'currency' replacing 'coin', and city names updated. The renumbering matters for citation, but the doctrinal content is identical. The genuine BSA innovations are concentrated in the documentary and electronic-evidence chapters, not in the relevancy chapter.

How should a candidate answer a mains question on relevancy of facts?

Move from the gateway to the categories. Begin with Section 3 BSA (previously Section 5 IEA) and the logical-versus-legal distinction. State the exclusionary rule in 'and of no others'. Then identify the seven categories of relevant fact — same-transaction, causal and conduct, explanatory, common-design, state-of-mind, admissions and confessions, judgments and opinions. Conclude with the relevancy-versus-admissibility distinction, citing Haricharan Kurmi. Avoid equating logical and legal relevancy, the most common error.