Most charges can be drafted in a single, almost formulaic line: the offence, the section, the time, the place and the person against whom it was committed. But for a residual category of offences that bare skeleton tells the accused almost nothing useful. To say merely that A “cheated B” on a certain date at a certain place leaves the accused completely in the dark — cheating can be committed in a thousand ways, and unless the charge discloses how the deception was practised, the accused cannot prepare a defence at all. The provision that fills this gap is Section 213 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section 236 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), titled “When manner of committing offence must be stated.” It is the third and final tier of the particulars regime, sitting on top of Sections 211–212 CrPC, and it answers a deceptively simple question: when is naming the offence, the time, the place and the person not enough?
Where “manner” fits in the particulars regime
The Code builds the contents of a charge in graduated layers. Section 211 CrPC requires the charge to state the offence and the section; Section 212 supplies the particulars as to time, place and person. Section 213 is the supplementary, fact-sensitive layer that comes into play only “when the nature of the case is such” that those earlier particulars “do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged.” In that situation, and only in that situation, the charge “shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose.” Under the BNSS the architecture is identical — Sections 234 and 235 carry the time/place/person particulars, and Section 236 carries the manner requirement, reproducing the 1973 text almost word for word.
The drafting cue is the phrase “sufficient notice.” Section 213 is not a free-standing demand that every charge narrate the modus operandi. It is a sufficiency test: the draftsman asks whether the offence, the date, the place and the victim, taken together, already convey enough for the accused to understand the case. If they do, manner is surplusage; if they do not, manner becomes mandatory. This places Section 213 squarely within the object of the charge — notice to the accused — rather than as an independent formality, and explains why the section is policed through the prejudice lens rather than rigid invalidity.
The bare text of Section 213 / Section 236 BNSS
Section 213 CrPC reads: “When the nature of the case is such that the particulars mentioned in sections 211 and 212 do not give the accused sufficient notice of the matter with which he is charged, the charge shall also contain such particulars of the manner in which the alleged offence was committed as will be sufficient for that purpose.” Section 236 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 reproduces this verbatim, substituting the references to Sections 234 and 235 (the BNSS equivalents of Sections 211 and 212). The substantive law is therefore unchanged by the 2023 recodification; only the section numbers have moved.
Two textual features deserve emphasis. First, the word “also” signals that manner is additive — it is layered on top of the Section 211–212 particulars, never a substitute for them. Second, the phrase “as will be sufficient for that purpose” sets a functional, not exhaustive, standard: the charge need not narrate every evidentiary detail, only enough manner-particulars to cure the deficiency in notice. The draftsman is not writing the prosecution's case; he is supplying the minimum that lets the accused know the matter he must meet.
The six illustrations — the real key to the section
Section 213 is one of the few procedural provisions whose meaning is carried almost entirely by its illustrations. They divide offences into two classes and are worth reading literally. Illustration (a): “A is accused of the theft of a certain article at a certain time and place. The charge need not set out the manner in which the theft was effected.” Illustration (e): “A is accused of the murder of B at a given time and place. The charge need not state the manner in which A murdered B.” These two represent offences whose definition is self-contained: once you know it is theft of a named article, or murder of a named victim, you know the case to meet.
The other four illustrations represent offences where definition alone is insufficient. Illustration (b): “A is accused of cheating B at a given time and place. The charge must set out the manner in which A cheated B.” Illustration (c): “A is accused of giving false evidence at a given time and place. The charge must set out that portion of the evidence given by A which is alleged to be false.” Illustration (d): obstruction of a public servant — the charge “must set out the manner in which A obstructed.” Illustration (f): disobeying a direction of law to save B from punishment — the charge “must set out the disobedience charged and the law infringed.” The dividing line is intelligibility: where the offence-name plus victim already discloses the gravamen, manner is dispensed with; where it does not, manner is compulsory.
Why theft and murder differ from cheating and perjury
The logic underlying the split is the structure of the offence itself. Theft (Section 378 IPC / Section 303 BNS) and murder (Section 300/302 IPC / Section 101/103 BNS) are result-and-act offences whose actus reus is narrow: a dishonest taking of moveable property, or a causing of death with the requisite intent. There is essentially one thing the accused must answer — did you take this article, did you kill this person — and the manner (whether the theft was by stealth or the killing by knife or poison) is a matter of evidence, not of notice. Telling the accused the manner adds nothing to his ability to defend; it merely commits the prosecution prematurely.
Cheating (Section 415/420 IPC / Section 318 BNS) and giving false evidence (Section 191/193 IPC / Section 227/229 BNS) are different in kind. Cheating is defined by a method — deception inducing delivery of property or an act/omission. Without knowing what the alleged deception was, the accused literally cannot identify the transaction, let alone defend it. Perjury is worse still: a witness may have given hours of testimony, and unless the charge isolates the specific statement said to be false, the accused is left to guess. The Code therefore demands manner precisely where the offence-definition turns on the way it was done. This is the same reasoning that animates the cognate rule on specifying the thing stolen, cheated or misappropriated, which Sections 219 and 222 fold into joint trials of such offences.
Manner in cheating charges — the leading authority
The classic application of Illustration (b) is K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266 (reported also as [1960] 2 SCR 89). The accused, a contractor, was convicted under Section 420 IPC of cheating the Government of Burma to the tune of some seven lakh rupees by presenting inflated claims, the misrepresentation having been made at Simla and the supporting false instrument verified at Jhansi, with payment ultimately obtained at Lahore. Because the very gist of the offence was the deceptive scheme spread across these locations, the charge could not be left at “cheated the Government”; the manner — the false claims and how they induced payment — had to be, and was, set out. The Supreme Court treated the detailed manner-particulars as integral to the validity of the cheating charge, vindicating the Illustration (b) principle.
The same discipline applies to economic-offence charges generally. Where the prosecution alleges a fraudulent scheme, the charge must identify the misrepresentation, the inducement and the property obtained; a bare invocation of Section 420 with a date and place will fail the sufficiency test in Section 213. This is why charge sheets in cheating cases run to particulars of the specific false representations — not as a courtesy, but because the section commands it.
Breach of trust, misappropriation and conspiracy charges
Criminal breach of trust (Section 405/409 IPC / Section 316 BNS) sits close to cheating for Section 213 purposes: the entrustment and the dishonest misappropriation or conversion must be spelt out so the accused knows which property and which act of dishonesty are alleged. In V.C. Shukla v. State (through CBI), 1980 (Supp) SCC 92, the Supreme Court was concerned with charges including criminal breach of trust and conspiracy framed by a Special Judge; the case is better known for its ruling on appealability of charge orders, but it proceeds on the assumption that such charges must disclose the substance of the dishonest dealing. The Section 219 CrPC relaxation — permitting up to three offences of the same kind within a year to be tried together — also requires, via Section 222, that the gross sum and the dates be specified, which is the manner-and-particulars rule applied to serial misappropriation.
Conspiracy charges (Section 120-B IPC / Section 61 BNS) raise the manner question acutely because the agreement is itself the offence. In Tulsi Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1963 SC 666, the appellants were tried for conspiracy to cheat certain banks. A complaint that the charge was confusing was raised only belatedly, and the Court held that the charge had in fact been fully understood by the appellants, who never complained at the appropriate stage of being bewildered by it. The decision illustrates that even in complex multi-accused conspiracies, the manner requirement is satisfied if the charge, read as a whole, conveys the substance of the agreed-upon scheme — and that defects not raised at trial rarely succeed on appeal.
False evidence and obstruction — Illustrations (c), (d), (f)
Illustration (c) is the most demanding of the manner illustrations. A perjury charge under Section 193 IPC (Section 229 BNS) “must set out that portion of the evidence given by A which is alleged to be false.” It is not enough to allege that the accused lied on oath on a given date; the charge must quote or precisely identify the impugned statement, because the falsity of one sentence in a deposition is the entire matter the accused must defend. A charge that fails to isolate the false statement deprives the accused of the most basic notice and is liable to be held insufficient under Section 213.
Illustrations (d) and (f) extend the same principle to offences of obstruction and disobedience. Obstructing a public servant (Section 186 IPC / Section 221 BNS) requires the charge to state the manner of obstruction — a refusal, a physical act, a threat — because “obstruction” covers too wide a field to give notice by itself. Likewise, disobeying a direction of law to save an offender (the Section 217 IPC family) requires the charge to identify the specific disobedience and the law infringed. In each, the unifying idea is that the offence-name is a category, not a description, and Section 213 forces the prosecution to descend from category to description.
Relationship with the form and contents of the charge
Section 213 does not stand alone; it modulates the general rules on the form and contents of the charge. Section 211 fixes the skeleton — offence, section, and (where the definition gives no notice) the definition itself; Section 212 adds time, place and person; Section 213 adds manner only where notice still falls short. The three sections are meant to be read as a cascade, each engaging only if the previous layer leaves the accused without sufficient notice. A well-drafted charge in a cheating or perjury case therefore moves seamlessly from “A cheated B on [date] at [place]” (Sections 211–212) to “… by falsely representing that … thereby dishonestly inducing B to deliver …” (Section 213).
Crucially, manner-particulars are confined to giving notice; they are not a licence to over-plead. The standard — “as will be sufficient for that purpose” — is the minimum, not the maximum. Loading the charge with evidentiary detail can itself cause confusion and defeat the object of the section, which is clarity. The judge framing the charge must therefore calibrate: enough manner to inform, not so much as to obscure. For the hub view of how these layered rules interlock, see the framing of charges guide.
Consequences of omitting required manner
What happens if the charge omits manner where Section 213 required it? The answer is governed by the curability provisions — Sections 215 and 464 CrPC (Sections 237 and 504 BNSS) — which subordinate every defect in the charge to the test of prejudice. The foundational authority is the Constitution Bench decision in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116. There the conviction was challenged because no alternative charge under Section 302 IPC simpliciter had been framed (only Section 302 read with Section 34). The Court held the omission to be a curable irregularity, not an illegality vitiating the trial, because it had occasioned no prejudice to the accused. The governing principle is that an error, omission or irregularity in the charge — including in stating the manner — is not fatal unless it has caused the accused real prejudice resulting in a failure of justice.
This converts Section 213 from a rule of strict invalidity into a rule of fair notice policed retrospectively. A missing manner-particular that genuinely misled the accused and crippled the defence will vitiate the trial; the same omission, where the accused plainly understood and met the real case, will be overlooked. The burden is on the accused to show that the defect actually prejudiced him.
The prejudice test — failure of justice under Section 464
The modern restatement of the prejudice test is Main Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 10 SCC 130. Construing the expression “failure of justice” in Section 464 CrPC, the Supreme Court reiterated that a conviction is not invalidated by any omission or irregularity in the charge — including a defect in stating the manner — provided it has not occasioned a failure of justice. The Court anchored the inquiry in the object of the charge: to enable the accused to have a clear idea of what he is being tried for and of the essential facts he has to meet. Where, despite the defect, the accused had that clear idea and a fair opportunity to defend, no failure of justice arises.
The same emphasis on the object of the charge appears in State of West Bengal v. Laisal Haque, AIR 1989 SC 129, where the Supreme Court explained that the object of framing a charge is to make the accused aware of what he is to be tried for by clearly explaining the main facts sought to be established, so that he has a full and fair chance to defend himself. Read together, Laisal Haque supplies the purpose and Main Pal supplies the remedial test: manner-particulars matter because they secure fair notice, and their omission bites only when fair notice was actually denied.
Defects not raised at trial — the timing rule
A recurring theme across the authorities is the importance of when the objection is taken. Tulsi Ram v. State of U.P., AIR 1963 SC 666, turned partly on the appellants having failed to complain at the appropriate stage that they were confused by the charge; the Court inferred from their silence that the charge had been understood. Willie Slaney and Main Pal both stress that the appellate court must examine whether the accused was in fact misled in conducting his defence — an inquiry in which a contemporaneous objection (or its absence) is powerful evidence. The practical lesson for the defence is that an alleged deficiency in manner must be raised at the framing stage or at the earliest opportunity; a complaint surfacing only in appeal, after the accused has fully contested the real case, will rarely establish prejudice.
This timing rule is a corollary of the prejudice doctrine. If the accused understood the manner of the alleged offence well enough to cross-examine and lead a defence, the omission to spell it out in the charge could not have caused a failure of justice — and his own conduct at trial proves as much. Section 213 thus protects a real interest in notice, not a technical right to a perfectly worded charge.
A drafting checklist for the manner requirement
For the judge or prosecutor framing a charge, Section 213 reduces to a short diagnostic. First, identify the offence and ask whether its statutory definition is self-disclosing once the victim and property are named — if it is theft, murder, robbery, dacoity or the like, manner may be omitted (Illustrations (a) and (e)). Second, if the offence is defined by a method — cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery, giving false evidence, obstruction, criminal conspiracy — spell out the manner: the deception, the entrustment and conversion, the false statement, the act of obstruction, or the object of the agreement (Illustrations (b), (c), (d), (f)). Third, keep the manner-particulars to the minimum needed for notice, avoiding evidentiary clutter.
Fourth, in serial-offence and joint-trial situations, dovetail the manner requirement with the joinder rules — Sections 219–220 CrPC permit certain offences to be charged together, but the manner and particulars of each must still appear. This connects the present topic to the wider scheme of particulars to be stated and to the rules on charging multiple offences. Done properly, the manner-particulars insulate the charge against a later prejudice challenge: if the accused was told exactly how he is said to have offended, no appellate court will find a failure of justice in the framing.
The position under the BNSS, 2023
The Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, which came into force on 1 July 2024, re-enacts the manner requirement without substantive change. Section 234 BNSS corresponds to Section 211 CrPC, Section 235 to Section 212, and Section 236 to Section 213, carrying forward the identical text and the same six illustrations. The curability scheme likewise survives: Section 237 BNSS mirrors Section 215 CrPC, and Section 504 BNSS mirrors Section 464, preserving the failure-of-justice test. Consequently, the entire body of case law — Slaney, Satwant Singh, Tulsi Ram, Laisal Haque and Main Pal — continues to govern the manner requirement under the new Code.
For aspirants this is a welcome simplification: the principles are stable across the CrPC and the BNSS, and only the section numbers must be relearned. The conceptual core — that the charge must tell the accused how, but only where the what, when, where and against whom leave him without sufficient notice — is the same in 2024 as it was in 1973, and traces back to the same illustrations that have anchored the rule since the Code of 1898. For the foundational framing of the subject, see the introduction, importance and statutory basis.
Frequently asked questions
What does Section 213 CrPC (Section 236 BNSS) actually require?
It requires the charge to additionally state the manner in which the alleged offence was committed, but only when the offence, section, time, place and person under Sections 211–212 (Sections 234–235 BNSS) do not by themselves give the accused sufficient notice of the case. Where those particulars already convey the gravamen, manner may be omitted.
Why must cheating charges state the manner but theft charges need not?
Theft is a self-disclosing offence — naming the article taken tells the accused the whole case (Illustration (a)). Cheating is defined by a method, namely deception (Illustration (b)); without knowing what the alleged deception was, the accused cannot identify or defend the transaction. K. Satwant Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1960 SC 266, applied this to an inflated-claims fraud where the manner had to be set out.
What is required when the charge is for giving false evidence?
Under Illustration (c) the charge must set out the specific portion of the evidence alleged to be false. It is not enough to allege perjury on a given date and place; the impugned statement itself must be identified, because its falsity is the entire matter the accused must meet.
Does omitting the manner automatically invalidate the trial?
No. By Sections 215 and 464 CrPC (Sections 237 and 504 BNSS), a defect in the charge — including in stating manner — vitiates the trial only if it caused real prejudice amounting to a failure of justice. Willie Slaney v. State of M.P., AIR 1956 SC 116, and Main Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 10 SCC 130, confirm that absent prejudice the conviction stands.
What is the test for failure of justice in this context?
Main Pal v. State of Haryana, (2010) 10 SCC 130, construing Section 464 CrPC, asks whether — despite the defect — the accused had a clear idea of what he was tried for and a fair opportunity to defend. If he did, there is no failure of justice. State of West Bengal v. Laisal Haque, AIR 1989 SC 129, frames the underlying object as giving the accused a full and fair chance to defend himself.
Has the BNSS changed the manner requirement?
No. Section 236 BNSS reproduces Section 213 CrPC verbatim, with the same six illustrations, and Sections 234–235 BNSS carry the time/place/person particulars. The curability provisions (Sections 237 and 504 BNSS) also survive, so the entire pre-2024 case law continues to apply; only the section numbers have changed.