Few civil suits reward — or punish — careless drafting of issues more sharply than a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell. The whole controversy is statutory: did the parties contract, was time the essence, was the plaintiff continuously ready and willing, is the relief barred by limitation, and should the court in its discretion grant the decree at all? Each of those is a distinct material proposition that, under Order XIV of the CPC, must be crystallised into a recorded issue. This chapter shows how a trial judge actually frames issues in a specific performance suit, which propositions the pleadings throw up, who carries the burden on each, and how the leading authorities — and the 2018 amendment to the Specific Relief Act — shape the wording of those issues.
Why Specific Performance Suits Are Issue-Heavy
A money suit may turn on a single issue — is the sum due and payable. A suit for specific performance is structurally different. The plaintiff is asking the court to compel a reluctant defendant to convey property, an equitable and (until 2018) discretionary relief, so the court must satisfy itself on a cluster of independent propositions before the decree can issue. Each proposition is something the plaintiff must allege to show a right to the decree, or the defendant must allege to defeat it, and is therefore a "material proposition" within the meaning of Order XIV Rule 1 of the CPC.
Order XIV Rule 1(1) tells the court that issues arise when a material proposition of fact or law is affirmed by one party and denied by the other, and Rule 1(2) defines material propositions as those a plaintiff must allege to show a right to sue or a defendant must allege to constitute a defence. In a specific performance suit the plaintiff must allege at least the contract, his own readiness and willingness, the defendant's breach, and that the suit is within time; the defendant typically denies the contract, pleads that time was of the essence and was not adhered to, denies the plaintiff's readiness and willingness, and pleads limitation, hardship or want of title. The mechanics of converting these affirmations and denials into recorded issues are common to all civil suits and are treated in material propositions and admissions; here the focus is on the propositions peculiar to specific performance.
The Statutory Skeleton: SRA Read With Order XIV
The substantive law lives in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 — principally Sections 10, 16 and 20 (the discretion provision) before the 2018 amendment, and Sections 10 and 16 after it. Order XIV CPC supplies only the machinery for recording the points in dispute. The judge therefore frames issues by overlaying the SRA's ingredients onto the pleadings: each statutory pre-condition to the decree that is denied in the written statement becomes an issue. Section 10 identifies when a contract is specifically enforceable; Section 16 lists the personal bars to relief, including the readiness-and-willingness requirement in clause (c); and the now-deleted Section 20 housed the equitable discretion. A judge who keeps these provisions open while reading the plaint and written statement will rarely miss an issue, because every contested ingredient of the section maps onto a corresponding affirmation in the plaint and denial in the defence.
It follows that the framing exercise in a specific performance suit is far less intuitive and far more statute-driven than in an ordinary civil suit. The judge is not merely asking "what are the parties fighting about" in the abstract; he is checking the pleadings against a statutory checklist and recording an issue for every ingredient placed in controversy. Omitting an issue on a denied ingredient — most commonly readiness and willingness, or time as essence — is a recurring ground of remand in the appellate courts, because a finding cannot be sustained on a point on which no issue was framed and no opportunity to lead evidence was given.
The 2018 amendment is doctrinally important for the way issues are now worded. By the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 (with effect from 1 October 2018), Section 10 was recast so that specific performance "shall be enforced" subject to Sections 11(2), 14 and 16 — converting the relief from a discretionary equity into an enforceable right and deleting the old Section 20 discretion. In Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects Pvt. Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355, the Supreme Court held that the amendment operates prospectively and does not govern transactions concluded before 1 October 2018. The practical upshot for issue-framing is that a "whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief" issue is appropriate for pre-amendment contracts but is conceptually inapt for post-amendment ones, where the court asks instead whether the statutory ingredients are made out.
Issue One: Existence and Terms of the Contract
The threshold issue is whether the agreement pleaded by the plaintiff is proved — its execution, its terms, the consideration and the payment of earnest money. Where the defendant denies the agreement outright, or admits a document but disputes its character (loan-cum-security versus sale), the issue must be framed to capture that precise dispute rather than a vague "whether there was an agreement". A frequent oral-agreement variant is illustrated by U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 INSC 713, where the Supreme Court set aside concurrent decrees because the plaintiff had not established the oral agreement and his readiness and willingness to the required standard; the case is a reminder that the contract issue and the readiness issue are distinct and that proof on one does not dispense with proof on the other.
Because execution and terms are quintessentially questions of fact turning on evidence, this is an issue of fact in the Order XIV Rule 1 sense, not a preliminary issue of law that can dispose of the suit at the threshold — a distinction developed in issues of fact and issues of law. The burden rests squarely on the plaintiff who affirms the contract.
Readiness and Willingness: The Central Issue
The issue that decides most specific performance suits is whether the plaintiff was, and continued to be, ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act makes proof of readiness and willingness a condition precedent to the decree, and the courts treat it as a continuing requirement from the date of the contract until the hearing. In N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, the Supreme Court held that continuous readiness and willingness is a condition precedent to the grant of specific performance and that the conduct of the plaintiff throughout must be examined; it cannot be a mere recital in the plaint divorced from proof.
The classic distinction between the two limbs comes from His Holiness Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji v. Sita Ram Thapar, (1996) 4 SCC 526, where the Court explained that "readiness" refers to the plaintiff's capacity to perform — chiefly his financial ability to pay the price — while "willingness" refers to his conduct and intention to perform. A well-framed issue can compress both limbs: "Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement throughout, as required by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963." Earlier, in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, AIR 1967 SC 868, the Court had already held that a decree cannot be granted unless the plaintiff shows he was ready and willing to perform at all material times.
The evidentiary content of this issue is often decisive. Readiness is generally proved by showing the plaintiff's financial capacity to pay the balance consideration — bank statements, sanctioned loans, fixed deposits, or a credible explanation of available funds — while willingness is inferred from conduct such as repeated demands for execution, readiness to get the document registered, tender of the price, or deposit into court. A plaintiff who pleads readiness but leads no evidence of the wherewithal to pay, or who admits that the earnest money was adjusted towards some unrelated liability, will usually fail on this issue however strong the proof of the contract. That is precisely why the issue must be framed in terms that throw the burden on the plaintiff and invite proof of both capacity and conduct, rather than a bare yes-or-no on willingness alone.
Averment Versus Proof After 2018
A subtle but examinable shift concerns whether readiness and willingness must be pleaded as well as proved. The pre-amendment Section 16(c) required the plaintiff to "aver and prove" that he had performed or had always been ready and willing. The 2018 amendment substituted "who fails to prove" for "who fails to aver and prove", so the statute now in terms requires proof rather than a formal averment. Even before the amendment, the Supreme Court had cautioned against treating the plea as a magic formula: in Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, (2005) 7 SCC 534, the Court held that the test is whether, on a meaningful reading of the plaint as a whole, the plaintiff's readiness and willingness is made out — substance prevails over a particular form of words.
For issue-framing the consequence is twofold. First, the readiness-and-willingness issue must still be framed wherever the defendant denies it, because the plaintiff must prove it irrespective of the pleading change. Second, an absence of the ritual averment is no longer, by itself, a ground to deny framing the issue or to non-suit the plaintiff. Whether the conduct disclosed amounts to readiness and willingness remains a question of fact for evidence, consistent with the materials-based approach in materials from which issues may be framed.
Whether Time Was of the Essence
Where the defendant pleads that the plaintiff failed to pay or perform within a stipulated period, the court must frame an issue on whether time was of the essence of the contract — a mixed question of law and fact. The governing modern statement is Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 4 SCC 344, where the Supreme Court reiterated that in contracts for sale of immovable property time is ordinarily not of the essence, but the presumption can be rebutted by the express terms or by the surrounding circumstances; and that even where time is not the essence for executing the sale deed, it may be the essence for payment of the price.
The Court in Saradamani Kandappan also sounded a contemporary caution that, given inflation and steep rises in property values, the traditional indulgence to buyers who sit on their rights should be applied with circumspection. The issue is therefore best framed in two parts where the pleadings require it — whether time was of the essence for payment, and whether the plaintiff complied — so that the finding feeds directly into the readiness-and-willingness and the discretion issues.
The time issue is doctrinally a mixed question: whether time is the essence is a matter of construction of the contract (a question of law on admitted terms), but whether the plaintiff in fact complied within the stipulated period is a pure question of fact. Where the agreement itself recites a reason for the urgency — for example, that the seller must discharge a mortgage by a fixed date to convey clear title — the court is more readily persuaded that the parties intended time to be of the essence. A forfeiture or default clause in the agreement is a further pointer, though not conclusive. Framing the issue with these distinctions in mind lets the appellate court see at once whether the trial judge construed the contract correctly and then applied that construction to the proved facts.
Breach and the Plaintiff's Own Performance
Specific performance presupposes a subsisting contract that the defendant has refused to perform, so an issue on the defendant's breach or refusal is generally required. This is closely tied to readiness and willingness: a plaintiff who has himself committed the first material breach, or who has failed to tender or deposit the balance consideration when called upon, cannot ordinarily obtain the decree. The framing should isolate (a) whether the defendant committed breach by refusing to execute the conveyance, and (b) whether the plaintiff performed or was always ready to perform the reciprocal obligations.
Because these propositions are affirmed by the plaintiff and denied by the defendant, they satisfy the Order XIV Rule 1 affirmation-and-denial test and each forms the subject of a distinct issue. Where the written statement makes no real denial of a particular term — for instance, admits execution but pleads only non-payment — no issue need be framed on execution; the court frames issues only on points genuinely in variance, a discipline explained in material propositions and admissions.
Limitation: Article 54 as a Framed Issue
Limitation is almost always a live issue in specific performance litigation. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes three years for a suit for specific performance, running from "the date fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused." The two limbs make the limitation issue fact-sensitive: the court must first decide whether a calendar date for performance was fixed and, if not, when the plaintiff received notice of refusal.
Where the defendant pleads limitation, an issue such as "Whether the suit is within limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963" is mandatory, and Section 3 of that Act obliges the court to dismiss a time-barred suit even if limitation is not set up as a defence — which is why a careful judge frames the issue suo motu where the plaint discloses a possible bar. The first limb applies only when a specific calendar date is fixed; absent that, the second limb and the date of notice of refusal govern, a question that turns on the evidence and correspondence between the parties.
A common error is to assume that the date in an agreement by which the sale is to be "completed" is automatically the date fixed for performance under the first limb. The courts have repeatedly held that the date fixed for performance must be a specified date in the calendar; a clause that performance shall take place within a period or upon the happening of a contingency does not, without more, fix a date, and the suit then falls under the second limb. Because the answer determines from which event the three years run, the limitation issue is genuinely fact-sensitive and cannot be disposed of as a pure question of law without first ascertaining whether a calendar date exists and, if not, when the plaintiff had notice of refusal.
Discretion and Conduct in Pre-Amendment Contracts
For contracts governed by the law as it stood before 1 October 2018, the court's discretion under the erstwhile Section 20 was itself a material proposition. Even a plaintiff who proved the contract, his readiness and willingness, and that the suit was in time could be refused the decree if granting it would give him an unfair advantage, cause hardship to the defendant, or if the plaintiff's conduct was inequitable. The relief, as N.P. Thirugnanam and Gomathinayagam Pillai both stress, was equitable and dependent on conduct.
Where such discretion is in play the court frames a residual issue — "Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance" or "to what relief is the plaintiff entitled". After the 2018 amendment, and following Katta Sujatha Reddy, the equitable discretion to refuse the decree on hardship grounds no longer governs post-amendment contracts; for those, the residual issue is reframed as whether the statutory ingredients are satisfied, with the court's room to substitute compensation now confined to the narrower statutory scheme.
Alternative Relief and the Omnibus Issue
Most specific performance plaints claim, in the alternative, refund of earnest money with interest or compensation in lieu of specific performance. The court should frame an explicit issue on alternative relief so that a plaintiff who fails on the decree but succeeds on the contract is not left remediless. In U.N. Krishnamurthy, having declined the decree, the Supreme Court still directed return of the earnest money with interest — exactly the kind of consequential relief a properly framed alternative issue secures.
The familiar omnibus issue "to what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled" is not a substitute for the substantive issues but a catch-all that lets the court mould relief — decree, alternative compensation, or refund — once the substantive findings are recorded. It should always be the last issue, never the only one, because an omnibus issue cannot cure the failure to frame a specific issue on a contested material proposition.
Burden of Proof and the Order of Issues
Order XIV Rule 1(5) requires the court, while framing issues, to keep in view the burden of proof, and Rule 1(3) directs that each material proposition affirmed by one and denied by the other forms the subject of a distinct issue. In a specific performance suit the burden allocation is fairly settled: the plaintiff carries the burden on the contract, on his readiness and willingness, and on limitation if put in issue; the defendant carries the burden on affirmative defences he sets up, such as that the document was a security and not a sale, or that he has a superior or protected title.
Sequencing matters. A logically ordered set of issues runs from the existence of the contract, through time as essence and the plaintiff's readiness and willingness, to breach, limitation, discretion and relief, so that an adverse finding on an anterior issue (say, that no concluded contract is proved) makes the later issues academic. Getting the order and the burden right at the framing stage — the very purpose of the exercise described in when issues are framed — prevents a mistrial on appeal.
A Model Set of Issues
Drawing the threads together, a competently drafted specific performance suit (pre-amendment contract) will usually yield issues to this effect: (1) whether the plaintiff proves the agreement of sale and its terms; (2) whether time was of the essence and, if so, whether the plaintiff complied; (3) whether the plaintiff was and continued to be ready and willing to perform his part within the meaning of Section 16(c); (4) whether the defendant committed breach by refusing to execute the sale deed; (5) whether the suit is within limitation under Article 54; (6) whether the plaintiff is entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance; and (7) to what relief, including alternative relief, is the plaintiff entitled.
For a post-amendment contract, issue (6) is recast to ask whether the statutory ingredients for enforcement under the amended Section 10 read with Section 16 are satisfied, dropping the language of discretion. Each issue maps to a denied material proposition and to a verified line of authority — the contract to U.N. Krishnamurthy, readiness and willingness to Thirugnanam and Acharya Swami Ganesh Dassji, time to Saradamani Kandappan, and the amendment's reach to Katta Sujatha Reddy. Aspirants should be able to reproduce this skeleton and justify each issue by reference to the SRA section and the controlling case. For the wider framework, return to the framing of issues guide and the introduction to the subject.
Frequently asked questions
What is the single most important issue in a specific performance suit?
Readiness and willingness. Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act it is a condition precedent to the decree, and N.P. Thirugnanam v. Dr. R. Jagan Mohan Rao, (1995) 5 SCC 115, holds that it must be continuous from the date of the contract until the hearing. Most suits are decided on this issue.
How did the 2018 amendment change issue-framing in these suits?
It recast Section 10 so specific performance "shall be enforced" and deleted the old Section 20 discretion, turning the relief into an enforceable right. So for post-amendment contracts the residual issue asks whether the statutory ingredients are satisfied, not whether the discretionary relief should be granted. Katta Sujatha Reddy v. Siddamsetty Infra Projects, (2023) 1 SCC 355, confirms the amendment is prospective.
Must readiness and willingness still be specifically pleaded after 2018?
The amendment substituted "who fails to prove" for "who fails to aver and prove", so the statute now stresses proof. Even earlier, Aniglase Yohannan v. Ramlatha, (2005) 7 SCC 534, held that substance prevails over form and the plaint is read as a whole. But the issue must still be framed and proved wherever the defendant denies it.
When is time treated as the essence of the contract for issue-framing?
In sales of immovable property time is presumptively not the essence, but Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 4 SCC 344, holds the presumption is rebuttable by express terms or surrounding circumstances, and time may be the essence for payment of the price even where it is not for executing the sale deed. A separate issue is framed where this is contested.
Is limitation a compulsory issue in a specific performance suit?
Wherever the plaint discloses a possible bar or the defendant pleads it, yes. Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 gives three years from the date fixed for performance or, if none is fixed, from notice of refusal. Section 3 obliges the court to dismiss a time-barred suit even without a plea, so a careful judge frames the issue suo motu.
Why frame an issue on alternative relief?
Because a plaintiff may fail on the decree yet be entitled to refund of earnest money or compensation. In U.N. Krishnamurthy v. A.M. Krishnamurthy, 2022 INSC 713, the Supreme Court declined the decree but still ordered return of the earnest money with interest. An express alternative-relief issue, plus the omnibus "to what relief" issue, secures that outcome.