Bar of Civil Court Jurisdiction (Section 67)

A reform statute that gives tenants security of tenure and a right to purchase is worth little if a landlord can re-litigate every protection in an ordinary civil suit. The Goa Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 therefore carves tenancy questions out of the civil court's hands and channels them to a specialised forum, the Mamlatdar. The bar on the civil court's jurisdiction is the keystone that holds the whole scheme together. A note of caution at the outset: although this topic is often labelled “Section 67” in coaching material, the bar in the bare Act as it stands on indiacode.nic.in is housed in Section 58 (“Bar to jurisdiction of Courts”), read with the Mamlatdar's gateway power in Section 7. We follow the verified statutory text, and flag where the popular numbering departs from it.

Where the Bar Actually Sits in the Act

The first task is to locate the provision precisely, because an exam answer that quotes the wrong section number invites instant marks loss. On the authoritative text of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (the Act's official short title), the ouster clause is Section 58, headed “Bar to jurisdiction of Courts”. There is no operative “Section 67” in the bare Act — the substantive Chapter runs through Sections 58 to 62 (delegation, directions, penalty, rules, removal of difficulties). Some compilations and study guides renumber or mis-cite the bar as “Section 67”; the safe practice is to write “Section 58 (‘Bar to jurisdiction of Courts’)” and, if you wish, add “sometimes cited as Section 67 in study material”. The companion ouster on execution is Section 16, “Bar to attachment, seizure or sale by process of Court”, which immunises a tenant's interest in the land from attachment in execution of a civil decree. Together, Sections 7, 16 and 58 build a closed channel that diverts agrarian disputes away from the District Munsif and into the revenue hierarchy. For the broader scheme, see our introduction and object note.

The Text and Structure of Section 58

Section 58 has two limbs. Sub-section (1) is a good-faith protection: “No suit or other proceeding shall lie against any person in respect of anything which is in good faith done or intended to be done under this Act.” This shields officers and parties acting bona fide under the statute. Sub-section (2) is the jurisdictional bar proper: “Save as provided in this Act, no Court shall have jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or Government, and no order passed by these authorities under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court.” Two features deserve emphasis. First, the bar is keyed not to a list of suits but to a class of questions — those the Act commits to the named authorities. Second, the closing words bar collateral attack: an order of the Mamlatdar or the Administrative Tribunal cannot be re-opened in a civil or criminal court. The phrase “save as provided in this Act” preserves the few residual matters the statute itself leaves open.

Section 7 — The Gateway That Triggers the Bar

The bar in Section 58 cannot be read alone; it bites only on questions the Act assigns elsewhere. The principal assigning provision is Section 7, “Question of tenancy”: “If any question arises whether any person is or was a tenant or should be deemed to be a tenant under this Act, the Mamlatdar shall, after holding an inquiry, decide such question.” A 1966 amendment adds a presumption that an entry of tenancy in a record of rights prepared under the Act is true. Section 7A, inserted in 1975, similarly vests the Mamlatdar with power to decide “whether any land is or is not used for agricultural purposes.” Because the existence of a tenancy, deemed-tenant status, and the agricultural character of land are precisely the questions “required to be… decided… by the Mamlatdar”, Section 58(2) strips the civil court of authority over them. The reach of Section 7 is wide: it is not confined to cases where the landlord–tenant relationship is admitted, but extends to disputed claims of tenancy. The substantive protections that flow once the Mamlatdar decides tenancy exist are covered in rights of the tenant and security of tenure.

The Foundational Principle — Dhondi Tukaram Mali

The Goa Act is modelled on the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948, and the seminal exposition of how a tenancy bar operates comes from there. In Dhondi Tukaram Mali v. Dadoo Piraji Adgale (AIR 1954 Bom 100), the Bombay High Court confronted the problem of a tenancy question arising incidentally within a suit otherwise properly before the civil court. The Court held that the Mamlatdar had exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a person was a tenant, and that even where such a question surfaced in a civil suit, the civil court could not itself adjudicate it; the proper course was to refer the issue to the competent authority and treat that authority's finding as binding. The legislature responded by enacting Section 85A of the Bombay Act, codifying the reference mechanism. Dhondi Mali remains the conceptual root of the doctrine that a tenancy statute's bar is question-based, not merely suit-based, and it directly informs how Section 58 of the Goa Act is read.

Incidental Tenancy Issues — Gundaji Satwaji Shinde

The Supreme Court settled the incidental-issue question authoritatively in Gundaji Satwaji Shinde v. Ramchandra Bhikaji Joshi (AIR 1979 SC 653). A suit for specific performance turned on whether the defendant was a protected tenant, an issue exclusively triable by the tenancy authority under the Bombay Act. The Court held that where, in a suit properly instituted in a civil court, an issue arises which is required to be decided by the competent authority under the Tenancy Act, the civil court is bound to stay the suit and refer that issue to the authority; it cannot decide the tenancy question itself even as a step towards granting civil relief. This is the practical operation of the bar: the civil court does not lose seisin of the suit, but it loses the power to determine the carved-out question. The same logic governs the Goa Act, where Section 7 supplies the carved-out question and Section 58 supplies the bar. The interplay matters most in disputes over termination of tenancy, where a landlord's civil claim often conceals a tenancy issue.

Application to the Goa Act — Vishwanath Kamat

The principle has been applied to the Goa statute directly. In Shri Vishwanath G. Kamat v. Jose Ivo Romano, the High Court of Bombay at Goa held that, on a combined reading of Section 7 with Section 58 of the Goa Tenancy Act, exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a person is or was a tenant, or a deemed tenant, is conferred on the Mamlatdar, and the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide such tenancy questions “has been completely ousted.” The case confirms that a Goa litigant who pleads tenancy or deemed-tenant status, or whose adversary does, cannot have that status adjudicated by the ordinary civil court. A plaint by an alleged tenant seeking relief against threatened dispossession by a landlord is liable to be rejected for want of jurisdiction; the remedy lies before the Mamlatdar. The deemed-owner consequences that follow a tenancy finding are explained in our note on resumption of land by the landlord.

Limits of the Mamlatdar's Power — Dattaram Arolkar

The bar is co-extensive with the authority's jurisdiction — no wider. Dattaram A. Arolkar v. Mamlatdar of Mormugao (Bombay High Court at Goa, decided 13 June 2000) illustrates the boundary. Purchasers sought a declaration before the Mamlatdar that an opponent was not a tenant, so as to correct the survey record. The Court held that the Mamlatdar's power under Section 7 (and 7A) is to decide whether a person is or was a tenant; it does not extend to granting a purely negative declaration of non-tenancy at the instance of a person seeking to clear a record. The case is a reminder that the ouster operates only on questions the Act actually entrusts to the Mamlatdar. Where a claim falls outside that entrustment — for example, a question of pure title between two non-tenants, or a relief the tenancy authority cannot grant — the civil court's jurisdiction is not displaced. Identifying the true nature of the question is therefore the decisive step in any jurisdictional objection.

What Still Remains With the Civil Court

The bar is significant but not total; “save as provided in this Act” and the limits of Section 7 leave a residue with the civil court. Disputes that do not turn on the existence of a tenancy — questions of title between rival owners, suits for possession where no party claims tenant status, and contractual claims unconnected with the agrarian relationship — remain civilly cognisable. A frequently cited illustration is a suit for perpetual injunction between two persons each claiming to be the tenant: since the Act does not commit a dispute inter se tenants over possession to the Mamlatdar, the civil court may entertain it. Equally, once the Mamlatdar has decided the tenancy question, the civil court may proceed on the basis of that binding finding to grant relief that lies within its own power, such as a money decree or possession consequent on the statutory determination. The line, as Gundaji Shinde shows, is between deciding the carved-out question and acting upon a decision already made.

Collateral Attack, Finality and Good Faith

Section 58(2)'s closing words — “no order passed by these authorities under this Act shall be questioned in any Civil or Criminal Court” — bar collateral challenge to Mamlatdar, Collector and Administrative Tribunal orders. A party aggrieved must use the statutory ladder: appeal to the Collector and, where provided, revision before the Administrative Tribunal, with the constitutional remedy of a writ under Articles 226/227 as the residual check on jurisdictional error. The good-faith clause in Section 58(1) protects officers and parties from suits over bona fide action under the Act, reinforcing the self-contained character of the scheme. Two ancillary provisions complete the picture: Section 16 bars attachment, seizure or sale of a tenant's interest in execution of a civil decree, preventing creditors from doing through execution what the bar forbids in adjudication; and Section 58A restricts appearance by pleaders before the Mamlatdar and Collector, underlining the Act's design as an accessible, summary forum for cultivators rather than a venue for protracted civil litigation.

The 2014 and 2017 Amendment Saga

Aspirants should know the recent legislative churn, because it directly affects the bar. By the Goa Agricultural Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 2014 (notified 25 September 2014), the State deleted Section 58(2), the very limb that ousted the civil court, with the policy aim of shifting tenancy adjudication from the Mamlatdar to the civil courts. That experiment was short-lived: a further amendment, brought into force on 31 August 2017, restored the Mamlatdar's exclusive jurisdiction, so that tenancy questions are once again decided by the revenue forum and not the civil court. The episode is a useful exam talking-point on the legislature's settled preference for a specialised, low-cost tenancy forum, and on how the bar's strength has fluctuated with policy. For the broader machinery of who decides what, revisit the key definitions and the project's Goa Agricultural Tenancy Act hub.

How to Answer a Jurisdiction Question in the Exam

A model approach runs in four steps. First, identify the question in dispute and ask whether it is one the Act “requires” to be decided by the Mamlatdar, Tribunal, Collector or Government — chiefly the Section 7 tenancy question or the Section 7A agricultural-use question. Second, if it is, invoke Section 58(2): the civil court has no jurisdiction to settle or decide it, and any such order is liable to be set aside. Third, address incidental issues using Gundaji Satwaji Shinde — the civil court stays the suit and refers the carved-out issue to the competent authority, then proceeds on the binding finding. Fourth, check the limits using Dattaram Arolkar and the residue — negative declarations, pure title disputes and inter-tenant injunctions may fall outside the bar. Anchor the answer on Section 58 read with Section 7, cite Dhondi Tukaram Mali, Gundaji Shinde and Vishwanath Kamat, and note the popular “Section 67” label so the examiner sees you know the source. That structure converts a tricky jurisdiction problem into a clean, scoring answer.