Eviction of Tenant — Grounds (Section 22)

The Goa, Daman and Diu Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1968 reverses the ordinary law of landlord and tenant: a tenant who pays rent and observes the lease enjoys a near-statutory immunity from eviction. Section 22 is the gateway that lets a landlord break that immunity, but only by squeezing his case into one of the enumerated grounds — arrears, subletting, waste, nuisance, acquisition of alternative accommodation, abandonment or denial of title. Each ground carries its own threshold and, in some cases, a curative proviso that lets the tenant escape eviction by paying up. This note sets out the architecture of Section 22, ground by ground, with the verified statutory text and the controlling case law.

The scheme of Section 22

Section 22(1) opens the door: a landlord who seeks to evict his tenant must apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf — he cannot resort to a civil suit or self-help. Section 22(2) then lists the grounds on which the Controller, if satisfied, may make an eviction order. The verb "may" is deliberate; even when a ground is proved, the Controller exercises a controlled discretion structured by the provisos. This statutory channelling mirrors the object of the Act, which is to protect tenants against unreasonable eviction while preserving the landlord's genuine interests — a balance explained in our note on the object and application of the Act. Because the grounds are exhaustive, a landlord pleading a ground outside Section 22(2) — for instance, a mere desire to re-let at a higher rent — has no case at all. The grounds are best grouped as default grounds (arrears), breach grounds (subletting, change of user, waste, nuisance), conduct grounds (abandonment, acquisition of other accommodation, denial of title) and the separate bona fide requirement route under Section 23, treated in our companion note on eviction for bona fide need.

Ground (a): arrears of rent

Under clause (a) the Controller may order eviction where the tenant is in arrears in payment of rent due by him in respect of the building for a total period of three months and has failed to pay or tender such arrears as are legally recoverable within thirty days of receipt of (or refusal of) a registered notice served by the landlord. Two pre-conditions are therefore jurisdictional: a three-month default and a registered demand notice. The clause is curable, not penal. The proviso to Section 22 directs that no order for eviction shall be made on the ground of arrears if the tenant, within thirty days of service of the summons, pays or tenders to the landlord or deposits with the Controller the arrears due to date together with the cost of the application. This "pay-and-stay" protection is, however, ordinarily a one-time indulgence in respect of the same building, so a habitual defaulter cannot weaponise it repeatedly. The arrears ground is closely tied to the continuing deposit obligation: a tenant who wishes to contest the application must also keep current rent paid up under the deposit machinery of the Act. Because the computation of "rent legally recoverable" turns on the lawfully fixed figure, the arrears ground cannot be divorced from standard rent; a tenant who has paid the standard rent is not in default even if the landlord demanded more. The ground is examined in depth in our dedicated note on eviction for arrears of rent.

Ground (b): subletting, transfer and change of user

Clause (b) covers three distinct breaches committed without the written consent of the landlord: transfer of the tenant's right under the lease, sub-letting of the entire building or any portion of it, and use of the building for a purpose other than that for which it was leased. Subletting is the most heavily litigated. The settled test is exclusive possession plus consideration. In Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. S.B. Sardar Ranjit Singh (AIR 1968 SC 933) the Supreme Court held that the onus to prove subletting is on the landlord, but once he shows prima facie that a third party is in exclusive possession of the let premises for valuable consideration, the burden shifts to the tenant to rebut it. In Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (1998) 3 SCC 1 the Court recognised that subletting is by nature a clandestine arrangement, so direct proof of money passing is rarely available; where the tenant has parted with exclusive possession the Controller may legitimately infer that it was for consideration. The companion concept of "parting with possession" was clarified in Vishwa Nath v. Chaman Lal (AIR 1975 Del 117): there must be parting with legal possession to the ouster of the grantor; if the tenant retains the right to control and exclude, there is no subletting. Thus a tenant who merely allows relatives or a manager to use the premises while remaining in legal possession does not fall within clause (b).

Subletting versus partnership and licence

Landlords frequently allege that a partnership is a disguised sub-tenancy. The leading authority is Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri (1987) 3 SCC 538, where the Supreme Court held that a tenant who genuinely enters a partnership and lets the firm carry on business in the demised premises, while himself retaining legal possession, does not sublet. The corollary, stated in Parvinder Singh v. Renu Gautam (2004) 4 SCC 794, is that the Controller may "tear the veil" of a sham partnership floated only to camouflage an effective transfer of exclusive possession. The enquiry is therefore one of substance: who, in reality, holds legal possession and bears the risk of the business? A bare licence that does not confer exclusive possession is equally outside clause (b). The same fact-sensitive approach governs the "change of user" limb — a residential building converted to a shop, or vice versa, in breach of the lease's purpose attracts the clause, but a trivial or incidental variation that does not alter the essential character of the tenancy will usually not. Because consent in writing is a complete answer, landlords should be cautious: tacit acquiescence over years may, on the facts, be treated as estoppel even though the statute speaks of written consent.

Grounds (c) and (d): acts of waste and nuisance

Clause (c) permits eviction where the tenant has committed such acts of damage as are likely to impair materially the value or utility of the building. The damage must be material and the work of the tenant; ordinary wear and tear, or deterioration from age, does not qualify. Structural alterations that weaken the building, demolition of walls, or removal of fixtures are typical instances. The phrase "likely to impair materially" means the landlord need not wait for actual collapse — a real and substantial risk to value or utility suffices, but trifling or reversible changes do not meet the threshold. Clause (d) deals with nuisance: the tenant has been guilty of such acts and conduct as are a nuisance to the occupiers of other portions of the same building or of buildings in the neighbourhood, and the clause expressly extends to conduct amounting to an offence under the law suppressing immoral traffic. Nuisance under this clause is the continuing disturbance of others' use and enjoyment — persistent noise, obnoxious trade, or criminal use of the premises — not an isolated quarrel. Both grounds are conduct-based and non-curable: unlike arrears, there is no statutory proviso letting the tenant make amends, though the Controller's discretion to refuse eviction where the breach is minor and not repeated remains a live consideration on the facts.

Ground (e): acquisition of alternative accommodation

Clause (e) addresses the tenant who no longer needs the protection of the Act because he has secured a home of his own. The Controller may order eviction where the tenant has, after the commencement of the tenancy, acquired, built or been allotted a suitable residence within the prescribed local limits (a dwelling house within reach of the let premises). The rationale is that rent-control protection is a shield for those genuinely dependent on the tenancy, not a windfall for a tenant who now owns or has been allotted comparable accommodation. The accommodation acquired must be reasonably suitable and available to the tenant for occupation; a derelict or distant property that cannot in fact house him does not trigger the clause. The burden is on the landlord to establish the acquisition and its suitability. This ground sits alongside the abandonment ground in clause (f) as the two "the tenant doesn't really need it" grounds, and both are conduct grounds turning on the tenant's own subsequent acts rather than on any breach of the lease covenants.

Ground (f): ceasing to occupy

Clause (f) allows eviction where the tenant has ceased to occupy the building for a continuous period of four months without reasonable cause. The provision targets the tenant who keeps the tenancy alive nominally — holding the keys and paying token rent — while making no real use of the premises, thereby blocking accommodation in a scarce market. "Occupation" is read purposively: physical residence is not indispensable so long as the tenant maintains effective control and animus to return, for instance during temporary absence on work, illness or travel. The crucial qualifier is "without reasonable cause"; a tenant who shows a genuine reason for the absence defeats the ground even if the building stood empty for the qualifying period. The four-month clock is continuous, so an interrupted absence resets it. Practically, landlords pair this ground with evidence of disconnected utilities, accumulated post or a sealed shop, while tenants rebut with proof of continuing furniture, periodic visits or an explained sojourn. Like clause (e), it is a conduct ground without a pay-and-cure proviso.

Ground (g): denial of title and bad-faith permanency claims

Clause (g) permits eviction where the tenant has denied the title of the landlord or claimed a right of permanent tenancy and such denial or claim was not bona fide. The clause codifies the common-law principle of forfeiture by disclaimer: a tenant who repudiates the very relationship under which he holds, by asserting that the landlord has no title or that he himself is a permanent tenant or owner, forfeits the protection of the Act. The denial must be clear, unequivocal and in bad faith. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed the related estoppel: a tenant who entered possession under the landlord cannot, while continuing in possession, dispute the landlord's title — the principle underlying Section 116 of the Evidence Act and applied across rent statutes. A merely bona fide dispute about who, among rival claimants, is the true landlord entitled to rent does not amount to a forfeiting denial; the clause bites only where the disclaimer is dishonest. This ground protects the integrity of the landlord-tenant relationship itself, distinguishing it from the breach and conduct grounds that presuppose a subsisting tenancy.

Bona fide requirement and the Controller's discretion

The most contested route to possession — the landlord's own bona fide requirement for occupation — is dealt with separately under Section 23 (with accelerated procedures for service personnel, government servants, their widows and non-resident Indians), but it informs the whole eviction scheme and is fully treated in our note on eviction for bona fide need. Two Supreme Court decisions set the tone for how the Controller must approach genuine need. In Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. (1998) 8 SCC 119 the Court held that the Controller must not start with a presumption that the landlord's requirement is not bona fide; once a prima facie case is shown, a presumption of bona fides may be drawn, and the court should not substitute its own notion of how the landlord might otherwise adjust. In Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. (2000) 1 SCC 679 the Court reiterated that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement and has freedom to choose which of his premises to occupy; the tenant cannot dictate that the landlord make do with some other property, though a manifestly suitable vacant alternative is a relevant fact. These principles temper the Controller's discretion across the Act and underline that genuine need, honestly proved, will prevail.

Procedure, rent deposit and appeals

Section 22 is procedural as much as substantive. The application goes to the Controller, who must record satisfaction on the specific ground pleaded; an order resting on a ground not raised is liable to be set aside. A tenant who wishes to contest must comply with the Act's deposit machinery — paying or depositing all arrears and continuing to deposit current rent during the pendency of the proceedings — failing which his defence may be struck out. The pay-and-stay proviso to the arrears ground is the tenant's principal safety valve and should be invoked within the thirty-day window from service of summons. Orders of the Controller are subject to appeal and, beyond that, to revision before the High Court, but the appellate forum will not re-appreciate evidence on bona fides or subletting as if at first instance; it intervenes on errors of law, perversity or jurisdictional excess. For the broader rent-fixation context that underlies the arrears computation and the landlord's permissible demands, see our notes on standard rent and lawful increases in rent. A consolidated map of the statutory scheme is available on the subject hub.