Every claim under the Goa Mundkars Protection Act rises or falls on Section 2. The whole protective scheme — security of residence, restricted eviction, the right to buy — attaches only to a person who first squeezes within the statutory label of mundkar, residing in a dwelling house on land owned by a bhatkar. The Bombay High Court at Panaji has repeatedly stressed that these are not loose descriptions but precise jurisdictional gateways: get the definition wrong and the Mamlatdar has no power to decide anything. This note dissects each defined term in Section 2, the deeming Explanation, the spatial limits of a dwelling house, and the case law that fixed their meaning.
Why Section 2 is the gateway
The Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) Act, 1975 abolished the old Goan custom under which a person was permitted to reside on a landowner's plot, often rendering free services in exchange. The Act converted that precarious occupation into a statutorily protected one. But protection is not at large: it is conferred on a mundkar as defined, in respect of a dwelling house as defined, against a bhatkar as defined. Because the Mamlatdar's jurisdiction under the Act is a creature of these definitions, a wrong finding on status is not a mere error of fact — it goes to the root of jurisdiction, and an order passed without a valid mundkar, dwelling house and bhatkar before the authority is liable to be set aside as a nullity. A further reason the definitions matter is that the Act is beneficial, agrarian-social legislation: its protective provisions are construed liberally in favour of the weaker occupant it was meant to shelter, while the exclusions and limits are read strictly, so a person who cannot pass the gateway gets none of that liberal construction. Section 2 therefore controls everything downstream, including security of residence and the right to purchase the dwelling house. The substantive history of the Act is set out in the introduction.
"Mundkar" — Section 2(p)
Section 2(p) defines a mundkar as a person who, with the consent of the bhatkar (or a person acting or purporting to act on the bhatkar's behalf), lawfully resides with a fixed habitation in a dwelling house, with or without an obligation to render services, and includes a member of his family. Three cumulative ingredients emerge from the text: (i) lawful residence with the bhatkar's consent; (ii) fixed habitation; and (iii) occupation of a dwelling house. In Maria Fernandes v. Ishaprema Niketan, 2002(2) ALL MR 465, the Bombay High Court at Panaji held that a claimant must affirmatively establish all three, and that the petitioner there failed because she could prove neither the original owner's consent nor a fixed habitation; the deeming Explanation could not rescue her because an eviction decree had already been obtained against her before the Act's benefit could attach.
The drafting word "includes" is significant. In Henriqueta D'Souza v. Mangesh D. Mishal, 2014(7) ALL MR 856, the Court held that when the legislature uses "includes" in Section 2(p), it does not intend to narrow the term; the definition becomes enumerative and not exhaustive, so the word retains its ordinary meaning while extending to the persons expressly brought in. This reading underpins the broader protective purpose of the statute.
Consent of the bhatkar and "fixed habitation"
The two contested limbs in practice are consent and fixed habitation. The residence must be lawful, meaning it began with the bhatkar's consent and not as a trespass. But mere lawful presence is not enough: it must be by way of fixed habitation. The concept connotes a substantial degree of permanency of occupation — a settled home, not a casual or transient stay. A person cannot maintain two competing fixed habitations at once. In Krishna Vithoba Xete Tilve v. Vassudev Pandurang Naik, 2015(2) ALL MR 659, the Court held that even where a claimant occupies more than one residence, only one location can qualify as the fixed habitation for any given period, and the claimant must prove which. The same decision observed that a dwelling house must be a separate, distinct unit capable of independent habitation, so a mere portion of a larger house may not by itself qualify.
These ingredients feed directly into the recognition procedure, where the Mamlatdar tests the same elements on evidence before declaring a person a mundkar.
The deeming Explanation to Section 2(p)
To ease the evidentiary burden on long-settled residents, the Explanation to Section 2(p) creates a deeming fiction. A person is deemed to be lawfully residing with the consent of the bhatkar if he has resided in the dwelling house for a period exceeding one year prior to the appointed date, and the bhatkar has either not initiated eviction proceedings during that one-year period through a competent court on the ground of trespass, or, having initiated them, has failed to obtain a decree for eviction. The fiction thus converts uncontested long occupation into deemed consent. Its limits are equally important: as Maria Fernandes illustrates, where the bhatkar has already secured an eviction decree, the deeming provision cannot operate and the occupant is left to prove actual consent and fixed habitation in the ordinary way.
Persons expressly excluded from "mundkar"
The definition carves out categories who, though they may physically reside on the bhatkar's land, are denied mundkar status because their occupation flows from a different legal relationship. These include a person who pays rent to the bhatkar for the house (a tenant, governed by rent law rather than this Act); a domestic servant or chowkidar paid wages and housed in out-houses incidental to that employment; an employee residing in quarters provided in connection with a mill, factory, mine or commercial establishment; and a caretaker engaged merely to look after property. The common thread is that the occupation in each case is referable to rent, wages or employment, not to the customary mundkarial relationship the Act was enacted to protect. A claimant who falls into any excluded class is outside the Act altogether, and the protections discussed in eviction on restricted grounds never arise.
"Bhatkar" — the landowner
The bhatkar is the counterpart of the mundkar: in substance, the person who owns the land on which the mundkar has his dwelling house. Ownership of the land, not of the house structure, is the touchstone — a point that matters because the dwelling house may have been built by the mundkar himself. The bhatkar is the party against whom the mundkar's security of residence operates, the party who must establish a permissible ground before any eviction, and the party whose bona fide need can, in narrow circumstances, justify recovery of the house. The bhatkar is also the person from whom the mundkar may compulsorily purchase the dwelling house under the purchase machinery of the Act, with compensation fixed by statutory formula rather than by negotiation. Two points of contrast with ordinary landlord-tenant law deserve emphasis. First, the bhatkar-mundkar relationship is not contractual rent for shelter — a person who pays rent for the house is expressly a tenant outside the Act, not a mundkar, so the bhatkar cannot defeat a genuine mundkar by characterising the arrangement as a lease. Second, because the bhatkar owns only the land and not necessarily the structure, the Act deliberately separates ownership of the soil from the right of residence and eventual ownership of the house, reversing the common-law presumption that whatever is built on land belongs to the landowner. The bhatkar’s ownership of the land is thus the fixed reference point against which the mundkar’s statutory rights are measured.
"Dwelling house" — Section 2(i)
Section 2(i) defines the dwelling house as the house in which the mundkar resides with a fixed habitation. Crucially, the definition does not depend on who paid for construction: it covers a house built by the mundkar at his own expense, or at the bhatkar's expense, or with the bhatkar's financial assistance. The dwelling house includes the land on which it stands together with the land around and appurtenant to it, subject to ceilings — broadly, land within five metres from the outer walls where the house is within the jurisdiction of a village panchayat, and within two metres where it is not, with overall area ceilings (commonly applied as up to 300 square metres in panchayat areas and 200 square metres in municipal areas). It also extends to connected structures customarily used with the house, such as cattle sheds and the like, and to customary easements of access. Two features distinguish it from an ordinary residential premises. First, it is tied to the person of the mundkar: it is the house in which this mundkar resides with fixed habitation, so identification of the dwelling house and identification of the mundkar are interlocking exercises. Second, registration under the Act fixes a person as the mundkar of a specific dwelling house and raises a statutory presumption to that effect, but not of any other property he may also occupy, as the Court underscored in Krishna Vithoba Xete Tilve. The definition is the foundation for the right of residence and the right to purchase, both of which can extend no further than the house and appurtenant land that answer this description.
Who built the house: the 1985 Amendment
An early and consequential controversy was whether protection extended only to houses the mundkar had built himself. In Santana Furtado Dias v. Uttam Tari (Bombay High Court, 1985), the Court read the definition restrictively, holding that the dwelling house had to have been constructed by the mundkar. That interpretation threatened to strip protection from a large class of mundkars who lived in houses built by, or with the help of, their bhatkars. The legislature responded with the Mundkars (Protection from Eviction) (Amendment) Act, 1985, which amended Section 2(i) to make clear that it is immaterial whether the house was constructed by the mundkar at his own expense, at the bhatkar's expense, or with the bhatkar's financial assistance. In Maria Eliza Marques v. Madhukar M. Moraskar (Bombay High Court at Panaji, 19 November 1997), a group of writ petitions challenging the constitutional validity of the 1985 Amendment, the Court traced this legislative history and upheld the expanded definition, recognising that the amendment cured the restrictive reading and restored the Act's protective sweep.
Spatial limits and the Mamlatdar's jurisdiction
The metre and area ceilings in Section 2(i) are not mere description — they delimit what the statutory authorities may adjudicate. In Antonio Salvador Francisco v. Pedro Carvalho, 2000(1) ALL MR 612, the Bombay High Court at Panaji held that a structure lying beyond the prescribed limits (five metres / 300 square metres in panchayat areas, two metres / 200 square metres in municipal areas, from the outer walls) cannot form part of the dwelling house; consequently a dispute about such a distant structure falls outside the Mamlatdar's reference jurisdiction under the Act. The spatial definition thus operates as a jurisdictional fence. This also caps the area a mundkar may eventually purchase, and the courts have warned that the right to the surrounding land does not by itself authorise fresh construction or encroachment before a certificate of transfer of ownership issues.
"Member of family" and heritability of status
Because Section 2(p) expressly includes a member of the mundkar's family, the statutory definition of that phrase (Section 2(n)) controls who may stand in the mundkar's shoes. For an individual mundkar it covers the spouse, son and unmarried daughter, and dependent relatives such as the father, mother, grandson, widowed daughter or widowed granddaughter who are solely dependent on the mundkar for maintenance; for a joint Hindu family it covers all members. The inclusion is what makes mundkarial status heritable — but not unlimited. In Henriqueta D'Souza v. Mangesh D. Mishal, 2014(7) ALL MR 856, the Court held that mundkarial rights devolve only on successors who were residing with the mundkar at the time of succession, and not on every legal heir under Portuguese succession law. The residence requirement of the core definition therefore travels into the law of succession: an heir who never shared the fixed habitation does not inherit the protection. Together with the inclusive "includes" reading, this keeps the family limb tethered to the Act's protective object.
Exam takeaways
For the examiner, Section 2 reduces to a checklist. A mundkar needs three things — lawful residence with the bhatkar's consent, fixed habitation, and a dwelling house — with the Explanation deeming consent after a year of unchallenged occupation before the appointed date (Maria Fernandes; Krishna Vithoba Xete Tilve). "Includes" makes the definition enumerative, widening rather than confining it (Henriqueta D'Souza). A bhatkar is simply the owner of the land. A dwelling house is protected regardless of who built it after the 1985 Amendment (Maria Eliza Marques; cf. the overtaken Santana Furtado Dias), and its statutory metre-and-area limits double as jurisdictional limits (Antonio Salvador Francisco). Master these and the remainder of the Act — recognition, eviction and purchase — follows logically.
Frequently asked questions
What are the three essential ingredients of a mundkar under Section 2(p)?
Lawful residence with the consent of the bhatkar, fixed habitation, and occupation of a dwelling house. All three are cumulative; failure on any one defeats the claim, as held in Maria Fernandes v. Ishaprema Niketan, 2002(2) ALL MR 465.
What does "fixed habitation" mean?
It connotes a substantial degree of permanency of occupation — a settled home rather than a casual or transient stay. A person cannot have two competing fixed habitations at once; only one residence qualifies for any given period (Krishna Vithoba Xete Tilve v. Vassudev Pandurang Naik, 2015(2) ALL MR 659).
How does the deeming Explanation to Section 2(p) work?
A person is deemed to reside with the bhatkar's consent if he occupied the dwelling house for over one year before the appointed date and the bhatkar neither initiated eviction for trespass during that year nor succeeded in obtaining an eviction decree. It cannot help an occupant against whom a decree was already obtained.
Does it matter who built the dwelling house?
No. After the 1985 Amendment to Section 2(i), a dwelling house is protected whether built by the mundkar himself, at the bhatkar's expense, or with the bhatkar's financial assistance. This reversed the restrictive reading in Santana Furtado Dias v. Uttam Tari (1985) and was upheld in Maria Eliza Marques v. Madhukar M. Moraskar (1997).
Who is excluded from the definition of mundkar?
A tenant paying rent for the house, a domestic servant or chowkidar housed incidentally to wages, an employee in quarters connected to a mill, factory, mine or commercial establishment, and a mere caretaker. Their occupation flows from rent, wages or employment rather than the mundkarial relationship.
Are mundkarial rights heritable?
Yes, but conditionally. Under Henriqueta D'Souza v. Mangesh D. Mishal, 2014(7) ALL MR 856, the rights devolve only on family members who were residing with the mundkar at the time of succession, not on every legal heir under Portuguese succession law. The word "includes" in Section 2(p) makes the definition enumerative, not exhaustive.