Every dispute under the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973 — whether over fair rent, amenities or eviction — begins life as an application before the Rent Controller. The Controller is not an ordinary civil court but a creature of statute, exercising a tightly defined adjudicatory power over rented urban premises. Understanding how the Controller is constituted, how an application is instituted and tried, and how the order travels up through appeal, revision and execution is essential, because the Act displaces the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts and channels the entire landlord–tenant relationship through this specialised hierarchy. This note maps that procedure from the filing of an application to its final enforcement.
The Controller as a statutory forum
Under Section 2(b) the “Controller” is any person appointed by the State Government to perform the functions of a Controller under the Act. The Controller is therefore a persona designata exercising delegated statutory jurisdiction, not a civil court of general jurisdiction. The significance is structural: once a building falls within a notified urban area (see application to notified urban areas), the matters the Act governs — fixation of fair rent, restoration of amenities, conversion of premises and eviction — can be agitated only before the Controller and not by a civil suit. The Supreme Court in Sarwan Singh v. Kasturi Lal, (1977) 1 SCC 750, while harmonising overlapping rent and slum-clearance statutes, affirmed that a self-contained rent-control code carves out an exclusive forum and ousts ordinary civil jurisdiction within its field. The Controller's competence is thus subject-matter specific: it cannot decide title disputes or claims falling outside the Act, but within its assigned sphere its jurisdiction is plenary and exclusive.
Institution and disposal of applications
Proceedings are commenced by an application to the Controller. Where the dispute concerns rent, the tenant or landlord applies under Section 4 for determination of fair rent; where the landlord seeks possession, he applies under Section 13(2) for a direction that the tenant put him in possession. Section 19 governs the mechanics where more than one Controller sits at the same place: the application must be made to the Controller authorised by the appellate authority of the area to entertain such applications, and that Controller may either retain the matter on his own file or make it over to another Controller at the same place for disposal. This ensures orderly allocation of work and prevents forum-shopping between co-equal Controllers. The application must disclose the statutory ground relied upon, because the Controller's jurisdiction to grant relief is confined to the enumerated grounds — a point that becomes decisive in eviction matters discussed under grounds for eviction. The Act also supplies an ancillary procedural remedy at the threshold: where a landlord refuses to receive rent, Section 6-A permits the tenant to apply to the Controller for leave to deposit the rent in his office, and on such deposit the payment is “deemed to be a payment made by the tenant to his landlord” — a mechanism that often pre-empts an arrears-based eviction application before it is even filed. Each species of application therefore invokes a distinct statutory ground, and the Controller's first task on institution is to identify the provision engaged and confine the enquiry to it.
Ordinary procedure in an eviction application
The general eviction procedure is laid down in Section 13. A landlord seeking possession applies under Section 13(2), and the Controller must give the tenant “a reasonable opportunity of showing cause against the application” before being satisfied that a ground exists. For arrears of rent under Section 13(2)(i), the tenant is afforded a statutory cure: if, within fifteen days of the first hearing after due service, he pays or tenders the arrears together with interest at eight per cent and such costs as the Controller allows, he is “deemed to have duly paid or tendered the rent” and eviction on that ground fails. The proviso also bars a landlord from claiming arrears for a period exceeding three years preceding the application. Where the landlord pleads bona fide personal necessity under Section 13(3), Section 13(4) requires the Controller to be satisfied that the claim is “bona fide” before ordering possession, and empowers him to grant the tenant reasonable time — not exceeding three months in the aggregate — to vacate. The enquiry is adjudicatory: evidence is led, cause is shown, and a reasoned order is passed.
Summary procedure under Section 13-A
Section 13-A, inserted by the 1986 Amendment, creates a fast-track summary procedure for a defined class of landlords — members of the Armed Forces (and, by Section 13-A(1A), certain Government and Board/Corporation employees) seeking possession of a residential building on the ground of personal necessity under Section 13(3)(a)(i). Here the procedural architecture is borrowed from summary-eviction models: under Section 13-A(2) the Controller issues summons in the prescribed form, and under Section 13-A(4) the tenant cannot contest the eviction unless he first files an affidavit disclosing his grounds and obtains leave to defend from the Controller. If he fails to appear or to obtain leave, the landlord's averments are “deemed to be admitted” and an order for eviction follows. Critically, Section 13-A(8) bars any appeal or second appeal against an order made under this section, subject only to the High Court's power to call for the records to satisfy itself that the order is according to law. Section 13-A(7) directs the Controller to follow the practice of a Court of Small Causes, including the recording of evidence, once leave is granted.
The leave-to-defend standard
The gateway provision is Section 13-A(5): the Controller “shall give” the tenant leave to contest if the affidavit discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining possession. The governing principle on when leave must be granted was authoritatively stated in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706. Construing the cognate summary scheme of Section 25-B of the Delhi Rent Control Act — the model on which Section 13-A is patterned — the Supreme Court held that leave to defend should not be granted on mere asking, nor refused merely because the tenant has not made out a strong case; the test is whether the affidavit raises a triable issue. If the facts pleaded, taken prima facie, would disentitle the landlord, leave must be granted, and to brush aside a genuine triable issue would be grave injustice; conversely a wholly frivolous or sham defence does not earn leave. This balances the landlord's right to a speedy remedy against the tenant's right to a fair adjudication, and is the single most litigated procedural question under Section 13-A.
Powers to summon witnesses and take evidence
To make its adjudication effective, Section 16 clothes any authority exercising powers under the Act — Controller, appellate authority or revisional authority — with “the same powers of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence” as a court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This borrowing of CPC machinery is functional rather than wholesale: the Controller is armed with coercive process to compel evidence, but does not thereby become a civil court for all purposes. In ordinary Section 13 proceedings the Controller holds “such enquiry as he may think fit” (the same phrase governs fair-rent enquiries under Section 4), giving him latitude over procedure while requiring observance of natural justice through the “reasonable opportunity” mandate. The flexibility is bounded by the obligation to record evidence and pass a reasoned order capable of withstanding appellate and revisional scrutiny. A further procedural safeguard against frivolous litigation appears in Section 13(7): where the Controller finds an eviction application to be frivolous or vexatious, he may direct the landlord to pay the tenant compensation not exceeding five hundred rupees. The recording of evidence assumes heightened importance in light of the limited revisional check discussed below — because the High Court cannot re-appreciate evidence, the Controller's findings of fact, properly recorded after hearing the parties, are in practice close to conclusive on the merits, making the trial stage before the Controller the decisive forum for factual contests.
Finality and the bar on re-opening
The Act builds in finality at two levels. Section 14 directs the Controller to summarily reject any application under Section 13(2) or (3) which raises substantially the same issues as have been finally decided in former proceedings under the Act — a statutory analogue of res judicata that prevents a landlord from harassing a tenant with successive identical applications. At the appellate level, Section 15(5) declares that the decisions of the appellate authority, and subject thereto the order of the Controller, “shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any court of law” except by way of revision under Section 15(6). Read together, these provisions establish that the Act is a complete code: once the internal hierarchy has spoken, the matter is closed to collateral attack in ordinary courts, reinforcing the exclusivity examined in the introduction to the Act.
Appeal to the appellate authority
The first tier of challenge is appeal under Section 15. By Section 15(1) the State Government confers appellate powers on designated officers and authorities. Section 15(2) gives “any person aggrieved” by an order of the Controller a right to appeal in writing within thirty days of the order, with power in the appellate authority to condone delay for reasons recorded in writing; the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order is excluded in computing limitation. On appeal being preferred, Section 15(3) empowers the appellate authority to stay further proceedings pending the appeal. Section 15(4) directs it to decide the appeal after sending for the record from the Controller, giving the parties an opportunity of being heard, and, if necessary, making further enquiry either personally or through the Controller. The appeal is thus a full re-hearing on facts and law, distinguishing it sharply from the narrower revision that follows.
Revision before the High Court
The apex of the statutory hierarchy is revision under Section 15(6), exercised by the High Court. The High Court may, on its own motion or on the application of an aggrieved party made within ninety days, call for and examine the record “for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety” of the order or proceedings, and pass such order as it deems fit. The scope of this power was definitively settled by a five-Judge Constitution Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, which construed the very words of Section 15(6) of the Haryana Act. The Court held that the expressions “legality” and “propriety” do not empower the High Court to re-appreciate evidence as if hearing an appeal; the revisional court may interfere only where a finding is perverse, based on no evidence, or arrived at by misreading material evidence resulting in a miscarriage of justice. The revisional court can reach a different conclusion on the legality of a finding, but cannot substitute its own view of the evidence for that of the appellate authority. This decision resolved a conflict between coordinate three-Judge Benches and now governs every revision under the Act.
Transfer of proceedings and the amended hierarchy
Two provisions reshape the forum. Section 20 empowers the High Court to transfer proceedings pending before one appellate authority to another, and an appellate authority to transfer proceedings between Controllers within its jurisdiction. More significantly, Section 20-A, introduced by amendment, restructured the hierarchy where Controllers' functions were assigned to judicial officers: proceedings pending before Sub-Divisional Officers (Civil) stand transferred to Subordinate Judges performing Controller functions, an appeal from such a Subordinate Judge lies to the District Judge exercising appellate powers, and a revision from that appellate order lies to the High Court. Pending appeals and revisions before the Deputy Commissioner and Financial Commissioner are correspondingly transferred to the District Judge and High Court. Section 17 governs costs throughout, vesting discretion in the Controller, appellate authority or revisional authority and requiring reasons in writing where costs do not follow the event.
Review and execution of orders
A limited power of review exists: under Section 13-A(9), where no revision application has been made to the High Court, the Controller may exercise the powers of review in accordance with Order XLVII of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — a narrow corrective for errors apparent on the record, not a substitute for appeal. Enforcement is dealt with by Section 18: every order made under the Act “shall be executed by a civil court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree or order of that court.” The Explanation fixes one year's rent of the premises preceding the date of the order as the jurisdictional value for determining the forum of appeal in execution. Thus while the Controller adjudicates, the ordinary civil court lends its executory machinery, completing the procedural circle from filing to physical recovery of possession. Compliance obligations also attach: under Section 21 both landlord and tenant must furnish prescribed particulars to the Controller, breach being punishable under Section 22.
Frequently asked questions
Is the Rent Controller a civil court?
No. Under Section 2(b) the Controller is a statutory authority appointed by the State Government — a persona designata exercising delegated jurisdiction over matters the Act assigns to it. It is armed with a civil court's powers to summon witnesses and compel evidence under Section 16, and its orders are executed by a civil court under Section 18, but it is not a court of general jurisdiction.
What is the difference between the ordinary Section 13 procedure and the Section 13-A summary procedure?
Under Section 13 the tenant is given a reasonable opportunity to show cause and a full enquiry follows. Under Section 13-A — available only to specified landlords such as armed-forces personnel — the tenant cannot contest the eviction unless he first files an affidavit and obtains leave to defend under Section 13-A(5); failing that, the landlord's averments are deemed admitted and eviction follows.
When must the Controller grant a tenant leave to defend under Section 13-A?
Leave must be granted where the tenant's affidavit raises a genuine triable issue — facts which, taken prima facie, would disentitle the landlord from obtaining possession. As held in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706, leave is neither granted for the mere asking nor refused for want of a strong case; only a frivolous or sham defence is denied leave.
Can the High Court re-appreciate evidence when exercising revisional power under Section 15(6)?
No. In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78, a five-Judge Constitution Bench construing Section 15(6) held that the words “legality or propriety” do not permit appellate-style re-appreciation of evidence. The High Court may interfere only with findings that are perverse, based on no evidence, or vitiated by misreading of material evidence.
What is the limitation period for appeal and for revision?
An appeal to the appellate authority must be filed within thirty days of the Controller's order under Section 15(2), extendable for recorded reasons. A revision to the High Court under Section 15(6) must be made within ninety days. In both, the time taken to obtain a certified copy of the order is excluded in computing the period.
How is a Rent Controller's order enforced?
Under Section 18, every order made under the Act is executed by a civil court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree or order of that court. The Explanation treats one year's rent of the premises preceding the order's date as the jurisdictional value for determining the forum of appeal in execution.