Hurt and Grievous Hurt

Sections 114 to 125 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 319 to 338 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, with one structural innovation and several drafting refinements — define and graduate the offences against the human body that fall short of homicide. The chapter is the workhorse of the criminal calendar: simple hurt, grievous hurt, hurt by dangerous weapons, hurt to extort, hurt to a public servant, hurt on provocation, the acid-attack offences introduced in 2013, and the rashness-or-negligence offences that overlap with rash driving and medical negligence.

The BNS introduces two pivotal changes. First, the suffering-threshold for grievous hurt under clause Eighthly is reduced from twenty days to fifteen days — a structural change that brings a wider class of injuries into the grievous-hurt grade. Second, two new sub-sections are added to Section 117 BNS — sub-section (3) creates an aggravated offence where the hurt causes permanent disability or persistent vegetative state, with minimum ten years imprisonment, and sub-section (4) creates a mob-hurt offence on caste, community, sex, religion or other identity grounds. The acid-attack provisions of Sections 326A and 326B IPC are carried forward in Sections 124(1) and 124(2) BNS, with permanent vegetative state added as an aggravation.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The chapter has a clear graduated structure. Section 114 BNS (previously Section 319 IPC) defines hurt — bodily pain, disease or infirmity. Section 115 BNS (previously Sections 321 and 323 IPC) creates the offence of voluntarily causing hurt with mens rea of intention or knowledge. Section 116 BNS (previously Section 320 IPC) defines grievous hurt by enumerating eight categories. Section 117 BNS combines Sections 322 and 325 IPC — voluntarily causing grievous hurt — with two new sub-sections introducing permanent-disability aggravation and mob-hurt. Sections 118 to 122 BNS deal with hurt by dangerous weapons, hurt to extort, hurt to extort confession, hurt to deter a public servant, and hurt on provocation. Section 123 BNS (previously Section 328 IPC) penalises causing harm by means of poison with intent to commit an offence. Section 124 BNS carries forward the acid-attack offences. Section 125 BNS (previously Sections 336 to 338 IPC) penalises acts endangering life or personal safety, both where hurt and where grievous hurt is caused.

Three observations frame the chapter. First, the mens rea is uniformly intention or knowledge — Section 115 BNS makes that explicit, and the same architecture runs through Sections 117 to 122 BNS. Second, the Code's grievous-hurt enumeration in Section 116 BNS is exhaustive — only the eight categories listed there qualify, and the eighth must be strictly construed (Parashram Kallappa Ghevade, 2007). Third, the offences are read against the background definitions in Section 2 BNS and the general exceptions in Sections 14 to 44 BNS — most importantly the consent and good-faith provisions that protect medical practitioners.

Hurt — Section 114 BNS

Section 114 BNS (previously Section 319 IPC) defines hurt as causing bodily pain, disease or infirmity to any person. The definition is broad, designedly so. The original Law Commissioners' note records the breadth: "a person who mixes a deleterious potion, and places it on the table of another; a person who conceals a scythe in the grass on which another is in the habit of walking; a person who digs a pit in a public path, intending that another may fall into it, may cause serious hurt, and may be justly punished for causing such hurt".

Pulling a woman by the hair was held to be hurt in Hadia Mia v. State of Assam (1988). Anis Beg v. State (1923) — the poisoned-sweetmeats case, where a love-philtre intent caused dhatura poisoning — confirmed that hurt by poison is within the section, even where no death follows. The actus reus is the causing of pain or infirmity; the mens rea — intention or knowledge — is supplied by Section 115 BNS where the offence of voluntarily causing hurt is to be made out.

Grievous hurt — Section 116 BNS

Section 116 BNS (previously Section 320 IPC) lists the eight kinds of hurt designated as grievous: (i) emasculation; (ii) permanent privation of the sight of either eye; (iii) permanent privation of the hearing of either ear; (iv) privation of any member or joint; (v) destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint; (vi) permanent disfiguration of the head or face; (vii) fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth; and (viii) any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of fifteen days in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.

The BNS reduction of the threshold under clause Eighthly — from twenty days to fifteen days — is the principal substantive change in the chapter. The change brings a wider class of injuries into the grievous-hurt grade and aligns the section with contemporary medical practice on recovery periods. Candidates should remember the new fifteen-day threshold in any answer that turns on the application of clause Eighthly.

The eight categories — case law

Hori Lal (AIR 1970 SC 1969) is the leading authority on clause Seventhly. The Supreme Court held that for a fracture it is not necessary that the bone be cut through and through; a break by cutting or splintering, a rupture, or a fissure all qualify. Even a partial cut amounts to a fracture (Narinder Singh v. Sukhbir Singh, 1992). Anta Dadoba (1863) — branding a girl's cheeks with a red-hot iron — is the early authority on clause Sixthly (disfiguration of the head or face).

The Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Shivalingaiah (AIR 1988 SC 115) — the squeezed-testicles case — held that the resulting cardiac arrest and sudden death fell within clause Eighthly (hurt that endangers life), not within Section 300 IPC. The case is the workhorse illustration of the line between grievous hurt and culpable homicide. Formina Sebastio Azardeo v. State of Goa (AIR 1992 SC 133) — the rape-and-stick-thrust case — held that the conviction lay under clause Eighthly where the injury endangered life but was not proved to be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. EK Chandrasenan v. State of Kerala (AIR 1995 SC 1066) — the methyl-mixed-arrack case — held that the accused had knowledge that the substances supplied could cause serious adverse effects, and that the maximum sentence under the section was properly awarded.

The line between grievous hurt and culpable homicide

The Bombay Full Bench in Abdul Wahab (1945) drew the classic line: in culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the injuries must be such as are likely to cause death; in grievous hurt under clause Eighthly, the injuries must be such as to endanger life. The two formulations are conceptually adjacent but doctrinally distinct, and the dividing line is one of the most heavily examined features of the homicide jurisprudence — the deeper-dive sits in the chapter on the distinction between culpable homicide and murder.

Where the requisite intention or knowledge for culpable homicide is absent and the injury does not meet the "likely to cause death" threshold, the offence is grievous hurt. Guruvulu (1945) — the cut-nostrils case where the only intention was theft and death was unexpected — was held to be grievous hurt and not murder. Pirthi v. State of Haryana (AIR 1994 SC 1582) — the kicked-testicles case where treatment was not given and death followed from gangrene — was held to be hurt under Section 323 IPC, not culpable homicide, because the chain of causation was broken.

Voluntarily causing hurt and grievous hurt — Sections 115 and 117 BNS

Section 115 BNS is the workhorse provision — voluntarily causing hurt is punishable with imprisonment up to one year or fine up to ten thousand rupees, the BNS having raised the IPC's one-thousand-rupee fine. Section 117(1) BNS defines the corresponding voluntarily-causing-grievous-hurt offence; Section 117(2) BNS prescribes punishment of imprisonment up to seven years and mandatory fine. The Supreme Court in State of UP v. Tribhuwan (AIR 2017 SC 5249) confirmed that imposition of jail sentence and fine under Section 325 IPC is mandatory once guilt is established.

The two BNS innovations in Section 117 BNS

Section 117(3) BNS is a new sub-section. Where, in the course of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, the offender causes the victim to be in permanent disability or in a persistent vegetative state, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for not less than ten years which may extend to imprisonment for life — meaning the remainder of the offender's natural life. The sub-section codifies the heightened condemnation that the Supreme Court has repeatedly expressed in cases involving grave and irreversible injury.

Section 117(4) BNS is the second innovation. Where a group of five or more persons acting in concert causes grievous hurt to a person on the ground of race, caste or community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or any other similar ground, each member of the group is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine. The provision is the grievous-hurt analogue of the mob-lynching innovation in Section 103(2) BNS, and it picks up the same identity-based aggravators.

Hurt and grievous hurt by dangerous weapons — Section 118 BNS

Section 118 BNS (previously Sections 324 and 326 IPC) makes simple hurt and grievous hurt more grave where they are caused by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting; any instrument used as a weapon of offence likely to cause death; fire or any heated substance; poison or any corrosive substance; explosive substance; substance deleterious to the human body to inhale, swallow or receive into the blood; or any animal. The BNS introduces a mandatory one-year minimum for Section 118(2) — voluntary grievous hurt by dangerous weapons — and raises the upper limit of fine to twenty thousand rupees.

The Supreme Court in Prabhu v. State of MP (AIR 2009 SC 745) laid down the three ingredients for the dangerous-weapons offence: voluntary causing of hurt; the hurt must be grievous; and it must be caused by dangerous weapons or means. The Court in State of UP v. Indrajeet alias Sukhatha (2000) explained that there is no fixed list of weapons — whether a particular article qualifies depends on the size, sharpness and other facts of the case. Mathai v. State of Kerala (AIR 2005 SC 710) — where a piece of stone was used — held that the small size of the stone disqualified it as a dangerous weapon and the conviction was altered from Section 326 to Section 325 IPC.

Acid attack — Section 124 BNS

Section 124 BNS carries forward Sections 326A and 326B IPC — the acid-attack offences introduced by the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 on the basis of the J. S. Verma Committee Report. The provisions penalise (i) voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid, with minimum ten years imprisonment extendable to life; and (ii) voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid with intent to cause grievous hurt or knowing it likely. The BNS adds permanent vegetative state as an aggravating outcome.

The case-law foundation is Sachin Jana v. State of WB (2008) and Kulamani Sahu v. State of Orissa (1994) — the latter reducing a Section 307 IPC conviction to Section 326 IPC where the medical evidence showed that the injuries to the face and eyes, while severe, were not sufficient to cause death. The acid-attack offences run alongside the compensation framework laid down in Laxmi v. Union of India (2014) — the Supreme Court's directive scheme on acid sale and victim rehabilitation.

Hurt to extort, to compel restoration, to deter a public servant — Sections 119 to 121 BNS

Section 119 BNS (previously Sections 327 and 329 IPC) penalises voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property or to constrain to an illegal act. Section 120 BNS (previously Sections 330 and 331 IPC) penalises voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession or to compel restoration of property. Section 121 BNS (previously Sections 332 and 333 IPC) penalises voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter a public servant from his duty — the BNS raising the imprisonment from three to five years for sub-section (1) and adding a mandatory one-year minimum for sub-section (2).

The most heavily litigated of these is Section 120 BNS — the third-degree-in-custody fact-pattern. Central Bureau of Investigation v. Kishore Singh (2011) 6 SCC 369 — where the victim was kept in custody for three days, not produced before a Magistrate within twenty-four hours, and tortured in barbaric ways — affirmed the Section 326 IPC conviction without leniency. The procedural-side connection is to contempts of the lawful authority of public servants and to the human-rights jurisprudence on custodial violence.

Hurt on provocation — Section 122 BNS

Section 122 BNS (previously Sections 334 and 335 IPC) provides the mitigating offence of voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt on grave and sudden provocation. The mens rea is the same as in Sections 115 and 117 BNS, but the punishment is reduced — Section 122(1) BNS, where simple hurt is caused, attracts imprisonment up to one month or fine up to five thousand rupees; Section 122(2) BNS, where grievous hurt is caused, attracts imprisonment up to five years and fine up to ten thousand rupees. The provision tracks the structure of Exception 1 to Section 101 BNS — the same grave-and-sudden-provocation doctrine, transposed into the hurt context. Where the provocation arises from a lawful act of private defence, the section's mitigation is unavailable.

Acts endangering life or personal safety — Section 125 BNS

Section 125 BNS (previously Sections 336 to 338 IPC) penalises any person who does any act so rashly or negligently as to endanger human life or the personal safety of others. Sub-section (a) — where hurt is caused — attracts imprisonment up to six months and fine up to five thousand rupees. Sub-section (b) — where grievous hurt is caused — attracts imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees. The BNS raises the imprisonment ceiling from two to three years for the grievous-hurt limb. The provision is the parallel, lesser offence to Section 106 BNS (causing death by negligence) and runs alongside the rash-driving offence in Section 281 BNS.

Section 109 BNS (attempt to murder) versus Section 118 BNS (grievous hurt by dangerous weapons)

The line between attempt to murder under Section 109 BNS and voluntary grievous hurt by dangerous weapons under Section 118 BNS is one of the most heavily examined boundary lines. The Supreme Court in Mangal Singh v. Kishan Singh (AIR 2009 SC 1535) explained the architecture: Section 109 BNS uses the words "under such circumstances" — meaning the act must be done under circumstances such that, if death had ensued, the offence would be murder under Section 101 BNS. Section 118 BNS does not contain those words — the inquiry is confined to the actus reus and the mens rea of the hurt itself.

Acid thrown on the face of a young, unmarried girl may attract Section 118 BNS (or Section 124 BNS) but be "acutely more serious" than a firearm shot that misses the victim and falls under Section 109 BNS — the Court in Mangal Singh warned against mechanical sentencing. The choice between the two sections turns on whether the accused had the requisite intention or knowledge for murder, and whether the surrounding circumstances would have made the act murder if death had ensued. Anwarul Haq v. State of UP (AIR 2005 SC 2382) — where a sharp-edged farsha caused only a scalp-deep injury — illustrates the line: the Supreme Court altered the conviction from Section 307 IPC to Section 324 IPC where the sharp edge was not used. State of MP v. Kashiram (2009) — chopping of a leg held to be sufficient to attract Section 307 — illustrates the contrary line.

Compounding and procedural side

The Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2005 took Section 324 IPC out of the compoundable list. The position carries into the BNS — Section 118(1) BNS, like its predecessor, is non-compoundable. Section 326 IPC was held non-compoundable in Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (AIR 1999 SC 2181) and Bankat v. State (AIR 2005 SC 368). The Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 nevertheless held that the High Court's inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings in case of a settlement between parties, even where the offence is non-compoundable — a useful procedural escape valve for the most appropriate cases. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 has been used in suitable cases — Jagat Pal Singh v. State of Haryana (AIR 2000 SC 3622) directed release on probation despite a Section 326 conviction, taking note of mitigating circumstances.

Sentencing pattern and punishment scheme

The chapter's punishment ladder is graduated. Section 115 BNS (hurt) — up to one year and fine. Section 117(2) BNS (grievous hurt) — up to seven years and mandatory fine. Section 117(3) BNS (permanent disability or vegetative state) — minimum ten years to life. Section 118(1) BNS (hurt by dangerous weapons) — up to three years. Section 118(2) BNS (grievous hurt by dangerous weapons) — minimum one year, up to life. Section 124 BNS (acid attack) — minimum ten years to life. Section 125 BNS — up to three years where grievous hurt is caused. The Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 framework — invoked in the punishments chapter — applies across the board where the circumstances are appropriate.

Selected leading authorities

Definition and ingredients: Hori Lal (1970), Anis Beg (1923), Hadia Mia (1988). Clause Eighthly: Shivalingaiah (1988), Formina Sebastio Azardeo (1992), Parashram Kallappa Ghevade (2007). Hurt versus culpable homicide: Abdul Wahab (1945, FB), Guruvulu (1945), Pirthi (1994). Dangerous weapons: Prabhu (2009), Indrajeet Sukhatha (2000), Mathai (2005). Acid attack: Sachin Jana (2008), Kulamani Sahu (1994), Laxmi v. Union of India (2014). Custodial torture: CBI v. Kishore Singh (2011). Section 307 versus Section 326: Mangal Singh (2009), Anwarul Haq (2005), Kashiram (2009). Sentencing: Tribhuwan (2017), Mohan Lal (2018, Rajasthan), Jagat Pal Singh (2000). Compounding: Surendra Nath Mohanty (1999), Bankat (2005), Gian Singh (2012).

Exam angle

Three lines of question recur. First, the eight categories of grievous hurt under Section 116 BNS — particularly clause Seventhly (fracture) and clause Eighthly (endangering life), with the BNS reduction of the threshold from twenty to fifteen days. Second, the line between Section 109 BNS (attempt to murder) and Section 118 BNS (hurt by dangerous weapons) — the Mangal Singh framework on "under such circumstances" is the standard mains framework. Third, the BNS innovations — Section 117(3) BNS (permanent disability), Section 117(4) BNS (mob hurt), the fifteen-day threshold under Section 116 BNS, the BNS-introduced minimums in Sections 117(2) and 118(2). Cross-cutting questions on the relationship with culpable homicide (the Abdul Wahab line), on the acid-attack jurisprudence (Section 124 BNS read with the 2013 amendment and the Verma Committee), and on custodial torture under Section 120 BNS appear regularly. The procedural side — compounding, probation, and the Section 528 BNSS quashing route — is a perennial favourite of the better mains examiners.

Frequently asked questions

What is the BNS innovation in Section 116 BNS on grievous hurt?

The BNS reduces the suffering-threshold under clause Eighthly from twenty days to fifteen days. A hurt that causes the sufferer to be in severe bodily pain or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits for fifteen days now qualifies as grievous hurt — earlier the threshold was twenty days. The change brings a wider class of injuries into the grievous-hurt grade and aligns the section with contemporary medical practice on recovery periods. The other seven categories — emasculation, permanent privation of sight or hearing, privation of any member or joint, destruction or impairing of powers of any member or joint, permanent disfiguration of head or face, and fracture or dislocation of bone or tooth — remain unchanged.

What is the difference between Section 109 BNS and Section 118 BNS?

Section 109 BNS — attempt to murder — uses the words "under such circumstances", meaning the act must be done under circumstances such that, if death had ensued, the offence would be murder under Section 101 BNS. Section 118 BNS — hurt by dangerous weapons — does not contain those words; the inquiry is confined to the actus reus and the mens rea of the hurt itself. The Supreme Court in Mangal Singh v. Kishan Singh (AIR 2009 SC 1535) explained that the choice between the sections turns on whether the accused had the requisite mens rea for murder. Acid thrown on a face may attract Section 118 BNS yet be more serious than a firearm shot that misses the victim and falls under Section 109 BNS.

What are the new sub-sections introduced by the BNS in Section 117 BNS?

Section 117(3) BNS introduces a new offence: where, in the course of voluntarily causing grievous hurt, the offender causes the victim to be in permanent disability or in a persistent vegetative state, the punishment is rigorous imprisonment for not less than ten years extending to life imprisonment for the remainder of the offender's natural life. Section 117(4) BNS introduces a mob-hurt offence: where a group of five or more persons acting in concert causes grievous hurt on the ground of race, caste, community, sex, place of birth, language, personal belief or other similar ground, each member is punishable with imprisonment up to seven years and fine. The latter is the grievous-hurt analogue of the mob-lynching provision in Section 103(2) BNS.

When does grievous hurt become culpable homicide?

Where the injuries are not merely such as to endanger life but are likely to cause death, the offence crosses from grievous hurt under clause Eighthly of Section 116 BNS to culpable homicide under Section 100 BNS. The Bombay Full Bench in Abdul Wahab (1945) drew the line: in culpable homicide not amounting to murder, the injuries must be likely to cause death; in grievous hurt under clause Eighthly, the injuries must endanger life. The two formulations are conceptually adjacent but doctrinally distinct. State of Karnataka v. Shivalingaiah (1988) — the squeezed-testicles case — illustrates the doctrine: cardiac arrest and sudden death fell within clause Eighthly, not within Section 300 IPC.

Are Section 118(1) BNS and Section 118(2) BNS compoundable?

No. The 2005 amendment to the CrPC took Section 324 IPC out of the compoundable list, and the position has carried into the BNS — Section 118(1) BNS, like its predecessor, is non-compoundable. Section 326 IPC was held non-compoundable in Surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa (AIR 1999 SC 2181) and Bankat v. State (AIR 2005 SC 368) — Section 118(2) BNS carries forward the same position. However, the Supreme Court in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 held that the High Court's inherent power under Section 528 BNSS (previously Section 482 CrPC) can be invoked to quash the proceedings on settlement between parties, even where the offence is non-compoundable.