Offences Against Public Tranquillity — Unlawful Assembly, Rioting, Affray (Sections 141–160 IPC)

Sections 189 to 197 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS) — re-enacting Sections 141 to 160 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — collect the offences that protect public tranquillity. The chapter sits one level below the State-protection chapter on offences against the State: where the latter protects sovereignty, this chapter protects the everyday peace of the streets, the markets and the public square. Five-or-more persons gathered with a prohibited common object form the elemental unit; from that unit, the law builds the offences of unlawful assembly, rioting, affray, and promoting enmity between groups.

The BNS preserves the IPC architecture but consolidates it. Section 189 BNS bundles all eight unlawful-assembly variants of the IPC (Sections 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 150, 151, 157, 158) into a single multi-clause provision. Section 191 BNS bundles the rioting trio (Sections 146, 147, 148 IPC). Section 194 BNS bundles affray (Sections 159, 160 IPC). Section 196 BNS modernises the IPC's Section 153A by adding electronic communication as a mode. The substantive content is largely intact; the structure is tighter.

Statutory anchor and scheme

The provisions cluster into four groups:

1. Unlawful assembly — Section 189 BNS in nine sub-sections, plus Section 190 BNS on liability under common object.
2. Rioting — Section 191 BNS in three sub-sections, Section 192 BNS on provocation, Section 193 BNS on owner/occupier liability.
3. Public-servant protection — Section 195 BNS punishing assault or obstruction of a public servant suppressing a riot.
4. Hate speech and national integration — Section 196 BNS on promoting enmity between groups, Section 197 BNS on assertions prejudicial to national integration.

Affray is dealt with at Section 194 BNS. Each cluster has its own intent threshold and its own punishment ladder.

Section 189 BNS — unlawful assembly

Ingredients

The offence has two constituent elements: (i) an assembly of five or more persons, and (ii) a common object falling within one of clauses (a) to (e). The Constitution Bench in Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 174 held that the membership requirement is essential — five or more persons must constitute the assembly, though it is not necessary that all five be brought to trial or convicted; absconders and unidentified persons may complete the requisite number.

Five or more persons

The number five is jurisdictional. Where two of six accused are acquitted, the remaining four cannot be members of an unlawful assembly unless the prosecution proves that some other unidentified persons participated — Subran v. State of Kerala (1993) 3 SCC 32. Where four of seven are acquitted, the remaining three cannot be convicted of rioting as members of an unlawful assembly — Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1961 SC 1787. The remaining three may, however, be convicted of the substantive offence with the aid of common intention under Section 3(5) BNS (previously Section 34 IPC).

Common object

Common object need not be the product of prior concert; it may form on the spur of the moment. It must, however, be shared by all members. Bhanwar Singh v. State of MP (2008) 16 SCC 657 sets out the indicia: nature of the assembly, nature of arms carried, behaviour of members at and around the scene, motive, and the events surrounding the offence. Mere presence at the scene does not make a person a member; the prosecution must prove either an overt act, or knowledge of the common object combined with continued physical presence — Raj Nath v. State of UP AIR 2009 SC 1422.

Becoming unlawful by subsequent conduct

Section 189(1) BNS retains the IPC Explanation: an assembly that was not unlawful when it assembled may subsequently become an unlawful assembly. A peaceful procession that turns violent acquires the prohibited character at the moment of transformation; every person who continues with knowledge of the change becomes liable from that point.

Section 190 BNS — liability under common object

Section 190 BNS (previously Section 149 IPC) is the structural pillar of this chapter. Every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of any offence committed by any member of the assembly in prosecution of the common object, or in an offence which the members of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object. The provision creates vicarious criminal liability — exceptional in the Code and unlike the personal-liability default of the general exceptions regime — justified by the heightened public-order risk of group violence.

The doctrinal interplay between Section 190 BNS (common object) and Section 3(5) BNS (common intention) is exam-critical and is examined in detail in the dedicated chapter on common intention versus common object. The headline distinctions: Section 3(5) BNS requires prior meeting of minds and an overt act by each participant; Section 190 BNS requires only membership of an unlawful assembly of five or more persons sharing a common object — no overt act by each member is needed.

Section 191 BNS — rioting

Section 191 BNS (previously Sections 146, 147, 148 IPC) defines and punishes rioting. Rioting is what an unlawful assembly becomes when force or violence is used by it, or by any member of it, in prosecution of the common object. Punishment under Section 191(2) BNS is imprisonment up to two years, or fine, or both. Where any member is armed with a deadly weapon, Section 191(3) BNS raises the upper imprisonment from three years (under Section 148 IPC) to five years.

Five ingredients of rioting

1. Five or more persons forming an unlawful assembly.
2. Common object animating that assembly.
3. Force or violence used by the assembly or by any member.
4. The force or violence used in prosecution of the common object.
5. The force or violence such as would alarm at least one person of reasonable courage — though this last requirement is a common-law gloss; under the Indian framework, force against an inanimate object suffices.

The slightest use of force by any one member in prosecution of the common object completes the offence. The hurt subsequently caused is a separate offence under Sections 115, 117 BNS (previously Sections 323, 325 IPC) — Lakshmiammal v. Samiappa AIR 1968 Mad 310. The framework is one of layered liability: rioting is the public-order offence; the bodily harm offence is the personal-protection offence; both apply.

Section 192 BNS — wantonly giving provocation

Section 192 BNS (previously Section 153 IPC) punishes anyone who wantonly gives provocation, by any illegal act, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause the offence of rioting to be committed. The punishment is up to one year, plus fine, where the rioting actually occurs in consequence; up to six months, plus fine, where it does not. The provision criminalises the upstream provocateur whose act, though not itself rioting, sets the stage for it. The threshold for liability here is conceptually adjacent to the attempt threshold under Section 23 BNS — both punish the actor whose conduct, though not yet harm-producing, has crossed beyond mere thought.

Section 193 BNS — owner, occupier and beneficiary liability

Section 193 BNS (previously Sections 154, 155, 156 IPC) imposes a layered liability on persons connected with the land on which an unlawful assembly or riot takes place. Section 193(1) BNS punishes the owner or occupier of land who knew of the assembly or riot and did not give earliest notice to the public servants concerned, or who, having reason to believe such an assembly or riot was likely to take place, did not use lawful means to prevent it. Section 193(2) BNS punishes the person for whose benefit the riot is committed. Section 193(3) BNS punishes the agent of an owner or occupier acting on his behalf. The BNS adds the words "Liability of" to the heading and includes "or riot" — formal changes that clarify scope.

Section 194 BNS — affray

Section 194 BNS (previously Sections 159, 160 IPC) defines and punishes affray. An affray is committed when two or more persons, by fighting in a public place, disturb the public peace. Punishment under Section 194(2) BNS is imprisonment up to one month, or fine up to one thousand rupees (raised from the IPC's one hundred), or both.

Three ingredients constitute affray: (i) two or more persons, (ii) fighting in a public place, (iii) disturbance of the public peace. Affray differs from rioting in the number of persons (two for affray, five for rioting), in the absence of a common-object requirement, and in the disturbance threshold (affray requires actual disturbance; rioting requires force or violence). The doctrinal positioning of affray is therefore as the milder, smaller-group cognate of rioting.

The owner-occupier doctrine in practice

Section 193 BNS is one of the few provisions in the Code that imposes positive duties on private persons. The owner or occupier of land must (i) give earliest notice to public servants on becoming aware of the assembly or riot, and (ii) use lawful means to prevent it where reason to believe such assembly or riot was likely. Failure to do so attracts a fine up to one thousand rupees. Section 193(2) BNS catches the person for whose benefit the riot is committed — the political leader whose followers riot in his cause, the businessman whose competitors are intimidated by a hired mob. Section 193(3) BNS catches the agent or manager who, knowing the riot is to occur and having lawful authority to prevent it, fails to do so. The framework is preventive and reflects the legislative judgment that public-order harms are best addressed by widening the perimeter of liability beyond the immediate participants.

Sentencing patterns across the chapter

The punishment ladder is graduated:

• Section 189(2) BNS — six months, or fine, or both.
• Section 189(3)–(7) BNS — six months to two years, plus fine.
• Section 191(2) BNS — two years, or fine, or both.
• Section 191(3) BNS — five years, or fine, or both (raised from three).
• Section 194(2) BNS — one month, or one thousand rupees fine, or both (raised from one hundred).
• Section 195(1) BNS — three years, with minimum fine of twenty-five thousand rupees.
• Section 195(2) BNS — one year, plus fine.
• Section 196 BNS — three years, or fine, or both; five years if in place of worship.
• Section 197 BNS — three years, or fine, or both.

The aggregate principle in Section 9 BNS (previously Section 71 IPC) on punishments permits cumulative imposition where the same conduct attracts multiple offences within the chapter — for instance, an unlawful-assembly conviction under Section 189 BNS and a separate rioting conviction under Section 191 BNS arising from the same incident.

Section 195 BNS — assault or obstruction of a public servant suppressing riot

Section 195 BNS (previously Section 152 IPC, in a single section) is now split into two sub-sections by the BNS, with different punishments and a fine threshold. Section 195(1) BNS punishes assault, or use of criminal force, on a public servant in the suppression of a riot; the BNS adds "or uses criminal force on any public servant" to the formulation, and prescribes a minimum threshold fine of twenty-five thousand rupees. Section 195(2) BNS — newly created — punishes the threat to assault, or attempt to obstruct, with imprisonment up to one year and fine. The split is one of the few BNS instances of a punishment reduction at the lower limb.

Section 196 BNS — promoting enmity between groups

Section 196 BNS (previously Section 153A IPC) punishes whoever, by words spoken or written, by signs, by visible representations, or — and this is the BNS addition — "through electronic communication", promotes or attempts to promote enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups, castes or communities, or commits any act prejudicial to harmony. Punishment is up to three years, or fine, or both; up to five years where the offence is committed in a place of worship.

Section 196 BNS sits at the boundary of free speech and public order. The Supreme Court's Section 153A IPC jurisprudence — Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 5 SCC 1, Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431 — requires the prosecution to prove an actual or attempted promotion of enmity, not merely critical or contrarian speech. The mens rea is intentional or reckless promotion. The provision must be read with the constitutional speech protections under Article 19(1)(a) and the restrictions under Article 19(2). The constitutional balance has parallels with the analysis applied to the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 351 BNS.

Section 197 BNS — assertions prejudicial to national integration

Section 197 BNS (previously Section 153B IPC) punishes imputations and assertions prejudicial to national integration. The BNS adds "or through electronic communication" as a mode and creates a new clause 197(1)(d): "makes or publishes false or misleading information, jeopardising the sovereignty, unity and integrity or security of India". The new clause aligns the section with the wider sovereignty-protection scheme, particularly the new Section 152 BNS on acts endangering sovereignty, unity and integrity.

Mens rea and the spectrum of liability

The chapter operates on a graded mens rea spectrum:

1. Section 189 BNS — knowledge that the assembly is unlawful, and intentional joining or continuing.
2. Section 190 BNS — vicarious liability of every member for offences committed in prosecution of the common object or which members knew to be likely.
3. Section 191 BNS — use of force or violence in prosecution of the common object.
4. Section 192 BNS — intention or knowledge that the provocation will cause rioting.
5. Section 193 BNS — knowledge of the assembly or riot, with failure to prevent it.
6. Section 196 BNS — intention to promote enmity.
7. Section 197 BNS — knowledge that the assertion is prejudicial to national integration.

The graded scheme reflects the layered seriousness of public-order harm. Casual onlookers escape; informed members are caught; instigators are caught more heavily; provocateurs and beneficiaries face their own dedicated offences.

Selected case law on common object

The line between mere presence and membership is the most exam-tested question in this chapter. Three cases mark the boundary. Akbar Sheikh v. State of WB (2009) 7 SCC 415 — whether an assembly is unlawful turns principally on the common object formed by the members. Uday Singh v. State of MP AIR 2017 SC 393 — mere presence is not enough; the prosecution must prove that the assembled person understood the assembly to be unlawful. Rattiram v. State of MP 2013 Cr LJ 2353 (SC) — common object cannot be attributed from mere presence at the scene; direct or circumstantial evidence beyond presence is required.

Public-order powers under the BNSS

The procedural complement to this chapter is in the BNSS. Section 148 BNSS (previously Section 129 CrPC) empowers an Executive Magistrate, officer in charge of a police station, or specified police officer to disperse an unlawful assembly. Section 149 BNSS (previously Section 130 CrPC) authorises use of armed forces to disperse such assembly where civil force is insufficient. Section 161 BNSS (previously Section 144 CrPC) empowers the District Magistrate to issue prohibitory orders. The interlocking design is preventive on the procedural side and punitive on the substantive side.

Selected case law on rioting and Section 190 BNS

Three propositions structure the case law. First, on the relationship between rioting and the substantive offences committed in its course — Vishal Singh v. State of MP AIR 1998 SC 308: acts done by some members outside the common object, or of such a nature that members could not have known were likely to be committed, are chargeable only against the actual perpetrators. The remaining members of the unlawful assembly are not vicariously liable for those acts. Second, on the dual-limb test of Section 149 IPC (now Section 190 BNS) — Ramachandran v. State (2011) 9 SCC 257: the court must ask whether the offence was in direct prosecution of the common object, and, if not, whether it was an offence the members knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the object. Third, on lawful pursuit — Maiku v. State of UP AIR 1989 SC 67: where the act in question was done in pursuit of a lawful object (a police investigation party at a recovery spot), Section 147 IPC is not attracted; the prosecution machinery itself does not become an unlawful assembly because of incidental violence in the lawful discharge of duty.

The Suleman Bakery line and the question of police as unlawful assembly

The question whether members of a police squad called to suppress a riot can themselves be treated as an unlawful assembly was addressed in Noorul Huda Maqbool Ahmed v. Ram Deo Tyagi (2011) 7 SCC 95. The Supreme Court held that the Special Operation Squad was lawfully discharging its duty of quelling communal riots and that the entry into the bakery did not amount to criminal trespass — a trespass is criminal only if accompanied by intent to annoy or to do something illegal. The decision is the leading authority for the proposition that lawful police duty does not become an unlawful assembly merely because force is used in its discharge.

Reading the chapter as a system

Sections 189 to 197 BNS form the public-order tier of the BNS. The unit of liability is the assembly; the trigger is the common object; the aggravation is the use of force; the consequences are personal liability under the substantive offence and vicarious liability under Section 190 BNS. The chapter overlaps with several other BNS chapters — abetment doctrine attaches to the provocateur under Section 192 BNS; criminal conspiracy under Section 61 BNS attaches where the gathering is preceded by an agreement; the bodily-harm provisions of Sections 115 to 122 BNS attach to the actual injuries. For the exam-aspirant, the takeaway is structural: every public-order fact-pattern engages Section 189/190 BNS first; every other section in the chapter is then a layered increment.

Frequently asked questions

Can fewer than five persons be convicted under Section 190 BNS?

Yes, in principle — provided the prosecution shows that the assembly itself had at least five members. Mohan Singh v. State of Punjab (1963) holds that conviction of less than five is permissible if some of the named accused have absconded, are unidentified, or are dead. But where five are named and the evidence narrows the participants to fewer than five with no further identified or unidentified members, Section 190 BNS cannot be invoked — Subran v. State of Kerala (1993). The remaining accused may be convicted with the aid of common intention under Section 3(5) BNS.

How is rioting under Section 191 BNS distinguished from affray under Section 194 BNS?

Three differences. First, the number of persons — rioting requires five or more (an unlawful assembly); affray requires only two. Second, the mental element — rioting requires a common object; affray requires no common object. Third, the trigger — rioting requires force or violence in prosecution of the common object, while affray requires fighting in a public place that disturbs the public peace. Affray is the milder, smaller-group cognate of rioting.

Does mere presence at the scene of an unlawful assembly attract Section 189 BNS?

No. The Supreme Court in Uday Singh v. State of MP (2017) and Rattiram v. State of MP (2013) held that common object cannot be attributed from mere presence. The prosecution must prove either an overt act by the accused, or knowledge of the unlawful character of the assembly combined with continued physical presence. A curious onlooker or bystander, without sharing the common object, is not a member of the unlawful assembly.

Can an assembly that started as lawful become an unlawful assembly?

Yes. The Explanation to Section 189(1) BNS expressly says so. A peaceful procession that turns violent, a religious gathering that develops a prohibited common object, a labour rally that crosses into criminal force — all become unlawful assemblies from the moment of transformation. Members who continue with knowledge of the change become liable from that point onwards. Members who leave at the moment of transformation, before any further act, are not.

What is the new clause 197(1)(d) of the BNS?

Section 197(1)(d) BNS is a BNS innovation with no IPC counterpart. It punishes whoever makes or publishes false or misleading information, jeopardising the sovereignty, unity and integrity or security of India. The clause aligns Section 197 BNS with the wider sovereignty-protection scheme — particularly Section 152 BNS — and criminalises a category of misinformation that the IPC's Section 153B did not reach. The mode of commission expressly includes electronic communication.

Has the punishment for rioting with a deadly weapon increased under the BNS?

Yes. Section 191(3) BNS raises the upper limit of imprisonment from three years (under Section 148 IPC) to five years. The increase reflects the legislative judgment that armed rioting carries a materially higher public-order risk than unarmed rioting. The fine continues to be at the discretion of the court, without a statutory ceiling.