Non-payment of rent is the most frequently pleaded eviction ground in Jharkhand. The governing statute is the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (Bihar Act 4 of 1983), which continued in force in Jharkhand after the State was carved out under the Bihar Reorganisation Act, 2000. The Act does not leave a defaulting tenant defenceless: it builds in a two-month threshold for default, a deposit mechanism where the landlord refuses rent, and judicially-softened consequences for failing to deposit during the suit. This note traces the arrears ground in section 11(1)(d), the meaning of rent lawfully payable, the deposit-before-Controller route, the strike-off of defence under section 15, and the leading authorities - above all Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta - that decide whether arrears actually translate into eviction. Read alongside the grounds of eviction and the subject hub.
Arrears as a statutory ground - section 11(1)(d)
Section 11 of the 1982 Act opens with the protective command that a tenant in possession shall not be liable to eviction except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one of the enumerated grounds. Arrears of rent is one such ground. Section 11(1)(d) authorises a decree where the amount of rent lawfully payable by the tenant, and due from him, is in arrears by not having been paid within the time fixed by contract, or in the absence of any such stipulation, by the last day of the month next following that for which the rent is payable. Default is therefore not measured from the first day rent falls due; the tenant gets the grace of the following month before he is in arrears. This twin test - contractual time first, statutory default time in the absence of contract - means the date of default must be computed precisely in every plaint, because an eviction decree founded on a wrongly-calculated default date is liable to be set aside. Because the grounds in section 11(1) are exhaustive and the arrears ground is one of the tenant-default grounds, the tenant forfeits the Act's protection only by his own conduct - and only if the statutory quantum and timing are both made out. The arrears ground also differs from the ordinary law of forfeiture under the Transfer of Property Act: even after the contractual tenancy is determined, the tenant remains a statutory tenant and can be evicted for arrears only by satisfying section 11(1)(d), not by mere notice to quit. For the full taxonomy of grounds see our note on the grounds of eviction.
The two-month threshold and the 1993 amendment
The decisive quantum is the period of arrears that triggers liability. As originally framed the threshold stood at three months, but the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control (Amendment) Act, 1993 reduced it to two months. After the amendment, a landlord need only establish that the amount of two months' rent, lawfully payable and due, is in arrears and was neither paid within time nor validly deposited. This is a material tightening of tenant protection on the arrears front, and it is a favourite examination point: the figure to remember for any default question under Jharkhand rent control law is two months, with three months being the pre-1993 position. The shortened period reflects the legislature's view that persistent non-payment, even for a short span, is a sufficient breach of the bargain to displace statutory protection, while still allowing the tenant a clear opportunity to cure. A point often missed is that the two months need not be the latest two months: arrears that accumulated earlier and remained unpaid will found the ground, subject to the tenant's right to wipe them out by valid payment or deposit. Equally, the reduction in quantum did not disturb the curative architecture of the Act - the deposit machinery and the directory time-frame for deposit during the suit continue to apply, so the lower threshold does not convert into an automatic eviction. The amendment is best understood as recalibrating the balance modestly in the landlord's favour on quantum while leaving the tenant's escape routes intact.
What is 'rent lawfully payable'
The arrears ground bites only on rent that is lawfully payable. This qualifier matters in two directions. First, a landlord cannot manufacture default by demanding more than the law permits: a tenant is not in arrears for failing to pay an unlawful enhancement, and where fair rent has been fixed, only the fair rent is lawfully payable. The principles for fixing the lawful figure are developed in our note on fair rent determination. Secondly, the Act caps what may be charged as advance: section 13 makes it unlawful to claim or receive any sum exceeding one month's rent as rent paid in advance, so a landlord cannot found a default plea on a tenant's refusal to pay an oversized advance. Where the very rate of rent is genuinely disputed, the tenant's remedy is not to withhold payment but to invoke the deposit machinery, paying what he admits and depositing the balance. A tenant who simply stops paying because he contests the rate runs the risk of being branded a defaulter on the rent actually found payable.
Deposit before the Controller and tender by money order
The Act anticipates the landlord who refuses rent in order to engineer a default. Where the landlord refuses to accept rent lawfully payable, or where there is a bona fide doubt as to the person entitled to receive it, the tenant is protected if he tenders the rent by postal money order or deposits it before the Controller in the prescribed manner (the deposit provisions of section 19 and the Rules). A valid tender or deposit is treated as payment, so the arrears ground simply does not arise. The tenant must, however, use the machinery correctly - depositing the full lawful rent, regularly, stating the circumstances and giving the prescribed notice. A casual or irregular deposit will not save him. The practical lesson is that a tenant faced with a recalcitrant landlord should never sit on the rent; he should create a paper trail of money-order receipts or Controller deposits that conclusively rebuts any plea of default. This deposit-on-refusal route is conceptually distinct from the deposit ordered during a pending suit, discussed next.
Deposit during the suit and strike-off of defence - section 15
Once an eviction suit is filed, the tenant who wishes to defend must keep the rent flowing. Section 15 empowers the Court to order the tenant to deposit the arrears of rent and to go on depositing the current rent month by month during the pendency of the proceedings. The sanction is severe: on failure of the tenant to deposit the arrears within fifteen days of the order, or to deposit the rent for any month by the fifteenth day of the next following month, the Court shall order the defence against ejectment to be struck off. A tenant whose defence is struck off cannot contest the landlord's claim or cross-examine his witnesses, and eviction will ordinarily follow. The provision is designed to stop a defaulting tenant from prolonging occupation, rent-free, behind the shield of litigation. Two consequences flow from a deposit order. First, the tenant must clear the accumulated arrears as a lump sum within the fifteen-day window; secondly, he must thereafter maintain the monthly rhythm, depositing each month's rent by the fifteenth of the succeeding month. A lapse on either limb attracts the sanction. Crucially, the deposit-during-suit obligation is independent of the merits of the arrears plea: a tenant who disputes that he was ever in default must still comply with the deposit order to preserve his right to defend, paying under protest if necessary. The apparent rigour of the word shall, however, has been substantially tempered by the Supreme Court, as the next section explains.
Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari - the period is directory
The cardinal authority on the strike-off provision is Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (AIR 1985 SC 964), arising directly under the Bihar rent control legislation. The tenant had failed to deposit rent within the fifteen-day window, and the question was whether the Court was bound to strike out his defence automatically. The Supreme Court drew the now-classic distinction between the obligation to deposit and the time-frame for doing so. While the duty to deposit is mandatory, the fifteen-day period prescribed for compliance was held to be directory, leaving the Court a discretion to extend time and to refuse to strike out the defence in deserving cases. The Court reasoned that a construction advancing the protective object of the Act must be preferred, and that a mechanical reading would render the Court powerless to prevent a miscarriage of justice where a tenant had fallen marginally or unintentionally behind. The judgment thus converts an apparently automatic penalty into a controlled judicial discretion, and it is the single most important case to cite on arrears in Jharkhand. The reasoning rests on a settled canon of statutory interpretation: whether a provision is mandatory or directory depends not on the word used but on the object of the enactment and the consequences of non-compliance. Treating the fifteen-day period as inflexible would defeat the Act's protective purpose by visiting a drastic, irreversible consequence - loss of the right to defend and almost certain eviction - on a tenant for a trivial or excusable delay. The discretion, however, is not a licence for indolence: it is to be exercised judicially, on cause shown, in favour of the tenant who is substantially compliant and bona fide, and against the tenant who treats the order with contempt. The case is therefore authority both for the existence of the discretion and for the disciplined manner of its exercise.
What conduct amounts to default
Beyond the statutory quantum, Courts ask whether the tenant's conduct genuinely amounts to default rather than mere occasional lateness. The leading general authority on the point, Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (AIR 1980 SC 954), holds that a tenant must observe reasonable punctuality, and that habitual, irregular payment - there, rent deposited at intervals of two to four months on many occasions, and never in advance - constitutes default notwithstanding eventual payment. Though decided under another State's rent statute, the principle is of general application and is routinely invoked: chronic irregularity is itself a breach, and a tenant cannot defeat the arrears ground merely by clearing dues belatedly after the suit. The arrears ground therefore looks both to the quantum (two months under section 11(1)(d)) and to the pattern of payment, and a tenant who hopes to retain protection must pay, tender or deposit the lawful rent with reasonable regularity rather than in sporadic lump sums.
Burden of proof and pleading the arrears
The burden of proving the arrears ground rests on the landlord. He must plead with precision the rate of rent, the period in default and the quantum of arrears, and prove that two months' lawfully payable rent fell due and was neither paid within time nor validly deposited. A vague or omnibus plea of non-payment will not do. Once the landlord establishes prima facie arrears, the evidential burden shifts to the tenant to show payment, valid tender, or deposit before the Controller, or to show that the sum demanded was not lawfully payable. Where fair rent is disputed, the Court determines the lawful figure and tests default against it, drawing on the principles in our note on fair rent determination. Receipts, money-order acknowledgements and Controller deposit challans are therefore the decisive evidence in any arrears contest, and their absence usually decides the case against the party who should have held them.
Relief against forfeiture and the cure window
The scheme of the arrears ground is corrective rather than purely punitive. The two-month grace within section 11(1)(d), the deposit-on-refusal route, and the directory reading of the strike-off period in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari together give the tenant repeated opportunities to cure default before he loses possession. A tenant who deposits the arrears and keeps depositing the current rent, even slightly late but bona fide, may persuade the Court to extend time and decline to strike out his defence. Conversely, a tenant who is wilfully and persistently in default, or who ignores a deposit order altogether, cannot expect indulgence; the discretion recognised in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari is to be exercised in deserving cases, not as a routine reprieve. The Court thus holds a balance - protecting the tenant who genuinely tries to pay while denying refuge to the tenant who exploits the litigation to avoid paying at all.
Arrears distinguished from other grounds
It is important to keep the arrears ground distinct from the other heads of section 11(1). Default in rent under clause (d) turns purely on money and timing and is curable by payment or deposit; it does not require any inquiry into the landlord's need. By contrast, the bona fide requirement ground under clause (c) - examined in our note on bona fide personal necessity - depends on the landlord's genuine need and attracts the special summary procedure under section 14, with its leave-to-contest filter. Unlawful sub-letting under clause (a), where the test of exclusive possession in Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998) 3 SCC 1, governs, is non-monetary and not curable by payment. A landlord may, of course, plead arrears alongside another ground, but each must be independently pleaded and proved. For the examinee, the clean rule is: arrears is the only ground a tenant can defeat simply by paying or depositing the lawful rent in time.
Practical takeaways for the exam
To master arrears under Jharkhand rent control law, anchor four points. First, the ground is section 11(1)(d), and the quantum is two months after the 1993 amendment, down from three. Secondly, only rent lawfully payable counts, and advance is capped at one month's rent by section 13. Thirdly, the tenant defeats the ground by paying, tendering by money order, or depositing before the Controller; and during the suit he must comply with a section 15 deposit order or risk having his defence struck off. Fourthly, and most importantly, the strike-off period is directory - Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (AIR 1985 SC 964) gives the Court discretion to extend time, while Mranalini B. Shah (AIR 1980 SC 954) confirms that habitual irregularity is itself default. Cross-read the definitions of building, tenant and rent on which the arrears ground rests, and you will be equipped for almost any default question.
Frequently asked questions
How many months of arrears justify eviction under Jharkhand rent control law?
Two months. Section 11(1)(d) of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 allows eviction where two months' lawfully payable rent is in arrears, not paid within the time fixed by contract or by the last day of the next month. The threshold was reduced from three months by the 1993 amendment.
What can a tenant do if the landlord refuses to accept rent?
The tenant should not withhold the rent. He may tender it by postal money order or deposit it before the Controller in the prescribed manner (section 19 and the Rules), including where there is a bona fide doubt about who is entitled to receive it. A valid tender or deposit counts as payment and defeats the arrears ground.
Can a tenant's defence be struck off for not depositing rent during the suit?
Yes. Under section 15, if the tenant fails to deposit the arrears within fifteen days of the Court's order, or the current rent by the fifteenth of the next month, the Court shall strike off the defence against ejectment. However, in Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta (AIR 1985 SC 964) the Supreme Court held the time-frame is directory and the Court may extend time in deserving cases.
What does 'rent lawfully payable' mean for the arrears ground?
Only rent the law permits the landlord to charge counts. Where fair rent has been fixed, only that figure is lawfully payable, and a landlord cannot create default by demanding an unlawful enhancement. Section 13 also caps advance at one month's rent, so refusal to pay a larger advance is not default.
Does paying arrears late after the suit save the tenant?
Not necessarily. Under Mranalini B. Shah v. Bapalal Mohanlal Shah (AIR 1980 SC 954) a tenant must observe reasonable punctuality, and habitual irregular payment is itself default despite eventual payment. But a bona fide tenant who deposits arrears and keeps depositing current rent may, under Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari, persuade the Court to extend time and not strike out his defence.
How is the arrears ground different from bona fide requirement?
Arrears under section 11(1)(d) is a tenant-default ground turning purely on money and timing, and is curable by payment or deposit. Bona fide requirement under section 11(1)(c) depends on the landlord's genuine need and attracts the special summary procedure of section 14. Arrears is the only ground a tenant can defeat simply by paying or depositing the lawful rent in time.