Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra

Facts

The question arose whether, given the bar in S397(2) CrPC against revision of interlocutory orders, the High Court could nonetheless interfere with such an order in exercise of its inherent power. The dispute required harmonising the newly enacted revisional bar with the inherent jurisdiction preserved by S482.

Issues

• Does the bar in S397(2) against revision of interlocutory orders also exclude the exercise of inherent power under S482?
• How are the revisional bar and the inherent power to be reconciled?

Arguments

It was argued that S397(2) bars all interference with interlocutory orders, so S482 cannot be used to circumvent that bar. The contrary view was that S482 is a savings provision declaring a wide pre-existing inherent power that the revisional bar does not extinguish.

Held

The Court held that the two provisions must be harmoniously construed. S397(2) bars revision of purely interlocutory orders, but the inherent power under S482 survives and may be invoked even against interlocutory orders where necessary to prevent abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of justice. However, inherent power cannot be used in a manner inconsistent with specific provisions of the Code, and must be exercised sparingly only when there is no other remedy and the impugned order results in manifest injustice.

Ratio decidendi

S482 operates as a savings clause whose inherent power is not taken away by the S397(2) bar; the power may be exercised even on interlocutory matters to prevent abuse of process or secure justice, provided it is not inconsistent with any express provision of the Code.

Significance

The leading authority reconciling the revisional bar with inherent jurisdiction; routinely cited to permit S482 relief against interlocutory orders such as framing of charge, and a touchstone for the limits of inherent power.

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