Aghnoo Nagesia v State of Bihar

Facts

The appellant, Aghnoo Nagesia, lodged the first information report himself at Palkot police station at 3.15 p.m. on 11 August 1963, confessing in detail that he had killed four relatives (Somra, his wife Chamin, their young son Dilu and his aunt Ratni) with a tangi over a property dispute. The FIR set out his motive, the weapon, the manner of each killing and the concealment of the weapon and bodies; he affixed his thumb-impression and later pointed out the bodies and the weapon. He was convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to death, the High Court admitting parts of the FIR (identity, motive, movements, concealment, subsequent conduct) while excluding only the direct descriptions of the killings.

Issues

• Whether a confessional first information report made by the accused to a police officer is inadmissible in its entirety under Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
• Whether such a confession can be dissected so that non-confessional or background portions (motive, preparation, opportunity, concealment, subsequent conduct) are admitted while only the parts describing the actual killing are excluded.
• Whether the evidence remaining after excluding the barred confession was sufficient to sustain the conviction.

Arguments

The appellant argued that the whole FIR was a confession made to a police officer and so was barred in its entirety by Section 25, leaving nothing admissible against him. The State contended that only the portions actually describing the murders were hit by Section 25, while the remaining parts (identity, motive, movements, concealment and subsequent conduct) were non-confessional admissions that remained admissible, as the High Court had held.

Held

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the conviction and death sentence. The Court held that a confession may reveal not only the commission of the crime but also the motive, preparation, opportunity, provocation, weapon, intention, concealment and subsequent conduct, and that 'if the confession is tainted, the taint attaches to each part of it.' A statement that admits the offence cannot be split, and every incriminating admission within it forms part of the confession; admitting the surrounding parts while excluding only the killing would make Sections 24, 25 and 26 of little substance. The whole FIR was therefore inadmissible save the formal parts identifying the appellant as its maker (parts 1, 15 and 18) and any information admissible under Section 27. With the confession excluded, the only evidence left was that the appellant pointed out the places where the bodies lay, the recovery of bodies and weapon, a blood-stained cloth and his presence in the area, which the Court found insufficient to convict.

Ratio decidendi

A confession is an indivisible whole; where a statement to a police officer amounts to a confession it is barred in its entirety by Section 25 of the Evidence Act, and it cannot be dissected to let in incriminating non-confessional portions such as motive, preparation or concealment. The only parts of such a confessional FIR that may be proved are the formal portions identifying the maker and information that strictly falls within the discovery exception in Section 27.

Significance

A landmark authority on the non-severability of confessions made to the police and on the absolute bar in Section 25, repeatedly followed on the principle that a confessional FIR (other than its Section 27 discovery portion and formal identifying part) is wholly inadmissible. The same position is preserved under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: Section 23(1) BSA re-enacts the bar on confessions to a police officer (old Section 25 IEA), the proviso to Section 23(2) BSA continues the Section 27 discovery exception, and Section 22 BSA carries forward old Section 24, so the case remains good law for interpreting these provisions.

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