Hari Charan Kurmi and Jogia Hajam v State of Bihar

Facts

On the night of 24-25 March 1960 a dacoity took place at the house of Deokinandan Jaiswal in Muzaffarpur, Bihar, in which his wife Damyanti Devi was murdered and Rs. 17,000 was looted. Six persons, including the two appellants, were tried. The trial court and the High Court relied substantially on the confession of a co-accused (Ram Surat) together with bloodstains found on the appellants' clothing to convict the appellants and sentence them to death.

Issues

• Whether the confession of a co-accused under Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act is substantive evidence that can found a conviction against another co-accused.
• What is the proper approach a court must adopt before it may use a co-accused's confession against a fellow accused.

Arguments

The appellants contended that the High Court erred in treating co-accused Ram Surat's confession as substantive evidence and misread Ram Prakash v State of Punjab; without that confession the remaining material (bloodstains) could not sustain a conviction. The State argued that the confession corroborated the physical evidence and the convictions were justified on the established interpretation of Section 30.

Held

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and acquitted both appellants, setting aside their convictions and death sentences. It held that a confession falling under Section 30 is not 'evidence' as defined in Section 3 of the Act; it is merely an element the court may take into consideration in a non-technical sense. A court cannot start with the confession of a co-accused: it must first weigh the other evidence led by the prosecution and, only if that evidence by itself almost establishes guilt, may it then turn to the confession to lend assurance to that conclusion. Since the independent evidence (bloodstains) was insufficient on its own and could not be supported by the co-accused's confession in the manner the High Court had used it, the convictions could not stand, for suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof.

Ratio decidendi

A confession by a co-accused under Section 30 of the Evidence Act is not substantive evidence and cannot by itself be the foundation of a conviction; it can be used only after the court has, on the other evidence, almost formed a conclusion of guilt, and then merely to lend assurance to that conclusion. This is to be distinguished from accomplice evidence under Section 133, which is substantive though it needs corroboration.

Significance

A leading Constitution Bench authority on the limited, subsidiary use of a co-accused's confession, reaffirming Bhuboni Sahu v The King and Kashmira Singh v State of M.P. and clarifying Ram Prakash v State of Punjab. It has been consistently followed (e.g. State (NCT of Delhi) v Navjot Sandhu). The same principle now sits under the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: Section 24 BSA re-enacts the old Section 30 in substantially identical terms, so a co-accused's confession remains a weak, non-substantive corroborative element and not the basis of conviction.

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