Reema Aggarwal v Anupam

Facts

The appellant married respondent Anupam on 25 January 1998; it was his second marriage while his first wife was still alive, rendering the marriage void. She alleged harassment and dowry demands by Anupam and his relatives, and was hospitalised after being administered an acidic/poisonous substance. The accused were charged under Sections 307 and 498-A IPC. The trial court acquitted them on the ground that, the second marriage being void, Anupam was not a 'husband' within Section 498-A, and the High Court declined leave to appeal in a cryptic order.

Issues

• Whether a man who marries a woman during the subsistence of an earlier marriage — so that the second marriage is legally void — can be prosecuted as a 'husband' under Section 498-A (and analogously Section 304-B) IPC.
• Whether the High Court could summarily decline leave to appeal without giving reasons.

Arguments

The State of Punjab argued that Sections 498-A and 304-B, being beneficial provisions to curb the social evil of dowry cruelty, must be construed liberally so that 'husband' covers anyone who assumes and cohabits in marital status, regardless of the marriage's validity. The respondent contended that these sections presuppose a legally valid marriage, that a void second marriage makes the man no 'husband', and relied on Ramnarayan v. State of M.P. for a strict construction.

Held

The Supreme Court held that a strictly literal or pedantic construction would defeat the purpose of provisions enacted to suppress the public evil of dowry-related cruelty, and applied the mischief rule (Heydon's case) to adopt a purposive interpretation. It held that 'husband' for the limited purpose of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC covers a person who enters into a marital relationship and, under colour of such proclaimed or feigned status, subjects the woman to cruelty — whatever the legitimacy of the marriage itself. The Court distinguished Section 494 (bigamy), whose essence is the act of validly 'marrying', from Section 498-A, whose thrust is subjecting a woman to cruelty, so the latter does not hinge on a valid marriage. It also held the High Court was not justified in summarily refusing leave to appeal without reasons, set aside that order, and remitted the matter for fresh consideration on merits.

Ratio decidendi

For the limited purpose of Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC, the term 'husband' includes any man who enters into and holds himself out in a marital relationship and subjects the woman to cruelty, even if that marriage is void or otherwise legally invalid; the validity of the marriage is immaterial to liability under these sections.

Significance

A landmark purposive interpretation that prevents men from escaping liability for dowry cruelty by pleading that their second/void marriage made them no legal 'husband'; it has been widely followed on the meaning of 'husband' under cruelty and dowry-death provisions (and noted alongside the contrary line later considered in cases dealing with void marriages). Under the new code the same principle applies to cruelty by husband or relatives under Sections 85-86 BNS and to dowry death under Section 80 BNS, which re-enact Sections 498-A and 304-B IPC in substantially identical terms.

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