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Limitation Act, 1963 · Section 3 (read with Section 5), Limitation Act, 1908/1963

Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee

Section 3 obliges a court to dismiss a suit, appeal or application filed beyond the prescribed period, whether or not the opponent pleads limitation.

Citation
AIR 1964 SC 1336
Court
Supreme Court of India
Decided
1963-05-02
Bench
K. Subba Rao, Raghubar Dayal, J.R. Mudholkar JJ

Facts

After the plaintiff died, an application to set aside abatement and substitute legal representatives was filed beyond the period prescribed for it. The trial court condoned the delay under Section 5 and allowed substitution. The High Court declined to interfere in revision, and the matter reached the Supreme Court on whether limitation barred the application and whether the High Court could disturb the finding of sufficient cause.

Issues

  • Whether a court is bound under Section 3 to dismiss an application filed after the prescribed period even if limitation is not pleaded by the opposite party.
  • Whether a High Court in revision can re-examine a subordinate court's factual finding of 'sufficient cause' under Section 5.

Arguments

The objecting party contended the application was time-barred and the abatement could not be set aside. The applicant contended sufficient cause was shown, delay was rightly condoned under Section 5, and the High Court could not reopen that finding in revision.

Held

The Court held that Section 3 enjoins a court to dismiss any suit, appeal or application instituted after the period of limitation, irrespective of whether the opposite party set up the plea of limitation; limitation is thus a matter of judicial duty, not merely a defence. However, Section 5 lets a court extend time where sufficient cause is shown, and once a subordinate court has, within jurisdiction, found sufficient cause and condoned delay, that discretionary factual finding cannot be disturbed by the High Court in revision merely because it might have taken a different view. As the trial court acted within its jurisdiction in condoning the delay, no revisional interference was warranted. The appeal accordingly failed on the revisional question.

Ratio decidendi

Section 3 makes the bar of limitation mandatory and operates of the court's own motion even without a plea, but Section 5 permits condonation; a within-jurisdiction finding of sufficient cause is not open to revisional reappraisal.

Significance

An early and frequently cited statement that the Section 3 bar is mandatory and self-operating, and that limitation must be applied by the court suo motu; consistently relied on in later cases distinguishing the absolute Section 3 bar from the discretionary Section 5 power.

Related

Section 5 (condonation of delay)Order XXII CPC (abatement/substitution)Revisional jurisdiction (Section 115 CPC)

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Source: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/932898/https://www.casemine.com/commentary/in/manindra-land-v.-bhutnath-banerjee:-upholding-subordinate-court's-findings-on-limitation-and-sufficient-cause/view

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