Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh

Facts

The dispute concerned whether a party in possession of immovable property had been dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, the dispossessor asserting a superior right/title to the property. The plaintiff in possession sought restoration of possession on the footing that he had been put out without his consent and without recourse to legal process. The case turned on whether the strength of the dispossessor's title could justify the forcible eviction.

Issues

• Whether a person entitled to possession (such as a landlord or title-holder) may take forcible possession from a person in possession without recourse to law.
• What questions a court is confined to in a summary suit under s. 6 (then s. 9).

Arguments

The dispossessor contended that having a better right or title to the property justified retaking possession. The dispossessed party contended that, regardless of title, possession could only be disturbed through due course of law, and a s. 6 suit lies on proof of prior possession and dispossession alone.

Held

The Supreme Court held that the object of section 6 (then section 9) is to discourage persons from taking the law into their own hands, however good their title may be. A person in possession cannot be dispossessed otherwise than in due course of law, and even the rightful owner must seek recourse to legal process rather than forcible eviction. In a suit under the section the court determines only two questions: whether the plaintiff was in possession, and whether he was dispossessed without his consent otherwise than in due course of law within six months preceding the suit. The question of title is wholly outside the inquiry.

Ratio decidendi

No person, however good his title, may forcibly dispossess another who is in possession otherwise than in due course of law; in a summary suit under s. 6 the court is confined to the questions of prior possession and wrongful dispossession within six months, and title is irrelevant.

Significance

A foundational authority repeatedly relied upon for the twin questions the court must decide under s. 6 and for the principle that self-help dispossession is impermissible even for an owner. It underpins later decisions such as Krishna Ram Mahale v Shobha Venkat Rao and Somnath Berman v S.P. Raju and is the standard citation for the object and scope of section 6.

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