Eviction of Tenant — Grounds (Section 27)

Section 27 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999 is the heart of the eviction machinery. It opens with a non obstante clause that forbids any court, District Judge or High Court from passing a decree for recovery of possession against a tenant except on the grounds enumerated in sub-section (2). The provision therefore reverses the ordinary law of landlord and tenant: a tenant who pays rent and behaves lawfully enjoys statutory immunity from eviction, and the landlord must bring his claim within one of the closed list of clauses (a) to (s). Each ground carries its own conditions, notices and provisos, and the burden of proof lies on the landlord. This article walks through every ground, the procedural safeguards, and the leading authorities that govern how courts read Section 27.

The protective scheme: sub-section (1)

Section 27(1) begins, "Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made … in favour of the landlord against a tenant, save as provided in sub-section (2)." Two features follow. First, the non obstante clause overrides both the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and any contractual stipulation — so a lease clause permitting eviction on notice is ineffective once the Act applies to the notified urban area. Second, the grounds in sub-section (2) are exhaustive: the words "on one or more of the following grounds only" close the list. A landlord must plead and prove a statutory ground; the court has no residual discretion to evict on equity. This structure mirrors every rent-control statute in India and reflects the welfare object of the Act, namely security of tenure for the tenant balanced against the genuine needs of the owner. For who counts as "tenant" and "landlord" here, see the definitions.

Ground (a): default in payment of rent

Clause (a) permits eviction where the tenant has "neither paid nor tendered the whole of the arrears of the rent and other charges legally recoverable from him within two months from the date on which a notice of demand for payment" has been served in the manner provided in section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. The ground is thus conditional on a valid notice of demand and a two-month window to cure. The default ground is intimately linked to the standard rent and to permissible lawful increases, because only rent "legally recoverable" can found a default. The first proviso curbs the habitual defaulter: a tenant who, having once obtained the benefit of the demand-notice protection, again defaults is not entitled to it a second time. The second proviso is the most important tenant safeguard — even where the tenant is liable to be evicted on this ground, "the Court shall make an order directing the tenant to vacate the premises unless he pays … or deposits into Court within one month of the date of order" the arrears computed at the last-paid rate up to the month before payment. This deposit-and-stay mechanism allows a defaulting tenant to defeat eviction by clearing dues, and it is mandatory: the court must give the opportunity before ordering possession.

Ground (b): subletting, assignment or parting with possession

Clause (b) covers a tenant who has "sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises" — either between the application of Part V of the old Karnataka Rent Control Act, 1961 and the present Chapter, or, after the Act's commencement, without the landlord's written consent. The settled test of subletting was laid down in Joginder Singh Sodhi v. Amar Kaur, (2005) 1 SCC 31: subletting comes into existence when the tenant gives up possession, wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession, and the two ingredients are parting with possession and monetary consideration. Because clandestine subletting is rarely proved by direct evidence, the courts apply a shifting burden. In Bharat Sales Ltd. v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1998) 3 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that subletting may be inferred from the conduct of the parties where a third party is found in exclusive possession. The principle was applied to this very statute in M.V. Ramachandrasa v. Mahendra Watch Company, 2026 INSC 348, where the Court, dealing with section 27(2)(b)(ii), reiterated that once the landlord proves a third party in exclusive possession and the original tenant's absence, the onus shifts to the tenant to explain the lawful nature of that possession; an unexplained partnership arrangement could be lifted to expose disguised subletting.

Ground (c): change of user / misuse

Clause (c) allows eviction where the tenant "has used the premises for a purpose other than that for which they were let" without the landlord's written consent — typically converting residential premises to commercial use or vice versa. The proviso imposes a strict procedural gate: no application lies unless the landlord has first served, by registered post personally served, a notice requiring the tenant to stop the misuse, and the tenant has refused or failed to comply within one month. Even then, the court may not order eviction "unless the Court is satisfied that the misuse of the premises is of such a nature that it is a public nuisance or that it causes damage to the interest of the landlord." Mere technical deviation is therefore insufficient; the misuse must reach a qualitative threshold of nuisance or prejudice. This makes clause (c) a relatively hard ground for landlords to establish and underscores the Act's tilt toward security of tenure.

Ground (d): non-user / non-occupation

Clause (d) addresses premises that the tenant has effectively abandoned. Where the premises were let and the tenant or a family member was in occupation for a period of six months, eviction lies if the tenant "has not been in occupation thereof, without a reasonable cause for a period of two years" immediately before the application. The defence is "reasonable cause" — temporary absence for work, study or medical treatment, with an intention to return and the retention of effects, ordinarily negatives the ground. A proviso lets the landlord, on the tenant's written request, permit occupancy by a third person not exceeding the tenancy period without attracting the clause. The Explanation defines "family" for clauses (d) and (r) as parents, spouse, dependent sons and daughters, and other relatives ordinarily living with and dependent on the tenant — a definition that recurs in the bona fide need analysis below.

Grounds (e)-(i): unsafe premises, repairs, rebuilding and demolition

Clauses (e) to (i) form a cluster dealing with the physical fate of the building. Clause (e) applies where the premises have "become unsafe or unfit for human habitation" and are required for repairs or reconstruction that cannot be done without vacation. Clause (f) covers demolition or building work ordered by the Government or a local authority under an improvement or development scheme. Clause (g) is for ordinary repairs requiring vacation; clause (h) for building, rebuilding, or substantial addition or alteration; and clause (i) for premises of not more than two floors required for immediate demolition with a view to rebuild. A common proviso to clauses (e), (g), (h) and (i) is the crucial safeguard: no eviction unless the court is satisfied that the plans and estimates of the repairs or reconstruction "have been properly prepared and that the landlord has the necessary means to carry out" the work. The Supreme Court has insisted on rigorous scrutiny of these conditions, including the dilapidated state, the approved plans and the landlord's financial capacity, before evicting under the demolition-reconstruction grounds. A further proviso preserves the tenant's right of re-entry: where the rebuilt building is restored to less than seventy-five per cent, a dispossessed tenant has a right to re-entry on new terms in premises equivalent in area to the original.

Grounds (j)-(k): alternative accommodation and service tenancies

Clause (j) permits eviction where the tenant, his spouse or a dependent son or daughter ordinarily living with him "has built or acquired vacant possession of or been allotted a residence or … a commercial premises," whether before or after the Act — the rationale being that a tenant with his own accommodation no longer needs the rent-control shelter. A proviso lets the court grant the tenant up to one year to vacate. Clause (k) deals with the service tenancy: where premises were let for residence by reason of the tenant's employment with the landlord, and that employment has ceased, eviction lies — but a proviso bars eviction if the court finds a bona fide dispute as to whether the employment has actually ended. Both clauses turn on objective facts and are comparatively narrow.

Grounds (l)-(n): waste, nuisance and breach of lease conditions

Clause (l) targets a tenant who has caused "substantial damage" or such alteration as changes the premises' identity or diminishes its value; the Explanation fixes "substantial damage" at expenditure of six months' rent or more (or less, if the court is satisfied given the nature of the damage), and a proviso saves the tenant who repairs or compensates within the time the court allows. Clause (m) permits eviction where the tenant, or a person residing or carrying on business with him, "has been convicted of causing nuisance or annoyance" to neighbours, or convicted of using or allowing use of the premises for an immoral or illegal purpose — note the requirement of a conviction, not mere allegation. Clause (n) applies where the tenant, after notice, deals with the premises contrary to a condition imposed on the landlord by the Government or local authority in the land lease, subject to a proviso allowing the tenant to comply or compensate within time.

Grounds (o)-(q): denial of title, occupant's failure and agreed vacation

Clause (o) makes denial of the landlord's title a ground: where the tenant, in his reply, having denied the landlord's ownership "has failed to prove it or that such denial was not made in a bonafide manner," eviction follows. The denial must be unequivocal and mala fide; a bona fide assertion of a genuine dispute of title is protected. Clause (p) allows eviction where "the person in occupation of the premises has failed to prove that he is a bonafide tenant," reaching unauthorised occupants and trespassers who cannot establish tenancy. Clause (q) is the agreed-vacation ground: where the tenant, after agreeing with or informing the landlord in writing of the date to vacate, fails to do so on or after that date, the landlord may recover possession — giving statutory teeth to a written surrender undertaking.

Ground (r): bona fide requirement of the landlord

Clause (r) is the most litigated ground. It applies where the premises "are required, whether in the same form or after re-construction or re-building, by the landlord for occupation for himself or for any member of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation." Two limbs must concur: a genuine requirement, and the absence of other reasonably suitable accommodation. Explanation-I creates a presumption: where the landlord supports his application by affidavit that the premises are required for himself or a dependent family member, the court "shall presume" that they are so required — though the presumption is rebuttable. On the meaning of "requirement," the locus classicus is Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999) 6 SCC 222, where the Supreme Court held that a requirement is not a mere desire; it is a "felt need which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire," to be assessed with a practical approach instructed by the realities of life, neither too liberal nor too pedantic. On the landlord's freedom of choice, Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co., (2000) 1 SCC 679, holds that the landlord is the best judge of his own requirement and the tenant cannot dictate which of the landlord's properties he should occupy. At the same time, where a landlord couples bona fide need with demolition and reconstruction, the courts demand strict compliance with the statutory conditions and detailed scrutiny of the dilapidated state, the capacity to reconstruct, and the want of suitable alternative accommodation before evicting under section 27(2)(r). A proviso bars an application within one year where the landlord acquired the premises by transfer, preventing purchase-and-evict abuse. See the dedicated treatment in bona fide need.

Ground (s), part-eviction and protection of sub-tenants

Clause (s) is a focused ground: where the landlord is a trustee of a Public Charitable Trust and the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust. Sub-section (3) introduces the doctrine of part-eviction — in proceedings under clauses (e), (f), (g), (h) or (r), or under sections 28 to 31, the court may order eviction from only a part of the premises if the landlord agrees, with a proportionate reduction in rent for the part vacated. This prevents over-recovery where the landlord's need or the building work concerns only a portion. Sub-section (4) protects lawful sub-tenants: no eviction order under sub-section (2) binds a sub-tenant referred to in section 33 who has given notice of his sub-tenancy to the landlord, unless that sub-tenant is made a party and the order is made binding on him — a salutary safeguard against collusive eviction of the principal tenant to defeat a recognised sub-tenant.

Procedure, special grounds and judicial approach

Section 27 must be read with the special accelerated grounds in sections 28 to 31, which give immediate-possession rights to particular landlords — for instance, section 28 confers a right of immediate recovery on a landlord who, occupying premises allotted by the Government or a local authority, is required to vacate them because he owns other accommodation in the local area. Explanation-I to clause (r) expressly extends its presumptions and the meaning of "owner" to sections 28 to 31, including allottees under hire-purchase, lease or sub-lease from the Bangalore Development Authority before full ownership accrues. Across all grounds the consistent judicial theme is that Section 27 is a tenant-protective code: the grounds are exhaustive, the burden lies on the landlord, mandatory notices and cure-periods must be honoured, and reconstruction and bona fide need claims face exacting scrutiny so that the statutory protection is not defeated by pretext. For the broader architecture of the Act, return to the Karnataka Rent Act hub and the introduction.