Definitions — Landlord, Tenant, Building, Fair Rent (Section 2)

The whole machinery of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 is switched on or off by the definitions in Section 2. Whether the Rent Control Court can entertain a petition at all, whether an occupant enjoys the Act's protection against eviction, and whether the fair-rent jurisdiction is attracted, all turn on whether the parties and the premises fall within the statutory definitions of landlord, tenant, building and the concept of fair rent. Because the Act is a special, beneficial statute that displaces the general law of landlord and tenant, these definitions are read strictly where they confer protection and liberally where they advance the legislative object. This note works through each definition clause-by-clause, anchors every proposition to verified authority, and flags the litigation traps that recur in judiciary and CLAT-PG papers.

The scheme of Section 2 and why definitions decide jurisdiction

Section 2 is the definition clause of the Act and opens with the familiar formula “In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires”. Each defined term is a jurisdictional gatekeeper: the Rent Control Court constituted under Section 3 can act only where the premises are a “building”, the applicant a “landlord”, and the respondent a “tenant” within Section 2. If any element is missing the dispute falls outside the Act and back into the ordinary civil court under the general law. The definitions are also deliberately wider than their ordinary meaning, using the inclusive technique (“means and includes”) so that the protective net catches relationships the common law would not. For the object and reach of the statute that these definitions serve, see our note on the introduction, object and application of the Act and the subject hub. The practical drill in any answer is to test the facts against each definition in turn before reaching the substantive ground of eviction or rent fixation.

“Building” — Section 2(1)

Under Section 2(1) a “building” means any building or hut or part of a building or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes, and includes the garden, grounds, wells, tanks and structures appurtenant to such building or hut and let or to be let along with it, together with any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in the building or hut. Critically, the definition excludes a room in a hotel or boarding-house. Three points dominate the case law. First, the words “part of a building” and “let or to be let separately” mean a single floor, a shop, or even one room let as a distinct unit is itself a “building”, so each separately-let portion is independently within the Act. Second, the inclusive limb pulls in appurtenances — the garden, well, tank and supplied furniture — only where they are let along with the structure, so a vacant plot let by itself is not a building. Third, the hotel/boarding-house exclusion keeps transient lodging outside rent control, because such occupation is a licence to use services, not a lease of demised premises.

Residential and non-residential buildings: one definition, no split protection

The Kerala Act, unlike some State statutes, draws no distinction at the threshold between residential and non-residential buildings — Section 2(1) expressly covers letting “for residential or non-residential purposes”. The consequence is that commercial tenancies enjoy the same protection from eviction as dwellings, subject only to the differently-worded grounds in Section 11. This matters when read with the Supreme Court's reasoning in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar, AIR 1985 SC 796, where a Constitution Bench held, in the context of the Delhi Rent Act, that a statutory tenancy in commercial premises is heritable because the Act treats contractual and statutory tenants alike and contains no provision cutting down succession for business premises. The same logic applies to Kerala, whose definition makes no functional distinction between the two classes of building; the protection, and its heritability, follow the statutory status rather than the purpose of the letting. See our notes on grounds of eviction and on Section 11 for how this single definition then channels into distinct eviction grounds.

“Landlord” — Section 2(3)

Section 2(3) defines “landlord” to include the person who is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of a building, whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on behalf of himself and others, or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant. The definition is therefore built on entitlement to receive rent, not on ownership of the building. The closing words — “if the building were let to a tenant” — mean a person can be a landlord even of a building lying vacant, which is essential because petitions for own-occupation under Section 11 are often filed before any tenant is inducted. The inclusion of agents, trustees, receivers and guardians lets representatives sue and be sued in that capacity, and the phrase “on behalf of himself and others” is the textual hook by which a co-owner who collects or is entitled to the rent qualifies as a landlord and may maintain proceedings without joining every co-owner — a position the Supreme Court has affirmed under cognate rent statutes, holding that a co-owner is a landlord and can maintain an eviction petition without exclusive title.

The sub-letting Explanation: a tenant can also be a landlord

The Explanation to Section 2(3) provides that a tenant who sub-lets shall be deemed to be a landlord within the meaning of the Act in relation to the sub-tenant. This deeming fiction creates a chain of relationships: as against the head-landlord the intermediate holder is a tenant, but as against the sub-tenant he is a landlord and may invoke the Act's machinery against the sub-tenant. The fiction does not, however, convert an unlawful sub-tenant into a person entitled to the Act's protection against the head-landlord, because the head-letting and the sub-letting are governed by separate relationships. The practical importance is that lawful sub-letting (where permitted) produces two distinct landlord-tenant relationships each independently within the Act, while unlawful sub-letting also furnishes a ground of eviction against the original tenant. Read this with our note on grounds of eviction, where sub-letting without consent recurs as a statutory ground.

“Tenant” — Section 2(6)

Section 2(6) defines “tenant” as any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building, and includes the heir or heirs of a deceased tenant, and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour. It then excludes three categories: a kudikidappukaran as defined in the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963; a person placed in occupation of a building by its tenant; and a person to whom the collection of rents or fees in a public market, cart-stand, slaughter-house, or of rents for shops, has been farmed out or leased by a municipal council, local board, panchayat or corporation. The core test is liability to pay rent — “by whom or on whose account rent is payable” — so a gratuitous occupant or a mere licensee placed in occupation by the tenant is not a tenant and enjoys no protection against the landlord. The exclusion of the person “placed in occupation by its tenant” is the textual bar that prevents an occupant inducted by the tenant from claiming tenancy directly against the landlord.

Heirs and the statutory tenant: the heritable interest

Two inclusive limbs in Section 2(6) embed the concept of the statutory tenant. The first — “heir or heirs of a deceased tenant” — makes the tenancy heritable. In A.M. Prabhakaran v. Chithappa Sulaikabi (Kerala High Court, 2007), the Court traced the history of the clause: before the amendment effective from 20 July 1966 the definition included only the surviving spouse or a son or daughter living with the tenant as a family member up to his death, but the amendment expanded it to cover the heir or heirs of the deceased tenant generally, irrespective of whether they were living with him. The second limb — “a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour” — is the classic statutory tenant who, though the contractual tenancy has ended, retains the Act's protection. The Supreme Court's Constitution Bench in V. Dhanapal Chettiar v. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 SC 1745, held that under any State Rent Control Act it is unnecessary to terminate the contractual tenancy by notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before seeking eviction, because the Act itself defines and protects the tenant's status independently of the contract; the heritability of that status in commercial premises was later settled in Gian Devi Anand.

The three exclusions from “tenant” and their consequences

Each exclusion in Section 2(6) keeps a class of occupant outside the protective scheme. The kudikidappukaran is excluded because that occupant of a hut on another's land is comprehensively protected by the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963, and overlapping rent-control protection would be incongruous. The person “placed in occupation by its tenant” is excluded so that the landlord's relationship runs only with the tenant, not with the tenant's licensee or sub-occupant who has no privity with, and pays no rent to, the landlord. The exclusion of farmees and lessees of municipal market, cart-stand and slaughter-house collections keeps purely commercial revenue-farming arrangements out of a statute meant to protect occupation of buildings. The drafting lesson for answers is that the exclusions are read strictly and a party seeking to oust the Act's protection must bring the occupant squarely within an excluded category; a borderline occupant who is liable to pay rent for a building remains a tenant.

“Fair rent” — the regulated rent and its statutory benchmarks

“Fair rent” is the rent that the Rent Control Court may fix on the application of either the landlord or the tenant under Section 5, displacing whatever rent the parties may have agreed. Fair rent is computed on objective statutory factors — broadly the cost of construction or market value of the building, the market value of the site, and a reasonable return on that aggregate investment — rather than on bargaining power, which is the whole point of a rent-control statute. The Act reinforces this by the related concept of “unconscionable rent”, defined as any rent more than double the maximum fair rent that could be fixed for a building under Section 5; charging or recovering such rent is penalised. Fair rent thus operates as the statutory ceiling that protects tenants from exploitative demands while assuring landlords a reasonable yield. The detailed methodology, the components of the computation, and revision of fair rent on changed circumstances are covered in our dedicated note on fair rent: determination and revision.

Supporting definitions: Rent Control Court and the authorities

Several ancillary definitions complete the operative framework. “Rent Control Court” means the Court constituted under Section 3, which is the court of first instance for petitions for eviction, fixation of fair rent and connected reliefs. The Act layers an Appellate Authority over that court and a revisional jurisdiction above the appellate stage, so the definitional chain — building, landlord, tenant, fair rent, Rent Control Court — feeds directly into a self-contained adjudicatory hierarchy that ousts the ordinary jurisdiction of civil courts in matters the Act covers. Because the Rent Control Court is a creature of statute, it can exercise only the powers the Act confers, and a finding that the premises are not a “building” or the respondent not a “tenant” is jurisdictional and goes to the root of the proceeding. The interaction of these definitions with the specific eviction grounds is developed in our notes on Section 11 and Section 12.

How definitions are tested and the recurring traps

Examiners rarely ask for a bare reproduction of Section 2; they test application. A classic problem hides a hotel room (excluded from “building”), a licensee placed in occupation by the tenant (excluded from “tenant”), or a co-owner suing alone (caught by “on behalf of himself and others” in “landlord”). The disciplined method is to identify the premises, then the parties, against the precise statutory words before touching the substantive ground. Remember the inclusive technique: “means and includes” definitions are wider than ordinary usage, so heirs and statutory tenants are tenants, and agents and trustees are landlords. Anchor heritability to Gian Devi Anand, the no-notice-required rule to V. Dhanapal Chettiar, and the expanded heir clause to A.M. Prabhakaran. Finally, treat the definitions as jurisdictional: if the premises are not a building or the occupant not a tenant, the Rent Control Court has no jurisdiction and the matter belongs to the civil court — a point that frequently carries the marks.