The single feature that lifts the Lok Adalat above ordinary mediation is the legal effect the statute attaches to what comes out of it. A settlement that would, in any private forum, be only a contract becomes, the moment it is reduced to an award, a decree of a civil court — final, binding and directly executable, with no appeal to anyone. This note examines that effect under Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 (the parent statute under which the Kerala State Legal Services Authority and its Lok Adalats function), the parallel finality of Permanent Lok Adalat awards under Section 22E, and the narrow window the courts have kept open for challenge.
The statutory source: Section 21
The effect of an ordinary Lok Adalat award flows entirely from Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Section 21(1) declares that “every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court.” Section 21(2) adds that “every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award.” These two limbs — the deeming fiction and the finality clause — together produce the award's distinctive force. The same Act, through Chapter VI (Sections 19 and 20), governs how matters reach the Lok Adalat in Kerala; this note assumes that machinery (covered in Lok Adalat in Kerala) and concentrates on what happens once an award is made.
Deemed to be a decree of a civil court
The phrase “deemed to be a decree” is a legal fiction with concrete consequences. A decree is the formal expression of an adjudication that conclusively determines the rights of the parties; once an award is clothed with that status, the court acquires, in relation to it, every power it would have over its own decree. The Supreme Court in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC 478 explained that the award of a Lok Adalat is on par with a decree passed on compromise: it carries the same binding and conclusive effect and amounts to an ending of the litigation between the parties. The fiction is not cosmetic — it is what makes the award enforceable through the ordinary execution machinery rather than by a fresh suit. A deeming provision, as the courts repeatedly note, must be carried to its logical conclusion: if the award is deemed a decree, it must be treated as a decree for every purpose, including execution, the running of limitation for execution, and the attachment and sale of property. The award therefore needs no further stamp of judicial approval after it is made; the seal of the Lok Adalat itself imports finality. This is what distinguishes the Lok Adalat from arbitration, where an award must still be confirmed and is open to challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Lok Adalat award skips that intermediate stage entirely — it is born with decree-like force.
Finality and the bar on appeal
Section 21(2) makes the award “final and binding” and shuts out any appeal. The rationale is structural: a Lok Adalat does not adjudicate; it records the parties' own settlement. There is nothing for an appellate court to correct on merits because the terms are the parties' own bargain. In P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job, where a dispute pending in first appeal was settled before a Lok Adalat, the Court held that the resulting award could not be reopened by regular remedies. Just as a consent decree cannot be assailed in a regular appeal, an award — being akin to a consent decree — cannot be challenged on the ground that it is erroneous on the merits. Finality, here, is the price and the point of consensual resolution. The bar on appeal serves the Act's larger objective of decongesting the docket: a matter settled before a Lok Adalat does not travel back up the appellate ladder, and the parties cannot have second thoughts dressed up as an appeal. This is also why the award is not subject to review or revision in the ordinary sense — there is no “error apparent” to review when the operative content is the parties' own agreement. The finality clause must, however, be read with the constitutional supervisory jurisdiction discussed below, which the legislature cannot abrogate; the bar in Section 21(2) operates on statutory appeals and revisions, not on the High Court's powers under Articles 226 and 227.
Award rests on consent, not adjudication
Because the effect is so strong, the courts insist that the foundation be genuine consent. State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh (2008) 2 SCC 660 is the leading authority on this point. The Court held that a Lok Adalat has no power to “hear” parties and adjudicate as a court does; the Act contemplates a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or settlement. The making of an award is “merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by parties” into an executable order under the Lok Adalat's seal. Where no settlement is reached, no award can be made; the record must be returned to the referring court for disposal in accordance with law. An “award” passed on merits without consensus — as had happened in Jalour Singh — is no award at all and is liable to be set aside, because the statutory effect of Section 21 attaches only to a true consent award.
Execution: enforced like any civil decree
The practical payoff of the deeming fiction is direct executability. A decree-holder under a Lok Adalat award need not file a fresh suit; the award is put into execution under the Code of Civil Procedure like a decree of the court. The reach of this principle was settled in K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012) 2 SCC 51 (AIR 2012 SC 719). There, a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was referred to a Lok Adalat and settled, the accused agreeing to pay the cheque amount in instalments. On default, the complainant sought execution. The Supreme Court held that in view of the “unambiguous language” of Section 21, every award — even one arising out of a criminal complaint — is deemed a decree of a civil court and is executable as such. The Court rejected the argument that an award in a criminal matter cannot be a civil decree: once Section 21 applies, the award's enforceability is decree-like irrespective of the nature of the original proceeding. The Court reasoned that to deny execution would defeat the very purpose of referring criminal compoundable matters to Lok Adalats, leaving a successful complainant with a hollow settlement and no efficient remedy. The decision is significant because cheque-bounce complaints form a large share of the matters disposed of in Lok Adalats across Kerala and elsewhere; treating those awards as executable civil decrees gives the settlement real teeth and spares the complainant the cost and delay of a separate recovery suit. The award is executed by the civil court that would have had jurisdiction, and the decree-holder enjoys the full range of execution remedies under Order XXI CPC.
Refund of court fee on settlement
A further consequence built into Section 21 itself benefits the parties financially. The proviso to Section 21(1) provides that where a case referred to the Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) is settled by an award, the court fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870. This is a deliberate incentive: a litigant who compromises before a Lok Adalat recovers the fee paid on the plaint or appeal. The provision underscores that the statutory scheme rewards consensual closure, and it sits alongside the broader access-to-justice objects of the Act discussed in Introduction, Constitution and Object.
The only door left open: Articles 226 and 227
Section 21(2) bars appeal but does not, and cannot, oust the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court. The reconciliation came in Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy (2018) 13 SCC 480, where the Court held that an award made on a settlement duly signed by the parties is final, binding and executable as a civil decree, and that a party wishing to challenge it can do so only by a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution — and that too on very limited grounds. Importantly, the Court ruled that a separate civil suit to set aside such an award is not maintainable, and a plaint seeking that relief is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC. The award's finality is thus near-absolute: the supervisory writ jurisdiction is the sole avenue, confined to jurisdictional error, fraud, or the absence of a genuine settlement.
What the writ court will and will not examine
Read together, the cases mark out narrow grounds. A writ court will interfere where the very foundation of the award is missing — no consent, a settlement procured by fraud or misrepresentation, lack of jurisdiction, or an “award” passed on merits in defiance of Jalour Singh. It will not, however, sit in appeal over the fairness or adequacy of terms the parties themselves accepted. In P.T. Thomas the Court underscored that the correctness of the award on the merits cannot be reagitated even under Article 226. The dividing line is between attacking the existence or validity of consent (permissible) and attacking the bargain struck (impermissible). This keeps the writ remedy a safety valve rather than a substitute appeal. A party alleging that the settlement was obtained by fraud, coercion or misrepresentation must establish that vitiating factor; mere dissatisfaction with the outcome, or a belated claim that the terms were improvident, will not do. Equally, a contention that one of the signatories lacked authority, or that the matter referred fell outside the Lok Adalat's competence, goes to the root of consent or jurisdiction and is therefore within the writ court's purview. The High Court, exercising supervisory rather than appellate power, asks not whether the award is right but whether it lawfully came into existence. This narrow framing protects the finality that Section 21(2) confers while preserving a constitutional check against awards that are, in truth, no awards at all.
Permanent Lok Adalat awards: a different finality
The effect of awards by Permanent Lok Adalats, established under Chapter VI-A (Sections 22A to 22E) for disputes over public utility services, differs in a crucial respect. Under Section 22C(8), if the parties fail to reach agreement, the Permanent Lok Adalat may decide the dispute on merits — an adjudicatory power the ordinary Lok Adalat lacks. Section 22E then provides that every such award, made either on merit or in terms of a settlement, shall be final and binding on all parties and persons claiming under them, shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court, and shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. The contrast is sharp: an ordinary award derives its force from consent, whereas a Permanent Lok Adalat award can bind even where one side never agreed. The detail of this forum is taken up in Permanent Lok Adalats for Public Utility.
Limits on the binding reach of an award
The decree-like effect, strong as it is, is not boundless. An award binds only the parties to the dispute and those claiming under them; it cannot conclude the rights of strangers who were never before the Lok Adalat. Consistent with Jalour Singh, an award that travels beyond the matter referred, or that purports to settle something to which a party did not in fact consent, can be impugned for want of jurisdiction or consent. The deeming fiction in Section 21 elevates a valid award to the status of a decree, but it cannot manufacture validity where the statutory pre-conditions — a real reference and a genuine settlement — are absent. The effect, in short, is as wide as the consent that underlies it and no wider.
Putting it together
For the aspirant, three propositions capture the effect of Lok Adalat awards. First, an award under Section 21 is a deemed civil decree — final, binding, non-appealable and directly executable (P.T. Thomas; K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon). Second, that effect attaches only to a genuine consensual settlement; an “award” on merits is void (Jalour Singh). Third, the sole challenge is a tightly confined writ under Articles 226/227, not a civil suit (Bhargavi Constructions). The Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22E stands apart, its awards binding even on merits. Read alongside the Kerala State Legal Services Authorities Act hub, these rules show why the Lok Adalat is the Act's most potent instrument of speedy, conclusive justice.
Frequently asked questions
Is a Lok Adalat award appealable?
No. Section 21(2) of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 makes every award final and binding and provides that no appeal shall lie to any court against it. Because the award merely records the parties' own settlement, there is nothing on merits for an appellate court to review, as confirmed in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job (2005) 6 SCC 478.
Can a Lok Adalat award be executed without filing a fresh suit?
Yes. Under Section 21(1) the award is deemed to be a decree of a civil court, so it is enforced directly through execution under the CPC. In K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012) 2 SCC 51, the Supreme Court held that even an award arising from a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act complaint is executable as a civil decree.
Can a Lok Adalat decide a case on merits?
An ordinary Lok Adalat cannot. State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh (2008) 2 SCC 660 held that it makes a non-adjudicatory determination based on compromise only; if there is no settlement the record returns to the referring court. An award passed on merits without consent is void. A Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22C(8), however, may decide public-utility disputes on merits.
How can a Lok Adalat award be challenged at all?
Only by a writ petition under Article 226 and/or Article 227 of the Constitution, on very limited grounds. Bhargavi Constructions v. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy (2018) 13 SCC 480 held that a separate civil suit to set aside an award is not maintainable and such a plaint may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC.
Is court fee refunded if a case is settled in a Lok Adalat?
Yes. The proviso to Section 21(1) provides that where a case referred under Section 20(1) is settled, the court fee paid is refunded in the manner provided under the Court-fees Act, 1870. This is a deliberate incentive to encourage consensual resolution.
How does a Permanent Lok Adalat award differ in effect?
Under Section 22E, an award of a Permanent Lok Adalat — made either on merit or on settlement — is final, binding, deemed a decree of a civil court, and cannot be questioned in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Crucially, because Section 22C(8) permits decision on merits, such an award can bind a party even without consent, unlike an ordinary Lok Adalat award.