Permanent Lok Adalats for Public Utility Services (Sections 22A–22E)

Of all the institutions created by the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, the Permanent Lok Adalat is the most paradoxical. It carries the conciliatory DNA of the ordinary Lok Adalat, yet, unlike its parent, it can impose a binding decision on the parties even where they refuse to settle. Inserted by the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002, Chapter VI-A (Sections 22A to 22E) created a permanent, pre-litigation forum for disputes touching public utility services such as transport, power, water, telecom, postal, hospital and insurance services. This chapter explains the definitions, the pecuniary and subject-matter limits, the mandatory conciliation-first procedure, the adjudicatory power that survives a failed settlement, and the constitutional battle the institution survived in Bar Council of India v. Union of India.

Why a Permanent Lok Adalat? The 2002 amendment and its object

The ordinary Lok Adalat under Section 19 suffers from one structural weakness: it can only record a settlement. If even one party walks away, the matter returns to the regular court and the parties are back to square one. For mass, recurring, low-value grievances against public utilities, electricity bills, insurance repudiations, water and telephone disputes, this revolving door defeated the very purpose of speedy justice.

To plug this gap, Parliament enacted the Legal Services Authorities (Amendment) Act, 2002 (Act 37 of 2002), with effect from 11 June 2002, inserting a new Chapter VI-A titled "Pre-Litigation Conciliation and Settlement". The Statement of Objects and Reasons recorded that the existing Lok Adalat system was failing public utility consumers because settlement was wholly dependent on the consent of both sides. The new forum was designed to be permanent (continuously functioning, not an occasional camp), pre-litigation (engaged before the dispute reaches a court), and crucially adjudicatory as a last resort, so that the absence of consent could not stall relief.

The object is rooted in the constitutional mandate explored in our chapter on the constitutional foundations of legal services: Article 39A's promise of access to justice and equal opportunity. The Permanent Lok Adalat operationalises that promise for a specific, high-volume category of disputes where the citizen typically faces a far more powerful institutional adversary.

Section 22A: 'Permanent Lok Adalat' and 'public utility service' defined

Section 22A is the gateway to the entire chapter. It opens with the words "In this Chapter and for the purposes of sections 22 and 23, unless the context otherwise requires", and supplies two definitions that control everything that follows.

First, clause (a) defines a Permanent Lok Adalat simply as a Permanent Lok Adalat established under sub-section (1) of Section 22B. Second, and far more consequentially, clause (b) defines "public utility service". The definition is an inclusive one and covers: (i) transport service for the carriage of passengers or goods by air, road or water; (ii) postal, telegraph or telephone service; (iii) supply of power, light or water to the public by any establishment; (iv) system of public conservancy or sanitation; (v) service in hospital or dispensary; and (vi) insurance service. To these six enumerated heads, the definition adds a residuary power: the Central or the State Government may, in the public interest, by notification, declare any other service to be a public utility service for the purposes of the chapter.

Two features of this definition deserve emphasis for the exam. The word "includes" makes the list expansive rather than exhaustive, and the residuary notification power lets governments bring new services, for example, broadband or mobile data, within the net without further legislation. The inclusion of insurance service has proved the single most litigated head, because insurance repudiations are exactly the kind of recurring, document-heavy, consumer-versus-institution dispute the forum was built for.

Section 22B: Establishment and composition of the forum

Section 22B(1) empowers the Central Authority (NALSA) or, as the case may be, every State Authority (SLSA), by notification, to establish Permanent Lok Adalats at such places, for exercising jurisdiction in respect of one or more public utility services, and for such areas, as may be specified in the notification. The architecture therefore dovetails with the tiered structure described in our chapter on the constitution of NALSA, SLSA, DLSA and TLSC: it is the central and State legal services authorities, not the district authorities, that establish and staff these forums.

Section 22B(2) prescribes a three-member composition that is the institution's defining structural feature. The Permanent Lok Adalat shall consist of: (a) a Chairman who is, or has been, a district judge or additional district judge, or has held judicial office higher in rank than that of a district judge; and (b) two other persons having adequate experience in public utility service, to be nominated by the Central Government or the State Government (on the recommendation of the Central or State Authority).

This composition is deliberate. The judicial Chairman supplies the legal rigour and impartiality necessary for a body that can decide on merits, while the two domain-expert members supply technical familiarity with the utility sector at issue, a crucial difference from the ordinary Lok Adalat, whose members are drawn more flexibly. The terms, qualifications and conditions of service of the members are prescribed by the Central Government by rules. In InterGlobe Aviation Ltd. v. N. Satchidanand, (2011) 7 SCC 463, the Supreme Court expressly anchored the forum's jurisdiction in Section 22B(1), noting that a Permanent Lok Adalat is established to exercise jurisdiction in respect of public utility services and discharges both conciliatory and adjudicatory functions.

Section 22C(1): Pre-litigation jurisdiction and the pecuniary ceiling

Section 22C is the operative heart of the chapter. Sub-section (1) provides that any party to a dispute may, before the dispute is brought before any court, make an application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for the settlement of the dispute. The phrase "before the dispute is brought before any court" is jurisdictionally decisive: the forum is a strictly pre-litigation mechanism. Once a suit on the same dispute has been instituted in a court, the Permanent Lok Adalat is ousted. The corollary in Section 22C(2) reinforces this: after an application is made to the Permanent Lok Adalat, no party to that application shall invoke the jurisdiction of any court in the same dispute.

The first proviso to Section 22C(1) carves out a subject-matter exclusion: the Permanent Lok Adalat shall not have jurisdiction in respect of any matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. Criminal liability is thus kept outside its reach.

The second proviso imposes a pecuniary ceiling: the forum shall have no jurisdiction where the value of the property in dispute exceeds ten lakh rupees. Importantly, the proviso simultaneously confers a power on the Central Government to increase this limit by notification, in consultation with the Central Authority, from time to time. Aspirants should state the statutory figure as ten lakh rupees while noting that the cap is upwardly revisable by executive notification, which is why coaching material occasionally cites a higher figure following a notification. Always cite the bare provision's ten-lakh baseline unless a specific later notification is in issue.

Insurance, transport and the contours of 'public utility service'

Because the definition in Section 22A(b) expressly includes insurance service, the bulk of Permanent Lok Adalat litigation concerns repudiated or short-paid insurance claims. The High Courts have consistently affirmed that such disputes fall squarely within jurisdiction provided they do not relate to an offence. In a 2024 decision, the Jharkhand High Court (per Navneet Kumar J.) reiterated that a Permanent Lok Adalat "has the right to decide the dispute which could not be settled by a settlement agreement between the parties and the dispute does not relate to any offence", confirming that insurance claims, as a public utility service, are within the forum's competence.

The transport head was tested in InterGlobe Aviation Ltd. v. N. Satchidanand, (2011) 7 SCC 463, arising from a fog-delayed IndiGo flight from Delhi to Hyderabad. The passengers approached the Permanent Lok Adalat, which awarded compensation. The Supreme Court, while accepting that air transport is a public utility service within the forum's jurisdiction, set aside the compensation on the merits, holding that neither consumer fora nor Permanent Lok Adalats can award compensation merely out of sympathy or because the passenger suffered inconvenience; there must be a real cause of action, that is, deficiency in service or negligence. The case is doubly instructive: it confirms transport disputes as jurisdictionally proper, yet disciplines the forum to award relief only on legally cognisable grounds.

Section 22C(3) to (7): The mandatory conciliation stage

Once an application is admitted, Sections 22C(3) to (7) prescribe a structured conciliation process that the forum must traverse before it can even contemplate adjudication. Section 22C(3) requires each party to file the documents and statements supporting its claim or defence. Under Section 22C(4), the Permanent Lok Adalat directs the parties to file additional statements as it deems necessary, and under Section 22C(5) it communicates each party's statements and documents to the other to ensure transparency.

Section 22C(6) then casts the central duty: the Permanent Lok Adalat shall conduct conciliation proceedings between the parties, taking into account the circumstances of the dispute and assisting them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement. Section 22C(7) provides that if, during conciliation, the forum perceives elements of a settlement acceptable to the parties, it shall formulate the terms of a possible settlement, submit them to the parties for observations, reformulate them in light of those observations, and, if the parties reach agreement, pass an award in terms of the settlement.

Sub-sections (6) and (7) also impose a reciprocal duty of good faith: the parties are bound to cooperate in good faith with the Permanent Lok Adalat in its conciliation effort. This conciliatory phase is not a formality; as the next section explains, the Supreme Court has held it to be a mandatory precondition to any decision on merits.

Section 22C(8): The power to decide on merits when conciliation fails

This is the provision that distinguishes the Permanent Lok Adalat from every other Lok Adalat under the Act. Section 22C(8) provides that where the parties fail to reach an agreement under sub-section (7), the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, if the dispute does not relate to any offence, decide the dispute. In other words, a failed conciliation does not send the matter back to court; instead the forum's role mutates from conciliator to adjudicator, and it renders a reasoned decision binding on the parties.

Contrast this with the ordinary Lok Adalat. In State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 660, the Supreme Court held that an ordinary Lok Adalat "does not contemplate nor require an adjudicatory judicial determination, but a non-adjudicatory determination based on a compromise or settlement". An ordinary Lok Adalat award is merely the administrative act of recording the parties' compromise; it has no independent verdict of its own. The Permanent Lok Adalat is the precise opposite at the failed-settlement stage, it delivers an independent verdict. This conceptual divergence is the single most examinable point in this chapter and connects directly to our treatment of the effect of Lok Adalat awards.

Conciliation is mandatory: Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama

The adjudicatory power under Section 22C(8) is not a shortcut that lets the forum skip conciliation. The Supreme Court settled this definitively in Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama, 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 499, decided on 19 May 2022 by a Bench of D.Y. Chandrachud and P.S. Narasimha, JJ. The Court held that the conciliation proceedings contemplated by Section 22C are mandatory in nature: a Permanent Lok Adalat may decide a dispute on merits only after it has first conducted, and exhausted, the conciliation stage prescribed by sub-sections (6) and (7).

The Court reasoned that the statutory scheme makes conciliation the rule and adjudication the exception, available only "where the parties fail to reach an agreement". A Permanent Lok Adalat that proceeds straight to a merits decision without genuinely attempting conciliation acts beyond its jurisdiction, and such an award is liable to be set aside. Significantly, the Court clarified that even the non-participation or absence of a party does not dispense with the forum's obligation to attempt conciliation. Canara Bank is therefore the authority for the proposition that the two stages, conciliation then, only on its failure, adjudication, are sequential and non-negotiable.

Section 22D: Procedure free of the CPC and Evidence Act

Section 22D governs how the Permanent Lok Adalat conducts itself in both its conciliatory and its adjudicatory roles. It provides that the Permanent Lok Adalat shall, while conducting conciliation proceedings or deciding a dispute on merit under the Act, be guided by the principles of natural justice, objectivity, fair play, equity and other principles of justice, and shall not be bound by the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

This freedom from the procedural and evidentiary codes is what makes the forum quick and accessible, but it was also the precise target of the constitutional challenge discussed below. The drafting answer is the express anchoring to natural justice: the forum is unshackled from technical procedure yet bound by substantive fairness. The judicial qualification of the Chairman under Section 22B(2) is the structural guarantee that this fairness is real. For the student, the formula to remember is: no CPC, no Evidence Act, but yes to natural justice, objectivity, fair play and equity.

Section 22E: Finality, decree status and the bar on civil challenge

Section 22E confers on the forum's awards the strongest possible finality. Sub-section (1) provides that every award of the Permanent Lok Adalat under the Act, made either on merit or in terms of a settlement agreement, shall be final and binding on all the parties thereto and on persons claiming under them. Sub-section (2) deems every such award to be a decree of a civil court. Sub-section (3) declares the award final and provides that it shall not be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. Sub-section (4) permits the forum to transmit the award to a civil court of local jurisdiction for execution as a decree.

The combined effect, as our chapter on the effect of Lok Adalat awards explains in detail, is that no statutory appeal lies against a Permanent Lok Adalat award. The executing court cannot reopen the merits; its role is confined to execution. The only avenue to assail an award, whether for jurisdictional excess, breach of natural justice, fraud, or a decision rendered without the mandatory conciliation stage, is the High Court's constitutional jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that this supervisory, not appellate, route is the sole permissible challenge.

Constitutional validity: Bar Council of India v. Union of India

The institution's adjudicatory power was frontally challenged in Bar Council of India v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 243. The Bar Council argued that Sections 22A to 22E were arbitrary and violative of Article 14, contrary to the rule of law and the separation of powers, because the Permanent Lok Adalat could (i) decide disputes on merits without the parties' consent, (ii) render awards that were final, binding and non-appealable, and (iii) do so without being bound by the CPC or the Evidence Act, all before a forum that included non-judicial members.

The Supreme Court, speaking through R.M. Lodha, J., upheld the constitutional validity of the entire scheme and dismissed the petition. The Court reasoned that there is no constitutional principle requiring that every dispute be adjudicated only by traditional courts; Parliament is competent to create effective alternative dispute-settlement mechanisms, and the Constitution itself contemplates such bodies through Articles 39A, 323A and 323B. The merits-deciding power was held to be neither arbitrary nor an impermissible delegation, because it is exercised by a forum chaired by a judicial officer, confined to a narrow, well-defined class of public utility disputes below a pecuniary ceiling, governed by natural justice under Section 22D, and supervised by the High Court under Articles 226 and 227. The absence of a statutory appeal did not render the scheme unconstitutional, since the availability of the High Court's writ and supervisory jurisdiction was an adequate safeguard.

Permanent Lok Adalat vs. ordinary Lok Adalat: a comparison

Examiners frequently ask candidates to distinguish the two institutions, so the contrasts are worth consolidating. Source of power: the ordinary Lok Adalat is constituted under Section 19 within Chapter VI; the Permanent Lok Adalat under Section 22B within Chapter VI-A. Nature: the ordinary Lok Adalat is purely conciliatory, while the Permanent Lok Adalat is conciliatory-cum-adjudicatory, what InterGlobe Aviation described as a hybrid forum. Consent: an ordinary Lok Adalat can only record a settlement the parties freely reach (State of Punjab v. Jalour Singh); a Permanent Lok Adalat can decide on merits even without consent (Section 22C(8)).

Further: Subject-matter: the ordinary Lok Adalat can take up any compoundable civil or criminal matter referred to it; the Permanent Lok Adalat is confined to public utility services below ten lakh rupees and never to non-compoundable offences. Stage: the Permanent Lok Adalat is strictly pre-litigation, whereas an ordinary Lok Adalat can take up cases both pre-litigation and those already pending in court on reference. Failure of settlement: if conciliation fails before an ordinary Lok Adalat, the case returns to court; before a Permanent Lok Adalat, the forum itself decides. The functional landscape of all these bodies is mapped further in our chapter on the functions of legal services authorities at each level.

Remedies against a Permanent Lok Adalat award

Given the bar in Section 22E(3), the aggrieved party's options are narrow but not non-existent. No first appeal, no second appeal and no revision lies, because the award is deemed a civil-court decree but is simultaneously declared not liable to be called in question in any original suit, application or execution proceeding. The executing court, when the award is transmitted under Section 22E(4), is confined to execution and cannot sit in judgment over the award's validity or merits.

The sole surviving remedy is a writ petition under Article 226 or a supervisory petition under Article 227 before the High Court. This is the safety valve the Supreme Court relied on in Bar Council of India to sustain the scheme. The grounds on which a writ court will interfere are correspondingly limited: want of jurisdiction (for example, a dispute exceeding the pecuniary cap, or one already pending in court, or relating to a non-compoundable offence), violation of natural justice, an award rendered without the mandatory conciliation stage required by Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama, or an award vitiated by fraud or perversity. The High Court exercises supervisory, not appellate, jurisdiction; it will not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own view on the merits.

Practical significance and exam takeaways

For the practitioner, the Permanent Lok Adalat is a powerful but jurisdictionally fragile forum: powerful because it delivers a binding, decree-like award without the cost and delay of a suit; fragile because any deviation from its statutory limits, the pecuniary cap, the pre-litigation requirement, the offence exclusion, or the mandatory conciliation stage, exposes the award to being quashed under Article 226 or 227.

For the exam, fix five anchors in memory. One: Chapter VI-A, Sections 22A to 22E, inserted by Act 37 of 2002 with effect from 11 June 2002. Two: jurisdiction is over public utility services (transport, postal/telegraph/telephone, power/light/water, conservancy/sanitation, hospital/dispensary, insurance) below ten lakh rupees, excluding non-compoundable offences, and only pre-litigation. Three: conciliation first, mandatorily (Canara Bank v. G.S. Jayarama, 2022); merits only on failure (Section 22C(8)). Four: awards are final, binding and decree-equivalent (Section 22E), challengeable only under Articles 226/227. Five: the whole scheme is constitutional (Bar Council of India v. Union of India, (2012) 8 SCC 243). Hold these alongside the broader entitlement framework in our chapter on persons entitled to free legal services and you have the chapter's full architecture.