Computation of Period of Limitation — Inclusion and Exclusion of Time (Sections 12–24) →

Sections 12 to 24 of the Limitation Act, 1963 form the machinery that converts the bare “period of limitation” prescribed in the Schedule into the actual “prescribed period” within which a litigant must move. Section 2(j) draws this distinction precisely: the period of limitation is the figure in the third column of the Schedule, while the prescribed period is that figure computed in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The provisions that do the computing are these thirteen sections. Some exclude time at the front end — the day the cause of action arose, the days spent obtaining a copy, the days a stay was in force. Others postpone the very starting point — death before the right accrues, fraud that conceals the cause of action, an acknowledgment that restarts the clock. Together they answer the practical question every advocate faces: counting from when, and leaving out what?

This chapter follows the sections in order. It situates them against the foundations laid in our note on the scheme and object of the Act and the operation of the bar of limitation under Section 3, and it pays particular attention to the two provisions examiners return to most often — Section 12 on the exclusion of the day and the time requisite for copies, and Section 14 on the exclusion of time spent prosecuting bona fide proceedings in a court without jurisdiction. Every case named below has been checked against the law reports.

The scheme of Sections 12 to 24

Section 3 commands the court to dismiss any suit, appeal or application made after the prescribed period, even where limitation is not pleaded as a defence. But Section 3 itself opens with the words “Subject to the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24”. Those provisions are therefore not exceptions grafted on as an afterthought; they are an integral part of the calculation that decides whether the bar in Section 3 has been crossed at all. Sections 12 to 24 fall into two broad groups. The first — Sections 12 to 15 — deals with the exclusion of identifiable stretches of time from a period that has already begun to run. The second — Sections 16 to 21 — deals with the events that determine, or postpone, the moment from which time begins. Sections 22 to 24 round off the machinery with continuing wrongs, suits requiring special damage, and the calendar reference for instruments.

One structural point governs the whole group. The Limitation Act bars the remedy without extinguishing the right, the sole exception being Section 27. Sections 12 to 24 operate purely on the remedy side: they lengthen or shorten the window in which the court may be approached, but they create no new substantive cause of action. They must therefore be construed strictly — a litigant claiming the benefit of an exclusion must bring the case squarely within the words of the section — yet, where the section is plainly attracted, the exclusion is a matter of right and not of discretion.

Section 12 — exclusion of the day and time requisite

Section 12 contains the first and most universally applied rule of computation. Sub-section (1) provides that in computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which the period is to be reckoned shall be excluded. This is the familiar “exclude the first day” rule. A suit for recovery of money on a promissory note executed on 12 April 2000, where the limitation is three years, must be filed on or before 12 April 2003, because 12 April 2000 — the date of execution from which time runs — is itself excluded. If 12 to 15 April 2003 are court holidays, Section 4 carries the filing over to the next open day, 16 April 2003, without any breach of limitation.

Sub-sections (2) to (4) add further exclusions for appellate and review proceedings. In computing limitation for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal, revision or review, two further stretches drop out: the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from. Sub-section (3) extends the exclusion to the time requisite for a copy of the judgment on which the decree is founded, and sub-section (4) to the time requisite for a copy of an award where the application is to set it aside. The result is that, for a suit, only the starting day is excluded, whereas for an appeal both the day of pronouncement and the copying time fall out of the reckoning.

Section 12(2) and the meaning of “time requisite”

The most litigated phrase in the section is “time requisite for obtaining a copy”. The leading authority is State of Uttar Pradesh v. Maharaj Narain, AIR 1968 SC 960, where the State had filed an appeal against acquittal and the dispute was whether the copying time should be measured against the copy actually filed or against an earlier copy that had been ready sooner. The Supreme Court held that “time requisite” means the time actually and reasonably occupied — the time beyond the party’s control — in obtaining the copy that is in fact filed with the memorandum of appeal, and not an ideal lesser period that might have been taken had the application been made on some other date. The party is not obliged to apply for the copy the moment the judgment is pronounced; it may apply at any time within the limitation period and still exclude the whole of the subsequent copying time.

The Explanation to Section 12 supplies the necessary qualification. In computing the time requisite, any time taken by the court to prepare the decree or order before an application for a copy is made shall not be excluded. There is usually an interval between the delivery of judgment and the signing of the decree; that interval is excluded only to the extent it falls after the copy application, never before it. The corollary is equally settled: delay caused by the party’s own carelessness — failing to apply, or failing to pay the copying charges — is not “requisite” and cannot be excluded. The section protects the diligent litigant against the delays of the registry, not the indolent one against his own.

Section 13 — pauper applications

Section 13 deals with the litigant who, lacking the means to pay court-fees, applies for leave to sue or appeal as a pauper (now an indigent person under Order XXXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure). Where such an application is made and then rejected, the time during which the applicant was prosecuting in good faith the application for leave is excluded in computing limitation for the suit or appeal. The court may, on payment of the proper court-fees, treat the suit or appeal as having the same force and effect as if the fees had been paid in the first instance. The provision recognises that a genuine but unsuccessful attempt to litigate as an indigent person should not by itself destroy the claim; the time honestly spent in that attempt is not held against the litigant.

Section 14 — bona fide proceedings without jurisdiction

Section 14 is the most important exclusion provision and a perennial examination favourite. Its policy is to protect a litigant who, in good faith, pursues a claim in a forum that turns out to be incompetent, so that the time so spent does not count against him when he files afresh in the correct forum. Sub-section (1) covers suits; sub-section (2) covers applications; sub-section (3), read with Order XXIII Rule 1 of the Code, extends the protection to a fresh suit instituted after permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail for a jurisdictional defect.

The Explanation clarifies three points: in excluding the period of the earlier proceeding, both the day it was instituted and the day it ended are counted; a plaintiff or applicant resisting an appeal is deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; and misjoinder of parties or of causes of action is a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction. “Good faith” is defined in Section 2(7): nothing is done in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. A litigant guilty of negligence, lapse or inaction cannot take shelter under the section; if the initial filing in the wrong forum was itself careless, the subsequent prosecution cannot be said to have been in good faith.

The five conditions — the Consolidated Engineering test

The settled checklist comes from Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169. Analysing Section 14, the Supreme Court laid down five conditions that must be satisfied before the section can be pressed into service: first, both the prior and subsequent proceedings must be civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; second, the prior proceeding must have been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; third, its failure must have been due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature; fourth, the earlier and the later proceedings must relate to the same matter in issue; and fifth, both proceedings must be in a court. The Court emphasised that the provision is designed to relieve against the bar of limitation in cases of a mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum, and that its equity should be applied to the fullest extent — the section is to be read to advance the cause of justice rather than to abort proceedings. On that reasoning the Court held that the principle of Section 14 applies to an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 to set aside an award.

The “same matter in issue” requirement does real work. In Commissioner, M.P. Housing Board v. Mohanlal and Company, decided on 19 July 2016, the Supreme Court held that an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration Act for appointment of an arbitrator and an objection to the award under Section 34 are not the same matter in issue — one lies at the stage of initiation, the other at the stage of culmination — so the time spent on the former cannot be excluded under Section 14 when the latter is filed late. The Court added that although Section 14 is to be construed liberally, where the facts disclose an absence of good faith of great magnitude the section will not come to the rescue of the litigant. Section 14 has no application to criminal proceedings.

Section 14 distinguished from Section 5

Section 14 must not be confused with Section 5. Section 5 confers a discretion to condone delay in an appeal or application on proof of sufficient cause; Section 14 mandates the exclusion of a defined period, leaving the court no discretion once the conditions are met. By its own terms Section 14 applies to suits and applications, not to appeals. But the wall between the two provisions is not absolute. In J. Kumaradasan Nair v. IRIC Sohan, (2009) 12 SCC 175, the Supreme Court held that although Section 14 does not in terms apply to appeals or revisions, the principle underlying it — that a litigant honestly pursuing a remedy in a wrong forum should not be penalised — can be invoked to make out sufficient cause under Section 5. So the time spent bona fide before an incompetent forum may be excluded outright under Section 14 where the later proceeding is a suit or application, or treated as sufficient cause for condonation under Section 5 where it is an appeal or revision.

Section 15 — other statutory exclusions

Section 15 collects five further situations in which time is excluded. Sub-section (1) excludes the time during which the institution of a suit or the execution of a decree has been stayed by an injunction or order, counting both the day the stay was issued and the day it was withdrawn. Sub-section (2) excludes the period of any statutory notice — most importantly the two months’ notice to the Government under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure — or the time required to obtain a sanction or consent that the law requires before suing; the Explanation directs that both the date of application for, and the date of receipt of, the sanction be counted. Sub-section (3) gives a receiver or liquidator appointed in insolvency or winding-up proceedings the exclusion of the period from the institution of the proceeding up to three months after his appointment, recognising that he needs time to acquaint himself with the estate before he can sue. Sub-section (4) excludes, in a suit for possession by an auction-purchaser, the time during which a proceeding to set aside the sale was prosecuted. Sub-section (5) excludes the time during which the defendant has been absent from India.

Sub-section (5) was tested in Turner Morrison & Co. Ltd. v. Hungerford Investment Trust Ltd., AIR 1972 SC 1311. The plaintiff sought to save limitation on the footing that the defendant, a foreign investment company, had been “absent from India”. The Supreme Court held that an incorporated company must be taken to reside wherever it carries on its activities, and that Hungerford — whose board met in India from time to time and which attended, through its representatives, the general meetings of the Indian company in which it had invested — was present in India and not absent from it. Section 15(5) therefore gave no assistance, and the claim was barred.

Section 16 — effect of death before the right accrues

Section 16 addresses death occurring before the right to sue accrues. Where a person who would have had a right to sue, or against whom a right would have accrued, dies before the right accrues, or where the right accrues only on the death of a person, limitation is computed from the time there is a legal representative capable of suing or of being sued. The provision is carefully confined: it applies only where death precedes the accrual of the cause of action. If the right accrues during the lifetime of the deceased, time begins to run at once and Section 16 has no role — the existence or non-existence of a legal representative is then irrelevant. By sub-section (3), the section does not apply to suits to enforce rights of pre-emption, or to suits for possession of immovable property or of a hereditary office.

Section 17 — fraud, mistake and concealed documents

Section 17 postpones the running of time where the litigant has been kept in ignorance of his cause of action by fraud or mistake. It applies in four situations: where the suit or application is based on the fraud of the defendant; where knowledge of the right or title is concealed by such fraud; where the relief sought is from the consequences of a mistake; and where a document necessary to establish the right has been fraudulently concealed. In each, limitation does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered the fraud or mistake, or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it — or, for a concealed document, until he first had the means of producing or compelling its production. The proviso protects an innocent purchaser for value who was not party to the fraud, mistake or concealment and had no reason to believe in it. A separate limb, sub-section (2), allows the court to extend time for executing a decree where a judgment-debtor has by fraud or force prevented execution.

The section was examined in Pallav Sheth v. Custodian, (2001) 7 SCC 549, where the Supreme Court explained that it embodies the principle that a party should not be penalised for failing to litigate when the facts necessary to do so were wilfully concealed, and equally that a party who has acted fraudulently should not gain the benefit of limitation running in his favour by virtue of that fraud. The section was further refined in P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, where the Court held that Section 17 does not cover every kind of fraud: clauses (b) and (d) reach only fraudulent conduct or concealment that has the effect of suppressing the knowledge that would entitle a party to pursue its remedy. Once a party becomes aware of the antecedent facts needed to bring the proceeding, limitation commences. The burden of proving fraud lies on the party alleging it, and the court will not infer it from mere suspicion. Section 17 does not apply to criminal cases.

Section 18 — acknowledgment in writing

Section 18 allows a fresh period of limitation to be earned by an acknowledgment of liability. Where, before the expiry of the prescribed period, an acknowledgment of liability in respect of any property or right is made in writing and signed by the party against whom the property or right is claimed (or by a person through whom he derives title or liability), a fresh period of limitation is computed from the time the acknowledgment was signed. The Explanation makes the requirement generous: the acknowledgment may omit the exact nature of the right, may aver that the time for payment has not yet come, may be coupled with a refusal to pay or a claim to set-off, and may even be addressed to a stranger; “signed” includes signature by a duly authorised agent; and an application for execution of a decree is not an acknowledgment in respect of property or right.

Two conditions are essential. First, the acknowledgment need not contain or amount to a promise to pay — it is enough that it admits a subsisting jural relationship of, say, debtor and creditor, with an intention to continue it until lawfully determined; the point was settled long ago in Subbaraya v. Narasimha, AIR 1936 Mad 939. Second, and critically, the acknowledgment must be made before the original period has expired. An acknowledgment of a liability that is already time-barred is worthless; Section 18 extends a living limitation, it does not resurrect a dead one. An acknowledgment without a signature is no acknowledgment; an unregistered document that ought to have been registered may still be used for the collateral purpose of proving the acknowledgment. The section does not apply to applications for the execution of a decree, so a decree must be executed within twelve years of becoming executable regardless of any acknowledgment.

Sections 19 and 20 — payment and acknowledgment by another

Section 19 produces the same effect as Section 18 but through part-payment rather than written admission. Where payment on account of a debt or of interest on a legacy is made before the expiry of the prescribed period by the person liable or his authorised agent, a fresh period of limitation runs from the date of payment — provided that an acknowledgment of the payment appears in the handwriting of, or in a writing signed by, the person making it. The two requirements are distinct in timing: the payment must be made within the period of limitation, but the writing evidencing it need only exist before the suit is filed. The writing is the prescribed and only mode of proving the payment that saves limitation.

Section 20 is explanatory of Sections 18 and 19. It clarifies that “agent duly authorised” includes, for a person under disability, his lawful guardian, committee or manager; that one of several joint contractors, partners, executors or mortgagees is not bound merely because another of them has signed an acknowledgment or made a payment; and that, for a Hindu undivided family, an acknowledgment or payment by the manager binds the whole family. The word “chargeable” in the section covers every kind of chargeability, including liability in respect of property, and is not confined to personal liability. Section 20 creates no exception to Sections 18 and 19; it simply identifies who can validly acknowledge or pay on another’s behalf.

Section 21 — adding or substituting parties

Section 21 fixes the date of institution where a new plaintiff or defendant is added or substituted after the suit has begun. The general rule in sub-section (1) is that, as regards the newly added party, the suit is deemed to have been instituted only when he was made a party — so limitation is tested against that later date and his claim may be barred even though the original plaintiffs sued in time. The proviso relaxes this where the court is satisfied that the omission to include the new party was due to a mistake made in good faith; the court may then direct that, as regards that party, the suit be deemed instituted on an earlier date. Sub-section (2) takes out of the rule the case where a party is added or substituted owing to assignment or devolution of interest during the pendency of the suit, or where a plaintiff is made a defendant or vice versa. In practice Section 21 must be read with Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code: it governs the addition of a necessary party, but has no application to the addition of a merely proper party.

Sections 22 to 24 — continuing wrongs, special damage and instruments

Section 22 provides that, in the case of a continuing breach of contract or a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort continues. The provision turns on the distinction between a wrong that is complete once and for all — where the mere continuance of the resulting damage does not extend limitation — and a wrong that subsists from day to day, giving a fresh cause of action de die in diem. The leading authority is Balkrishna Savalram Pujari v. Shree Dnyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, AIR 1959 SC 798, where the Supreme Court drew the line precisely: the ouster of the hereditary worshippers was a wrong complete on the date it occurred and was not a continuing wrong, whereas a subsisting interference with a continuing right would be. The same idea explains why an infringement of a trade mark is treated as a continuing wrong: in Bengal Waterproof Ltd. v. Bombay Waterproof Mfg. Co., AIR 1997 SC 1398, the Court held that a fresh suit for acts of infringement and passing off committed after an earlier suit is not barred, because each fresh act of infringement furnishes a fresh cause of action.

Section 23 deals with suits for compensation for an act which does not give rise to a cause of action unless and until some specific injury actually results: there, limitation is computed from the time the injury results, not from the date of the act. The plaintiff must establish that a specific legal injury — an injury that can be pointed to and proved — has in fact occurred; the section applies to suits founded on both tort and contract. Section 24 closes the group with a rule of construction: all instruments are, for the purposes of the Act, deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian calendar, so that any period mentioned in an instrument is measured by that calendar regardless of any other reckoning the parties might privately have intended.

Exam takeaways

Four distinctions recur in objective papers. First, Section 12: for a suit only the first day is excluded under sub-section (1); for an appeal the day of pronouncement and the time requisite for the copy are also excluded under sub-section (2) — and “time requisite” is the actual reasonable time taken, per Maharaj Narain, not an ideal lesser period. Second, Section 14 versus Section 5: exclusion under Section 14 is mandatory and confined to suits and applications, while condonation under Section 5 is discretionary and confined to appeals and applications; the principle of Section 14 can nonetheless support sufficient cause under Section 5, as J. Kumaradasan Nair holds. Third, the five conditions of Section 14 from Consolidated Engineering — same party, due diligence and good faith, defect of jurisdiction or like cause, same matter in issue, and both proceedings in a court.

Fourth, the acknowledgment and continuing-wrong rules. An acknowledgment under Section 18, or a part-payment under Section 19, must be made before the original period expires — neither can revive a time-barred claim — and both start a fresh period running. A continuing wrong under Section 22 renews limitation from moment to moment, but only where the wrong genuinely subsists from day to day, as the line drawn in Balkrishna Savalram Pujari shows. For the wider framework into which these computation rules fit, see the detailed treatment of acknowledgment under Section 18 and the companion note on the continuing breach and continuing wrong, and return to the hub for the full Limitation Act syllabus.