Right to Information Act, 2005

The Right to Information Act, 2005 institutionalises the citizen's constitutional right to know about the functioning of government. The right itself does not originate in the statute — it flows from Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution as developed through a long line of Supreme Court decisions. The statute is the instrument that lays down the practical regime — the public information officer, the time-bound disclosure obligation, the exemptions, the appellate machinery, the Information Commissions, and the penalty framework — through which the constitutional right is operationalised. The Act came into force on 12 October 2005 and overrides the colonial Official Secrets Act, 1923 by virtue of Section 22.

This chapter sets out the constitutional foundation, the pre-2005 legal landscape, the scheme of the Act, the exemption framework, the appellate architecture, and the leading cases that have shaped the working of the statute. The chapter completes the institutional component of administrative law — natural justice supplies the procedural floor of administrative action; the right to information supplies the transparency floor without which procedural fairness cannot be policed. It sits alongside the chapters on the rule of law and separation of powers as the third leg of the constitutional accountability framework that sources of administrative law contributes to the discipline.

The constitutional foundation — Articles 19(1)(a) and 21

The Constitution of India does not specifically enumerate a right to information. The right has been derived by the Supreme Court from two distinct constitutional sources. Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees freedom of speech and expression, has been read to include the right to receive information — the freedom to express is meaningless unless coupled with the related right to be informed. Article 21, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, has been read to include the right to be informed on matters that affect citizens' livelihood and lifestyle. The judicial expansion has converted the freedom of expression from a one-way speaking right into a two-way speaking-and-receiving right.

The line begins with State of U.P. v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 865. The Court held that the people of a country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way by their public functionaries — they are entitled to know the particulars of every public transaction in all its bearing. The right to know, derived from the concept of freedom of speech, was held not to be absolute but to make secrecy unjustifiable in the routine business of government. The case arose from a privilege claim by the government over the Blue Book containing the prime ministerial security protocol; the Court rejected the blanket privilege and required in-camera judicial inspection of the document.

S.P. Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149 expanded the proposition. The Court held that the right to know is implicit in the right to free speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a). The case concerned a privilege claim over the inter-se correspondence between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of the High Court, and the Chief Justice of India on the transfer and confirmation of judges. The Court rejected the privilege and observed that the century-old Section 123 of the Evidence Act, 1872 — drafted for the needs of an empire — required reinterpretation in the light of the republican form of government adopted by the people of India.

Article 21 was added as a second source in Reliance Petrochemical Ltd. v Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1989 SC 190. The Court observed that people at large have a right to know in order to be able to take part in participatory development in the industrial life and democracy. The right puts greater responsibility on those who undertake the duty to inform.

The two strands were consolidated in Secretary, Ministry of I & B v Cricket Association of Bengal AIR 1995 SC 1236, the Hero Cup decision. The Court held that the freedom of speech and expression in Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to acquire and disseminate information. The decision recognised airwaves as public property requiring regulation by an autonomous body; it ruled that the government has no exclusive right to broadcast media; and it confirmed that a citizen has a fundamental right to use the best means of imparting and receiving information, including telecast and broadcast.

The voter's right to information traces back to the core idea that public power must answer to those it governs, and was added by Union of India v Association for Democratic Reforms AIR 2002 SC 2114. The Court held that the voter's right to know about the antecedents — including the criminal record, financial position, and educational qualifications — of a candidate contesting election to Parliament or a State Legislature is fundamental and basic for the survival of democracy. The voter's franchise is an act of expression; the information about the candidate is the necessary precondition for that expression. The judgment, reaffirmed in People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India AIR 2003 SC 2363, links the right to information to the participatory dimension of democracy.

The pre-2005 legal landscape — secrecy as the rule

Before the 2005 Act, the legal default in Indian administration — much like the colonial discretion examined in the chapter on the distinction between administrative, constitutional and international law — was non-disclosure. The position was sustained by three layers of statutory and constitutional protection.

The Constitution itself protects certain communications among high-level functionaries. Article 74(2) provides that the advice tendered by ministers to the President shall not be inquired into by any court. Article 163(3) contains a parallel protection at the State level. The protection covers the substance of ministerial advice; it does not extend to the underlying material on which the advice is based.

The Indian Evidence Act, 1872 contributed two key non-disclosure provisions. Section 123 provided that no one shall be permitted to give evidence from unpublished official records relating to affairs of State, except with the permission of the head of the department, who shall give or withhold permission as he thinks fit. Section 124 extended a similar privilege to confidential official communications. The provisions gave the administration substantial power to withhold information in litigation.

The Official Secrets Act, 1923 supplied the third layer. Section 3 prohibits spying and the disclosure of official information for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State. Section 5 — the controversial provision — virtually prohibits the disclosure of any information that the government considers confidential. The word "secret" is undefined; in the absence of a definition, classification was at the discretion of the executive. Liability under the Act arose even where information was received for the public good. The 1923 Act carried the legacy of British rule into the democratic republic.

The judicial expansion of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 had shifted the constitutional position by the late 1990s. The statutory landscape lagged behind. The Freedom of Information Act, 2002 was enacted as a first attempt — drafted by H.D. Shourie's working group and assented to in January 2003 — but it was never notified into force. On the recommendation of the National Advisory Council and other stakeholders, the 2002 Act was repealed and replaced by the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The Right to Information Act, 2005 — scheme

The Act, in style and accountability ambition, parallels the institutional checks studied in the chapters on parliamentary control over delegated legislation and judicial control over delegated legislation. The Act received presidential assent on 15 June 2005 and came into force on 12 October 2005. The Preamble sets out the practical regime of the right to information for citizens to secure access to information under the control of public authorities, in order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority. The right is statutorily recognised; the source of the right remains constitutional. The Supreme Court held in Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 166 (2010) DLT 305 (FB) that the Act is not the repository of the right; it is the instrument that lays down the procedure for its exercise.

The structural elements are: a wide definition of "information" and "right to information" (Sections 2(f) and 2(j)); an obligation on every public authority to make proactive disclosure (Section 4); the appointment of Public Information Officers in every public authority (Section 5); a request procedure with time-bound disposal (Sections 6 and 7); a list of exemptions (Sections 8 and 9), partially relievable by an overriding public-interest test; a part-disclosure rule for severable records (Section 10); a third-party protection rule (Section 11); a two-tier appellate architecture culminating in the Central or State Information Commission (Sections 12 to 19); a penalty framework (Section 20); an overriding-effect provision (Section 22); a finality clause barring civil-court jurisdiction (Section 23); and a list of exempt intelligence and security organisations (Section 24, Second Schedule).

Definitions — Sections 2(f), 2(h), 2(j)

Section 2(f) defines "information" expansively — any material in any form, including records, documents, memos, e-mails, opinions, advices, press releases, circulars, orders, log books, contracts, reports, papers, samples, models, data material in any electronic form, and information relating to any private body which can be accessed by a public authority under any other law. The breadth of the definition is the operative driver of the statute. As the Delhi High Court observed in The CPIO, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 162 (2009) DLT 135 (Del), the crucial words "any material in any form" cut down all narrow interpretations and permit courts to give the right the widest operation that the language will permit.

Section 2(h) defines "public authority" to include any authority or body or institution of self-government established or constituted by the Constitution, by an Act of Parliament or State Legislature, by notification, or owned, controlled, or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate government. The definition catches the executive, the legislature, and the judiciary, all constitutional bodies, panchayati raj institutions, local bodies, and substantially financed non-governmental organisations. The Act is premised on the disclosure norm — refusal is the exception.

Section 2(j) defines "right to information" as the right to information accessible under the Act which is held by or under the control of any public authority and includes the right to inspection of work, documents, records; taking notes, extracts or certified copies; taking certified samples of material; and obtaining information in the form of diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes, or in any other electronic mode or through printouts where the information is stored in a computer or any other device.

Proactive disclosure — Section 4

Section 4(1)(a) requires every public authority to maintain all records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner that facilitates the right to information; computerise records that are appropriate for computerisation; and connect the network for facilitated access. Section 4(1)(b) requires every public authority to publish — within 120 days of the commencement of the Act and to update annually — seventeen specified categories of information about itself, including its organisational particulars, the functions and duties of officers and employees, the procedure for decision-making, the rules and regulations applied, the directory of officers and employees, the budget allocated and expended, and the manner of execution of subsidy programmes. The proactive-disclosure obligation is meant to minimise the citizen's need to file individual applications — the Act exhorts public authorities to take constant steps to provide information suo motu to the public.

Procedure for obtaining information — Sections 5 to 7

Section 5 requires every public authority to designate as many officers as Public Information Officers (PIOs) as are necessary to provide information. Assistant PIOs are designated at sub-divisional level to receive applications and forward them. Section 6 prescribes the application procedure — requests may be made in writing or by electronic means, in Hindi, English, or the official language of the area, accompanied by the prescribed fee. The applicant is not required to give any reason for requesting the information. Section 6(2) is the operative locus-standi-abolishing provision: no reason for seeking information can be required.

Section 7 sets the time limits. The PIO must dispose of the request — by providing the information or rejecting it with reasons — as expeditiously as possible and in any case within thirty days of the receipt of the request. Where the information sought concerns the life or liberty of a person, the time limit is reduced to forty-eight hours. Where the request is transferred to another public authority under Section 6(3), the time runs from the receipt by the transferee. Where the request involves a third party, an additional ten days are allowed under Section 11 for the third party to make submissions, extending the total disposal time to forty days.

Exemptions — Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 24

The right to seek information is not absolute. The Act balances the citizen's right of access against legitimate State and third-party interests through a structured exemption framework.

Section 8(1) sets out eleven categories of exempt information. Disclosure may be refused where it would prejudicially affect the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security and strategic, scientific or economic interests of the State, the relation with foreign States, or lead to incitement to an offence (clause a). Information forbidden by a court of law is exempt (clause b). Information that would cause a breach of privilege of Parliament or a State Legislature is exempt (clause c). Commercial confidence, trade secrets, and intellectual property are exempt where disclosure would harm the competitive position of a third party, unless the larger public interest warrants disclosure (clause d). Information held in fiduciary relationship is exempt unless the larger public interest warrants disclosure (clause e). Information received in confidence from a foreign government is exempt (clause f). Information that would endanger the life or physical safety of a person, or identify a confidential informant, is exempt (clause g). Information that would impede investigation or prosecution is exempt (clause h). Cabinet papers including deliberations of the Council of Ministers are exempt, with disclosure permitted after the decision is taken and the matter is over (clause i). Personal information that has no relationship to public activity or interest, or that would cause unwarranted invasion of privacy, is exempt unless the larger public interest warrants disclosure (clause j). The proviso further provides that information which cannot be denied to Parliament or the State Legislature shall not be denied to any person.

The exemption framework is the doctrinal mirror of the discretion-control structure set out in the chapters on administrative discretion and the doctrine of legitimate expectation — the State retains a controlled domain of withholding, but every withholding is reviewable.

Section 8(2) contains the public-interest override — a public authority may allow access to information notwithstanding the exemptions of Section 8(1) if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests. The exception applies even to officially classified information.

Section 8(3) imposes a sunset rule on most categories — information relating to any occurrence, event or matter that took place twenty years before the date of request shall be made available, with the exceptions of clauses (a), (c), and (i).

Section 9 permits a PIO to reject a request where access would involve infringement of copyright subsisting in a person other than the State. Section 10 contains the severability rule — where part of a record is exempt and part is not, the part that is not exempt shall be disclosed if it can reasonably be severed.

Section 11 protects third-party interests. Where the requested information relates to or has been supplied by a third party and treated as confidential, the PIO must give the third party written notice within five days and an opportunity to make submissions. The third party has an appeal right under Section 19. The third-party procedure extends the disposal timeline to forty days.

Section 24 takes specified intelligence and security organisations listed in the Second Schedule out of the Act altogether — the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing, the Border Security Force, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, the Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, the Directorate of Enforcement, the Narcotics Control Bureau, the Aviation Research Centre, the National Security Guard, and others. The exemption does not, however, cover information relating to allegations of corruption and human-rights violations — for which the Central Information Commission's approval is required as a procedural safeguard.

Information Commissions — Sections 12 to 17

The Act establishes an apex independent body to oversee its implementation. Section 12 constitutes the Central Information Commission consisting of the Chief Information Commissioner and not more than ten Information Commissioners. The members are appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister (Chair), the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. Members must be persons of eminence in public life with knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media, or governance. Members cannot be Members of Parliament or of a State Legislature, hold any other office of profit, be connected with a political party, or carry on any business or profession.

The Chief Information Commissioner holds office for five years or until the age of sixty-five, whichever is earlier; Information Commissioners hold office for the same term. Removal is on the ground of proved misbehaviour by the President on a reference to and report by the Supreme Court. Section 15 establishes the State Information Commission on a parallel pattern, with appointments by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee headed by the Chief Minister.

The institutional design — independence, security of tenure, civil-court powers — is calibrated to address the structural-bias risks that any oversight body faces, and the functional taxonomy explained in the chapter on classification of administrative functions places the Commissions firmly within the quasi-judicial category. The Information Commissions have civil-court powers in respect of summoning, attendance, inspection, discovery, and evidence on affidavit. They can examine any record during inquiry; nothing may be withheld on any ground. They have the power to make any order required for compliance — including the order to provide access, to appoint an officer, to publish specified information, to make changes in record-keeping practices, and to compensate the complainant for loss or detriment.

Appeals, complaints, and penalties — Sections 18 to 20

Section 19 provides a two-tier appellate architecture. The first appeal lies to an officer senior in rank to the PIO within the public authority — to be filed within thirty days of the impugned order or of the expiry of the disposal period. The first appellate authority must dispose of the appeal within thirty days, extendable to forty-five days for recorded reasons. The second appeal lies to the Central or State Information Commission within ninety days of the first appellate authority's order or of the expiry of the period for it. The Information Commission's order is final, subject only to writ jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 32.

Section 18 provides a parallel complaint route directly to the Information Commission for any person who has been refused access, has not received a reply within the time limit, has been required to pay an unreasonable fee, has been given false or misleading information, or has any grievance under the Act.

Section 20 provides the penalty framework. Where a PIO has, without reasonable cause, refused to receive an application, refused to furnish information within the time limit, malafidely denied a request, knowingly given incorrect, incomplete, or misleading information, or destroyed information, the Information Commission shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees per day until the application is received or information is furnished, subject to a cap of twenty-five thousand rupees. The Commission may also recommend disciplinary action under the applicable service rules.

Overriding effect, judicial review, and bar of jurisdiction

Section 22 gives the Act overriding effect on the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and any other inconsistent law. The non-obstante clause cuts down the protection of Section 5 of the 1923 Act and reduces it to ineffectiveness in the area covered by the 2005 Act.

Section 23 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of any order made under the Act. The finality clause does not affect the writ jurisdiction of the High Courts and Supreme Court — judicial review under Articles 226 and 32 is part of the basic structure and cannot be ousted, as confirmed in L. Chandra Kumar v Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261. The framework on judicial review is set out in the chapter on grounds of judicial review; the writ remedies through which review operates are catalogued in the chapter on writs as tools of administrative law.

Judges' assets disclosure — the Subhash Chandra Agarwal litigation

The reach of the Act in respect of the higher judiciary was tested in The CPIO, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 162 (2009) DLT 135 (Del) and the Full Bench appeal Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 166 (2010) DLT 305 (FB). The applicant sought information on whether judges of the Supreme Court had filed declarations of personal assets pursuant to the 1997 Full Court Resolution. The CPIO refused the request on the grounds that the information was not held under the Registry's control, that the resolution was an in-house exercise without statutory force, and that the disclosure would breach a fiduciary relationship. The Central Information Commission upheld the request.

The Single Judge dismissed the writ petition and the Full Bench affirmed. The Full Bench held that the Chief Justice of India is a "public authority" under Section 2(h); that the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court as an institution cannot be treated as separate public authorities; that the asset declarations are "information" within the wide definition of Section 2(f); that the CJI does not hold the declarations in a fiduciary capacity (the judges are independent constitutional functionaries, not subordinate to the CJI; the declarations are made in discharge of a constitutional ethical obligation, not as a personal trust); and that the declarations are personal information attracting Section 8(1)(j) — disclosure can be ordered where the larger public-interest test is satisfied. The framework reflects the doctrinal principle that all power, including judicial power, is held accountable in a modern Constitution.

A linked decision, Khanapuram Gandaiah v Administrative Officer AIR 2010 SC 615, holds that the RTI Act cannot be used to require a judicial officer to disclose the reasons for a judicial order beyond those stated in the order itself — the protection is to safeguard the independence of the judiciary, not to shield malice or corruption.

Political parties and the 2013 amendment proposal

The Central Information Commission held in a decision dated 3 June 2013 that six national political parties — Congress, BJP, NCP, CPI(M), CPI, and BSP — are public authorities within Section 2(h) on the ground that they are substantially financed by the government through the indirect benefits of allotted office space, government accommodations at concessional rates, income-tax exemptions, and free airtime on All India Radio and Doordarshan, and that they perform public functions of constitutional significance. The Commission directed the parties to designate PIOs and disclose their sources of funding.

The government introduced the Right to Information (Amendment) Bill, 2013 to remove political parties from the ambit of the Act with retrospective effect from 3 June 2013. The Bill proposed an Explanation to Section 2(h) excluding any association or body of individuals registered or recognised as a political party under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Bill was deferred and lapsed. The CIC's order has not been complied with and has not been judicially set aside; the position remains contested.

The doctrinal place of the Act in administrative law

The right to information completes the procedural architecture of administrative law. The principles of natural justice — set out in the chapter on audi alteram partem and nemo judex — require that an affected person be heard and that the decision-maker be impartial; the rules on components of the right to hearing require notice, disclosure of materials, and an opportunity to respond; the reasoned-decision rule requires the decision-maker to articulate reasons.

The procedural floor presupposes informational access. A citizen who cannot obtain the materials on which an administrative decision is based cannot meaningfully exercise the right to be heard, cannot scrutinise the decision-maker for bias, cannot evaluate the reasonableness of the discretion exercised, and cannot test the rationality of the reasons given. The right to information supplies the foundational layer on which the rest of administrative law operates. The framework is reinforced by the constitutional remedies — the writs are available where information is withheld in violation of statute, and the writ courts have repeatedly directed disclosure where the Information Commissions' orders have been resisted.

Implementation and enduring concerns

Implementation challenges have produced a steady flow of writ petitions and have engaged the public interest litigation route to enforce systemic compliance. The Act has been described in the Delhi High Court's words as a powerful beacon illuminating unlit corners of State activity. The implementation record has been mixed. The volume of applications filed annually has grown substantially. Public Information Officers have been designated across central and state administrations. The Information Commissions have built up a substantial body of decisions on the exemption framework, the public-interest override, and the third-party procedure.

The persistent concerns are familiar. Bureaucratic resistance to disclosure expresses itself through delay in PIO appointments, mechanical citation of the Section 8 exemptions, and excessive use of the in-fiduciary-relationship and personal-information clauses. Record-keeping is uneven; in many offices the Section 4 proactive-disclosure obligation is honoured in form rather than in substance. Awareness of the right is uneven across regions and demographic groups, and the volume of frivolous or harassment-driven applications has dragged on PIO capacity. The selection process for Information Commissioners — particularly after the 2019 amendments altering tenure and salary protections — has attracted criticism for diminishing the independence of the Commissions.

Notwithstanding these concerns, the doctrinal direction is settled. The right to information is constitutionally grounded in Articles 19(1)(a) and 21; it is statutorily institutionalised by the 2005 Act; it is enforced through a two-tier appellate architecture culminating in independent Information Commissions; and it is judicially supervised through the writ jurisdiction. The chapter on the Ombudsman institutions covers the parallel anti-corruption oversight machinery; the right to information complements those institutions by giving the citizen the informational route to identify and prosecute administrative wrongdoing. The combination of substantive doctrine — natural justice, discretion, judicial review — and informational access — through the 2005 Act — supplies the working framework of administrative-law accountability in India.

Practical takeaways for the exam

Three propositions to fix in memory. First, the right to information is constitutional in source — Articles 19(1)(a) and 21, as developed in Raj Narain (1975), S.P. Gupta (1982), Reliance Petrochemical (1989), Cricket Association of Bengal (1995), and Association for Democratic Reforms (2002); the 2005 Act is the statutory instrument that operationalises the right, not its repository. Second, the structural elements of the Act are: wide definitions of "information" and "public authority" (Sections 2(f) and 2(h)); proactive disclosure under Section 4; PIOs under Section 5; thirty-day disposal under Section 7 (forty-eight hours for life and liberty); eleven categories of exemption under Section 8 with a public-interest override and a twenty-year sunset; severability under Section 10; third-party protection under Section 11; Information Commissions under Sections 12–17; two-tier appeal under Section 19; penalty under Section 20; overriding effect on the Official Secrets Act under Section 22; and bar of civil-court jurisdiction (with writ-review preserved) under Section 23. Third, the leading-case framework: the Subhash Chandra Agarwal Full Bench decision (2010) holds that the CJI is a public authority, asset declarations are "information", the CJI is not a fiduciary, and the disclosure of asset contents is governed by Section 8(1)(j); the CIC's June 2013 political-parties decision held the six national parties to be public authorities and remains binding pending the lapsed amendment Bill; Khanapuram Gandaiah (2010) protects judicial reasoning from RTI inquiry to safeguard judicial independence.

The candidate who has internalised the constitutional foundation, the structural scheme, the exemption framework with its public-interest override, and the leading-case position has the analytic apparatus for any RTI question that is likely to come on the paper. The Act sits at the intersection of constitutional law and administrative law — it gives effect to a fundamental right and supplies the informational floor on which the rest of administrative law's procedural and substantive doctrines operate.

Frequently asked questions

Is the right to information a fundamental right or a statutory right under the RTI Act, 2005?

Both, but the constitutional source is primary. The right to information has been derived by the Supreme Court from Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 21 (right to life and personal liberty) in a long line beginning with State of U.P. v Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 865, expanded in S.P. Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149, anchored to Article 21 in Reliance Petrochemical AIR 1989 SC 190, consolidated in Cricket Association of Bengal AIR 1995 SC 1236, and applied to the voter's franchise in Association for Democratic Reforms AIR 2002 SC 2114. The Right to Information Act, 2005 is the statutory instrument that lays down the practical regime — the procedure, time limits, exemptions, and appellate machinery — through which the constitutional right is operationalised. The Delhi High Court Full Bench in Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2010) held that the Act is not the repository of the right; the constitutional provisions are. The statute must therefore be interpreted with the widest operation that its language permits.

What are the time limits for disposing of an RTI application under Section 7?

The Public Information Officer must dispose of the request — by providing the information or rejecting it with reasons — as expeditiously as possible and in any case within thirty days of receipt. Where the information sought concerns the life or liberty of a person, the time limit is reduced to forty-eight hours. Where the application has been transferred under Section 6(3), the thirty-day clock runs from the receipt by the transferee. Where the request involves third-party information under Section 11, the third party is given five days to receive notice and ten days to make submissions; the total disposal time extends to forty days. Failure to dispose within these limits is treated as a deemed refusal that grounds a first appeal under Section 19. Section 20 provides a daily penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees up to a cap of twenty-five thousand rupees for unreasonable delay.

What is the public-interest override in Section 8 and how does it work?

Several of the Section 8(1) exemptions are not absolute — they are subject to a built-in public-interest test. The clauses on commercial confidence and trade secrets (d), fiduciary information (e), and personal information / privacy (j) all contain the proviso that the information shall be disclosed where the larger public interest warrants. Section 8(2) supplies a more general override — a public authority may allow access to information notwithstanding any of the Section 8(1) exemptions if the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm to the protected interests; the override applies even to officially classified information. The proviso to Section 8(1) further provides that information that cannot be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature shall not be denied to any person. Section 8(3) imposes a twenty-year sunset on most categories, with sovereignty and integrity, parliamentary privilege, and cabinet papers excluded from the sunset. The combined framework converts the exemptions from blanket bars into rebuttable presumptions.

Does the RTI Act apply to the higher judiciary, and what does the Subhash Chandra Agarwal decision hold?

Yes. The Delhi High Court Full Bench in Secretary General, Supreme Court of India v Subhash Chandra Agarwal 166 (2010) DLT 305 (FB) held that the Chief Justice of India is a public authority within Section 2(h); that the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court as an institution cannot be treated as separate public authorities; that the asset declarations made by the judges pursuant to the 1997 Full Court Resolution are 'information' within the wide definition of Section 2(f); and that the Chief Justice does not hold the declarations in a fiduciary capacity, because the judges are independent constitutional functionaries and the declarations are made in discharge of a constitutional ethical obligation rather than a personal trust. The contents of the declarations are personal information attracting Section 8(1)(j); they may be accessed where the larger public-interest test is satisfied. The decision rests on the constitutional principle that all power — judicial power being no exception — is held accountable in a modern Constitution. Khanapuram Gandaiah v Administrative Officer AIR 2010 SC 615 is the parallel limit: the Act cannot be used to require a judicial officer to give reasons beyond those in the order itself.

What is the position of political parties under the RTI Act?

The position is contested. The Central Information Commission held in its decision dated 3 June 2013 that six national political parties — Congress, BJP, NCP, CPI(M), CPI, and BSP — are public authorities within Section 2(h). The reasoning rested on substantial indirect government financing through allotted office space at concessional rates, government accommodations at low rates, income-tax exemptions, and free airtime on All India Radio and Doordarshan during elections; and on the public-function character of the parties' role in democratic governance under Articles 102(2) and 191(2) of the Constitution and Section 29A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Commission directed the parties to designate Public Information Officers and disclose their sources of funding. The government introduced the Right to Information (Amendment) Bill, 2013 to exclude political parties from Section 2(h) with retrospective effect from 3 June 2013; the Bill was deferred, lapsed, and has not been re-introduced. The CIC's order has not been complied with by the parties and has not been set aside by a court of competent jurisdiction; it remains the operative ruling but is, in practice, unenforced.

Does the Act override the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and Sections 123–124 of the Evidence Act, 1872?

Section 22 of the 2005 Act gives it overriding effect on the Official Secrets Act, 1923 and on any other law inconsistent with it. The non-obstante clause cuts down the protection of Section 5 of the 1923 Act — which had previously prohibited the disclosure of any information classified as secret — and reduces it to ineffectiveness in the area covered by the 2005 Act. The Sections 123 and 124 protections of the Evidence Act, 1872 — covering unpublished official records and confidential official communications — have been substantially diluted by the line of decisions beginning with S.P. Gupta v Union of India AIR 1982 SC 149, which observed that the century-old provisions required reinterpretation in the light of the republican form of government. The 2005 Act does not formally repeal Sections 123 and 124, but the disclosure norm of the Act, combined with the public-interest override of Section 8(2), has reduced their practical scope. The traditional Crown-privilege framework has effectively been displaced by the statutory framework of Sections 8, 10, and 11.