Definitions — Work, Author, Adaptation, Cinematograph Film (Section 2)

Section 2 of the Copyright Act, 1957 is the dictionary of the statute. Every operative provision — Section 13 (subsistence), Section 14 (rights), Section 17 (ownership), Section 51 (infringement), Section 52 (fair dealing) — turns on the meaning that Section 2 gives to a single defined term. Read carelessly, the Act is a maze of overlapping rights; read with Section 2 in hand, it falls into a clean grid.

The chapter that follows treats the seven definitions that the exam consistently tests: work and its sub-classes, author, adaptation, cinematograph film, sound recording, communication to the public, and the cluster of definitions that together identify the first owner. Each is read in its working position — never in isolation, but with the operative provision that depends on it.

The architecture of Section 2

Section 2 contains roughly forty defined expressions, several added by successive amendments. The 1994 amendment introduced the definitions of computer, computer programme, cinematograph film in its present form, communication to the public, and performer. The 2012 amendment added the definitions relevant to disability access, technological protection measures, rights management information, and the visually impaired person. The arrangement is alphabetical (Section 2(a) to Section 2(zb)) but the conceptual order travels in a different direction — first the work, then the author, then the rights and uses.

Two interpretive rules hold across all definitions. First, definitions in Section 2 control unless the context otherwise requires (Section 2 opening words). Second, where a definition is inclusive ("includes"), the courts read it as expanding rather than restricting; where it is exhaustive ("means"), the courts confine the term to what the section enumerates. The drafting style of Section 2 is mixed: literary work (Section 2(o)) is inclusive; cinematograph film (Section 2(f)) is exhaustive; author (Section 2(d)) is exhaustive but proceeds class by class.

"Work" and its sub-classes

Section 2(y) identifies the work as one of three things: a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work; a cinematograph film; or a sound recording. The three classes correspond to the three columns of Section 13 and the three regimes of Section 14. The class controls the test: literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works require originality under Section 13(1)(a); cinematograph films and sound recordings do not — they require only the absence of substantial duplication of an earlier work (Section 13(3)).

Literary work (Section 2(o)). The definition is inclusive: literary work includes computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer databases. The 1994 amendment added the computer-programme limb to bring India into compliance with TRIPS Article 10(1). The class does not require any literary merit — a railway timetable, a price-list, a directory and a question-paper have all been held to be literary works in Indian and English authority. What it does require is that the work be expressed in print or writing — oral expressions are not literary works under the Act, although they may be performances under Section 38. The Section 13 originality threshold then decides whether the particular literary work attracts copyright.

Dramatic work (Section 2(h)). A dramatic work includes any piece for recitation, choreographic work or entertainment in dumb show, the scenic arrangement or acting form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise; but does not include a cinematograph film. The italicised proviso is critical: a film is not a dramatic work; the screenplay underlying the film, however, is. The Delhi High Court in R.G. Anand v. Delux Films (1978) 4 SCC 118 (on appeal from Delhi) confirmed that a stage play is the paradigm of a dramatic work and the film made of it is a separate, derivative work.

Musical work (Section 2(p)). The 1994 amendment redrafted this to mean a work consisting of music and includes any graphical notation of such work, but does not include any words or any action intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music. Three classes are thus separated where one earlier sat: the lyric (literary work), the music (musical work), and the song-as-performed (a sound recording or a cinematograph film, depending on fixation). The split has serious consequences for ownership and royalty — the lyricist, composer and producer hold three separate copyrights and may negotiate three separate licences.

Artistic work (Section 2(c)). A painting, sculpture, drawing (including a diagram, map, chart or plan), engraving or photograph, irrespective of artistic quality; a work of architecture; and any other work of artistic craftsmanship. The phrase irrespective of artistic quality was lifted from the English Copyright Act, 1956 and confirms that the courts will not enquire into the aesthetic merit of the work. The architectural limb covers buildings — both the design drawings and the executed structure.

"Author" — Section 2(d), defined work by work

Unlike the everyday usage, author in the Act is a technical term that varies with the class of work. Section 2(d) sets out six clauses:

1. Literary or dramatic work — the author of the work.
2. Musical work — the composer.
3. Artistic work other than a photograph — the artist.
4. Photograph — the person taking the photograph.
5. Cinematograph film or sound recording — the producer.
6. Literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which is computer-generated — the person who causes the work to be created.

The sixth clause, inserted in 1994, is the early Indian legislative response to AI-generated and computer-generated content. Where a poem is generated by a programme that the user runs, the user — not the programmer of the engine — is the author for the purposes of the Act. The clause leaves open the harder question of authorship of works generated by an autonomous AI without human direction; that question awaits judicial development.

Note carefully that the author is not always the first owner. Section 17 begins with the proposition that the author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein, then carves five exceptions: works made by an employee under a contract of service; works commissioned for valuable consideration (paintings, photographs, engravings); speeches and lectures delivered in public; Government works; and works of public undertakings. The chapter on authorship and ownership of copyright develops the Section 17 exceptions in detail, and the assignment, licence and compulsory licence chapter sets out how rights move thereafter.

"Adaptation" — Section 2(a)

Adaptation is one of the exclusive rights identified in Section 14 and is therefore precisely defined. Section 2(a) sets out five classes:

1. For a dramatic work, the conversion of the work into a non-dramatic work.
2. For a literary or artistic work, the conversion into a dramatic work by way of performance in public or otherwise.
3. For a literary or dramatic work, an abridgement or a version in which the story or action is conveyed wholly or mainly by means of pictures (a comic-book version of a novel, for example).
4. For a musical work, an arrangement or transcription.
5. For a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, the use of the work involving its rearrangement or alteration.

The fifth limb is the catch-all and covers most modern reuse — turning a novel into a screenplay, a screenplay into a graphic novel, a piano sonata into an orchestral arrangement, a building into a sculptural model. Under Section 14(a)(vi) the right to adapt vests in the author of the underlying work; without licence, the adaptation is an infringement under Section 51, and the adapter cannot claim copyright in his adaptation as against the author of the underlying work — although as against the world, the adaptation, if itself original, attracts a separate copyright (Section 13(1)(a)).

"Cinematograph film" — Section 2(f)

The definition was significantly redrafted in 1994. Section 2(f) now reads: "cinematograph film" means any work of visual recording and includes a sound recording accompanying such visual recording; and "cinematograph" shall be construed as including any work produced by any process analogous to cinematography including video films.

Three points repay close attention. First, the definition is exhaustive in form ("means") but expanded by an inclusion ("and includes"). The accompanying sound recording is not a separate work for the purposes of the film — it is part of the film. Second, the second limb expressly absorbs digital and video media: a video film recorded on any digital format is within the definition. Third, the term visual recording is itself separately defined in Section 2(xxa): the recording in any medium, by any method including the storing of it by any electronic means, of moving images or of the representations thereof, from which they can be perceived, reproduced or communicated by any method.

The definition has two important consequences. The author of the cinematograph film is the producer (Section 2(d)(v)); the term of copyright is sixty years from the year of publication (Section 26); the rights are those listed in Section 14(d) — the right to make a copy of the film (including a photograph of any image forming part), to sell or give on hire any copy, and to communicate the film to the public. The chapter on Section 14 exclusive rights takes the catalogue in detail.

"Sound recording" — Section 2(xx)

Section 2(xx) defines a sound recording as a recording of sounds from which such sounds may be produced regardless of the medium on which such recording is made or the method by which the sounds are produced. The 1994 amendment chose this medium-neutral language to absorb gramophone records, audio cassettes, compact discs, MP3 files, and any future format. The term replaced the earlier record in the 1957 Act.

The author of a sound recording is the producer; the term is sixty years from the year of publication; the rights are those in Section 14(e) — the right to make any other sound recording embodying it (including by storing in any medium by electronic means), to sell or give on hire any copy, and to communicate it to the public. The producer's copyright is independent of the copyrights in the underlying lyric and music; it does not extinguish them. This was the central holding of the Supreme Court in Indian Performing Right Society v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association, AIR 1977 SC 1443 — a case that the 2012 amendment further refined by giving the lyricist and composer a non-waivable right to royalty for use otherwise than as part of the film.

"Communication to the public" — Section 2(ff)

Inserted by the 1994 amendment and substantially expanded since, Section 2(ff) defines communication to the public as making any work or performance available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing physical copies of it, whether simultaneously or at places and times chosen individually, regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees, hears or otherwise enjoys the work or performance so made available.

The expansive language is the gateway to the digital regime. The phrase at places and times chosen individually brings on-demand internet streaming within the right of communication; the phrase regardless of whether any member of the public actually sees means that uploading a work to a server accessible to the public is itself a communication to the public, even before the first download. The Delhi High Court in Star India v. Piyush Agarwal (2013) 56 PTC 28 (Del) and the Bombay High Court in Tips Industries v. Wynk Music (2019) 4 ARBLR 17 (Bom) have applied the broad language to hold that internet hosting and on-demand streaming engage Section 2(ff).

The right to communicate to the public is then granted by Section 14 separately for each class of work — Section 14(a)(iii) for literary, dramatic and musical works; Section 14(c)(iii) for artistic works; Section 14(d)(iii) for films; Section 14(e)(iii) for sound recordings.

"Performance" and "performer" — Sections 2(q) and 2(qq)

Performers' rights are a separate species of right introduced in 1994 to comply with the 1961 Rome Convention and TRIPS Article 14. Section 2(q) defines performance, in relation to performers' right, as any visual or acoustic presentation made live by one or more performers. Section 2(qq) lists who is a performer: an actor, singer, musician, dancer, acrobat, juggler, conjurer, snake-charmer, a person delivering a lecture or any other person who makes a performance. The 2012 amendment added the proviso that an extra in a film, whose performance is incidental, does not count as a performer for the purposes of Section 38A's exclusive rights.

The performer's right is a right separate from the copyright in the work performed: an actor performing in a film acquires a performer's right under Section 38, while the producer of the film acquires copyright in the cinematograph film under Sections 14(d) and 17. The chapter on performers' rights and broadcast reproduction rights works through Sections 38 to 39A in detail. The default royalty regime under copyright societies registered under Section 33 collects and distributes performance royalties for these rights.

"Infringing copy" — Section 2(m)

Section 2(m) defines infringing copy work-class by work-class. For a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, an infringing copy is a reproduction otherwise than in the form of a cinematograph film. For a cinematograph film, an infringing copy is any copy of the film. For a sound recording, an infringing copy is any sound recording embodying the same sound recording. For a programme or performance broadcast, an infringing copy is any sound recording or cinematograph film of the programme or performance.

The phrase otherwise than in the form of a cinematograph film is critical. It means that the film made of a literary work — say, a film made of a novel — is not an infringing copy of the novel; it is an infringement of the right of reproduction in another form, but the legal hook is Section 51 read with Section 14(a)(iv) (cinematographic adaptation), not Section 2(m) read with Section 51. The drafting choice avoids classifying the film as a copy of the underlying literary work — they are separate works in separate columns of Section 13.

Other definitions worth remembering

Several other Section 2 definitions repay attention:

• Section 2(s) — "publication": making a work available to the public by issue of copies or by communicating it to the public. Either limb suffices; physical printing is no longer essential.
• Section 2(j) — "exclusive licence": a licence which confers on the licensee any right comprised in the copyright in a work to the exclusion of all other persons including the owner.
• Section 2(ffa) — "composer": in relation to a musical work, the person who composes the music regardless of whether he records it in any form of graphical notation.
• Section 2(uu) — "producer": in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, a person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the work.
• Section 2(z) — "work of joint authorship": a work produced by the collaboration of two or more authors in which the contribution of one author is not distinct from the contribution of the other author or authors.

The work of joint authorship definition is the gateway to Section 22 second limb (term in joint-authorship cases — life plus sixty years calculated from the death of the last surviving author). The publication definition is the gateway to Section 26 (term for cinematograph films, computed from publication, not from creation).

Reading the definitions in their operative context

The single most common exam error is to read Section 2 in isolation. The definitions are not free-standing; each one fastens onto an operative provision. Five linkages should be committed to memory:

1. Section 2(o) → Section 13(1)(a): a literary work attracts copyright only if original.
2. Section 2(d) → Section 17: the author is the first owner unless one of the five exceptions applies.
3. Section 2(a) → Section 14(a)(vi): the right to adapt vests in the author of the underlying work.
4. Section 2(ff) → Section 14(a)(iii) / 14(c)(iii) / 14(d)(iii) / 14(e)(iii): communication to the public is granted separately to each work-class.
5. Section 2(m) → Section 51: an infringing copy is the unit on which infringement is computed.

For the next stage of analysis, see the subject matter of copyright under Section 13 and the meaning of copyright as the bundle of exclusive rights. The treatment of term of copyright ties the definition of publication to the calculation of duration. The infringement of copyright chapter operates on the foundation of infringing copy just developed. The exceptions are organised in the chapter on acts not constituting infringement under Section 52.

Three exam-tested distinctions

Three further distinctions are exam-stable and worth holding apart in working memory. First, a literary work and a dramatic work. The novel is a literary work; the screenplay derived from the novel is a dramatic work; the film made of the screenplay is a cinematograph film. Three separate works, three separate copyrights, three separate authors. The proviso to Section 2(h) — "but does not include a cinematograph film" — keeps the dramatic-work and the film-class apart. Second, a sound recording and a musical work. The melody composed by the composer is the musical work; the studio rendering captured on a master tape is the sound recording. Two separate works, two separate authors (composer for the music, producer for the recording), two separate terms (life plus sixty for the music; sixty from publication for the recording). Third, a photograph and an artistic work. The photograph is an artistic work under Section 2(c) but its author is "the person taking the photograph" under Section 2(d)(iv) — a clause that the courts have read to mean the photographer in fact, not the studio that employs him; ownership then follows Section 17, which may transfer first ownership to the studio under the contract-of-service exception.

The exam approach

For state judiciary, CLAT PG and the SEBI Legal Officer paper, Section 2 questions cluster around four points. First, the work-class question: identify whether a given thing (a database, a sculpture, a film) is a literary, artistic or other class of work. Second, the author question: identify the author for each class of work — the producer for films and sound recordings, the composer for music, the artist for an artistic work other than a photograph. Third, the communication-to-the-public question: identify whether internet streaming, broadcasting, on-demand viewing engage Section 2(ff). Fourth, the adaptation question: identify whether a particular reuse — a graphic novel of a film, a musical arrangement of a song — is an adaptation under Section 2(a).

Three principles travel through every Section 2 question. First, definitions read in operative context, never free-standing. Second, the inclusive style of drafting expands rather than restricts. Third, the 1994 and 2012 amendments introduced new clauses that mark the line between the digital and pre-digital regime — knowing the date of insertion of a clause is often a one-mark differentiator on the question paper.

Frequently asked questions

Does the Copyright Act protect computer programmes as a separate class of work?

No. Section 2(o) defines literary work to include computer programmes, tables and compilations including computer databases. The 1994 amendment added the limb to comply with Article 10(1) of the TRIPS Agreement. A computer programme is therefore a literary work for the purposes of Section 13 (subsistence) and Section 14, although Section 14(b) crafts a separate set of rights for computer programmes — including the right to sell or give on commercial rental — that goes beyond the standard literary-work bundle in Section 14(a).

Who is the author of a cinematograph film under the Copyright Act, 1957?

Section 2(d)(v) makes the producer the author of a cinematograph film. The producer is defined in Section 2(uu) as the person who takes the initiative and the responsibility for making the work. The director, screenplay writer, lyricist and composer are not authors of the film as such; they are the authors of their respective contributions — the dramatic work (screenplay), literary work (lyric) and musical work (composition) — and retain copyright in those underlying works subject to the 2012 amendment provisos to Sections 17, 18 and 19.

What is communication to the public under Section 2(ff)?

Section 2(ff) defines communication to the public as making any work or performance available for being seen, heard or otherwise enjoyed by the public, directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by issuing physical copies, whether simultaneously or at places and times chosen individually, regardless of whether any member of the public actually accesses it. The clause is broad enough to capture internet streaming, on-demand viewing, broadcasting and webcasting, and was so applied in Tips Industries v. Wynk Music (2019) 4 ARBLR 17 (Bom).

What is the difference between author and first owner under the Act?

The author is identified by Section 2(d) work-class by work-class — the writer, composer, artist or producer as the case may be. The first owner is identified by Section 17. As a general rule the author is the first owner, but Section 17 carves five exceptions. For a work made by an employee in the course of employment under a contract of service, the employer is the first owner. For commissioned paintings, photographs, engravings and films, the commissioner is. For Government works, the Government is. The chapter on authorship and ownership develops these exceptions.

Is a sculpture protected under the Copyright Act regardless of artistic merit?

Yes. Section 2(c) defines an artistic work to include a painting, sculpture, drawing, engraving or photograph, irrespective of artistic quality. The phrase irrespective of artistic quality is a deliberate exclusion of any judicial enquiry into aesthetic merit. The threshold remains the Section 13(1)(a) originality requirement — the sculpture must be the author's own creation displaying skill and judgment producing some creative spark — but its merit as art is not a separate condition.