Law of the Sea — UNCLOS Provisions Relevant to India

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea — UNCLOS, often called the Constitution for the Oceans — is the framework treaty governing the use of the world's seas, their seabed and the airspace above. It runs to 320 articles in seventeen parts and nine annexes. India signed it on 10 December 1982 and ratified it on 29 June 1995. Most of its provisions are now part of customary international law, as the ICJ confirmed in the Maritime and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain case (2001). For students of international law for judiciary examinations, the architecture of UNCLOS — six maritime zones, each with its own jurisdictional formula — is the central syllabus point, and the Indian Maritime Zones Act, 1976 is the domestic instrument through which the framework operates in India.

The historical movement is from mare clausum to mare liberum and back, an evolution that mirrors the broader development traced in the chapter on the nature, definition and basis of international law. Until the seventeenth century the seas were thought open to appropriation; Grotius's Mare Liberum (1609) argued that the oceans, as res communis, were accessible to all nations but incapable of appropriation. Through the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the freedom of the seas became the dominant principle, balanced by a narrow belt of territorial sea around each coastal State. The twentieth century enlarged that belt and created intermediate jurisdictional zones — the contiguous zone, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone — culminating in UNCLOS III at Montego Bay in 1982.

The road to UNCLOS III

Two earlier UN conferences had attempted comprehensive codification. UNCLOS I in Geneva in 1958 produced four conventions — on the territorial sea and contiguous zone, on the high seas, on fishing and conservation of living resources, and on the continental shelf — but failed to fix the breadth of the territorial sea. UNCLOS II in 1960 again failed on that point. UNCLOS III ran for nine years and concluded in 1982 with a single comprehensive treaty, adopted by 130 States as a "package deal" — to be accepted as a whole, with no reservations on any part. The compromise traded an exclusive economic zone for the developing world (which sought 200 nautical miles of resource jurisdiction) against the navigational and seabed-mining concerns of the maritime powers. UNCLOS came into force on 16 November 1994 after sixty ratifications. The 1958 Conventions remain in force between States that have not ratified UNCLOS, but for most purposes they are superseded — a treaty-succession question that connects to the chapter on the interaction of treaty law and customary international law.

The six maritime zones

UNCLOS divides the sea into six zones: internal waters and archipelagic waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone, the continental shelf and the high seas. Internal waters and the territorial sea fall within the coastal State's national territory and sovereignty. The contiguous zone and the EEZ lie outside national territory but allow the coastal State to exercise certain functional powers. The continental shelf gives the coastal State sovereign rights over seabed resources. The high seas remain open to all States and incapable of appropriation. The framework provides a logical scale of decreasing coastal-State authority moving seaward, balanced against increasing freedom for other States.

Internal waters

Article 8 defines internal waters as those on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea — ports, bays, estuaries, canals, rivers, lakes and inland seas. The coastal State has complete sovereignty: there is no general right of innocent passage for foreign ships through internal waters. The only customary right of access is for ships in distress, where lives on board are at risk. Once a ship enters a foreign port, it comes under the territorial civil and criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State, and may not leave until it has completed all formalities. The position is closely linked to the law of jurisdiction over persons and events within State territory, which controls the exercise of authority over events within a State's territory.

The territorial sea

Article 2 of UNCLOS provides that the sovereignty of a coastal State extends beyond its land territory and internal waters to an adjacent belt of sea — the territorial sea — and that this sovereignty extends to the airspace above and to the seabed and subsoil below. Sovereignty over the territorial sea is incidental to sovereignty over the land: maritime rights derive from the coastal State's sovereignty over the land, in the principle "the land dominates the sea." The breadth of the territorial sea was unsettled until UNCLOS. Article 3 fixes the maximum at 12 nautical miles, measured from the baseline. India's position under Section 3 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 mirrors UNCLOS: the territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the baseline (the limit was 3 miles until 1956, 6 miles until 1967 and 12 miles thereafter).

Baselines

Article 5 prescribes the normal baseline as the low-water line along the coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognised by the coastal State. Where the coastline is deeply indented or fringed by islands, Article 7 permits a coastal State to draw straight baselines connecting appropriate points, provided the lines do not depart appreciably from the general direction of the coast and the sea areas enclosed are sufficiently linked to the land to be subject to the regime of internal waters. The legitimacy of the straight-baseline method was first accepted by the ICJ in Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (UK v Norway, ICJ Rep. 1951), where the special geography of the Norwegian "Skjaergaard" — a fringe of islands and rocks along the coast — and Norway's long-established practice were both held to support the method. Article 7 of UNCLOS codifies the rule.

Right of innocent passage

Sovereignty over the territorial sea is qualified by the right of innocent passage. Article 17 confers the right on the ships of all States, coastal or land-locked. Article 18 defines passage as continuous and expeditious navigation through the territorial sea, including stopping and anchoring incidental to navigation, force majeure or distress. Article 19 specifies that passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State, and lists twelve activities that are presumed prejudicial — the practice or exercise of weapons; the collection of information to the prejudice of the coastal State; spying; fishing; marine pollution; research or survey activities; the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft or military device; jamming of coastal-State communications; and other named activities. Aircraft do not enjoy a right of innocent passage; submarines must navigate on the surface and show their flag (Article 20).

Article 25 reserves to the coastal State the right of protection: it may take steps necessary to prevent passage that is not innocent and may suspend innocent passage temporarily in specified areas if required for security, provided suspension has been published. Article 27 limits the coastal State's criminal jurisdiction over crimes committed on board a foreign ship in passage to four cases — where the consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State; where the crime disturbs the peace of the country or good order of the territorial sea; where the master or the consul requests assistance; or where it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. The Indian Maritime Zones Act, 1976 follows the same scheme. Section 4 confers the right of innocent passage on all foreign ships other than warships and submarines; warships may pass only after prior notice to the Central Government and underwater vehicles must navigate on the surface.

The Corfu Channel rule

The leading authority on the right of passage of warships through international straits in time of peace is the Corfu Channel case (UK v Albania, ICJ Rep. 1949). British warships passing through the Albanian portion of the Corfu Channel struck mines whose existence Albania knew of but did not communicate. The ICJ held that, in time of peace, States have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorisation of the coastal State, provided the passage is innocent. Albania's refusal to warn of the mines breached well-recognised principles of humanity and the obligation not knowingly to allow its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States. The subsequent British minesweeping operation in Albanian waters, however, violated Albanian sovereignty and could not be justified as innocent passage or as self-protection.

The contiguous zone

Article 33 of UNCLOS permits a coastal State to claim a contiguous zone extending up to 24 nautical miles from the baseline — the area twelve miles beyond the territorial sea. In the contiguous zone the coastal State may exercise the control necessary to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary laws within its territory and territorial sea. Security is conspicuously not on the UNCLOS list; the International Law Commission considered the term too vague and feared it would invite abuse. India, however, included security in its statutory framework: Section 5 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 lists security alongside the four UNCLOS heads, broadening the executive's powers in the zone. India's strong support for the contiguous-zone concept at UNCLOS III is the reason it survived in the final text — many delegations had argued the EEZ rendered it superfluous, but India contended that the EEZ did not specifically confer the customs, immigration and sanitary jurisdiction the contiguous zone supports. India's posture in such treaty negotiations is shaped by its position on the treatment of States and individuals as subjects of international law.

The contiguous zone may form part of the EEZ if one is claimed; if no EEZ is claimed, it sits within the high seas as a limited zone of jurisdiction. The leading illustration of the law of the contiguous zone in practice is the Re Martinez case (1959), where the Italian appellate court upheld jurisdiction over a smuggler captured at 54 nautical miles after a pursuit that began in Italy's vigilance zone. The Indian Maritime Zones Act, 1976 likewise extends Indian penal and customs law to the contiguous zone and authorises the Central Government to alter the limit by notification, in line with India's broader treaty-implementation practice analysed in the chapter on the implementation of international treaties in Indian courts.

The exclusive economic zone

The exclusive economic zone is a UNCLOS innovation, introduced to satisfy the developing world's demand for control of fisheries and other resources off its coasts. Article 57 fixes the breadth at 200 nautical miles from the baseline. Within the EEZ the coastal State has sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring, exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources, living and non-living, of the waters and the seabed; jurisdiction over the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; over marine scientific research; and over the protection and preservation of the marine environment. Other States retain the freedoms of navigation, overflight and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, subject to the rights and duties of the coastal State. The EEZ illustrates the evolving treatment of treaty sources of international law under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute: a wholly new functional zone, created by treaty, that has rapidly hardened into customary international law.

The EEZ is therefore not part of the high seas and not part of the coastal State's sovereign territory. It is a sui generis zone of functional jurisdiction. Section 7 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 declares an EEZ extending 200 nautical miles from the baseline and extends the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Penal Code to designated areas within it (typically installations and artificial islands). The leading Indian case-law on the EEZ is Republic of Italy v Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 721 — the Enrica Lexie case discussed below.

The continental shelf

The continental shelf — the natural prolongation of the land territory beneath the sea — is the oldest of the modern functional zones. Truman's Proclamation in 1945 first asserted United States jurisdiction over the resources of the shelf; India followed in 1955; the 1958 Geneva Convention codified the concept. UNCLOS Article 76(1) defines the continental shelf as comprising the seabed and subsoil that extend beyond the territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of the land territory to the outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend that far. Where the continental margin extends beyond 200 nautical miles, the outer limit may not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baseline or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500-metre isobath; an extended-shelf claim must be approved by the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS).

The juridical basis of the coastal State's rights is geographical, not occupational. The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases (1969) held that the rights of the coastal State exist ipso facto and ab initio by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, as an extension of it for the purpose of exploring the seabed and exploiting its natural resources. Article 77 confers exclusive sovereign rights on the coastal State for that purpose: if the coastal State does not explore or exploit, no other State may do so without its consent. The natural resources of the shelf include mineral and non-living resources of the seabed and subsoil, together with sedentary living organisms — shellfish and similar species that are immobile or move only in constant physical contact with the seabed. The exclusive economic zone covers the rest of the living resources of the superjacent waters.

The coastal State's rights over the shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high seas (or, if the EEZ is claimed, as EEZ); other States have a right to lay submarine cables and pipelines, conduct marine research and harvest non-sedentary living resources subject to the coastal State's regulation. Article 82 imposes a revenue-sharing obligation on the coastal State for exploitation beyond the 200-nautical-mile limit, with payments to the International Seabed Authority after the first five years of production at a site; developing States that are net importers of the mineral are exempt. Delimitation between adjacent or opposite States is governed by Article 83, which calls for an agreement on the basis of international law as referred to in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute, in order to achieve an equitable solution. The case-law on delimitation — North Sea Continental Shelf (1969), Tunisia/Libya (1982), Libya/Malta (1985), Gulf of Maine (1984), Bangladesh/Myanmar (ITLOS 2012) and the Bay of Bengal arbitration (Bangladesh v India, 2014) — collectively establishes that equidistance is a starting point for delimitation between opposite coasts but that the result must be equitable in the light of all the relevant circumstances, including geography, resources and historic rights.

The high seas

Article 86 defines the high seas as all parts of the sea not included in the EEZ, the territorial sea, the internal waters of a State or the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State. Article 87 sets out the freedoms of the high seas — navigation, overflight, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, the construction of artificial islands and installations permitted under international law, fishing, and scientific research — to be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States and for the rights of the deep seabed Area. Article 88 reserves the high seas for peaceful purposes. Article 89 forbids any State to subject any part of the high seas to its sovereignty. The high seas are res extra commercium — incapable of being appropriated.

Flag-State jurisdiction

The exclusive flag-State principle, enshrined in Article 92, requires every ship on the high seas to fly the flag of one State only and subjects it to that State's exclusive jurisdiction. The principle was articulated by the PCIJ in the Lotus case (1927): "vessels on the high seas are subject to no authority except that of the State whose flag they fly." Article 91 requires a genuine link between the State and the ship — a doctrinal echo of the genuine-link requirement applied to natural persons in Nottebohm and discussed in the chapter on State recognition and succession. The genuine-link requirement was a response to the practice of "flags of convenience" in States such as Panama and Liberia, which permitted entirely foreign ships to register under their flag. Article 94 obliges the flag State to exercise effective jurisdiction and control over administrative, technical and social matters on its ships, including issues of safety, qualifications of the master and crew, and investigation of casualties. Article 97 — important for the Indian case-law on the Enrica Lexie — provides that in the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation on the high seas, penal or disciplinary proceedings may be instituted only before the flag State or the State of the accused's nationality.

Piracy

Piracy is the textbook exception to flag-State jurisdiction. Article 101 defines piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation, committed for private ends, by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, directed against another ship or aircraft or persons or property on board. Voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship and the inciting or facilitating of an act of piracy are also covered. Article 105 confers universal jurisdiction: every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft on the high seas, arrest the offenders and seize the property on board; the courts of the seizing State may decide on penalties. The pirate is the classic hostis humani generis — the enemy of mankind — and the regime is the cleanest illustration of the universal principle of jurisdiction. The Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention 1988, prompted by the Achille Lauro hijacking, supplements UNCLOS by extending criminal jurisdiction to maritime terrorism and other threats to navigation.

Right of visit and right of hot pursuit

Article 110 permits the warship of any State to board a foreign ship on the high seas if there is reasonable ground for suspecting that the ship is engaged in piracy, slave trade or unauthorised broadcasting; that the ship is without nationality; or that the ship is in fact of the same nationality as the warship despite flying a foreign flag. Compensation is payable if the suspicion proves unfounded. Article 111 codifies the right of hot pursuit: the coastal State may pursue a foreign ship on the high seas if there is good reason to believe the ship has violated its laws while in internal waters, the territorial sea, the archipelagic waters or the contiguous zone (and, in respect of EEZ or continental-shelf rights, in those zones). The pursuit must be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop, must be continuous and uninterrupted, and ceases as soon as the pursued ship enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State. The cumulative conditions are strict; the I'm Alone case (Canada v United States, 1935) is the leading illustration of an unjustified extended pursuit. Section 9(5) of the Indian Maritime Zones (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 gives Indian authorities the right of hot pursuit in respect of fishing offences in the EEZ. The cooperation duty in Article 100 of UNCLOS — "all States shall co-operate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy" — is a treaty form of aut dedere aut judicare linking maritime offences to the broader law on international criminal law and the ICC's prosecution of crimes against humanity.

The Enrica Lexie ruling

The most important Indian Supreme Court decision on UNCLOS is Republic of Italy v Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 721 — the Enrica Lexie case. On 15 February 2012, two Italian marines deployed on the Italian-flagged tanker MV Enrica Lexie, mistaking the Indian fishing vessel St. Antony for a pirate craft, opened fire and killed two Indian fishermen. The incident occurred at 20.5 nautical miles from the Kerala coast — outside the territorial sea but within the contiguous zone and EEZ. The Italian marines were arrested by the Kerala Police and charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC. Italy challenged the jurisdiction of the Indian courts.

Italy advanced two principal arguments. First, that the marines were Italian military personnel and protected by sovereign immunity for acts performed in the course of official duty. Second, that Article 97 of UNCLOS gave exclusive jurisdiction to the flag State in the case of any "incident of navigation" on the high seas. The Supreme Court rejected both. Sovereign immunity did not apply because Section 2 IPC renders "every person" liable for offences committed within India, regardless of national origin. Article 97 did not apply because the firing was a deliberate criminal act, not an "incident of navigation" in the sense of the article — which the Court read to refer principally to collisions and accidents in the course of normal navigation.

The Court relied in part on the Lotus precedent, allowing extraterritorial jurisdiction where conduct abroad has substantial effect on the State's interests or affects its citizens, and in part on the passive personality and objective territorial principles surveyed in the chapter on State jurisdiction — territorial, personal and universal. Notification under Section 7(7) of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 had extended the IPC and CrPC to the contiguous zone and EEZ. The Court drew a careful distinction between rights of sovereignty (full sovereignty exercised in territorial waters and the contiguous zone) and sovereign rights (limited functional rights exercised in the EEZ for resource purposes), but held that the extension of Indian penal law gave the Union of India jurisdiction to prosecute the marines, subject to a residual question of concurrent jurisdiction under Article 100 of UNCLOS. The Kerala State Police were held to lack jurisdiction; only the Union of India could prosecute, and a Special Court was directed to be set up. The matter was subsequently referred to international arbitration in 2015 under Annex VII of UNCLOS, which in 2020 held that India had jurisdiction but the Italian marines enjoyed functional immunity, awarding compensation to the families of the deceased.

The international seabed area

The deep seabed Area — the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction — is governed by Part XI of UNCLOS. Following Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta's address to the UN General Assembly in 1967, the resources of the Area were declared the "common heritage of mankind" by General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) of 1970. Part XI establishes the International Seabed Authority (ISA) at Kingston, Jamaica, to administer mineral exploration and exploitation in the Area. The 1994 Implementation Agreement revised Part XI in response to the concerns of developed States, particularly on industrial-policy and decision-making issues, and made participation in the regime acceptable to a wider group of States. India has been recognised as a pioneer investor in the polymetallic-nodule areas of the Central Indian Ocean Basin and holds an ISA contract for exploration there. The deep-seabed regime is, alongside outer space and the Antarctic, one of the principal applications of the "common heritage of mankind" idea explored in the chapter on international environmental law from Stockholm and Rio to Paris.

Settlement of disputes under UNCLOS

Part XV of UNCLOS provides a comprehensive dispute-settlement system. States Parties may choose between four fora — the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS, established under Annex VI), an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII or a special arbitral tribunal under Annex VIII. The system overlaps with the broader regime for the peaceful settlement of international disputes through the ICJ and arbitration. ITLOS has issued important rulings on prompt release of vessels, provisional measures and the genuine-link requirement (the M/V Saiga cases). The Bangladesh/Myanmar delimitation (2012) was the first contentious maritime delimitation decided by ITLOS; the Bay of Bengal arbitration between Bangladesh and India (2014) was the first delimitation between two States Parties decided by an Annex VII tribunal.

India's domestic legal framework

The Indian Maritime Zones Act, 1976 implements the UNCLOS framework in domestic law. Section 3 establishes sovereignty over territorial waters extending to 12 nautical miles. Section 5 establishes the contiguous zone extending to 24 nautical miles, including security among the heads of jurisdiction. Section 6 declares the continental shelf in conformity with Article 76 of UNCLOS. Section 7 establishes the EEZ to 200 nautical miles. Section 7(7) authorises notifications extending Indian enactments to designated areas within the EEZ; the 1981 Notification under that provision extended the IPC and CrPC to the contiguous zone and to designated areas of the EEZ — the foundation for the Supreme Court's jurisdictional reasoning in Enrica Lexie. The Maritime Zones (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act, 1981 imposes heavy penalties for unauthorised fishing in any maritime zone of India and authorises hot pursuit. The Coast Guard Act, 1978 establishes the Indian Coast Guard as the principal enforcement agency in the maritime zones.

The constitutional foundation sits in Article 297 of the Constitution, which vests in the Union all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, the continental shelf or the exclusive economic zone of India, and provides that the limits of the territorial waters, the continental shelf, the EEZ and other maritime zones shall be such as may be specified by Parliament. Article 51 directs the State to foster respect for international law and treaty obligations, and Article 253 confers Parliament's power to legislate to give effect to international agreements — the joint constitutional basis on which UNCLOS has been incorporated, as analysed in the chapter on the Indian Constitution and international law under Articles 51 and 253.

Recurring distinctions and exam angle

Three distinctions appear most often in objective papers. First, between the territorial sea (sovereignty, with innocent passage) and the contiguous zone (limited functional jurisdiction over customs, fiscal, immigration and sanitary matters; security in India). Second, between the EEZ (sovereign rights over resources, freedom of navigation for others) and the high seas (no sovereignty, all freedoms with due regard). Third, between the continental shelf (resource jurisdiction over seabed and subsoil, including sedentary species) and the EEZ (resource jurisdiction over the water column and non-sedentary species). Numerical landmarks — 12 nm, 24 nm, 200 nm, 350 nm or 100 nm from the 2,500-metre isobath — must be remembered exactly. Cases — Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (straight baselines), Corfu Channel (warship passage through international straits), North Sea Continental Shelf (geographical basis of shelf rights), Lotus (flag-State jurisdiction and territorial extension), I'm Alone (limits of hot pursuit), and Enrica Lexie (Indian application) — are the canonical citations.

The interface between the law of the sea and the broader law of jurisdictional immunity is also tested. Warships and government ships used for non-commercial purposes enjoy sovereign immunity in foreign waters under Article 32 of UNCLOS, a parallel to the rules on diplomatic and consular privileges and immunities. Universal jurisdiction over piracy is the maritime application of the universal-jurisdiction principle; the cooperation duty in Article 100 is a treaty form of aut dedere aut judicare. The treaty itself is governed by the rules collected in the chapter on treaties — formation, validity and termination under the Vienna Convention.

Conclusion

UNCLOS is the most ambitious example of international codification since the UN Charter. Its six-zone architecture reconciles the freedom-of-the-seas tradition with the legitimate resource and security interests of coastal States. For India, the framework is operationalised through the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 and the related fisheries and coast-guard statutes; the Supreme Court's Enrica Lexie decision is the leading domestic application of the contiguous-zone and EEZ provisions. For the judiciary aspirant, the chapter rewards careful attention to numerical limits, the precise content of each zone's jurisdictional formula, and the leading cases — Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, Corfu Channel, North Sea Continental Shelf, Lotus, and Enrica Lexie — that anchor the doctrine in concrete fact-patterns. The grand themes — common heritage of mankind, freedom of navigation, sovereign rights as distinct from sovereignty, peaceful uses of the sea — are themes that will continue to shape the law as the deep seabed becomes commercially exploitable and as climate change reshapes coastlines.

Frequently asked questions

What is the maximum breadth of the territorial sea under UNCLOS?

Article 3 of UNCLOS fixes the maximum breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nautical miles, measured from the baseline determined in accordance with the Convention. The provision is reflective of customary international law and is binding even on States that are not parties to UNCLOS. India's position under Section 3 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 mirrors UNCLOS — the territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles from the baseline. The limit was 3 miles until 1956, increased to 6 miles in 1956 and to 12 miles in 1967. The Central Government may alter the limit by notification, having regard to international law and State practice.

What is the difference between the EEZ and the continental shelf?

Both extend up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, but they cover different things. The exclusive economic zone is a regime over the water column and the seabed beneath it, conferring sovereign rights over both living resources (chiefly fisheries) and non-living resources, plus jurisdiction over artificial islands, marine scientific research and environmental protection. The continental shelf is a regime over the seabed and subsoil only, conferring sovereign rights over the mineral and other non-living resources of the seabed and over sedentary living species. The shelf may extend beyond 200 nautical miles where the natural prolongation of the land territory does, up to a 350-nautical-mile cap.

Can a coastal State suspend the right of innocent passage?

Yes, but in narrow circumstances. Article 25(3) of UNCLOS permits a coastal State to suspend temporarily, in specified areas of its territorial sea, the innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential for the protection of its security including weapons exercises. The suspension must be without discrimination in form or in fact between foreign ships and must take effect only after publication. The right of innocent passage through international straits may not be suspended even in time of armed conflict — the rule confirmed by the ICJ in the Corfu Channel case (1949). India has corresponding power under Section 4 of the Maritime Zones Act, 1976 in the interest of peace, good order and security.

What did the Supreme Court decide in the Enrica Lexie case?

In Republic of Italy v Union of India (2013) 4 SCC 721 the Supreme Court held that India had jurisdiction to prosecute the two Italian marines who killed two Indian fishermen 20.5 nautical miles off the Kerala coast. Article 97 of UNCLOS — which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the flag State in the event of any "incident of navigation" — did not apply because the firing was a deliberate criminal act, not a navigational accident. Sovereign immunity did not apply because Section 2 IPC reaches every person within India. The Notification of 27 August 1981 had extended the IPC and CrPC to the contiguous zone and EEZ. The Kerala State Police lacked jurisdiction; only the Union of India could prosecute through a Special Court.

What is the right of hot pursuit and what are its conditions?

Article 111 of UNCLOS allows a coastal State to pursue a foreign ship on the high seas if it has good reason to believe that the ship has violated its laws while in the internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea or contiguous zone (and, for EEZ or continental-shelf rights, in those zones). The pursuit must be commenced after a visual or auditory signal to stop given from a sufficient distance to be seen or heard; must be continuous and uninterrupted; and may be conducted only by warships, military aircraft or other clearly marked government vessels or aircraft on government service. The pursuit ceases as soon as the pursued ship enters the territorial sea of its own State or of a third State.

What is piracy under Article 101 of UNCLOS and who has jurisdiction?

Article 101 defines piracy as any illegal act of violence, detention or depredation committed for private ends by the crew or passengers of a private ship or aircraft, on the high seas or in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State, directed against another ship or aircraft or persons or property on board. Voluntary participation in the operation of a pirate ship and the inciting or facilitating of an act of piracy are also covered. Article 105 confers universal jurisdiction: any State may seize a pirate ship on the high seas, arrest the offenders and seize the property on board, and its courts may decide on penalties. The pirate is treated as hostis humani generis.