Waqf — Definition, Kinds, Mutawalli, Waqf Boards

A waqf is the permanent dedication, by a person professing Islam, of any property — movable or immovable — for any purpose the Muslim law recognises as pious, religious, or charitable. Once dedicated, the corpus is taken out of the human commercial ledger: the right of the dedicator (the waqif) is extinguished, ownership is treated as vested in the Almighty, and the income alone may be applied to the objects of the dedication. The expression itself means "detention" — the property is detained from sale, gift, and inheritance forever. The institution sits at the centre of Indian Muslim charitable law, and is now governed in substance by the Shariat Application Act, 1937 on the doctrinal side and by the Waqf Act, 1995 on the administrative side.

The chapter is among the most heavily statutory in Muslim personal law because four overlapping layers must be read together: classical Hanafi doctrine on what counts as a valid dedication, the Mussalman Wakf Validating Acts of 1913 and 1930 which rescued private family waqfs (waqf-alal-aulad) from the Privy Council's decision in Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) 22 I.A. 76, the Wakf Act, 1995 which consolidated the prior central and state Acts and now provides the institutional architecture, and the Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 followed by later amendments which sharpened the regulatory grip of the Waqf Boards. The exam-aspirant must hold all four in view at once.

Definition under classical doctrine and statute

Section 3(r) of the Waqf Act, 1995 defines "waqf" as "the permanent dedication by a person professing Islam, of any movable or immovable property for any purpose recognised by the Muslim Law as pious, religious or charitable", and the Act expressly includes (i) a waqf by user, (ii) grants including mushrut-ul-khidmat for any pious purpose, and (iii) a waqf-alal-aulad to the extent the property is dedicated for a pious, religious, or charitable purpose. The definition departs slightly from the older formulation in Section 2 of the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913 by extending the subject from "any property" to "any movable or immovable property" and by enumerating the inclusive heads.

Classical Hanafi doctrine takes a slightly different cut. According to Abu Hanifa, waqf is the detention of a specific thing in the ownership of the waqif coupled with the appropriation of its profits for charitable purposes. According to the two disciples — Abu Yusuf and Imam Muhammad — waqf signifies the extinction of the appropriator's ownership in the thing dedicated and its detention "in the implied ownership of God" so that the profits may revert for the benefit of mankind. Indian courts have consistently followed the latter view: the Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar (1921) 48 I.A. 302 stated that "when once it is declared that a particular property is wakf… the right of the wakif is extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty," and the Supreme Court in Ahmed G.H. Ariff v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax (AIR 1971 SC 1691) reiterated that by dedication the property is divested from the waqif and vests in the Almighty.

Essentials of a valid waqf

A waqf comes into existence only if four classical essentials concur. Each is independently fatal if absent.

1. Permanent dedication. The dedication must be perpetual, not for a fixed term. A waqf for twenty years is invalid; so is a deed providing that the property reverts to the heirs in case of mismanagement. Where the corpus itself is impermanent — a usufructuary mortgagee's interest, or a house on land leased for a fixed term — there can be no valid dedication. Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad reaffirmed the basic working maxim of Indian wakf law: "once a waqf is always a waqf".
2. Permissible object. The object must be one the Muslim law treats as religious, pious, or charitable. The classical menu is wide: mosques and provision for imams; colleges and stipends for professors; aqueducts, bridges, and caravanserais; alms to the poor and assistance for haj; the maintenance of imambaras, dargahs, idgahs, and khankahs; recital of the Quran in public places; the celebration of fateha and barsi (death anniversaries) of the settlor's family. Objects forbidden by Islam (a church, a temple) cannot be the object of a Muslim waqf, and a dedication to "utter strangers" is invalid even if accompanied by a charitable gift.
3. Property belongs to the waqif. The waqif must be the owner of the property at the date of dedication; a usufructuary mortgagee, or a fiduciary lacking power of disposition, cannot make a valid waqf. A widow who executes a waqfnama as part of a transaction in fraud of her husband's heirs cannot give validity to the waqf even to the extent of her own inherited share, the Privy Council held in Har Prasad v. Fayaz Ahmad (1933) 60 I.A. 116. The line between a permissible dedication and an attempted disinheritance is policed by the same heir-protective policy that animates the doctrines of aul and radd.
4. Capacity of the waqif. Every Muslim of sound mind who has attained majority may make a waqf. Majority for this purpose is governed by the Indian Majority Act, 1875 — eighteen years, or twenty-one where a guardian was appointed. A non-Muslim may also create a waqf for any object that is religious under Muslim law and lawful under his own creed (Mst. Mundaria v. Shyam Sunder, AIR 1963 Pat. 98), but the 1995 Act limits dedication to persons "professing Islam".

Subject of waqf — movables, mushaa, mortgaged property

Under the 1995 Act the subject of a waqf may be "any movable or immovable property", which settles the older controversy. Before the Validating Act of 1913, Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras had held that movables could not be the subject of a waqf unless they were accessory to immovable property; Allahabad had taken the contrary view. The 1995 Act adopts the wider position, and a waqf of shares in a joint stock company, of Government promissory notes, or even of money, is valid. A waqf of a mere money decree is, however, not valid since the decretal amount may not be realised (Ghulam Mohiuddin v. Hafiz Abdul, AIR 1947 All. 127). The expansion of permissible subjects under the 1995 Act fits the broader move within Muslim personal law to draw boundaries between religious endowment and the ordinary Shia rules of inheritance that would otherwise govern movables on death.

An undivided share (mushaa) may form the subject of a waqf, on the more approved view of Abu Yusuf, whether or not the property is capable of partition — except where the dedication is for a mosque or burial ground, in which case the mushaa is invalid. The reason given is that "the continuance of a participation in anything is repugnant to its becoming the exclusive right of God". A property that is already mortgaged or leased is a permissible subject; the encumbrance does not destroy the dedication, though it may in practice limit the income available to the objects. The contrast with the inter vivos law of hiba (gift) is sharp here — a hiba of mushaa in property capable of partition is bad, while a waqf of mushaa is good (except for a mosque or burial ground).

Form, completion, and registration

No particular form is required. A waqf may be created orally or in writing, and the use of the very word "waqf" is neither necessary nor conclusive. What matters is the unequivocal intention to dedicate. The Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar said the tenor of the document must show that a dedication to a pious or charitable purpose is meant; if it does, the waqf is complete.

On the question of when an inter vivos waqf is completed, the schools differed. Abu Yusuf held that a mere declaration of endowment by the owner is sufficient; Imam Muhammad held that, in addition to a declaration, a mutawalli must be appointed and possession delivered to him. The Calcutta, Rangoon, Patna, Lahore, Madras, Bombay, and Oudh High Courts adopted Abu Yusuf's view, and a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Mohammad Yasin v. Rahmat Ilahi (1947) settled in the same sense. The Hanafi position in India is therefore that mere declaration suffices to complete a waqf, and that the founder may constitute himself the first mutawalli without any transfer of physical possession from his name as owner to his name as mutawalli. Shia law diverges: under Ithna Ashari doctrine, delivery of possession to the mutawalli is necessary, and where the waqif appoints himself mutawalli the character of his possession must visibly change from owner to custodian. (The school divisions of Sunni and Shia jurisprudence matter here in their full doctrinal force.)

Registration is required where the dedication is by a written waqfnama and the property is immovable property of value above one hundred rupees, by force of Section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act, 1908. The Privy Council in Muhammad Rustom Ali v. Mushtaq Husain (1920) 47 I.A. 224 held that a waqfnama operates to extinguish ownership and therefore needs registration; but a separate "trusteenama" appointing additional mutawallis without transferring property need not be registered.

Public and private waqfs — the family waqf controversy

Waqfs divide doctrinally into two classes: public waqfs, where the dedication is to a public religious or charitable object (a mosque, a college, the relief of the poor); and private waqfs (waqf-alal-aulad), where the immediate beneficiaries are the settlor's family, children, and descendants, with an ultimate gift over to a charitable purpose on extinction of the line. Whether a private waqf was valid at all was the great Indian controversy of the late nineteenth century. The Privy Council in Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) 22 I.A. 76 held that where the primary object was the aggrandisement of the family and the ultimate gift to charity was illusory by reason of either small amount or remoteness, the waqf was invalid in its entirety. The decision caused widespread dissatisfaction in the Indian Muslim community.

Parliament responded with the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1913, which permits a Muslim to create a waqf in favour of his family, children, and descendants for the maintenance and support thereof, provided that the ultimate benefit (express or implied) is reserved for a charitable purpose of a permanent character. Section 4 of the 1913 Act expressly displaces the principle that the gift to charity must be substantial: it is enough that there be an ultimate gift to charity. Because the 1913 Act was held by the Privy Council not to operate retrospectively, Parliament enacted the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act, 1930, which gave retrospective force to the 1913 Act. The combined effect is that, since 1930, waqf-alal-aulad is good even if the gift to charity is illusory in size or remote in time, so long as it is genuine. The relationship between the family-waqf institution and ordinary Sunni rules of inheritance is thus carefully calibrated — the dedication takes the property out of the inheritance pool altogether, but the descendants still benefit through the income. The 1995 Act preserves this position by including waqf-alal-aulad expressly within the statutory definition.

Mutawalli — appointment, powers, removal

The mutawalli is the manager of the waqf, not the owner. Property does not vest in him as it would in a trustee under English law; the Indian Trusts Act, 1882 in terms exempts waqfs from its scope, and the expression "vested in trust" in Section 10 of the Limitation Act does not apply to a mutawalli. The Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar set the framework: the Muslim law of trusts owes its origin to a rule laid down by the Prophet, and means "the tying up of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings".

The classical rules on appointment, codified in Sections 63 and 66 of the 1995 Act, run as follows. The waqif may appoint himself, his children and descendants, any other person, a female (where the duties are not exclusively spiritual), or a non-Muslim, to be the first mutawalli. He may lay down a scheme for succession. If the deed of waqf is silent on succession, the founder, his executor, the mutawalli for the time being on his death-bed, and (failing all three) the Court may appoint a successor. After the 1995 Act, the State Government, in consultation with the Waqf Board, exercises the supervisory power that earlier vested in the Court over appointment, removal, and alteration of schemes of management; in cases of vacancy with no provision in the deed, the Waqf Board itself appoints under Section 63.

The position of mutawalli is therefore quite distinct from the testamentary executor whose powers are explained in the chapter on wills: the executor administers an estate that vests in him, the mutawalli administers a corpus that has vested in the Almighty. Two restrictions on the mutawalli's office have a sharp exam edge. First, the office is not heritable as of right under personal law; it may become hereditary by custom, but such a custom is opposed to the general law and must be supported by strict proof (Ghulam Hassan v. Bachu Mian, citing the Hanafi position). Second, the office is not transferable; a mutawalli may, on his death-bed, appoint a successor where the founder and executor are both dead and the deed is silent, but he cannot delegate his living functions while in good health.

Restrictions on alienation lie at the heart of the office. Under classical doctrine, a mutawalli has no power, without the leave of the Court, to mortgage, sell, or exchange waqf property unless expressly empowered by the deed. Section 51 of the 1995 Act has reshaped the position: any gift, sale, exchange, or mortgage of immovable waqf property is void unless effected with the prior sanction of the Waqf Board, and a mosque, dargah, or khanqah cannot be alienated at all except in accordance with law. The Board may sanction a transaction only if it is necessary or beneficial to the waqf, consistent with its object, and the consideration is reasonable; a sale must ordinarily be by public auction. As to leases, Section 56 makes any lease above three years void; a lease above one year and up to three years is void unless the Board has sanctioned it. These restrictions on alienation are stricter than the rules that govern pre-emption (shufa) over private property — waqf property is simply not in the marketplace at all unless the Board says it is.

The Waqf Act, 1995 — administrative architecture

The Waqf Act, 1995 (Act 43 of 1995) was passed to provide for the better administration of waqfs across India. It came into force on 1 January 1996, applies to all waqfs created before or after the Act, and extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir (the geographical exception was relaxed by later amendments). Section 112 repealed the Wakf Act, 1954 and all corresponding state Acts, leaving only the Dargah Khwaja Saheb Act, 1955 (which governs the Ajmer dargah) outside its scope. The Act sits alongside the wider corpus of Indian personal-law statutes — for instance the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 — but its objects are administrative rather than rights-creating: it provides the institutional plumbing through which the substantive Hanafi rules now run.

Three institutional limbs of the 1995 Act repay attention.

1. Survey of waqfs and the State Waqf Board. Sections 4 to 8 require the State Government to appoint a Survey Commissioner of Waqfs to make a preliminary survey, classify the waqfs as Sunni or Shia, and prepare a list. The list, once published in the Official Gazette under Section 5, is conclusive evidence of the waqf character of the property unless successfully challenged before the Tribunal under Section 6 within one year of publication. Section 13 establishes a Board of Waqfs (Sunni and, where required, Shia) for each State and for the Union Territory of Delhi; the constitution under Section 14 includes elected members from MPs/MLAs/advocates/mutawallis, nominees representing eminent Muslim organisations and Islamic scholars, and an officer not below the rank of Deputy Secretary. Where a Shia waqf exists, one member must be a Shia.
2. Functions of the Board. Under Section 32 the Board maintains records of the origin, income, object, and beneficiaries of each waqf, ensures that income is applied to its proper objects, settles schemes of management, scrutinises and approves budgets submitted by mutawallis, appoints and removes mutawallis under Section 63, and grants or refuses sanction for alienation under Sections 51 and 56. Under Section 54 the Chief Executive Officer of the Board may direct the removal of an encroacher from waqf property; an order under Section 54(3) is enforceable by the local Sub-Divisional Magistrate.
3. The Waqf Tribunal. Section 83 of the 1995 Act establishes a specialist Waqf Tribunal in each State for the adjudication of disputes regarding waqf property — a three-member tribunal with a District Judge as Chairperson. Section 6 read with Section 83 channels disputes about whether a property is waqf, or whether it is Sunni or Shia, exclusively into the Tribunal once the survey list is published; civil-court jurisdiction is largely barred by Section 85. The decision of the Tribunal is final on questions of fact, subject to revision by the High Court under Section 83(9). The Supreme Court in Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan held that the 1995 Act applies prospectively, so that suits and proceedings commenced before 1 January 1996 continue under the older law.

Central Waqf Council and the 1984 Amendment

The Central Waqf Council, established under Section 9 of the 1995 Act (re-enacting earlier provisions), advises the Central Government on the working of the State Boards and the due administration of waqfs. It is chaired ex officio by the Union Minister in charge of waqf affairs and consists of up to twenty members drawn from MPs, judges of the Supreme Court or High Courts, scholars of Muslim law, advocates, and mutawallis of waqfs with significant annual income. Every State Waqf Board contributes one per cent of its aggregate net annual waqf income to the Council. The Central Wakf Council Rules, 1998 govern the Council's functioning.

The Wakf (Amendment) Act, 1984 had earlier sought to overhaul the 1954 Act by giving Boards stronger powers of supervision, by tightening the rules on alienation, and by expressly providing for waqf-alal-aulad's place within the statutory scheme; many of its provisions were not brought into force, but its objects and reasons were absorbed into the consolidated 1995 Act.

Doctrine of cy-pres and partial invalidity

Where the objects of a waqf are partly valid and partly invalid, the waqf operates as to the lawful objects and fails as to the rest; the property dedicated for invalid purposes reverts to the waqif. Where, however, a clear charitable intention is expressed in the instrument and the specified objects fail, the doctrine of cy-pres allows the income to be applied for the benefit of the poor or for objects as near as possible to those that have failed. The doctrine, importantly, presupposes a valid waqf to begin with: a waqf void for uncertainty cannot be validated by cy-pres, and a waqf-alal-aulad that fails as such cannot be turned into a public waqf by the doctrine.

Testamentary waqf and waqf during marz-ul-maut

A waqf may be created inter vivos or by will. A testamentary waqf is in substance a charitable bequest and is therefore subject to the same restrictions as the bequest of a private legacy: it cannot operate over more than one-third of the net estate without the consent of the heirs after death — the doctrine treated in detail in the law of testamentary bequest. The same one-third cap applies to a waqf created during marz-ul-maut (death-illness), borrowing the rule from the law of death-bed gifts. The distinction between waqf-bil-wasiyat (a will dedicating the property as waqf at death) and wasiyat-bil-waqf (a will gifting property to a donee with a direction to create a waqf) is one of form rather than substance, but the latter delays the impressing of the waqf character until the donee has acted.

Limitation, court fees, and the 1929 amendments

Limitation in the recovery of waqf property has been the subject of repeated legislative attention. Article 134B of the Limitation Act, 1908 — inserted by Act I of 1929 — provided a twelve-year limitation for a suit to recover possession of immovable property comprised in a waqf and transferred by a previous mutawalli for valuable consideration without sanction. Article 134C provided a similar period for property comprised in a Hindu, Muslim, or Buddhist religious or charitable endowment. Article 96 of the present Limitation Act, 1963 carries forward the same scheme, adjusted for the modern statutory landscape, and dovetails with the special periods supplied by Sections 6 and 83 of the Waqf Act 1995 for challenges to survey-list classifications and Tribunal references. The bottom line for the exam-aspirant: a waqf does not lose its waqf character merely because a mutawalli has alienated the property in breach of his powers; the new mutawalli has a fresh starting point on which to bring suit.

Distinguishing features — waqf, trust, and Hindu endowment

Three distinctions recur. First, a waqf differs from an English charitable trust because the property is treated as having vested in the Almighty rather than in the trustee; the mutawalli is a manager, not a trustee, and the Indian Trusts Act 1882 in terms does not apply to waqfs. Second, a waqf is nevertheless treated as a "trust" for the purposes of Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, so that suits for the proper administration of public charitable waqfs may be brought under that section with the consent of the Advocate-General or the Collector. Third, the office of mutawalli differs from a Hindu shebait in that shebaitship has been judicially treated as bearing some characteristics of property (heritability, transferability subject to limits), whereas mutawalliship is an office in the strict sense — not heritable as of right, not transferable, and forfeitable for misconduct.

Recent Supreme Court jurisprudence

Indian courts have recently sharpened several propositions. In Sayyed Ali v. A.P. Wakf Board, Hyderabad, the Supreme Court held that once the property has been found to be waqf, it always retains its waqf character and the grant of a patta in favour of a mokhasadar under the Inams Act does not nullify the dedication. In Markaz Construction v. Supra Humayun Mirza Wakf, the Court held that a long-term lease for commercial construction on waqf property by the Board cannot bypass the mutawalli; the views of the mutawalli must be considered before the Board chooses a contractor, and the procedure under Rule 12 of the Andhra Pradesh Waqf Rules 1974 (and analogues in other States) must be followed. In All India Imam Organization v. Union of India, the Court held that imams of mosques registered with the Boards are entitled to remuneration from the Boards' resources — Article 21 supplies the floor — and directed the Central Waqf Council to prepare a scheme. The statutory direction in Section 2 of the Shariat Act remains the doctrinal anchor for the underlying personal law that the Boards apply.

Shia divergences

Shia law departs from the Hanafi position at three points. First, an inter vivos waqf is not complete on mere declaration; delivery of possession to the mutawalli is essential, and where the waqif is the first mutawalli the character of his possession must visibly alter from owner to custodian. Second, after delivery of possession the waqif is functus officio: he may not appoint a fresh mutawalli or alter the scheme. Third, while the Privy Council in Baqar Ali Khan v. Anjuman Ara Begam (1902) 30 I.A. 94 settled that a Shia may create a waqf by will, the doctrinal cap of one-third on a testamentary waqf operates with the same rigour as on any Shia bequest, with the additional Shia rule that consent of the heirs may be obtained either before or after death.

Connections to the rest of Muslim Law

The waqf chapter does not stand alone. It draws its testamentary cap from the law of bequests, its inter vivos limits from gift doctrine, its capacity threshold from the classical sources of Muslim law, and its school divergences from the architecture set out in the schools of Muslim law. The institutional layer — Boards, Council, Tribunal — sits closer to constitutional and administrative law and rewards reading alongside the broader corpus on Muslim Law as a whole. For the exam-aspirant, the waqf chapter is best mastered by holding the four-statute matrix (Validating Act 1913, Validating Act 1930, Wakf Act 1954, Wakf Act 1995) in view at all times, and by noticing how each layer altered the work of its predecessor without disturbing the core Hanafi proposition: ownership leaves the human ledger and detains itself in the implied ownership of God.

Frequently asked questions

What are the essential elements of a valid waqf under Muslim law?

Four essentials must concur. First, the dedication must be permanent — a waqf for a fixed term, or one that reverts to heirs on mismanagement, is invalid. Second, the object must be one Muslim law treats as religious, pious, or charitable; objects forbidden by Islam (a temple, a church) cannot found a waqf. Third, the property must belong to the waqif at the date of dedication; a usufructuary mortgagee cannot make a valid waqf. Fourth, the waqif must be a Muslim of sound mind and majority — eighteen years under the Indian Majority Act 1875. Section 3(r) of the Waqf Act 1995 codifies this and adds the inclusive heads of waqf by user, grants, and waqf-alal-aulad.

What is waqf-alal-aulad and was it ever held invalid?

Waqf-alal-aulad is a private family waqf — the income goes to the settlor's family and descendants, with an ultimate gift over to a charitable purpose on extinction of the line. The Privy Council in Abul Fata Mahomed Ishak v. Russomoy Dhur Chowdhry (1894) held that where the primary object was the aggrandisement of the family and the gift to charity was illusory, the entire waqf failed. Parliament responded with the Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1913, which validated such waqfs provided there is an ultimate gift to charity, however small or remote. The Mussalman Wakf Validating Act 1930 gave the 1913 Act retrospective effect. The Wakf Act 1995, by Section 3(r), preserves waqf-alal-aulad within the statutory definition.

Can a mutawalli sell or mortgage waqf property?

Not without sanction. Under classical Hanafi doctrine, the mutawalli has no power to mortgage, sell, or exchange waqf property without leave of the Court, unless the deed of waqf expressly empowers him. Section 51 of the Waqf Act 1995 has reshaped the position: any gift, sale, exchange, or mortgage of immovable waqf property is void unless made with the prior sanction of the Waqf Board, and a mosque, dargah, or khanqah cannot be alienated at all except in accordance with law. The Board may sanction only if the transaction is necessary or beneficial to the waqf, consistent with its object, and the consideration is reasonable. A sale must ordinarily be by public auction confirmed by the Board.

What is the role of the Waqf Tribunal under the 1995 Act?

Section 83 of the Waqf Act 1995 establishes a specialist Waqf Tribunal in each State, headed by a District Judge with two other members. The Tribunal adjudicates disputes about whether a property is waqf, whether the waqf is Sunni or Shia, and questions arising under the Act. Section 85 bars the jurisdiction of civil courts on matters required by the Act to be determined by the Tribunal. The Tribunal's decision is final on questions of fact, subject to revision by the High Court under Section 83(9). The Supreme Court in Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan held that the 1995 Act operates prospectively, so suits commenced before 1 January 1996 continue under the older law.

Who appoints the mutawalli and how can the office become vacant?

The waqif appoints the first mutawalli and may lay down a scheme for succession; he may name himself, his descendants, any other person (including a female where duties are not exclusively spiritual), or a non-Muslim. If the deed is silent on succession, a fresh appointment may be made by the founder if alive, then his executor, then the mutawalli on his death-bed (where the office is not hereditary), and failing all three by the Court. After the 1995 Act, the State Government, in consultation with the Board, exercises this supervisory power, and where the office is vacant with no provision in the deed the Waqf Board itself appoints under Section 63. The office is not heritable as of right under personal law; it may be hereditary only by strict-proof custom.

How does a waqf differ from an English trust and from a Hindu endowment?

Three distinctions matter. First, in a waqf the property is treated as having vested in the Almighty, not in the mutawalli; the mutawalli manages but does not own. The Indian Trusts Act 1882 in terms exempts waqfs. Second, a waqf is nevertheless a "trust" for the limited purpose of Section 92 of the CPC, so suits for the proper administration of public waqfs may be brought under that section. Third, the office of mutawalli is not property in the sense in which the office of Hindu shebait sometimes is; mutawalliship is not heritable as of right, not transferable, and forfeitable for misconduct. The Privy Council in Vidya Varuthi v. Balusami Ayyar set this framework and Indian courts have followed it consistently.