Landmark Cases on SRA — Pre and Post-Amendment

The case-law on the Specific Relief Act, 1963 splits naturally on a date — 1 October 2018, when the Specific Relief (Amendment) Act, 2018 came into force. Pre-amendment authorities developed the inadequacy test for specific performance, the equitable doctrines of comparative hardship and clean hands, the readiness-and-willingness rule under Section 16(c), and the working law of injunctions and possession. Post-amendment authorities — led by Katta Sujatha Reddy v Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355 — recast the architecture: specific performance is now an enforceable right, not a discretionary equitable remedy, but the change is prospective. This chapter is the capstone of the SRA cluster. It collects the leading authorities, splits them on the 2018 line, and threads them back into the doctrinal chapters where each case does its real work.

The chapter is organised by topic — recovery of possession, specific performance, readiness and willingness, discretion, prospectivity of the 2018 amendment, declarations, and injunctions. Within each topic, the pre-2018 and post-2018 authorities are kept distinct, because their precedential force on a given transaction depends on which side of 1 October 2018 the contract or cause of action sits.

The 2018 line — why it matters for case-law

The threshold rule is the prospectivity ruling in Katta Sujatha Reddy v Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355. The Supreme Court there held that the 2018 Amendment Act, having created new substantive rights and obligations, applies prospectively only and does not govern transactions that took place before 1 October 2018. The court reasoned that, for determining whether a substituted law is procedural or substantive, the nature of the parent enactment is not material; what matters is the nature of the amendments themselves. The Amendment Act was not a mere procedural enactment.

The practical consequence for case-law is that pre-amendment authorities continue to govern transactions before 1 October 2018, while post-amendment authorities govern transactions on or after that date. A 2017 sale agreement litigated in 2025 is decided under the unamended Sections 10, 14, 16, 20 and 21, with the equitable doctrines of K. Narendra and pre-amendment Saradamani still operative. A 2019 sale agreement is decided under the recast sections, with Katta Sujatha Reddy as the keystone.

The same logic extends to ancillary changes — the deletion of Section 14(1)(a) (no specific performance where compensation is adequate), the introduction of substituted performance under Section 20, the recast of Section 21 (compensation only "in addition to", not "in lieu of", specific performance), and the new Sections 20A, 20B and 20C on infrastructure projects. None of these operate retrospectively. Annamalai v Vasanthi and Others, SLP(C) Nos. 26848-26849 of 2018, restates the prospectivity rule.

Recovery of possession — the Section 5 and Section 6 line

Lallu Yeshwant Singh v Rao Jagdish Singh, AIR 1968 SC 620

The foundational decision on possessory rights. The Supreme Court held that prior possession is prima facie evidence of title; in a suit for possession based on title, the plaintiff need do nothing more than prove that he had an older possession than that of the defendant. The case has been read in three directions. First, a tenant dispossessed by his landlord can sue under Section 6, even though their relationship is contractual. Second, a real owner is entitled to defend illegal occupation and to throw out the trespasser during the act and process of trespassing. Third, where the trespasser has settled into peaceful, long, anterior possession, even without title, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner except in due course of law. The decision is the doctrinal anchor of the chapter on Section 6 — suit by dispossessed person without establishing title.

Krishna Ram Mahale v Shobha Venkat Rao, AIR 1989 SC 2097

The Supreme Court applied the Lallu Yeshwant Singh rule to a settled-possession case: where a person is in settled possession of property, even on the assumption that he had no right to remain on the property, he cannot be dispossessed by the owner of the property except by recourse to law. The principle gives Section 6 its larger constitutional content — it is not a relief for those with title; it is a discipline imposed on those with title, requiring them to use the law's machinery and not their own muscle.

Sanjay Kumar Pandey v Gulbahar Sheikh, AIR 2004 SC 3354 (also reported (2004) 4 SCC 664)

Two propositions the case settles. First, the sole issue in a Section 6 suit is possession; questions of title are irrelevant and cannot be tried within the section. Second, the remedy of a person unsuccessful in a Section 6 suit is to file a regular suit establishing his title — and on succeeding, he will be entitled to recover possession of the property notwithstanding the adverse decision under Section 6. The decision draws a clear line between the summary jurisdiction of Section 6 and the title-based jurisdiction of Section 5 — title-based recovery of immovable property.

Nair Service Society Ltd. v K.C. Alexander, AIR 1968 SC 1165

A constitutional-law-flavoured decision on possession. The Supreme Court approved the English principle that possession is a good title against all but the true owner, and entitles the possessor to maintain ejectment against any other person who dispossesses him. The case complements Lallu Yeshwant Singh and is the standard citation for the proposition that prior possession entitles a plaintiff to recover from a trespasser even without proof of title.

Specific performance — the inadequacy test and its survivors

Hasham v Zenab, (1960) AC 316 (PC); cited in Indian commentary

The Privy Council's restatement of the equitable foundations of specific performance — that the right was, in general, founded on a breach of contract, but not in the same manner as the right to sue at law; the equitable jurisdiction was not limited to the cases in which damages could be recoverable at law. Hasham continues to be cited for the proposition that specific performance is not a contract-act remedy but an independent equitable head of relief, even in its post-2018 statutory form.

Katta Sujatha Reddy v Siddamsetty Infra Projects (P) Ltd., (2023) 1 SCC 355

The keystone post-2018 decision. The Supreme Court held that, after the 2018 Amendment, specific performance — which had stood as a discretionary remedy — is now codified as an enforceable right, no longer dependent on equitable principles expounded by judges, but founded on satisfaction of the requisite ingredients in the Act. The amendment applies prospectively and will not govern transactions that took place before its commencement. The court also held, on the merits of the appeal, that a violation of an essential term of the contract disentitles the plaintiff to specific performance — though not a violation of a non-essential term — affirming the working test from Gostho Behari Sadhukhan v Omiyo Prasad Mullick, AIR 1960 Cal. 361, and Sellappa Chetty v Marappa Goundar, AIR 1965 Mad. 37. The decision is the doctrinal anchor of the chapter on contracts specifically enforceable after the 2018 amendment.

Annamalai v Vasanthi and Others, SLP(C) Nos. 26848-26849 of 2018; (2025) INSC 1267

Restates the prospectivity rule. The 2018 amendment, which made the grant of specific performance of contracts a mandatory relief, has no retrospective effect and does not apply to suits or transactions that arose before its enforcement on 1 October 2018; the grant of specific performance was, for those earlier transactions, a matter of judicial discretion, not a mandatory relief. The two-line summary settles the question for transactions on either side of the 2018 line.

Readiness and willingness — Section 16(c)

Saradamani Kandappan v S. Rajalakshmi, (2011) 12 SCC 18

The classical authority on the time element in readiness and willingness. The Supreme Court held that, while exercising discretion in suits for specific performance, courts must bear in mind that when the parties prescribe a time or period for taking certain steps or for completion of the transaction, that period must have some significance — it cannot be ignored. The court will apply greater scrutiny and strictness when considering whether the purchaser was ready and willing to perform his part. The proposition survives the 2018 amendment because Section 16(c) survives in substance; the readiness-and-willingness inquiry continues to be the gate to specific performance even under the recast Section 10. The case feeds directly into the chapter on specific performance of contracts — general principles.

B. Santoshamma v D. Sarala, (2020) 19 SCC 80

The vendee-friendly post-2018 decision. The Supreme Court held that the non-deposit by the vendee of a balance sum of Rs. 5,000 as directed by the trial court would not constitute absence of readiness and willingness, in the facts of a case where the vendee had already paid Rs. 45,000, had been litigating for 10 years, had not obtained the suit land, and was facing an appeal against the decree of specific performance by the vendor. The vendee could not be expected to put in more money until the decree assumed finality. The decision is the standard authority for nuancing the strict Saradamani rule where extraneous litigation has frustrated formal compliance with court orders.

K.S. Sundaram Iyer v K. Jagadeesan, AIR 1965 Mad. 85

The election-doctrine authority. When the plaintiff has once repudiated the contract and elected to sue for damages, he cannot thereafter claim specific performance of the same contract and treat the contract as if it were subsisting. By such election, he disables himself from making the averment of continuous readiness and willingness. The case continues to be cited in post-2018 commentary because the underlying election principle does not depend on the discretionary character of the pre-amendment regime — it is structural to the readiness-and-willingness requirement, which Section 16(c) preserves.

Discretion — what survives of Section 20

K. Narendra v Riviera Apartments (P) Ltd., AIR 1999 SC 2309

The pre-amendment authority on the doctrine of comparative hardship — the proposition that, where parties are not on equal footing and the bargain is unconscionable and oppressive, specific performance will be refused; performance involving some hardship on the defendant which he did not foresee, while non-performance involves no such hardship on the plaintiff, is one of the circumstances in which the court may properly exercise discretion not to decree specific performance. The doctrine had statutory recognition in the unamended Section 20. After the 2018 amendment, the doctrine survives only to the extent it bears on the Section 14 enforceability gates; it is not a free-standing equitable defence. The case is the doctrinal anchor of the chapter on discretion of the court in granting specific performance.

Sukhdev Singh v Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331

A Constitution Bench decision on the declaration jurisdiction. The court held that employees of statutory bodies have a statutory status; if dismissed in contravention of the statutory provisions, they have a right to a declaration that they continue to be in service, even though they are not in the service of the Union or the States. The case overruled Indian Airlines Corporation v Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1971 SC 1828, on the ground that the relationship is statutory, not contractual. The decision is the working authority on declaratory decrees against statutory bodies and feeds the chapter on declaratory decrees under Sections 34 and 35.

Injunctions — perpetual, mandatory, temporary

Cotton Corporation of India v United Industrial Bank Ltd., AIR 1983 SC 1272

The settled authority on the reach of Section 41 SRA bars. The Supreme Court held that the expression "injunction" in Section 41(b) is not qualified by any adjective and therefore comprehends both interim and perpetual injunctions. The court added that, while the inherent power under Section 151 CPC may be invoked to grant a temporary injunction in cases not covered by Order XXXIX, that power cannot be invoked to nullify or stultify a statutory provision such as Section 41(b). An interim injunction restraining the filing of a winding-up petition was, accordingly, refused. The decision is the doctrinal anchor of the chapter on temporary injunctions and the cross-reference to Order XXXIX CPC.

M/s H.M. Kamaluddin Ansari & Co. v Union of India, (1983) 4 SCC 417; Ravi Singhal v Manali Singhal, (2001) 8 SCC 1

The discretion-on-injunction line. The Supreme Court held that the granting of a temporary injunction is a matter of judicial discretion; the exercise of discretion should not be perverse or irrational; the order must be capable of being carried out, and should not be contradictory and ineffective. The two cases together set the floor on the orders an Indian civil court can pass on an Order XXXIX application.

Indian Cable Co. Ltd. v Smt. Sumitra Chakraborty, AIR 1985 Cal. 248

The standard authority on the higher threshold for interim mandatory injunctions. The case must be unusually strong and clear; a higher standard than the prima facie case ordinarily required for a prohibitory injunction must be met. The court must feel a high degree of assurance that, at the trial, a similar injunction would in all probabilities be granted, and that irreparable injury will be caused if the act complained of is allowed to continue until the final decision. The principle is reflected in the chapter on mandatory injunctions under Section 39.

Meux's Brewery Co. v City of London Electric Lighting Co., (1895) 1 Ch. 287

The English authority that gives Section 40 its substantive content. The four-condition test for substituting damages for an injunction — small injury, money-measurable, small-payment-compensable, oppressive to grant injunction — is read into Section 40(1) as the codification of the Lord Cairns' Act jurisdiction. The case is the doctrinal anchor of the chapter on damages in lieu of or in addition to injunction under Section 40.

Manohar Lal Chopra v Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal, AIR 1962 SC 527

The classical authority on the inherent power under Section 151 CPC. The Supreme Court held that, where the case falls outside the express categories of Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2, the court may grant a temporary injunction in exercise of its inherent power. The power is supplementary and is constrained by the statutory provisions — including, as Cotton Corporation later confirmed, the bars in Section 41 SRA.

Declaratory decrees and ancillary doctrines

Indumatiben v Union Bank of India, AIR 1969 Bom. 423

On the difference between Section 34 and Section 37 of the Act. The Bombay High Court held that, in the case of Section 34, the court cannot grant a declaratory relief where further relief is capable of being granted; in the case of Section 37, there is no such restriction and an injunction can be granted without any prayer for declaration, although in many cases the declaration is inherent in the grant of the injunction. The case is the standard citation on the proviso to Section 34 and on the relationship between declaratory and injunctive reliefs.

Kuldip Singh v Subhash Chander Jain, AIR 2000 SC 1410

On the meaning of "obligation" in Section 38(1). The Supreme Court held that the obligation contemplated is a legal obligation, that is, a duty enforceable by law. The obligation may arise from contract, or be in the nature of a trust, or be an obligation the breach of which amounts to a tort or civil wrong. The case is the canonical authority on what counts as an enforceable "obligation" for perpetual-injunction purposes and feeds the chapter on perpetual injunctions — when granted and when refused.

Quick-reference table — pre-2018 vs post-2018

For the exam-aspirant who wants the architecture in one screen:

1. Pre-2018 (transactions before 1 October 2018). Specific performance is discretionary; K. Narendra, Saradamani, Sundaram Iyer, the unamended Sections 10, 20, and 21 govern. Compensation under Section 21 may be claimed in lieu of specific performance.
2. Post-2018 (transactions on or after 1 October 2018). Specific performance is the rule for enforceable contracts; the recast Sections 10, 11(2), 14, 16 and 21 govern; Katta Sujatha Reddy and Annamalai are the prospectivity authorities; B. Santoshamma applies the readiness rule flexibly. Compensation under Section 21 only "in addition to" specific performance.
3. Possession (both regimes). Lallu Yeshwant Singh, Krishna Ram Mahale, Sanjay Kumar Pandey, Nair Service Society — all unaffected by the 2018 amendment, which only added a clarifying line in Section 6(1) on juridical possession.
4. Injunctions (both regimes). Cotton Corporation, Kamaluddin Ansari, Indian Cable, Meux's Brewery, Manohar Lal Chopra — substantially unaffected by the 2018 amendment; new Sections 20A and 41(ha) overlay the working law in infrastructure-project cases.
5. Declaration (both regimes). Sukhdev Singh, Indumatiben — unaffected by the 2018 amendment, which did not touch Sections 34 and 35.

How the cases map to the doctrinal chapters

Each authority in this chapter does its real work elsewhere in the cluster. Lallu Yeshwant Singh, Krishna Ram Mahale, and Sanjay Kumar Pandey are the working authorities on Section 5 and Section 6 possession. Katta Sujatha Reddy and Annamalai are the prospectivity authorities, and bear on every chapter that touches the post-2018 regime, including Section 14 contracts not specifically enforceable and the choice-of-remedy chapter. Saradamani and B. Santoshamma belong with the chapter on persons entitled to sue and persons against whom specific performance may be enforced. K. Narendra is the discretion authority. Cotton Corporation, Kamaluddin Ansari, Indian Cable and Meux's Brewery all feed the injunction chapters.

Pitfalls and the MCQ angle

The exam-rich points in this chapter are the dates and the doctrinal pivots:

1. Cite the date. 1 October 2018. The amendment came into force on that day. Pre-transactions are governed by the old regime; post-transactions by the new.
2. Get Katta Sujatha right. The case is (2023) 1 SCC 355, decided on 25 August 2022. It holds the amendment is prospective. It is also the keystone for the proposition that specific performance is now an enforceable right, not a discretionary remedy, for post-2018 transactions.
3. Don't generalise K. Narendra. The comparative-hardship doctrine applied under the unamended Section 20. After 2018, it has no free-standing operation; it survives only as a colour to the Section 14 gates.
4. Don't merge possession-cases with the contract-case line. Lallu Yeshwant Singh, Krishna Ram Mahale, Sanjay Kumar Pandey are about Sections 5 and 6 — possession. The 2018 amendment touched these sections only marginally (the juridical-possession clarification in Section 6(1)).
5. Distinguish pre and post-amendment Section 21. Pre-2018: damages in addition to or in lieu of specific performance. Post-2018: only in addition to. Tied to the choice of remedy doctrine and to Sundaram Iyer's election rule.

For an end-to-end review of the 2018 reforms see the chapter on the introduction, object, scheme and scope of the Specific Relief Act; for the special procedural changes see the chapter on special courts and time limits under the 2018 amendment; and for the bridge to the cognate Contract Act remedies see the chapter on remedies for breach under the Indian Contract Act. The full set of chapters in the cluster sits at the Specific Relief Act notes hub.