The Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 does not entrust enforcement to the ordinary machinery of the criminal courts. It creates a self-contained code in which the gateway to prosecution is locked: no magistrate may take cognizance of an offence except on a complaint by a designated officer, every offence is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, and statutory presumptions tilt the evidentiary balance against the clinic. This chapter maps that procedural architecture — from the bar in Section 28, through the trial forum and the presumptions, to the search-and-seizure power and the line of Supreme Court and High Court decisions that police how the courts actually handle these cases.
The procedural scheme: a self-contained enforcement code
Court procedure under the PCPNDT Act cannot be read in isolation from its object. As the Supreme Court repeatedly stressed in Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 301 of 2000, orders of 4 May 2001 and 10 September 2003, reported at (2003) 8 SCC 398) and again in Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India, (2013) 4 SCC 1, the statute is a measure of affirmative protection for the girl child rooted in Article 21, and a court interpreting its procedural provisions must lean towards effective implementation rather than dilution.
Two features distinguish the Act's procedure from a routine criminal case. First, prosecution is initiated by complaint, not by police charge-sheet: Section 28 bars cognizance except on a complaint by the Appropriate Authority or an authorised officer. Second, the substantive offence-defining provisions — principally the bar on communicating sex in Section 5 and the absolute prohibition in Section 6, dealt with in the sibling chapters on the prohibition on communicating the sex of the foetus and on determination of sex being prohibited — feed into a penalty and procedure framework in Chapter VII (Sections 22 to 30). Understanding court procedure therefore means understanding how those chapters interlock. For the broader statutory context, see the PCPNDT Act notes hub.
Section 28: the bar on cognizance and who may complain
Section 28(1) is the procedural keystone. It provides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under this Act except on a complaint made by (a) the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government or the State Government or the Appropriate Authority; or (b) a person who has given notice of not less than fifteen days in the manner prescribed to the Appropriate Authority of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint to the court.
The fifteen-day notice mechanism is deliberate. It allows a citizen or social organisation to galvanise enforcement where the Authority is inert, while giving the Authority a window to act first. The Explanation to Section 28(1) clarifies that "person" includes a social organisation. Section 28(3) reinforces the citizen's standing by empowering the court, on demand by such a complainant, to direct the Appropriate Authority to make available copies of the relevant records in its possession. The Appropriate Authority and its tiers are explained in the chapter on the regulation of genetic counselling centres and clinics.
The structure of Section 28 borrows from a familiar family of special statutes — the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Environment (Protection) Act and similar laws — in which prosecution is channelled through a designated regulator rather than left to the open process of an FIR followed by a police report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The policy reason is twofold. First, the offences are technical and turn on specialised records and equipment, so the legislature trusted the regulator who already inspects and registers clinics to assess whether a prosecution is warranted. Second, by interposing the Authority, the Act guards against frivolous or extortionate complaints against medical professionals while still leaving a citizen-activated route open through the notice procedure. The result is that the very first question in any PCPNDT prosecution is not "what is the evidence?" but "is there a competent complaint?" — a threshold the defence will invariably test.
Trial forum: no court inferior to a Metropolitan Magistrate or JMFC
Section 28(2) fixes the trial forum: no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under the Act. The choice of a first-class magistrate, rather than a special court, reflects a deliberate legislative balance — the offences are serious but are tried at a level accessible across districts. This combines with the Section 28(1) gateway to produce the rule applied in Manish Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1154, where the Delhi High Court held that the Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class is competent to take cognizance and try an offence under the Act on the complaint of an Appropriate Authority or an authorised officer.
Because the magistrate's jurisdiction is keyed to a valid complaint, a defect in the complainant's authority is fatal at the threshold. That is why the identity of the complainant — addressed next — is so frequently litigated.
Who can validly complain: the Appropriate Authority question
Section 28 confers the right to complain on the Appropriate Authority or an officer specifically authorised. Courts have read this strictly. In Dr. Vinod Kumar Bassi v. State of U.P., 2024 LiveLaw (AB) 193, the Allahabad High Court held that an Additional Chief Medical Officer is not an Appropriate Authority and has no authority to file a complaint for an offence under the Act; a complaint by such an officer, absent valid authorisation, cannot ground cognizance. The procedural lesson is that the prosecution must demonstrate, on the face of the complaint, that the complainant is either the Appropriate Authority constituted under Section 17 or an officer duly authorised.
Conversely, the Act does not require the Appropriate Authority to be a multi-member body before it can complain. In Manish Gupta, the Delhi High Court rejected the argument that a complaint by a single-member Appropriate Authority was invalid, distinguishing between State-level authorities under Section 17(3)(a) and district or sub-district authorities under Section 17(3)(b), and holding that a validly constituted single-member district Authority can file a competent complaint.
It is important to note the doctrinal line the courts draw here. The number of members who must concur differs depending on the function being exercised. For filing a complaint under Section 28, a single-member district Authority suffices where the Authority is so constituted; but for authorising a search and seizure under Section 30, the Supreme Court in Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg insisted on a collective decision by the whole Authority. The two propositions are reconciled by reading each power against its own statutory text and its potential for abuse: a search is a coercive invasion of premises requiring the safeguard of collective deliberation, whereas the complaint is the considered culmination of that earlier process. For exam purposes the safest formulation is that the complainant must be the Appropriate Authority or its authorised officer, and that the precise composition required tracks the function and the constitution of the Authority concerned.
The role of the police and the FIR controversy
Whether an offence under the Act can be set in motion by an FIR and police investigation has divided the High Courts. The Punjab and Haryana High Court has taken the view that while an FIR may be lodged and the police may investigate, cognizance can be taken only on a complaint by the Appropriate Authority as mandated by Section 28. A stricter view emerged in Dr. Brij Pal Singh v. State of U.P., 2024:AHC:159207, where the Allahabad High Court held that registration of an FIR for PCPNDT violations is impermissible and that the role of the police is confined to assisting the Appropriate Authority; the bench referred questions on the point for authoritative resolution given divergent High Court opinion.
The Supreme Court clarified one facet of this debate in Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 INSC 176, holding that a discharge in a case arising from a police FIR has no bearing on a separate complaint filed by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28 — the two streams are distinct, and cognizance ultimately rests on the statutory complaint, not the police report.
Section 27: cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable
Section 27 declares that every offence under the Act shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. The procedural consequences are significant. "Cognizable" ordinarily permits arrest and investigation without a magistrate's order; "non-bailable" means bail is a matter of judicial discretion rather than right; and "non-compoundable" forecloses any settlement or withdrawal by the parties, reflecting the public-interest character of the offence.
The non-compoundable character is the procedural counterpart to the Section 28 complaint bar: just as the complaint cannot be initiated by a private accuser at large, the prosecution once launched cannot be bought off by private compromise. Read with the presumptions discussed below, Section 27 ensures that sex-selection prosecutions are not quietly extinguished, which the Supreme Court in Voluntary Health Association of Punjab identified as a chronic enforcement failure requiring strict judicial monitoring.
The non-bailable classification also affects how the magistrate handles bail. Because bail is discretionary rather than a matter of right, the court weighs the gravity of the offence, the risk of tampering with the clinic's records and the public interest in deterring foeticide. In practice, courts have been cautious about granting bail in well-documented cases, mindful of the Supreme Court's repeated exhortations in CEHAT and Voluntary Health Association of Punjab that the Act be enforced with rigour. Equally, the cognizable label means the investigative machinery — whether the police in an assisting role or the Authority itself — can act promptly to secure equipment and records before they are destroyed, which matters because, as discussed below, PCPNDT trials stand or fall on documentary evidence.
Section 24: the presumption against the woman's family
The Act builds an evidentiary presumption into the trial. Section 24 provides that the court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the pregnant woman was compelled by her husband or any relative, as the case may be, to undergo the prohibited diagnostic technique, and that such persons shall be liable for abetment of the offence under Section 23(3). The presumption shifts the burden onto the family members to displace the inference of coercion.
This protective presumption dovetails with the legislative policy of shielding the woman herself from prosecution while reaching those who pressure her. It is a rebuttable presumption — the contrary may be proved — but it materially alters how the court approaches the evidence at trial, and counsel must lead positive proof to rebut it rather than relying on the prosecution's failure to establish coercion affirmatively.
The presumption must be read alongside the principle, articulated in the line of Supreme Court PILs, that the woman who undergoes a prohibited procedure is treated by the Act as a victim rather than an offender. Section 23(3) and Section 24 together fix abetment liability on the husband and relatives, and the burden of disproving coercion lies on them once the foundational facts are shown. For a court, the practical effect is that the evidentiary spotlight at trial turns on the conduct of the family and the clinic, not on the pregnant woman, and a defence built merely on her apparent willingness will not displace the statutory inference. This is a deliberate departure from the ordinary criminal-law presumption of innocence, justified by the Act's protective object under Article 21 as repeatedly affirmed in CEHAT v. Union of India.
Section 30: search, seizure and the procedure for collecting evidence
Section 30(1) empowers the Appropriate Authority, or an officer authorised by it, where it has reason to believe that an offence under the Act has been or is being committed, to enter and search any place and to seize and seal records, objects or other material. Sub-section (2) attracts the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to searches and seizures, so far as may be, to action under Section 30. The expression "reason to believe" is a safeguard against arbitrary action and requires the Authority to apply its mind on objective material.
The Supreme Court in Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 INSC 176, held that the decision to authorise a search must be that of the Appropriate Authority acting collectively, and that a search or sting operation directed by only a single member — for instance the Chairperson alone — of a multi-member District Appropriate Authority is illegal. Crucially, however, the Court held that illegality of the search does not by itself render the seized material inadmissible: the evidence gathered may still be relied upon subject to the rules of relevancy and the test of admissibility. Procedural irregularity in authorising the search and the evidentiary value of what is found are thus distinct questions.
Record-keeping, Form F and the evidentiary spine of the trial
Because sex-determination offences are clandestine, the prosecution's evidence frequently turns on the clinic's records rather than direct testimony. Section 4 and the Rules require maintenance of Form F for every procedure. In Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 129 of 2017, decided 3 May 2019), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of Sections 23(1) and 23(2) and held that complete filling of Form F is mandatory, observing that non-maintenance of records is a "springboard for commission of the offence of foeticide" and not a mere clerical error.
The procedural significance is direct: incomplete or vague records are themselves treated as a contravention attracting penalty, and they furnish the material on which the court convicts. A trial under the Act is, in large measure, a documentary trial, which is why the search-and-seizure power in Section 30 and the obligation to produce records under Section 28(3) are so central to procedure. The definitional underpinnings of these records are covered in the chapter on definitions.
The High Courts have applied FOGSI robustly. In a series of decisions the Punjab and Haryana High Court has upheld convictions resting principally on defective or missing Form F entries, treating the failure to maintain complete records as substantive proof of contravention rather than a venial lapse to be excused. The procedural consequence for the defence is stark: it is not enough to argue that no act of sex determination was directly proved, because the offence of non-maintenance of records is itself complete on the documents, and the court may convict on that footing alone. This evidentiary architecture — mandatory records, a documentary trial, and a refusal to treat record-keeping as clerical — is what gives the Section 28 complaint and the Section 30 seizure their bite, and it is the single most examinable feature of court procedure under the Act.
Penalties and the parallel disciplinary track under Section 23
On conviction, Section 23(1) prescribes imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees for a first offence, and up to five years and fifty thousand rupees for any subsequent offence. Beyond the criminal sentence, Section 23(2) creates a parallel disciplinary consequence: on framing of charges by the court, the Appropriate Authority reports the registered medical practitioner to the State Medical Council, which may suspend registration during the pendency of the case, and on conviction removes the practitioner's name from the register for five years for a first offence and permanently for a subsequent offence.
Section 23(3) extends liability to those who seek the aid of a clinic for sex selection, dovetailing with the Section 24 presumption against the woman's family. The procedural takeaway is that a single set of facts can trigger two tracks — the criminal trial before the magistrate and disciplinary action before the Medical Council — running on charge-framing and conviction respectively. The constitutional validity of this scheme was settled in FOGSI v. Union of India (2019).
Offences by companies and abetment
Where a Genetic Counselling Centre, Laboratory or Clinic is run by a company or a body corporate, the Act adopts the standard deeming device: persons in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business at the time of the offence are deemed guilty, subject to the defence of due diligence and absence of knowledge, while directors, managers or officers whose consent, connivance or neglect is shown are independently liable. This mirrors comparable provisions in other regulatory statutes and ensures that the corporate form is not a shield.
Abetment is woven through the penalty scheme. Section 23(3) makes any person who seeks the aid of a centre for sex selection liable, and the Section 24 presumption channels abetment liability towards the husband and relatives. Procedurally, this means a single complaint may arraign the doctor, the clinic's owners and the relatives together, with the court applying the statutory presumption to the family members at trial.
Judicial monitoring and the reach of court orders
Court procedure under the Act has been shaped not only by individual trials but by continuing-mandamus PILs. In CEHAT v. Union of India and again in Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India, (2013) 4 SCC 1, the Supreme Court issued structural directions — summoning Health Secretaries, ordering speedier disposal of pending prosecutions, and insisting on regular reporting — recognising that slow and ineffective enforcement was defeating the Act.
The Court's procedural reach extended even to intermediaries. In Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC 229, the Supreme Court directed search engines to develop an in-house "doctrine of auto-block" mechanism to prevent display of sponsored content and advertisements relating to pre-natal sex determination, holding that the obligation was affirmative and ongoing rather than triggered only by specific notice. While this concerned online regulation rather than trial procedure, it illustrates how courts have read the Act's enforcement obligations expansively. The Act's object and origins are traced in the chapter on the introduction, object and background of sex-selective abortion.
Procedural checklist for an exam answer
A clean answer on PCPNDT court procedure should move through the gateway, the forum, the offence character, the presumptions and the evidence. First, cognizance is barred under Section 28 except on a complaint by the Appropriate Authority, an authorised officer, or a citizen who has given fifteen days' notice; verify the complainant's authority, as Dr. Vinod Kumar Bassi shows. Second, the trial lies before a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class under Section 28(2), and a single-member district Authority can validly complain (Manish Gupta).
Third, every offence is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable (Section 27), so no compromise is possible. Fourth, the Section 24 presumption of coercion operates against the husband and relatives. Fifth, evidence flows from collective search and seizure under Section 30 — a single-member search is illegal but the material may still be admissible (Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg) — and from mandatory Form F records (FOGSI). Finally, conviction triggers both the criminal sentence and Medical Council action under Section 23(2). The interface with the Central Supervisory Board on policy and the registration regime rounds out the procedural picture.
Frequently asked questions
Can a magistrate take cognizance of a PCPNDT offence on a police charge-sheet?
No. Section 28(1) bars cognizance except on a complaint by the Appropriate Authority, an authorised officer, or a citizen who has given fifteen days' notice. In Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 INSC 176, the Supreme Court held that even a discharge in a police-FIR case does not affect a separate complaint under Section 28, underscoring that cognizance rests on the statutory complaint.
Which court tries an offence under the PCPNDT Act?
Section 28(2) provides that no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try an offence under the Act. The Delhi High Court applied this in Manish Gupta v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1154.
Are PCPNDT offences bailable or compoundable?
Neither. Section 27 expressly declares every offence under the Act to be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. This reflects the public-interest character of the offence and means the prosecution cannot be settled or withdrawn by private compromise.
Can an ordinary citizen or NGO file a complaint?
Yes. Under Section 28(1)(b) a person, including a social organisation per the Explanation, who has given not less than fifteen days' notice to the Appropriate Authority of the alleged offence and of the intention to complain may approach the court. Section 28(3) lets the court direct the Authority to supply relevant records to such a complainant.
Is a search ordered by a single member of the Appropriate Authority valid?
No. In Dr. Naresh Kumar Garg v. State of Haryana, 2026 INSC 176, the Supreme Court held that authorisation of a search under Section 30 must be a collective decision of the Appropriate Authority; a search directed by only the Chairperson is illegal. However, the Court held the seized material may still be admissible subject to relevancy and the test of admissibility.
How important are Form F records in a PCPNDT trial?
They are central. In FOGSI v. Union of India (W.P. (C) No. 129 of 2017, decided 3 May 2019), the Supreme Court upheld Sections 23(1) and 23(2) and held complete filling of Form F mandatory, treating non-maintenance of records as a springboard for foeticide rather than a clerical error. PCPNDT trials are largely documentary, turning on these records.