Chapter VII of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 is the enforcement engine of the entire statute. Sections 22 to 28 convert the substantive prohibitions of Section 5 and Section 6 into hard criminal consequences: a sweeping advertisement ban, escalating imprisonment and fines for medical professionals and those who seek their aid, a reverse-onus presumption that the pregnant woman was coerced, vicarious liability for companies, and a procedural lattice that makes every offence cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. For the judiciary and CLAT-PG aspirant, this chapter is where doctrine meets deterrence, and where the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to dilute a welfare statute aimed at the survival of the girl child.
The architecture of Chapter VII
Chapter VII is titled "Offences and Penalties" and runs from Section 22 to Section 28. It is best read as a graded scheme. Section 22 criminalises advertisement of pre-conception or pre-natal sex determination and selection. Section 23 is the principal penal provision, punishing both the supply side (medical professionals and owners of registered units) and the demand side (those who seek their aid). Section 24 supplies an evidentiary presumption that shifts the burden onto the husband or relative who procured the procedure. Section 25 is a residuary penalty for any contravention for which no specific punishment is provided. Section 26 fixes liability on companies and their officers. Sections 27 and 28 are procedural keystones: the former classifies every offence as cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, while the latter restricts who may set the criminal law in motion and which court may try the offence.
The deterrent posture of the chapter cannot be understood in isolation from the substantive prohibitions it enforces. Section 5 forbids communicating the sex of the foetus by any means; Section 6 prohibits determination of sex altogether except for the limited diagnostic purposes in Section 4. Crucially, the proviso to Section 4(3) deems any deficiency or inaccuracy in the prescribed records to be a contravention of Section 5 or Section 6 unless the contrary is proved by the person conducting the ultrasonography. This deeming clause is the doctrinal bridge between record-keeping lapses and the penal provisions of Chapter VII, and it is the reason a blank entry in Form F can attract prosecution under Section 23. Readers may revisit the regulatory base in regulation of genetic counselling centres and clinics and the foundational concepts in the PCPNDT Act hub.
Section 22: the sweeping ban on advertisement
Section 22 was substituted by the 2003 Amendment Act and is deliberately expansive. Sub-section (1) bars any person, organisation, Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic, including any clinic, laboratory or centre having an ultrasound machine or imaging machine or scanner, or any other technology capable of undertaking determination of sex of the foetus or sex selection, from issuing, publishing, distributing or communicating any advertisement "in any form, including internet" regarding facilities of pre-natal determination of sex or sex selection before conception. Sub-section (2) widens the net to any advertisement "by any means whatsoever, scientific or otherwise" regarding such determination or selection. Sub-section (3) prescribes the punishment: imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees.
The Explanation to Section 22 defines "advertisement" capaciously to include any notice, circular, label, wrapper or other document, including advertisement through internet or any other media, and any visible representation made by means of any hoarding, wall-painting, signal, light, sound, smoke or gas. The deliberate inclusion of "internet" and "sound, smoke or gas" signals Parliament's intent to capture every conceivable medium. In Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, the Supreme Court read Section 22 as not confined to commercial advertisements; the object of the law is to prevent any message or communication that results in determination or selection of sex by any means whatsoever. The Court progressively directed search engines such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft to develop an "auto-block" mechanism to suppress sponsored links and advertisements offending Section 22 whenever Indian users entered specified keywords, and to constitute a Nodal Agency to receive complaints. This litigation is the leading authority on the application of Section 22 to the digital sphere.
Section 23(1): punishing the medical supply side
Section 23(1) is the heart of the penal scheme. It applies to any medical geneticist, gynaecologist, registered medical practitioner or any person who owns a Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic, or is employed in such a centre, laboratory or clinic and renders professional or technical services to or at such a unit, whether on an honorary basis or otherwise. Such a person who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or the rules made thereunder is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees, and on any subsequent conviction with imprisonment up to five years and fine up to fifty thousand rupees.
Two features deserve emphasis. First, the phrase "any of the provisions of this Act or rules" sweeps in not merely the dramatic offence of sex determination but also breaches of the regulatory machinery, including the obligation to maintain complete records. Second, liability extends to honorary service providers, foreclosing the argument that an unpaid consultant escapes the penal net. The escalation for a subsequent conviction reflects the legislative intent to treat recidivism in this field with particular severity. The provision must be read with Section 6, which it principally enforces.
Form F, record-keeping and the FOGSI judgment
The single most important case on Section 23 is Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283. FOGSI challenged the constitutional validity of Sections 23(1) and 23(2), contending that a mere clerical lapse in filling Form F could not be equated with the substantive offence of sex determination, that the provision treated unequals as equals contrary to Article 14, and that it disproportionately burdened the right to practise a profession under Article 19(1)(g). A Bench of Arun Mishra and Vineet Saran, JJ. rejected the challenge in its entirety.
The Court held that complete maintenance of Form F is mandatory, not directory, and that incomplete records cannot be dismissed as inconsequential clerical errors. In its memorable formulation, "non-maintenance of record is a springboard for the commission of the offence of foeticide." The reasoning rests on the proviso to Section 4(3): once a deficiency or inaccuracy in the prescribed record is established, a contravention of Section 5 or Section 6 is presumed unless the practitioner proves the contrary. The Court reasoned that diluting Section 23 would defeat the object of the Act and relegate the right to life of the girl child under Article 21 to a formality. FOGSI thus authoritatively settles that record-keeping discipline is not bureaucratic pedantry but the very evidentiary backbone of enforcement, and that Section 23 survives constitutional scrutiny.
Section 23(2): suspension and removal from the medical register
Section 23(2), as substituted in 2003, supplies a professional sanction that operates alongside the criminal penalty. The name of a registered medical practitioner against whom proceedings are taken is to be reported by the Appropriate Authority to the State Medical Council concerned for necessary action, including suspension of registration if the charges are framed by the court, and which is to continue till the case is disposed of. On conviction, the consequence is removal of the practitioner's name from the register of the Council for a period of five years for the first offence and permanently for the subsequent offence.
This provision is significant for two reasons. It demonstrates that the Act layers a regulatory disability over the ordinary criminal sanction, attacking the practitioner's licence to practise rather than merely imposing imprisonment and fine. And it ties the timing of suspension to the framing of charges, ensuring that an accused doctor cannot continue to operate the very machinery alleged to have been misused while the trial is pending. In FOGSI the Court specifically upheld this sub-section against the argument that suspension on the framing of charges was excessive, holding that the gravity of the mischief justified the stringency.
Sections 23(3) and 23(4): the demand side and the woman's protection
Section 23(3) targets the demand side. Any person who seeks the aid of a Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory, Genetic Clinic, ultrasound clinic or imaging clinic, or of a medical geneticist, gynaecologist, sonologist, imaging specialist, registered medical practitioner or any other person, for sex selection or for conducting pre-natal diagnostic techniques on any pregnant woman for purposes other than those specified in Section 4(2), is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to fifty thousand rupees for the first offence, and on subsequent conviction with imprisonment up to five years and fine up to one lakh rupees. The higher fine ceiling for seekers than for professionals at the first-offence stage underscores that the law treats the procurer of sex selection as a primary wrongdoer, not a peripheral one.
Section 23(4) is a protective carve-out inserted for the removal of doubts. It clarifies that the provisions of sub-section (3) shall not apply to the woman who was compelled to undergo such diagnostic techniques or such selection. The legislature thereby recognises the pregnant woman as a victim of familial and social coercion rather than an offender, and deliberately removes her from the ambit of the demand-side penalty. This carve-out dovetails with the evidentiary presumption in Section 24, which presumes that she acted under compulsion.
Section 24: the reverse-onus presumption of compulsion
Section 24, substituted by the 2003 Amendment, creates a statutory presumption that operates notwithstanding anything in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The court shall presume, unless the contrary is proved, that the pregnant woman was compelled by her husband or any other relative, as the case may be, to undergo a pre-natal diagnostic technique for purposes other than those specified in Section 4(2). Such a husband or relative is then liable for abetment of the offence under Section 23(3) and is punishable for the offence specified in that section.
The provision is a classic reverse-onus clause: it presumes coercion against the woman and casts the criminal liability onto the person who procured the procedure. Read together with the protective exemption in Section 23(4), Section 24 reflects a coherent legislative philosophy that the demand for sex selection typically originates not with the woman but with the patriarchal family, and that the law's penal force should fall on the coercer. The presumption is rebuttable, so the husband or relative may lead evidence to displace it, but the burden of proof is decisively shifted. For aspirants, Section 24 is a fertile illustration of how a welfare statute can constitutionally re-engineer the ordinary rules of evidence to serve a compelling social object.
Section 25: the residuary penalty
Section 25 is the catch-all provision. Whoever contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or any rules made thereunder for which no penalty has been elsewhere provided is punishable with imprisonment up to three months, or fine up to one thousand rupees, or both. In the case of a continuing contravention, an additional fine up to five hundred rupees for every day during which the contravention continues after conviction for the first such contravention may be imposed.
Section 25 performs an important gap-filling function. The Act and its rules impose numerous obligations, ranging from display of notices to maintenance of registers to conditions of registration, that are not individually backed by a bespoke penalty. Section 25 ensures that no breach of the regulatory regime goes wholly unpunished. The continuing-offence component, modelled on familiar regulatory statutes, recognises that some contraventions persist over time and that a one-time fine would be an inadequate deterrent against ongoing non-compliance. Because the penalty is comparatively modest, Section 25 typically applies to procedural and registration defaults rather than to the grave substantive offences captured by Sections 22 and 23.
Section 26: offences by companies
Section 26 imports the standard vicarious-liability template used across Indian regulatory law. Under sub-section (1), where an offence under the Act is committed by a company, every person who at the time the offence was committed was in charge of, and responsible to, the company for the conduct of its business, as well as the company itself, is deemed guilty and liable to be proceeded against and punished. The proviso furnishes the usual defence: such a person is not liable if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its commission.
Sub-section (2) extends liability, notwithstanding sub-section (1), to any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company where it is proved that the offence was committed with his consent or connivance or was attributable to his neglect. The Explanation defines "company" to include any body corporate, a firm or other association of individuals, and "director" in relation to a firm to mean a partner. The structure is the well-settled two-tier scheme familiar from companion legislation: sub-section (1) fixes presumptive liability on those in charge subject to a due-diligence defence, while sub-section (2) requires affirmative proof of consent, connivance or neglect for officers who are not otherwise in day-to-day charge. Genetic clinics and diagnostic chains operated through corporate or partnership vehicles are squarely within this net.
Section 27: cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable
Section 27 is short but consequential: every offence under the Act shall be cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. Each limb carries practical weight. Because the offences are cognizable, the police machinery and the Appropriate Authority can act on the offence without the prior leave that a non-cognizable offence would require, though the actual prosecution is channelled through the complaint mechanism of Section 28. Because they are non-bailable, bail is not a matter of right but lies in the discretion of the court, reflecting the seriousness with which the legislature views sex selection. And because they are non-compoundable, the parties cannot privately settle or withdraw the prosecution; the offence is treated as a wrong against society and the unborn girl child rather than a private dispute.
The non-compoundable character is particularly important in practice. Sex-selection offences often involve a willing patient or family and a complicit practitioner, so the absence of a victim-complainant in the ordinary sense could otherwise tempt the parties to compromise. By placing these offences beyond compounding, Section 27 prevents the criminal process from being neutralised by collusion between the demand side and the supply side. The classification also aligns with the Supreme Court's repeated insistence, in cases such as Voluntary Health Association of Punjab, that the Act be implemented with full rigour.
Section 28: who may complain and which court may try
Section 28 controls the gateway to prosecution. Under sub-section (1), no court shall take cognizance of an offence under the Act except on a complaint made by (a) the Appropriate Authority concerned, or any officer authorised in this behalf by the Central or State Government or the Appropriate Authority; or (b) a person who has given notice of not less than fifteen days in the prescribed manner to the Appropriate Authority of the alleged offence and of his intention to make a complaint to the court. The fifteen-day period was substituted in 2003 for the earlier thirty days, easing the burden on private complainants and whistle-blowers. The Explanation clarifies that "person" includes a social organisation, thereby enabling NGOs and activist bodies to act as complainants.
Sub-section (2) confines trial to a court of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class, fixing the forum and ensuring a measure of judicial seniority. Sub-section (3) empowers a private complainant proceeding under clause (b) to demand that the Appropriate Authority make available copies of the relevant records in its possession, addressing the evidentiary asymmetry that would otherwise cripple citizen enforcement. The citizen-complainant mechanism is a deliberate design feature: the Act mobilises civil society to supplement official enforcement, a strategy the Supreme Court endorsed in Centre for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 398, where it issued detailed directions to galvanise the dormant statutory machinery.
Judicial philosophy: no dilution of a survival statute
A consistent thread runs through the Supreme Court's treatment of Chapter VII: refusal to dilute. In CEHAT v. Union of India, (2003) 8 SCC 398, the Court found the Act largely unimplemented and issued a battery of directions to the Centre, States and Appropriate Authorities to operationalise registration, record-keeping, inspection and prosecution. In Voluntary Health Association of Punjab v. Union of India, (2013) 4 SCC 1, and in subsequent orders, the Court reinforced strict implementation, directing faster disposal of cases, monitoring of unregistered clinics, regulation of the sale of ultrasound machines, and suspension of registration of convicted doctors. In Sabu Mathew George, it extended the advertisement prohibition into the architecture of internet search. And in FOGSI v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283, it shut the door on the argument that record-keeping defaults are trivial.
The unifying rationale is the constitutional value attached to the survival of the girl child under Article 21 and the State's obligation under Articles 15(3) and 39 to protect women and children. The Court has treated the declining child sex ratio as a constitutional emergency that justifies a stringent reading of penal and procedural provisions. For the examinee, the lesson is doctrinal as well as practical: when a welfare statute confronts an objection grounded in professional inconvenience or procedural technicality, the judicial instinct under the PCPNDT regime has been to favour the object of the Act over the convenience of the regulated.
Exam pointers and common traps
Several distinctions recur in examinations and deserve crisp recall. The advertisement offence under Section 22(3) carries imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees, identical to the first-offence penalty for professionals under Section 23(1). The demand-side penalty in Section 23(3), however, carries a higher fine ceiling of fifty thousand rupees for the first offence and one lakh rupees on subsequent conviction, a frequently tested contrast. The residuary penalty in Section 25 is a modest three months or one thousand rupees or both, with a continuing fine of five hundred rupees per day, and applies only where no other penalty is prescribed.
Candidates should remember that Section 23(4) and Section 24 together immunise the woman and shift liability to the coercing husband or relative; the woman is a victim, not an accused. The notice period under Section 28(1)(b) is fifteen days after the 2003 amendment, not thirty. Trial lies only before a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class under Section 28(2). And under Section 27, every offence is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable, so a compromise between the doctor and the family cannot end the prosecution. Finally, the proviso to Section 4(3) supplies the deeming link that allows a record-keeping lapse to be prosecuted as a Section 5 or Section 6 contravention through the penal route of Section 23, the principle crystallised in FOGSI. For the wider statutory context, see the definitions and the Central Supervisory Board chapters.
Frequently asked questions
What is the punishment under Section 23 of the PCPNDT Act for a medical practitioner?
Under Section 23(1), a medical geneticist, gynaecologist, registered medical practitioner or owner or employee of a registered unit who contravenes the Act or rules is punishable with imprisonment up to three years and fine up to ten thousand rupees for the first offence, rising to five years and fifty thousand rupees on a subsequent conviction. Section 23(2) additionally provides for suspension of registration once charges are framed and removal of the name from the medical register for five years (first offence) or permanently (subsequent offence).
Can a pregnant woman be punished under the PCPNDT Act for undergoing sex determination?
No. Section 23(4) expressly states that the demand-side penalty in Section 23(3) does not apply to a woman who was compelled to undergo the diagnostic technique or selection. Section 24 reinforces this by presuming, unless the contrary is proved, that she was compelled by her husband or a relative, who is then liable for abetment under Section 23(3). The statutory scheme treats the woman as a victim, not an offender.
Why did the Supreme Court uphold Section 23 in the FOGSI case?
In Federation of Obstetric and Gynaecological Societies of India (FOGSI) v. Union of India, (2019) 6 SCC 283, the Court rejected the argument that incomplete Form F entries are mere clerical errors. It held that complete maintenance of records is mandatory, that non-maintenance of record is a springboard for the commission of foeticide, and that diluting Section 23 would relegate the girl child's right to life under Article 21 to a formality. Sections 23(1) and 23(2) were held constitutionally valid.
Are offences under the PCPNDT Act bailable or compoundable?
Neither. Section 27 declares that every offence under the Act is cognizable, non-bailable and non-compoundable. The non-compoundable character is especially significant because it prevents the doctor and the family from privately settling the matter, treating the offence as a wrong against society and the unborn girl child rather than a private dispute.
Who can file a complaint under the PCPNDT Act and before which court?
Under Section 28(1), only the Appropriate Authority or an authorised officer may complain, or a private person (including a social organisation) who has given the Appropriate Authority not less than fifteen days' notice of the alleged offence and of his intention to complain. The offence can be tried only by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class under Section 28(2), and the complainant may demand copies of relevant records under Section 28(3).
How does Section 22 apply to online advertisements?
Section 22 expressly covers advertisements "in any form, including internet" and "by any means whatsoever, scientific or otherwise," with punishment under Section 22(3) of up to three years' imprisonment and a fine up to ten thousand rupees. In Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, the Supreme Court directed search engines such as Google, Yahoo and Microsoft to operate an auto-block mechanism suppressing offending sponsored results for specified keywords, confirming that the ban reaches the digital sphere.