Drafting of Affidavits and Verification →

An affidavit is the workhorse of civil litigation: it launches interlocutory applications, supports plaints under the amended Code, proves service, and increasingly carries examination-in-chief itself. Yet it is also the document most often drafted carelessly, with a boilerplate verification that swears everything “true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief” and discloses none of the three. The courts have been unsparing about such slipshod work. From Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar in 1909 to Amar Singh v. Union of India a century later, the message is constant: an affidavit that does not separate personal knowledge from information and belief, and does not disclose the source of each, is no affidavit at all. This note treats affidavit drafting and verification as a single craft — governed by Order XIX and Section 139 CPC, the Oaths Act, 1969, and the verification discipline of Order VI Rule 15 — and shows how to draft a body and jurat that will survive scrutiny, and what happens when they do not.

What an affidavit is — and is not

An affidavit is a written statement of facts made voluntarily and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the person making it (the deponent), taken before a person having authority to administer the oath. It is, in substance, sworn testimony reduced to writing in advance of, or in lieu of, oral deposition. The Code of Civil Procedure does not define “affidavit”; the term draws its content from Order XIX, Section 139, the Oaths Act, 1969, and a long line of authority. Three features distinguish it: it is a statement of fact, not argument or law; it is made on oath or solemn affirmation; and it is sworn before an authorised officer who certifies the swearing in the jurat.

What an affidavit is not is equally important for the draftsman. It is not pleading — it does not, by itself, raise the issues a court tries; that function belongs to the plaint and the written statement. Nor, as a rule, is an affidavit “evidence” in the trial sense: in Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Supreme Court clarified that the affidavit now required to accompany a plaint under Order VI Rule 15(4) and Section 26(2) does not become evidence for the purpose of trial — it merely fixes responsibility on the deponent for the truth of the pleaded facts. Confusing the affidavit with the substantive pleading it supports is the commonest drafting error, and the source of much wasted oath-taking. For the place of this skill in the wider drafting curriculum, see the Pleading & Drafting hub and its introduction.

The statutory framework: Order XIX, Section 139 and the Oaths Act

The governing provisions are compact. Order XIX of the CPC contains three rules. Rule 1 empowers the court, at any time for sufficient reason, to order that any particular fact may be proved by affidavit, subject to the opposite party's right to require the deponent's attendance for cross-examination where the deponent can be produced. Rule 2 deals with affidavit evidence on applications and the right to cross-examine the deponent. Rule 3 — the heart of the matter for drafting — confines affidavits “to such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his belief may be admitted: provided that the grounds thereof are stated.” Rule 3 also visits the costs of an affidavit that needlessly sets out hearsay, argument, or copies of documents upon the party filing it.

Section 139 CPC identifies who may administer the oath or affirmation on an affidavit: a court or magistrate, a notary appointed under the Notaries Act, 1952, or an officer or person appointed by the High Court, or any other authorised officer. The Oaths Act, 1969 supplies the power to administer oaths: Section 3 lists the courts and persons who may do so, and Section 4 extends that power, for affidavits in judicial proceedings, to any person empowered by the High Court, and for other affidavits to persons empowered by the State Government. The practical upshot is that a civil affidavit is competently sworn before a commissioner of oaths or notary so empowered; an affidavit sworn before someone outside that list is defective in its execution, not merely its content.

Anatomy of a well-drafted affidavit

A serviceable affidavit has a fixed skeleton, and a draftsman who departs from it invites objection. The title names the court, the cause number, and the parties, exactly as in the cause to which the affidavit relates. The commencement (the deponent clause) identifies the deponent in full — name, age, parentage or spouse's name, occupation, and residential address — followed by the formula “do hereby solemnly affirm and state as follows” (or “make oath and say”, where an oath rather than affirmation is taken). Age and address are not decorative: they tie the deposition to a real, locatable person and underpin any later perjury action.

The body is divided into consecutively numbered paragraphs, each confined so far as possible to a single fact or a closely related cluster of facts. The first paragraph conventionally establishes the deponent's locus and competence — for example, that the deponent is the plaintiff, or a partner or authorised officer of the plaintiff firm or company who is acquainted with the facts of the case and competent to swear the affidavit. Where the deponent swears on behalf of a company, the authority (board resolution or power of attorney) should be pleaded and annexed; an affidavit by a stranger to the facts is worthless, a point to which the verification jurisprudence returns again and again. The body must be confined to facts; submissions of law, argument, and rhetoric belong in the application or in counsel's address, not in a sworn statement.

The affidavit closes with the verification clause, then the deponent's signature, and finally the jurat — the officer's certificate that the affidavit was solemnly affirmed (or sworn) before him by the deponent on a stated date and at a stated place. The jurat is what converts a signed statement into an affidavit; an unsworn or improperly attested document is not one. Annexures referred to in the body should be marked (Annexure A-1, A-2 and so on), each paginated and itself supported by the verification where its contents are deposed to.

Order XIX Rule 3: knowledge, information and belief

The single rule that does most work in affidavit drafting is Order XIX Rule 3, and its logic is worth internalising. The default is that an affidavit may depose only to facts within the deponent's own knowledge — facts he personally perceived and can therefore prove. The exception is for interlocutory applications, where the deponent may state matters of belief, but only “provided that the grounds thereof are stated”. In other words, on an interlocutory application a deponent may say “I believe X”, but must add “because Y” — the source and ground of the belief.

The leading exposition is Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar, (1910) ILR 37 Cal 259, where the Calcutta High Court (Jenkins C.J. and Woodroffe J.) struck at affidavits that contained only a sweeping averment that the contents were true “to the best of the deponent's knowledge, information and belief” without indicating what was of knowledge, what of information, and on what grounds the belief rested. The Court held that every affidavit must comply strictly with Rule 3: facts of knowledge and facts of belief must be kept distinct, and where belief is deposed to, its grounds must be stated. A century later the Supreme Court in Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69, reiterated the same discipline, warning that perfunctory and slipshod affidavits inconsistent with Order XIX Rule 3 should not be entertained. The drafting lesson is mechanical but unforgiving: tag every paragraph, in the verification, to the source on which it rests.

Drafting the verification clause

The verification is where Rule 3 is operationalised, and it is the clause examiners and judges read first. A model verification does three things. It identifies the deponent and the place and date of verification. It then allocates the paragraphs by source — for example: “I, the above-named deponent, verify that the contents of paragraphs 1 to 4 are true to my personal knowledge; that the contents of paragraphs 5 and 6 are based on information received from [named source], which I believe to be true; and that the contents of paragraphs 7 and 8 are based on the records of the company maintained in the ordinary course of business, which I believe to be true.” Finally it states that nothing material has been concealed and no part of it is false.

The cardinal sin is the catch-all verification that swears the whole affidavit “true to the best of my knowledge, information and belief” without telling the reader which paragraph is which. In State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, AIR 1952 SC 317, a Constitution Bench condemned exactly this: the body of the affidavit disclosed that certain matters were within the deponent's personal knowledge, yet the verification swore everything as true to information and belief. The Court held that such “slipshod verifications” might well lead to the affidavit being rejected, and laid down that verifications should “invariably be modelled on the lines of Order XIX Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applies in terms or not,” with the sources of information clearly disclosed where the matter is not within personal knowledge. The verification, in short, is not a formality bolted on at the end; it is the load-bearing wall of the document.

Verification of pleadings under Order VI Rule 15

Verification is not unique to affidavits; it is also a mandatory feature of pleadings, and the two regimes interlock. Order VI Rule 15(1) requires every pleading to be verified at its foot by the party or one of the parties, or by some other person proved to the satisfaction of the court to be acquainted with the facts of the case. Sub-rule (2) requires the verifier to specify, by reference to the numbered paragraphs, what he verifies of his own knowledge and what upon information received and believed to be true — mirroring Order XIX Rule 3. Sub-rule (3) requires the verification to be signed and to state the date and place of signing.

The 1999–2002 amendments added sub-rule (4): the person verifying the pleading must also furnish a supporting affidavit, dovetailing with the new Section 26(2) for plaints. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Supreme Court explained the purpose and limits of this affidavit: it fixes additional responsibility on the deponent for the truth of the pleaded facts and deters reckless allegations, but it is not evidence for the trial, and on any amendment of the pleadings a fresh affidavit consonant with the amendment must be filed. This is why mastering the affidavit is inseparable from mastering the underlying pleading — the plaint's structure, verification and annexures and the verified written statement each carry their own affidavit, and a careless one undermines an otherwise sound pleading.

Consequences of defective verification — curable, not fatal

If a defective verification automatically sank the document, litigation would grind to a halt over clerical lapses. The courts have therefore drawn a careful line: a defect in verification, whether of a pleading or of a supporting affidavit, is ordinarily a curable irregularity, not an incurable nullity. The locus classicus is F.A. Sapa v. Singora, (1991) 3 SCC 375, an election-petition case where a three-Judge Bench held that a defect in verification or in the supporting affidavit is curable and not, by itself, fatal to the petition; the court may permit the defect to be remedied, the object of verification being to fix responsibility and discourage irresponsible allegations rather than to set a trap.

That principle was carried into the post-amendment plaint regime in Vidyawati Gupta v. Bhakti Hari Nayak, (2006) 2 SCC 777, where the Supreme Court held that the requirements of Order VI Rule 15 read with Order IV are procedural and directory, so that an initial non-compliance does not render the plaint non est; the defect can be cured and the plaint registered. But “curable” is not a licence for sloppiness. As the Court cautioned in F.A. Sapa and again in Amar Singh, a failure to disclose the grounds or sources of information, if not promptly cured, may lead the court to doubt the veracity of the evidence ultimately tendered. The draftsman should treat curability as a safety net for genuine slips, not as a substitute for getting the verification right at the outset.

When an affidavit is treated as no affidavit at all

There is a category of defect more serious than the curable verification slip: the affidavit that, because of its execution or its disregard of Rule 3, is treated as no affidavit at all. The leading authority is A.K.K. Nambiar v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 652, where neither the petition nor the affidavit in support, nor the affidavits filed in answer, were verified at all. The Supreme Court held that the affidavits, suffering from a total want of verification, could not be admitted in evidence; the importance of verification, the Court said, is to test the genuineness and authenticity of the allegations and to make the deponent responsible for them, so that the court can decide whether it is safe to act on the affidavit. An entirely unverified affidavit fails that test at the threshold.

The same fate awaits the affidavit whose verification is a bare “correct to the best of my knowledge” untethered to any source. In Sukhwinder Pal Bipan Kumar v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court treated an affidavit that merely asserted the paragraphs were “correct to the best of my knowledge” — without disclosing, as Order XIX Rule 3 requires, the nature and source of that knowledge with sufficient particularity — as no affidavit at all, with the result that the allegations stood unsupported. The practical line is this: a verification with the wrong allocation of paragraphs is usually curable; an affidavit with no verification, or one sworn before an unauthorised officer, or one whose verification is so empty that it discloses nothing, may be disregarded entirely.

Affidavit as examination-in-chief: Order XVIII Rule 4

Since the 2002 amendments, the affidavit has migrated to the centre of the trial itself. Order XVIII Rule 4(1) now provides that, in every case, the examination-in-chief of a witness shall be on affidavit, copies being supplied to the opposite party. This is the most consequential modern use of the document: the affidavit is no longer merely an interlocutory tool but the very vehicle of the witness's evidence, with cross-examination and re-examination taken orally before the court or commissioner.

This shift sharpens the drafting stakes. An examination-in-chief affidavit must confine itself to facts the witness can prove of personal knowledge — the interlocutory indulgence for matters of belief does not apply to substantive trial evidence — and must track the pleadings without travelling beyond them. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, the Supreme Court, while upholding Order XVIII Rule 4 as amended, emphasised that the affidavit of examination-in-chief and the affidavit accompanying the pleading serve different functions and must not be conflated. For the litigator, the discipline of Order XIX Rule 3 now governs the proof of the case at trial, not merely the launch of an application, which is why affidavit drafting has become a core trial skill rather than an interlocutory afterthought.

Affidavits in support of interlocutory applications

The most frequent occasion for an affidavit is the interlocutory application — for injunction, stay, attachment before judgment, condonation of delay, or amendment. Order XIX Rule 3 expressly relaxes the knowledge requirement here: on interlocutory applications, statements of belief are admissible, provided the grounds are stated. This is a deliberate concession, because an applicant seeking urgent relief often cannot prove every fact of personal knowledge and must rely on information from clients, records, or counsel.

But the concession is conditional, and draftsmen routinely forget the condition. A deponent on an injunction application may say “I am informed by the plaintiff and verily believe that the defendant is about to alienate the suit property” — but must add the source (“informed by the plaintiff”) and, ideally, the basis (“on the strength of the agreement to sell dated… produced as Annexure A-2”). A bald “I believe the defendant will alienate the property”, without source or ground, offends Rule 3 and weakens the application precisely where it must be strong. Because interlocutory relief turns so heavily on the prima facie strength of the supporting affidavit, the affidavit is functionally part of the application itself; the mechanics of those applications are treated in the note on drafting of interlocutory applications. A well-grounded belief affidavit is often the difference between an ex parte order granted and an application stood over.

False affidavits: perjury and contempt

The oath is not ceremonial; it carries criminal and quasi-criminal consequences. A deponent who knowingly swears a false affidavit on a matter of substance commits the offence of giving false evidence — historically under Sections 191 and 193 of the Indian Penal Code, and now under Sections 227 (giving false evidence) and 229 (punishment for false evidence) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 — because a person making a statement on oath before an authorised officer is legally bound by oath to state the truth. Independently, filing a false affidavit to obtain a favourable order is also criminal contempt of court.

The leading modern statement is Muthu Karuppan v. Parithi Ilamvazhuthi, (2011) 5 SCC 496, where the Supreme Court held that giving false evidence by filing a false affidavit is “an evil which must be effectively curbed with a strong hand”, and that contempt or prosecution should be set in motion where there is a prima facie case of deliberate falsehood on a matter of substance and the court is satisfied of a reasonable foundation for the charge. The Court was equally clear that the jurisdiction is to be exercised sparingly, on grounds higher than mere suspicion. For the draftsman, the practical message is twofold: never let a client depose to a fact the client does not actually know to be true, and ensure the verification honestly allocates each paragraph — because the verification is exactly the record by which a later court will judge whether a falsehood was deliberate.

Common drafting errors and how to avoid them

Certain mistakes recur with such regularity that they amount to a checklist of what to avoid. First, the catch-all verification condemned in Purushottam Jog Naik — cure it by allocating paragraphs to knowledge, information and belief, and stating the source of each. Second, argument masquerading as fact: an affidavit that pleads law, characterises the opponent's conduct, or quotes authorities offends the “facts only” rule of Order XIX Rule 3 and invites a costs order under that very rule. Third, the stranger deponent who is not acquainted with the facts and whose competence is never established — always open with a competence paragraph and, for companies and firms, annex the authorising resolution or power of attorney.

Fourth, the missing or defective jurat: an affidavit not sworn before an authorised officer, or lacking the place and date of swearing, is defective in execution; verify the officer's authority under Section 139 CPC and the Oaths Act before swearing. Fifth, unmarked or unparticularised annexures: every document relied on must be marked, paginated, and brought in through a paragraph that deposes to it. Sixth, belief without grounds on interlocutory affidavits — always state the source. A disciplined draftsman runs each affidavit against this list before it is sworn; the few minutes spent are far cheaper than an adjournment to re-swear, or a finding that the document was “no affidavit at all”.

A model affidavit and jurat

It helps to see the skeleton assembled. The affidavit opens with the full cause title (court, suit number, parties), then the commencement: “I, [name], aged about [—] years, son/daughter/wife of [—], resident of [—], do hereby solemnly affirm and state as follows:—”. Paragraph 1 establishes competence: “That I am the plaintiff in the above suit” (or “that I am a partner of the plaintiff firm / the [designation] of the plaintiff company, duly authorised vide resolution dated [—] annexed as Annexure A-1, and am acquainted with the facts of the case and competent to swear this affidavit”). The succeeding numbered paragraphs depose to the facts, each confined and each capable of being tagged to a source.

The document then carries the verification: “Verified at [place] on this [—] day of [—], 20[—], that the contents of paragraphs 1 to [—] are true to my personal knowledge and the contents of paragraphs [—] to [—] are based on information received and legal advice, which I believe to be true, and that nothing material has been concealed therefrom.” Below the deponent's signature sits the jurat: “Solemnly affirmed before me by the deponent, who is identified to me, at [place] on this [—] day of [—], 20[—],” signed and stamped by the oath commissioner or notary. Drafted this way, the affidavit answers, on its face, the three questions every court asks of it — who is deposing, what they know, and on what authority it was sworn — and so satisfies the discipline traced from Padmabati Dasi through Salem Advocate Bar Association to Amar Singh. To see how this discipline carries into related drafts, compare the verification practice in the note on the replication and rejoinder.