When a child becomes the victim of a sexual offence, the law's protective instinct does not end with prosecution of the offender. A second injury looms — the public unmasking of the child through a newspaper byline, a television frame or a viral post. Section 23 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) answers that danger with a near-absolute statutory shield over the child's identity. It regulates how media may report on a child, it prohibits any disclosure that could reveal who the child is, it fastens vicarious liability on publishers and owners, and it backs the prohibition with a penal sanction. Read alongside the in-camera trial regime, this provision converts the child's anonymity from a courtesy into a legally enforceable right. This chapter dissects each sub-section, traces the jurisprudence from Bijoy @ Guddu Das v. State of West Bengal through the Supreme Court's landmark directions in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, and confronts the unresolved fault-line exposed by the split verdict in Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v. State of Karnataka.

The statutory text and its scheme

Section 23 sits in Chapter V of POCSO under the marginal heading "Procedure for media", and is structured in four sub-sections. Sub-section (1) provides that no person shall make any report, or present comments, on any child from any form of media or studio or photographic facilities without having complete and authentic information, which may have the effect of lowering his reputation or infringing upon his privacy. Sub-section (2) is the operative anonymity clause: no report in any media shall disclose the identity of a child including his name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of the identity of the child. To this an exception is attached by proviso — the Special Court, competent to try a case under the Act, may, if it thinks fit and for reasons to be recorded in writing, permit such disclosure, but only if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child.

Sub-section (3) imposes vicarious liability: the publisher or owner of the media or studio or photographic facilities shall be jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employees. Sub-section (4) is the penal teeth: any person who contravenes the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall be liable to be punished with imprisonment of either description for a period which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with both. The architecture is deliberate — a positive duty of responsible reporting in (1), an absolute identity-bar in (2) softened only by a judicially supervised exception, owner liability in (3), and punishment in (4). For the wider statutory setting, see our chapter on the introduction to the POCSO Act and the definitions clause, which together explain who is a "child" and what the Act seeks to protect.

How wide is the identity bar?

The enumeration in sub-section (2) — name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood — is illustrative, not exhaustive. The closing words "or any other particulars which may lead to disclosure of the identity of the child" make the test functional rather than formal. The question is not whether a particular label was used but whether the cumulative information published could, directly or by inference, lead an ordinary reader in the relevant community to identify the child. In Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court underlined that media must not disclose any material which can lead to the disclosure of the identity of the victim, observing that in a small village even naming the village, the parents or the school can be enough to unmask the child.

This functional standard has real consequences. Mosaic disclosure — where no single report names the child but a combination of details across reports renders the child identifiable — falls within the prohibition. Likewise, the bar travels with the publication: blurring a photograph but naming the father, or anonymising the child while broadcasting the FIR number and police station, defeats the section. The Calcutta High Court in Bijoy @ Guddu Das v. State of West Bengal (2017) read the identity to include the child's family, school, relatives, neighbourhood or any other information by which the identity of the child may be revealed, reinforcing that the inquiry is substance over form. Because the offences themselves frequently occur within the family or immediate circle, identifying the accused can also identify the victim — a tension that responsible reporting must navigate.

Bijoy @ Guddu Das: the foundational guidelines

The most influential early articulation of Section 23's discipline came from a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court (Joymalya Bagchi, J.) in Bijoy @ Guddu Das v. State of West Bengal (2017). The Court was disturbed to find that the trial judge had himself disclosed the child victim's name, address and parentage in the body of the judgment. It held that such disclosure of the child's identity in the judgment delivered by a Special Court would amount to a breach of the statutory mandate, and expressed utmost displeasure at the lapse.

The Court laid down a comprehensive set of directions. The investigating agency must ensure the child's identity is not disclosed at any stage of the investigation; any breach by a police officer, media person or other individual attracts prosecution under Section 23(4). Special Courts must refrain from disclosing the child's particulars — name, address and parentage — in their judgments unless such disclosure is in the interest of the child. The Court also tied Section 23 to the broader confidentiality regime under the Act, reading it with Section 33(7) (duty of the Special Court to ensure the child's identity is not disclosed during investigation or trial), Section 36 (screening of the accused from the child) and Section 37 (in-camera trial). Bijoy remains the template adopted by Special Courts across the country for anonymising case records and judgments.

Nipun Saxena v. Union of India: the binding directions

The definitive pronouncement is the Supreme Court's judgment in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India (decided 11 December 2018, by Madan B. Lokur and Deepak Gupta, JJ.). The Court bifurcated its analysis between adult rape victims under Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code and child victims under POCSO, and issued a unified set of directions. It upheld and harmonised the confidentiality regime of Section 228A IPC and Section 23 POCSO, holding that the identity of victims of sexual offences should not, as a rule, be disclosed.

Among the operative directions, the Court held that no person can print or publish the name of the victim or disclose any facts which can lead to the victim being identified. The name or identity should not be disclosed even under the authorisation of the next of kin, unless circumstances justifying disclosure exist, and that determination is to be made by the competent authority — for adult victims, the Sessions Judge concerned; for a child victim, the Special Court under POCSO. FIRs relating to offences of rape and offences under POCSO shall not be put in the public domain or uploaded online. All authorities to whom the victim's name is disclosed in the course of investigation or trial are themselves duty-bound to keep the name and identity secret. The Court further directed that records be kept in a sealed cover and that one-stop centres and similar bodies maintain confidentiality. Nipun Saxena is therefore the authoritative national gloss on Section 23 and is binding under Article 141.

Section 33(7) and the duty of the Special Court

Section 23 does not operate alone; it is reinforced by Section 33(7), which casts an independent duty on the Special Court to ensure that the identity of the child is not disclosed at any time during the course of investigation or trial. Where Section 23 governs the conduct of media and the public, Section 33(7) governs the conduct of the court itself. The two provisions converge on cause-titles, order-sheets, deposition records and the final judgment, all of which must anonymise the child — typically by using a pseudonym, initials or a neutral descriptor such as "the victim" or "the child".

The practical machinery flows from this. Trials proceed in camera under Section 37, the child is screened from the accused under Section 36, and the courtroom is cleared of unauthorised persons. Read with the anonymity directions in Nipun Saxena, Section 33(7) means that even the publicly accessible judgment must be sanitised before pronouncement or upload. The Calcutta High Court in Bijoy expressly invoked Section 33(7) when censuring the trial judge, demonstrating that a breach by the court is not merely an irregularity but a violation of statutory command. These protections complement the substantive offences such as penetrative sexual assault and aggravated penetrative sexual assault, ensuring that vigorous prosecution never comes at the cost of the child's dignity.

Vicarious liability of publishers and owners

Sub-section (3) is an unusual and powerful feature: it makes the publisher or owner of the media, studio or photographic facility jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employees. The ordinary rule that an editor or proprietor is liable only on proof of personal knowledge or connivance is displaced; POCSO fixes liability at the level of control. The legislative logic is that newsrooms and studios are institutions with the resources and editorial systems to prevent disclosure, and the burden of compliance should rest with those who command the publication apparatus.

This was illustrated in Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v. State of Karnataka, where the editor of a newspaper faced prosecution under Section 23 after his publication named a sixteen-year-old victim of sexual harassment in a news report. The case proceeded against the editor in his editorial capacity, consistent with the joint-and-several liability contemplated by sub-section (3). For media organisations, the message is operational: editorial protocols, sub-editing checklists and image-redaction workflows are not best practices alone but liability-management necessities, because under POCSO the proprietor cannot disclaim an employee's lapse.

Gangadhar Narayan Nayak: the cognizability split

The most significant unresolved question under Section 23 emerged in Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v. State of Karnataka, where a two-judge Bench of the Supreme Court (Indira Banerjee and J.K. Maheshwari, JJ.) delivered a split verdict on 21 March 2022. The question was whether, because the maximum punishment under Section 23(4) is one year, the offence is non-cognizable, so that the police require the prior permission of a Magistrate under Section 155(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure before investigating; and whether, absent such permission, the Special Court must discharge the accused.

Justice Indira Banerjee held that investigation was permissible without a Magistrate's prior permission. She reasoned that POCSO is a special, child-protective statute whose reporting and investigation scheme — including the mandatory reporting obligation under Section 19 — overrides the general procedure in the CrPC to the extent of inconsistency, and that requiring a Magistrate's sanction would frustrate the protective purpose of the Act. Justice J.K. Maheshwari took the contrary view: classifying the Section 23 offence as non-cognizable given the sub-three-year sentence, he held that the requirement of permission under Section 155(2) applies, while suggesting that the Special Court could be read in as the competent authority to grant such permission. Because the Bench was divided, the matter was directed to be placed before a larger Bench, and the point of law remains open. Aspirants should note this is a live controversy on the procedural character of the offence, not on the substantive identity-bar, which is settled.

Social media, intermediaries and digital disclosure

Section 23 was drafted in 2012 with traditional "media" — print, broadcast, studios, photographic facilities — in contemplation, but its functional language has been applied to the digital ecosystem. A post on a social network, a re-shared image, or a video clip naming or depicting a child victim falls squarely within "any form of media" and "any report in any media". The danger is amplified online: disclosure is instantaneous, permanent and virally amplified, and a single identifying frame can be screenshotted before takedown.

The Supreme Court's directions in Nipun Saxena expressly forbid putting FIRs in offences against children in the public domain or uploading them online, recognising the internet as a primary vector of disclosure. The broader concern about online sexual-violence content was the subject of In Re: Prajwala, the suo motu proceeding (initiated on a letter dated 18 February 2015) in which the Supreme Court engaged major intermediaries — Google, Facebook, WhatsApp, Yahoo and Microsoft — and directed the constitution of a committee to advise on technological measures, including auto-blocking through keywords and hashes, to curb circulation of rape and child-abuse material. Together these threads confirm that Section 23 applies with full force to digital disclosure, that intermediaries bear takedown and prevention responsibilities under the Information Technology framework, and that individual users who post identifying material are exposed to prosecution under Section 23(4).

The narrow 'interest of the child' exception

The only gateway out of the absolute bar is the proviso to sub-section (2): the Special Court may permit disclosure, for reasons recorded in writing, if in its opinion such disclosure is in the interest of the child. Three features of this exception deserve emphasis. First, the touchstone is the interest of the child, not the interest of justice or the public's right to know — a distinction the courts have been careful to maintain. Second, the power is reposed exclusively in the Special Court; no police officer, journalist, parent or guardian may authorise disclosure on their own assessment. Third, the discretion is structured: reasons must be recorded in writing, ensuring the decision is reasoned and reviewable.

The classic example, noted in the jurisprudence, is where a deceased or missing child cannot otherwise be identified and limited disclosure of a photograph is necessary to trace the child or establish identity for the prosecution itself. Even the Nipun Saxena framework, in dealing with the analogous situation of deceased or mentally incapacitated victims, insists that disclosure occur only where circumstances justify it and only through the competent court — for a child, the Special Court. The exception is therefore the rare, court-supervised release valve, not a routine carve-out, and its narrowness is what preserves the integrity of the rule.

It is important to distinguish this from the public interest or freedom-of-press arguments that media houses sometimes advance. The legislature, by anchoring the proviso to the interest of the child rather than the interest of the public or of justice, made a clear value choice: the child's welfare is paramount and is not to be balanced away against the newsworthiness of a case, however sensational. Courts applying the proviso have accordingly required a concrete, child-centred justification — such as tracing an abducted child or establishing the identity of a deceased victim for the prosecution — rather than a generalised appeal to transparency. Even where disclosure is permitted, it must be the minimum necessary; a court may, for example, allow release of a photograph for identification while continuing to bar publication of the family's address or the child's school. This calibrated approach keeps the exception faithful to its protective purpose and prevents it from swallowing the rule.

A recurring practical question is whether the child, or the child's parents or guardian, can consent to disclosure of the child's identity — for instance, to seek public sympathy, crowd-funded support or to campaign for justice. The structure of Section 23 answers in the negative for any disclosure routed through media: the bar in sub-section (2) is cast on "no report in any media" and the only permitted route to lawful disclosure is the Special Court's reasoned order under the proviso. There is no "consent of the victim" defence written into the section.

This mirrors the position the Supreme Court adopted in Nipun Saxena for adult and deceased victims, where it held that even authorisation by the next of kin does not by itself legitimise disclosure unless justifying circumstances are found by the competent court. For a child — by definition a person under eighteen under the definitions clause — the rationale is stronger still, because a minor cannot give legally effective consent to waive a protection the legislature has conferred for the minor's benefit. The protective shield is thus non-waivable: well-meaning parents who name their child in a media appeal, and the outlet that publishes it, both risk contravening Section 23.

Interplay with Section 228A IPC, JJ Act and IT Rules

Section 23 does not occupy the field alone. Section 228A of the Indian Penal Code (now Section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023) criminalises disclosure of the identity of victims of certain sexual offences and overlaps with POCSO where the victim is a child. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 contains a parallel prohibition — Section 74 — barring disclosure of the identity of children in conflict with law or child victims and witnesses. The Nipun Saxena Court consciously read Section 228A IPC and Section 23 POCSO together to construct a coherent anonymity regime spanning adult and child victims.

On the digital side, the Information Technology Act, 2000 and the Intermediary Guidelines impose takedown and due-diligence obligations on platforms hosting identifying or abusive content, complementing the prohibition on the original publisher. Where the same act of disclosure attracts both Section 23 POCSO and Section 228A IPC, the special and later child-specific statute governs, and the more stringent protective standard prevails. For the offences that these confidentiality provisions surround, see our chapters on sexual assault and aggravated penetrative sexual assault; the full map of the Act is set out on the POCSO notes hub.

Punishment, procedure and enforcement gaps

The sanction under sub-section (4) is imprisonment of either description for not less than six months and up to one year, or fine, or both. The mandatory minimum of six months is notable for an offence that is often treated lightly in practice. Enforcement, however, remains uneven. Prosecutions under Section 23 are comparatively rare, even where breaches are visible, in part because of the procedural uncertainty exposed by the Gangadhar Nayak split — the unresolved question of whether the police may investigate without a Magistrate's permission can stall cases at the threshold.

Three enforcement levers exist alongside the penal route. First, the Special Court's contemporaneous control under Section 33(7) allows it to direct redaction and to initiate action against breaches during trial. Second, the vicarious liability under sub-section (3) lets prosecution reach the proprietor, not merely a junior reporter. Third, the constitutional and contempt jurisdiction of the High Courts and Supreme Court — exercised in Bijoy and Nipun Saxena — supplies systemic directions where individual prosecution is inadequate. For aspirants, the examinable core is precise: the four sub-sections and their content, the one-year/six-month sanction, the Nipun Saxena directions, the Bijoy guidelines on judgments, and the open cognizability question from Gangadhar Nayak.

A further enforcement gap lies in detection. Unlike the substantive offences against the child, a breach of Section 23 is frequently discovered only after publication, by which time the harm is irreversible and, in the digital context, often beyond recall. This is why the jurisprudence has shifted emphasis from after-the-fact punishment to systemic prevention — mandatory anonymisation of records under Section 33(7), prohibitions on uploading FIRs, and intermediary takedown duties. The protective philosophy of POCSO treats the child's anonymity not as a privacy interest that can be vindicated by damages but as a dignity interest that must be guarded prospectively, because once a child has been publicly identified as a survivor of sexual abuse, no sentence under sub-section (4) can restore what was lost. The provision is therefore best understood as one limb of an integrated confidentiality system rather than a standalone penal clause.

Frequently asked questions

What does Section 23 of the POCSO Act protect?

It protects the identity of a child victim of a sexual offence. Sub-section (2) bars any media report from disclosing the child's name, address, photograph, family details, school, neighbourhood or any other particulars that may lead to the child being identified, and sub-section (1) requires that any media report on a child be based on complete and authentic information and not lower the child's reputation or infringe privacy.

Can a child victim's identity ever be lawfully disclosed?

Only through the narrow proviso to Section 23(2): the Special Court may permit disclosure, for reasons recorded in writing, if in its opinion the disclosure is in the interest of the child. No police officer, journalist, parent or guardian can authorise disclosure on their own. In Nipun Saxena v. Union of India, the Supreme Court confirmed that the competent authority for a child victim is the Special Court under POCSO.

What did Nipun Saxena v. Union of India decide?

Decided on 11 December 2018, the Supreme Court harmonised Section 228A IPC and Section 23 POCSO and issued binding directions: no one may publish a victim's name or any identifying fact; next-of-kin authorisation alone does not justify disclosure; FIRs in rape and POCSO cases must not be put in the public domain or uploaded; and all authorities handling the identity must keep records confidential, in sealed cover.

What is the punishment for violating Section 23?

Under sub-section (4), contravening sub-section (1) or (2) is punishable with imprisonment of either description for not less than six months and up to one year, or with fine, or with both. There is a mandatory minimum of six months' imprisonment, though courts may instead impose only a fine.

Is a publisher liable for an employee's disclosure?

Yes. Section 23(3) makes the publisher or owner of the media, studio or photographic facility jointly and severally liable for the acts and omissions of his employees. This displaces the usual requirement of proving the proprietor's personal knowledge, fixing responsibility at the level of editorial control — as seen in the prosecution of the newspaper editor in Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v. State of Karnataka.

Is the Section 23 offence cognizable or non-cognizable?

This is unsettled. In Gangadhar Narayan Nayak v. State of Karnataka (2022), a two-judge Supreme Court Bench split: Justice Indira Banerjee held the police may investigate without a Magistrate's permission because POCSO overrides the CrPC, while Justice J.K. Maheshwari treated the offence as non-cognizable, requiring permission under Section 155(2) CrPC. The matter was referred to a larger Bench and remains open.