Every subordinate civil court in Punjab and Haryana runs on a thick book of working rules that no statute spells out line by line. That book is the product of the High Court's rule-making power. The Punjab Courts Act, 1918 supplies a handful of express rule-making heads, but the broad authority to regulate the practice and procedure of subordinate civil courts flows from Sections 122 to 129 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Letters Patent, and the constitutional power of superintendence in Article 227 and administrative control in Article 235. This note maps each source, fixes its limits, and ties it to the leading authorities. Read it alongside the Punjab Courts Act hub.
Locating the power: not one section but a system
Aspirants often hunt for a single section of the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 headed "power to frame rules". There is no such omnibus provision. The Act, being a constitutive statute that sets up the hierarchy of civil courts in the region, confers only specific rule-making heads and leaves the general procedural rule-making power to the Code of Civil Procedure and the High Court's chartered and constitutional powers. The 1918 Act establishes the courts and their jurisdiction; the rules that govern how those courts actually function are framed under a layered scheme. Three strands matter: (1) the express heads inside the 1918 Act, principally Section 46-A (petition-writers) and Section 47 (list of holidays); (2) the general procedural rule-making power under Sections 122 to 129 CPC; and (3) the supervisory and administrative powers in Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution, which the High Court exercises through its High Court Rules and Orders. Understanding the topic means understanding how these strands fit together over the architecture set out in the classes of courts created by the Act.
Express rule-making heads in the 1918 Act: Sections 46-A and 47
The Punjab Courts Act, 1918 itself confers rule-making power in two narrow but practically important fields. Section 46-A empowers the High Court to "from time to time make rules consistent with this Act and any other enactment for the time being in force" to (a) declare what persons may act as petition-writers in subordinate courts, (b) regulate the issue of licences to them, their conduct of business and the scale of fees they may charge, and (c) determine the authority that will investigate breaches and the penalties that may be imposed. The crucial qualifier is the opening phrase: the rules must be consistent with the Act and any other law in force, which subordinates them to the parent statute. Section 47 directs that, subject to such general orders as the appropriate Government may make, the High Court shall prepare and publish each year a list of days to be observed as holidays in the subordinate civil courts. These two heads are the only express, self-contained rule-making powers in the body of the 1918 Act, and both are confined to administrative housekeeping rather than core procedure.
Section 45: mode of conferring powers and the rule-making texture of the Act
Several provisions of the Act delegate operational choices to the High Court without using the word "rules". Section 45 provides that, except as otherwise provided, any power that may be conferred by the High Court on any person under the relevant Part may be conferred either by name or by virtue of office. This is a delegation-of-powers mechanism rather than a substantive rule-making head, but it reflects the Act's design: the legislature fixes the skeleton of courts and jurisdiction, and entrusts the High Court with the administrative discretion to clothe officers with powers and to keep the system running. Read with the High Court's control over subordinate courts, Section 45 shows why so much of the day-to-day governance of civil courts is found not in the bare Act but in delegated instruments. The same logic underlies the pecuniary jurisdiction framework, where statutory ceilings are administered through High Court allocation of work.
The principal engine: Section 122 CPC
The real workhorse of the High Court's procedural rule-making is Section 122 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It empowers High Courts (other than the court of a Judicial Commissioner) to make rules, after previous publication, "regulating their own procedure and the procedure of the Civil Courts subject to their superintendence", and to annul, alter or add to all or any of the rules in the First Schedule to the Code. This is the source under which the Punjab and Haryana High Court has framed its civil rules; indeed, Chapter 21 of Volume I of the High Court Rules and Orders is expressly headed as rules made by the High Court under Section 122. The power is wide in subject-matter but bounded in two ways: rules must be made after previous publication, and they cannot be inconsistent with the body of the Code (Sections 1 to 158), which only Parliament may amend. The distinction matters because the procedure that the subordinate civil courts set up under the 1918 Act actually follow is overwhelmingly this delegated procedure, not the bare statutory text.
Sections 123 and 124: the Rule Committee safeguard
The rule-making power under Section 122 is not exercised by the judges alone in an unstructured way. Section 123 CPC requires the constitution of a Rule Committee at the usual seat of each High Court referred to in Section 122. The committee comprises three judges of the High Court (at least one of whom has served as a District or Divisional Judge for three years), two enrolled legal practitioners, and a judge of a subordinate civil court. Section 124 CPC directs that the Rule Committee shall report to the High Court on any proposal to annul, alter or add to the First Schedule rules or to make new rules, and the High Court must take that report into consideration before making rules. This consultative mechanism is a procedural safeguard: it injects practitioner and subordinate-judiciary input into rules that will bind the very courts over which the High Court superintends, and its omission can be a ground for attacking the validity of rules.
Letters Patent and Section 129 CPC: the original-side dimension
For chartered High Courts, a separate rule-making channel exists. Section 129 CPC preserves the power of a chartered High Court to make rules, notwithstanding anything in the Code, regulating its own procedure in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction as it thinks fit, consistent with the Letters Patent. In Iridium India Telecom Ltd. v. Motorola Inc., (2005) 2 SCC 145, the Supreme Court held that the amended Order VIII Rule 1 CPC did not apply to suits on the original side of a chartered High Court, because such suits continue to be governed by the Original Side Rules framed under Section 129 read with the Letters Patent. The case illustrates that the original-side rule-making power is robust and can displace First Schedule provisions in that arena, in contrast to the Section 122 power, which cannot override the Code itself. While the Punjab and Haryana High Court's primary rule-making activity over subordinate courts rests on Section 122 and Article 227, the Letters Patent and Section 129 explain the wider constitutional pedigree of High Court rule-making power.
Article 227: rule-making as an incident of superintendence
The constitutional anchor of the High Court's authority to make general rules for subordinate courts is Article 227 of the Constitution. Article 227(2) expressly empowers every High Court to (a) call for returns from subordinate courts, (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts, and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by their officers. This is a self-executing rule-making power that operates independently of any statute. In Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath, AIR 1954 SC 215, the Constitution Bench held that the power of superintendence under Article 227 is both administrative and judicial and is to be exercised "most sparingly and only in appropriate cases" to keep subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority, not to correct mere errors. The administrative limb of that power is precisely what authorises the general rules and forms governing how subordinate civil courts under the 1918 Act conduct their appellate and original work.
The limits of supervisory rule-making: Surya Dev Rai and L. Chandra Kumar
The supervisory power that underpins rule-making is itself confined. In Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 : (2003) 6 SCC 675, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Article 227 power is administrative as well as judicial, may be invoked at the instance of an aggrieved person or suo motu, and is wider than the certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 in being free of those technical fetters, but is to be used sparingly to keep subordinate courts within their authority and not as an appellate substitute. The constitutional indispensability of this power was settled in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 : AIR 1997 SC 1125, where a seven-judge bench held that the power of judicial review and superintendence of the High Courts over subordinate courts and tribunals is part of the basic structure of the Constitution and cannot be ousted. Because rule-making for subordinate courts is an emanation of this superintendence, the power to frame rules cannot be taken away by ordinary legislation any more than the supervisory jurisdiction can.
Article 235: administrative control over the subordinate judiciary
Distinct from the procedural rule-making of Article 227 is the administrative control vested by Article 235, under which the High Court controls the district courts and courts subordinate thereto, including the posting, promotion and grant of leave to persons belonging to the judicial service. Through this control the High Court frames service rules and administrative instructions governing the conduct, transfer and discipline of judicial officers manning the courts created under the Punjab Courts Act, 1918. The two articles work in tandem: Article 227 governs how the courts function as institutions of adjudication, while Article 235 governs the human and administrative side of those same courts. Together they fill the space that the 1918 Act deliberately leaves open, since that Act, like its companion the constitution of civil courts in Haryana, is concerned with creating the hierarchy rather than with its detailed internal governance.
When rules fail: repugnance, ultra vires and procedural safeguards
Every rule-making power examined here is delegated and therefore subject to the doctrine of ultra vires. A settled principle of administrative law is that conferment of rule-making power by an Act does not enable the rule-making authority to make a rule beyond the scope of the enabling Act, or inconsistent with or repugnant to it; such a rule is void. Thus a rule under Section 46-A of the 1918 Act that is repugnant to the Act fails on the very words "consistent with this Act", and a rule under Section 122 CPC that conflicts with the substantive provisions of the Code (Sections 1 to 158) is void to that extent. In Salem Advocate Bar Association v. Union of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344, the Supreme Court, while upholding the CPC amendments and directing the framing of model rules, treated the proviso to Order VIII Rule 1 as directory rather than mandatory, underscoring that even validly framed procedural rules must be read in aid of justice and not as instruments of defeat. The practical lesson is that the High Court's power to frame rules is broad but always tethered: it must respect the parent statute, follow the Rule Committee process under Sections 123 to 124 where applicable, and observe the requirement of previous publication.
The product: the High Court Rules and Orders
The visible output of all these powers is the multi-volume High Court Rules and Orders of the Punjab and Haryana High Court (Volumes I to V). Volume I, Chapter 21 contains rules made under Section 122 CPC; other volumes contain rules framed under the Letters Patent, under Article 227, and under specific statutes, covering everything from the conduct of judicial business to records, fees, and the powers of ministerial officers. For the subordinate civil courts established by the Punjab Courts Act, 1918, these Rules and Orders are the operative law of procedure on most day-to-day questions. This is why a student answering on the "power of High Court to frame rules" must present the topic as a composite: the express heads in Sections 46-A and 47 of the 1918 Act, the general procedural engine of Sections 122 to 129 CPC with its Rule Committee safeguard, and the constitutional bedrock of Articles 227 and 235, all converging in the Rules and Orders that actually bind the courts. To see how the system handles cross-references between forums, study the procedure on reference alongside this note.
Frequently asked questions
Is there a single section in the Punjab Courts Act, 1918 that gives the High Court power to frame rules?
No. The 1918 Act confers only specific rule-making heads, chiefly Section 46-A (petition-writers) and Section 47 (court holidays). The general power to frame procedural rules for subordinate civil courts comes from Sections 122 to 129 CPC and from Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution, not from a single omnibus section of the 1918 Act.
What does Section 122 CPC empower the High Court to do?
Section 122 CPC empowers High Courts (other than a Judicial Commissioner's court) to make rules, after previous publication, regulating their own procedure and that of subordinate civil courts, and to annul, alter or add to the rules in the First Schedule. It cannot, however, be used to override the body of the Code (Sections 1 to 158).
What is the role of the Rule Committee under Sections 123 and 124 CPC?
Section 123 CPC constitutes a Rule Committee of three High Court judges, two legal practitioners and a subordinate civil judge at each High Court's seat. Under Section 124, the committee reports on proposed rules and the High Court must consider that report before making rules under Section 122, providing a consultative safeguard.
How does Article 227 support the High Court's rule-making power?
Article 227(2) expressly lets every High Court make and issue general rules and prescribe forms regulating the practice and proceedings of subordinate courts. In Waryam Singh v. Amar Nath, AIR 1954 SC 215, the Court held the superintendence power is administrative as well as judicial; the administrative limb authorises these general rules and forms.
Can rules framed by the High Court be struck down?
Yes. Being delegated legislation, such rules are void if they exceed the enabling provision or are repugnant to the parent statute. A Section 46-A rule must be "consistent with" the 1918 Act, and a Section 122 rule cannot conflict with the body of the CPC; conflict renders the rule ultra vires and void to that extent.
What is the difference between Article 227 and Article 235 in this context?
Article 227 concerns the High Court's superintendence over how subordinate courts function as adjudicating bodies, including the power to make general procedural rules and forms. Article 235 concerns administrative control over the judicial service, posting, promotion and discipline of judicial officers. Both fill the governance space the 1918 Act leaves open.