Once you know which documents must be registered and how long you have to present them, one question remains: before which officer? The Registration Act, 1908 does not leave this to the convenience of the parties. Sections 28 to 31 fix the place of registration with deliberate rigidity, because the registering officer's authority is purely territorial. Register a deed relating to land before a Sub-Registrar in whose sub-district not a single inch of that land lies, and the registration is a nullity — the very mischief the Privy Council branded a "fraud on the registration law" more than a century ago. This article walks through Sections 28, 29, 30 and 31, the leading authorities on territorial jurisdiction, and the recurring device of the fictitious parcel.
Why the place of registration is jurisdictional, not procedural
The scheme of the Registration Act treats the location of registration as a question of competence, not mere convenience. A Sub-Registrar derives authority from the State Government only over a defined sub-district, and a Registrar over a defined district. Outside that territory the officer is, for the purpose of registration, a stranger with no power to authenticate anything. The consequence is severe: a document registered by an officer who lacks territorial jurisdiction is treated as not registered at all, with all the disabilities that flow from non-registration under Section 49 — the very disabilities discussed in our note on the documents of which registration is compulsory.
This is why Sections 28 to 31 are studied as a self-contained block. Section 28 fixes the forum for documents touching immovable property; Section 29 covers everything else; Section 30 confers an enlarged discretion on Registrars; and Section 31 carves out the exceptional case of registration at a private residence. Together they answer the single question the executant must resolve before presenting a deed: which office, and which officer, can lawfully receive it. The broader purpose of the Act — to bring "order, discipline and public notice" into property dealings, as the Supreme Court put it in Suraj Lamp & Industries (P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana, AIR 2012 SC 206 — depends on documents being registered where the public would naturally search for them, namely where the property lies.
Section 28: documents relating to immovable property
Section 28 is the cornerstone. It provides that every document of the kind described in Section 17(1)(a) to (e), Section 17(2) (so far as it relates to immovable property), and Sections 18 and 19 in so far as they relate to immovable property, shall be presented for registration in the office of a Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property to which such document relates is situate. The word is "shall" — the provision is mandatory, not directory.
Two features deserve emphasis. First, the test is the situation of the property, not the place of execution and not the residence of the parties. A sale deed of land in District A executed in District B must still be registered in the sub-district where the land lies. Second, the phrase "whole or some portion" is generous: it is enough that any part of the property is within the sub-district. Where a single deed conveys two contiguous plots straddling two sub-districts, the parties may lawfully present it in either office, because a portion lies within each. Courts have read "some portion" to mean any portion and not a substantial portion — a reading that, as we shall see, both empowers and tempts.
Because Section 28 governs the most consequential class of instruments — sale deeds, gift deeds, mortgages and long leases of land — it is the provision around which the bulk of the case law has grown. It is also the provision exploited by the "fictitious parcel" device discussed below.
The "some portion" rule and the limits of party choice
The liberality of "some portion" gives the parties a genuine, lawful choice of forum where property genuinely spans more than one sub-district. There is nothing improper in choosing the more convenient of two competent offices. The line is crossed only when the property said to lie within the chosen sub-district is fictitious, non-existent, or never intended to be dealt with, and is inserted solely to drag the deed within the jurisdiction of a Sub-Registrar of the parties' choosing.
The distinction is therefore between (i) a bona fide deed that happens to cover land in two sub-districts — registrable in either — and (ii) a colourable deed in which a token or sham item is added to manufacture jurisdiction. The first is the legislature's deliberate flexibility; the second is fraud on the registration law. Everything turns on whether the parcel relied on for jurisdiction is real and genuinely the subject of the transaction. This is also why the description of the property in the deed matters so much: an inaccurate or padded schedule is the usual fingerprint of the device.
Harendra Lal Roy: the fictitious-parcel fraud
The leading authority is the Privy Council decision in Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Hari Dasi Debi, decided on 25 March 1914. A mortgage deed was registered in Calcutta on the strength of a parcel of property described as lying within that town. The Privy Council found that the parcel was, to the knowledge of the parties, a fictitious entry inserted to give the deed the appearance of relating to property within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta Sub-Registrar (and, incidentally, the Calcutta High Court), so that registration could be obtained there. Their Lordships held that such a device is a fraud on the registration law and that the registration so obtained was invalid. The case established two propositions that endure: a registering officer has no jurisdiction unless some genuine portion of the property lies within the sub-district, and the insertion of a sham parcel to confer that jurisdiction vitiates the registration.
The principle was applied in the mortgage context in Mathura Prasad v. Chandra Narayan Chowdhury (1921), where a mortgage bond was registered in a district in which none of the genuinely mortgaged properties was situate; the registration, and with it the security, was held bad. The two decisions together hold that registration secured by including a fictitious or insignificant item, never truly the subject of the transfer, is open to challenge as void — and the challenge may be raised not only by a party to the deed but by a stranger affected by it.
For the examinee, the analytical key is to separate two enquiries that the device deliberately blurs. The first is whether the parcel relied on for jurisdiction exists at all and is genuinely part of the transaction; the second is whether, existence apart, it was inserted in good faith or as a colourable contrivance. A genuine but small parcel lawfully founds jurisdiction under the liberal "some portion" rule, however modest its value. A sham parcel founds nothing, because the registering officer's territorial competence cannot rest on a fiction. Harendra Lal Roy is the classic illustration of the second category, and it remains the case most likely to be cited in any examination question on the place of registration of immovable property.
Consequence: registration without territorial jurisdiction is void
The settled position is stark. If the registering officer has no territorial jurisdiction — because no genuine portion of the property lies within the sub-district — the registration is void, not merely irregular. It cannot be cured by acquiescence, and the resulting endorsement of "registered" is of no effect. A deed in that condition stands, for the purposes of Section 49, in the position of an unregistered document: it cannot affect immovable property comprised in it, cannot be received as evidence of any transaction affecting such property, and cannot found a suit for specific performance based on it as a registered instrument.
This is why the place of registration is logically prior to every other safeguard in the Act. The careful machinery of presentation by persons entitled to present documents, admission of execution, and endorsement is wasted effort if the office chosen was incompetent from the outset. The territorial inquiry comes first; everything downstream presupposes that the right office was selected.
Section 29: where other documents are registered
Section 29 deals with everything Section 28 does not — principally documents that do not relate to immovable property, and copies of decrees or orders. Such a document, or a copy of a decree or order, may be presented for registration either (a) in the office of the Sub-Registrar in whose sub-district the document was executed, or (b) in the office of any other Sub-Registrar under the State Government at which all the persons executing and claiming under the document desire the same to be registered.
The contrast with Section 28 is instructive. For immovable property the connecting factor is the situation of the land and the parties have no free choice; for other documents the connecting factor is the place of execution, with a fallback that lets the parties, by consent, choose any other Sub-Registrar in the State. The unanimity requirement in limb (b) is important — the choice of a different office must be the desire of all the executants and claimants, not merely one of them. A copy of a decree or order may be presented where the original decree or order was made, or, where the decree or order does not affect immovable property, in any other Sub-Registrar's office where all the persons claiming under it desire registration. This is the provision under which instruments such as powers of attorney, agreements not creating an interest in land, and the like are registered, and it dovetails with the rules on the time for presenting documents.
A subtle but examinable point is the difference in policy underlying the two limbs. The execution-based limb (a) protects the public record by anchoring registration to a place with a real connection to the document — the spot where the parties signed. The consent-based limb (b) recognises that for instruments not touching land there is no strong public-notice interest tying registration to any particular soil, so the parties may, by unanimous choice, register wherever within the State is convenient. Even here, however, the chosen office must be one "under the State Government"; the parties cannot, by consent, send the document to a Sub-Registrar of another State. The territorial logic of the Act is relaxed for these documents, not abandoned.
Section 30: the Registrar's enlarging discretion
Section 30(1) confers a useful flexibility at the level of the Registrar. It provides that any Registrar may, in his discretion, receive and register any document which might be registered by any Sub-Registrar subordinate to him. In other words, a party who is entitled to register a document before a particular Sub-Registrar may, as an alternative, present it before the Registrar of that district, who has a discretionary power to accept it. This does not enlarge the territorial reach — the document must still be one that some subordinate Sub-Registrar could competently register — but it offers an alternative forum within the district hierarchy. The structure of Registrars and Sub-Registrars itself is explained in our note on the registration establishment.
The word "discretion" matters: the Registrar is not bound to receive a document merely because a Sub-Registrar could have, and the power is to be exercised judicially, not arbitrarily. Section 30 is therefore best understood as a convenience-and-supervision provision that keeps registration within the proper district while allowing the senior officer to step in.
Section 30(2): the presidency-towns and Delhi power
Historically, Section 30(2) created a far wider power for a handful of metropolitan Registrars. It provided that the Registrar of a district in which one of the presidency-towns of Calcutta, Bombay or Madras was situate could receive and register any document referred to in Section 28 without regard to the situation in any part of India of the property to which the document related — a striking departure from the strict territoriality of Section 28, justified by the commercial importance of those towns.
By the Registration (Amendment) Act, 1969 (Act 45 of 1969), this benefit was extended to the Registrar of the Delhi district, reflecting Delhi's growth as the capital and a national commercial centre. Where a document is registered under this all-India power, the Act provides for a copy and the endorsements to be forwarded to every Registrar within whose district any part of the property is situate, who then follows the procedure prescribed for filing, so that the public record where the land actually lies is not left blank. Because Section 30(2) is a special and exceptional power confined to named metropolitan Registrars, students should be careful to treat it as the narrow exception it is and not as a general escape from Section 28.
Section 31: registration at a private residence
Section 31 addresses where within the competent jurisdiction the officer may physically act. The general rule is that registration or deposit is to be made only at the office of the officer authorised to accept it. Section 31 makes an exception: such officer may, on special cause being shown, attend at the residence of any person desiring to present a document for registration, or to deposit a will, and there accept the document or will for registration or deposit.
Three points are commonly examined. First, the power is discretionary — the officer "may" attend, and is not obliged to. Second, it is conditioned on "special cause": old age, serious illness, bodily infirmity, or the imminence of death in the case of a will are the typical grounds, and a bare request for convenience will not do. Third, Section 31 does not enlarge territorial jurisdiction — the residence visited must still be within the area the officer is competent to serve. It simply relaxes the rule that the act must take place at the office. The provision is closely allied to the will-and-deposit machinery and to the exemptions from personal appearance available to the infirm and to persons in custody, which is why it is studied alongside the rules on who may present a will under Sections 40 and 41.
Section 31 is best understood by contrasting it with Section 28. Section 28 answers which sub-district is competent — a question of territorial jurisdiction that the parties cannot waive. Section 31 answers a different, narrower question: at what spot within that competent area the officer may perform the act. The default spot is the office; the exception is the residence. A document accepted at a residence under Section 31 is registered exactly as if it had been brought to the office, and the ordinary endorsements, certificate of registration under Section 60, and consequences follow. What Section 31 emphatically does not do is allow an officer to reach out beyond his territory: special cause cannot manufacture jurisdiction that Section 28 or Section 29 withholds. The two provisions thus operate on different planes and must not be conflated in an answer.
Kishore Chandra Singh Deo: residence and jurisdiction
The interplay between residence and the registering officer's jurisdiction was examined by the Supreme Court in Sri Sri Sri Kishore Chandra Singh Deo v. Babu Ganesh Prasad Bhagat, reported in [1954] SCR 919. The dispute concerned the authentication of a power of attorney and the validity of the registration process where questions were raised about the principal's residence and the absence of any bodily infirmity. The Court took a practical view of the residence requirement, holding that even a temporary residence within the officer's jurisdiction could satisfy the relevant condition, and that the authentication and registration were valid where the procedural prerequisites appeared to have been met. The decision is a reminder that while territoriality under Section 28 is strict as to the property, the residence-based connecting factors elsewhere in the Act (such as for powers of attorney and for attendance at a residence) are construed with a degree of practicality.
Veena Singh: place presupposes genuine execution
A modern decision worth knowing is Veena Singh (Dead) through LR v. District Registrar / Additional Collector (F/R), 2022 LiveLaw (SC) 462. The principal holding is on the meaning of "execution": the Court clarified that the execution of a document does not stand admitted merely because a person admits to having signed it — execution involves the conscious adoption of the contents of the deed, not the bare fact of a signature. The relevance to the place-of-registration block is contextual but real: the Act's machinery for fixing the place and registering the instrument presupposes a genuinely executed document. Where execution itself is in doubt, the registering officer's enquiry and the downstream consequences of registration cannot be taken for granted. The case is therefore a useful caution that the territorial and procedural rules of Sections 28 to 31 operate on top of, and do not dispense with, the requirement of true execution.
Place, refusal and the finality of registration
The choice of place also shapes what happens if registration goes wrong. A Sub-Registrar may refuse to register a document — including on the ground that it has been presented at the wrong office under Section 28 — recording his reasons under Section 71, and that refusal may be carried in appeal to the Registrar under Section 72. But once a document has actually been registered, the registering officer is functus officio. In Satya Pal Anand v. State of M.P., AIR 2014 SC 2361, the Supreme Court held that the authority has no jurisdiction to cancel a registration once made; and in Bina Murlidhar Hemdev v. Kanhaiyalal Lokram Hemdev, AIR 1999 SC 2171, the Court emphasised that after registration the Sub-Registrar no longer holds jurisdiction over the matter. The remedy for a registration vitiated by want of territorial jurisdiction is therefore not administrative cancellation but a challenge before a civil court, where the fictitious-parcel principle of Harendra Lal Roy can be invoked to have the registration declared void.
Quick matrix: which office, which section
To consolidate: a document relating to immovable property goes, under Section 28, to the Sub-Registrar in whose sub-district the whole or any genuine portion of the property lies — mandatory, property-based, no free choice. Any other document or a copy of a decree or order goes, under Section 29, to the Sub-Registrar of the sub-district of execution, or by the consent of all parties to any other Sub-Registrar in the State. Under Section 30(1) a Registrar may, in his discretion, receive anything a subordinate Sub-Registrar could; under Section 30(2) the Registrars of the presidency-town districts and (since 1969) Delhi may register Section 28 documents irrespective of where in India the property lies. And under Section 31, for special cause, the competent officer may attend a private residence to register a document or accept a will for deposit. For the wider picture, return to the Registration Act hub or move on to the rules on persons entitled to present documents.
Frequently asked questions
Where must a sale deed of land be registered?
Under Section 28 of the Registration Act, 1908, a document relating to immovable property must be presented to the Sub-Registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property is situate. The place of execution and the residence of the parties are irrelevant; the connecting factor is the situation of the land.
What does "some portion" of the property mean in Section 28?
It means any portion, not a substantial portion. If a single deed covers land lying in two sub-districts, it may be registered in either office because a portion lies within each. The latitude is genuine, but it cannot be abused by inserting a sham parcel merely to manufacture jurisdiction.
Is registration in the wrong office valid?
No. If the registering officer has no territorial jurisdiction because no genuine portion of the property lies within the sub-district, the registration is void, not merely irregular. The deed is then treated as unregistered for the purposes of Section 49 and cannot affect the immovable property comprised in it.
What is the fictitious-parcel fraud, and which case decided it?
It is the device of inserting a fictitious, non-existent or insignificant item of property into a deed solely to bring it within a chosen Sub-Registrar's jurisdiction. In Harendra Lal Roy Chowdhuri v. Hari Dasi Debi (Privy Council, 1914) such a parcel was held to be a fraud on the registration law, rendering the registration invalid.
What is the special power under Section 30(2)?
Section 30(2) allows the Registrar of a district containing a presidency-town (Calcutta, Bombay or Madras) and, since the 1969 amendment, the Registrar of the Delhi district, to register a Section 28 document irrespective of where in India the property is situate. It is a narrow exception to the strict territoriality of Section 28.
Can a document be registered at a person's home?
Yes, exceptionally. Under Section 31, the competent officer may, on special cause being shown such as serious illness or bodily infirmity, attend a person's private residence to register a document or accept a will for deposit. The power is discretionary and does not enlarge the officer's territorial jurisdiction.