Powers and Functions of CIC and SIC

The Right to Information Act, 2005 would be a paper tiger without an independent enforcement machinery, and that machinery is the Central Information Commission (CIC) and the State Information Commissions (SIC). Constituted under Sections 12 and 15 respectively, these commissions are the apex adjudicatory authorities of the RTI regime. They receive and inquire into complaints under Section 18, decide second appeals under Section 19, wield the coercive powers of a civil court while inquiring, and impose monetary penalties on errant Public Information Officers under Section 20. This chapter maps the constitution, jurisdiction, powers and limits of the CIC and SIC, weaving in the leading Supreme Court authorities that have defined the contours of their authority. For the foundational framework, read alongside the RTI Act hub and the chapter on introduction, object and scheme.

Constitution of the CIC and SIC (Sections 12 and 15)

Section 12(1) directs the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, to constitute a body called the Central Information Commission to exercise the powers conferred and perform the functions assigned under the Act. Under Section 12(2), it consists of the Chief Information Commissioner and such number of Central Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary. Section 15 mirrors this structure at the State level: every State Government must constitute a State Information Commission consisting of the State Chief Information Commissioner and not more than ten State Information Commissioners.

The appointment mechanism is deliberately insulated from executive caprice. Under Section 12(3), the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners are appointed by the President on the recommendation of a committee comprising the Prime Minister (as Chairperson), the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the Prime Minister. At the State level, Section 15(3) substitutes the Chief Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Chief Minister, with appointments made by the Governor. Section 12(5) requires members to be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance, and Section 12(6) bars them from being Members of Parliament or a Legislature, holding any other office of profit, or being connected with any political party or business.

The general superintendence, direction and management of the Commission's affairs vests in the Chief Information Commissioner under Section 12(4), who may exercise the powers of the Commission autonomously without being subject to directions by any other authority. This statutory autonomy is the bedrock of the Commission's independence. The relationship of these commissions to the entities they police is best understood by reading the chapter on public authority, information and the PIO.

Tenure, Salary and the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019

As originally enacted, Section 13 fixed a robust five-year term (or until the age of 65, whichever was earlier) for the Chief Information Commissioner and Information Commissioners, and Section 13(5) pegged their salaries and conditions of service to those of the Chief Election Commissioner and Election Commissioners respectively. Sections 16(1) and 16(5) made parallel provision for the SIC, equating the State Chief Information Commissioner with an Election Commissioner and a State Information Commissioner with the Chief Secretary of the State Government. This statutory equation with constitutional functionaries was the chief guarantor of the commissioners' status and independence.

The Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019 recalibrated this scheme. It amended Sections 13, 16 and 27 to delete the fixed five-year tenure and the salary parity, substituting in their place the phrase that the term of office, salaries, allowances and other terms and conditions of service shall be "such as may be prescribed by the Central Government." Pursuant to this, the Right to Information Rules, 2019 fixed the tenure at three years. Critics argued the amendment diluted the commissions' independence by placing the levers of tenure and remuneration in the hands of the very executive whose decisions the commissions adjudicate. For the judiciary aspirant, the examinable proposition is precise: tenure and salary are no longer fixed in the statute itself but flow from delegated rule-making by the Central Government.

Removal of Information Commissioners (Sections 14 and 17)

The security of tenure that underpins independence is reinforced by a stringent removal procedure. Under Section 14, the Chief Information Commissioner or any Information Commissioner can be removed from office only by an order of the President on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, and that too after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the President, has on inquiry reported that the commissioner ought to be removed on such ground. Pending that reference, Section 14(2) permits the President to suspend the commissioner and prohibit attendance at office.

Section 14(3) carves out an additional, summary route: the President may remove a commissioner by order if the commissioner is adjudged an insolvent, has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude, engages in paid employment outside the duties of office during the term, is in the opinion of the President unfit to continue by reason of infirmity of mind or body, or has acquired a financial or other interest likely to affect his functions prejudicially. Section 17 replicates this entire architecture for the State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners, with the Governor making the reference to the Supreme Court. The deliberate parallel with the removal procedure for higher judiciary and constitutional functionaries signals the quasi-judicial dignity Parliament intended these offices to carry.

Power to Receive and Inquire into Complaints (Section 18)

Section 18(1) imposes on the CIC and SIC the duty to receive and inquire into complaints from any person on six enumerated grounds: (a) inability to submit a request because no PIO has been appointed or an Assistant PIO refused to accept the application or appeal; (b) refusal of access to information requested under the Act; (c) non-response within the prescribed time limit; (d) being required to pay an amount of fee considered unreasonable; (e) being given information believed to be incomplete, misleading or false; and (f) any other matter relating to requesting or obtaining access to records under the Act. The residuary clause (f) gives the complaints jurisdiction considerable breadth.

Section 18(2) makes the inquiry discretionary at the threshold: where the Commission is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to inquire into the matter, it may initiate an inquiry. The most potent investigative provision is the closing sub-section, which declares that notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other Act of Parliament or State Legislature, the Commission may, during an inquiry, examine any record to which the Act applies that is under the control of the public authority, and "no such record may be withheld from it on any grounds." This overrides claims of confidentiality at the inquiry stage, enabling the Commission to look behind a denial. The substantive entitlement that complaints protect is set out in the chapter on the right to information.

Civil Court Powers While Inquiring (Section 18(3))

To make the inquiry meaningful, Section 18(3) clothes the Commission, while inquiring into any matter, with the same powers as are vested in a civil court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in respect of: (a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of persons and compelling them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce documents or things; (b) requiring the discovery and inspection of documents; (c) receiving evidence on affidavit; (d) requisitioning any public record or copies thereof from any court or office; (e) issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents; and (f) any other matter which may be prescribed.

These coercive powers transform the Commission from a mere grievance forum into a body that can compel testimony and the production of documents on pain of the consequences attaching to civil-court process. Crucially, the case law has clarified that these are powers exercised while inquiring; they do not convert every complaint into an occasion for the Commission to direct disclosure of the very information that ought to have been pursued by appeal. That limit is the subject of the leading authorities discussed below.

The Appellate Mechanism (Section 19)

Section 19 erects a two-tier appellate structure. Under Section 19(1), any person who does not receive a decision within the time specified, or is aggrieved by a decision of the PIO, may within thirty days prefer a first appeal to an officer senior in rank to the PIO in each public authority; the appellate officer may condone delay for sufficient cause. Section 19(3) provides for a second appeal to the CIC or SIC within ninety days from the date the decision should have been or was actually received, again with a power to condone delay.

Two protective features stand out. Section 19(5) places the onus squarely on the PIO: in any appeal proceedings, the burden of proving that a denial of a request was justified lies on the PIO who denied it. Section 19(6) requires first appeals to be disposed of within thirty days, extendable to a total of forty-five days for reasons recorded in writing. Where third-party information is involved, Section 19(4) mandates a reasonable opportunity of hearing to that third party. The mechanics of the underlying request that triggers this chain are explained in the chapter on the request for obtaining information.

Binding Decisions and Remedial Powers (Section 19(7)-(8))

Section 19(7) declares that the decision of the CIC or SIC "shall be binding." The remedial arsenal in Section 19(8) is where the Commission's enforcement power is at its widest. In its decision, the Commission has the power to (a) require the public authority to take any steps necessary to secure compliance with the Act, including by providing access to information in a particular form, appointing a PIO, publishing categories of information, making changes to its record-management practices, enhancing training on the right to information, or providing an annual report under Section 4(1)(b); (b) require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered; (c) impose any of the penalties provided under the Act; and (d) reject the application.

The compensation power under Section 19(8)(b) and the structural-reform directions under Section 19(8)(a) are distinctive: they allow the Commission not merely to order disclosure but to address systemic non-compliance and award redress to the citizen. The obligations a public authority must proactively meet, which the Commission can enforce under this provision, are detailed in the chapters on obligations of the public authority and the designation of Public Information Officers.

Complaint or Appeal? The Manipur Distinction

A recurring confusion is whether a citizen denied information should proceed by complaint under Section 18 or by appeal under Section 19. The Supreme Court settled this in Chief Information Commissioner v. State of Manipur (2011) 15 SCC 1, decided on 12 December 2011. There, an applicant who received no response to his RTI application filed a complaint under Section 18, and the State Chief Information Commissioner directed the State Information Officer to furnish the information. The Court held that this was impermissible: when access to information is refused or not provided, the appropriate remedy is the appeal route under Section 19, and a Commission entertaining a Section 18 complaint cannot pass an order directing the supply of the information sought.

The reasoning is that Sections 18 and 19 "serve different purposes and lay down different procedures and they have to be maintained and preserved in their distinct contours." Section 18 confers a power of inquiry into the categories of complaint listed in Section 18(1) and, on inquiry, the power to impose penalty under Section 20; it is not a parallel mechanism for securing the information itself. The power to direct disclosure of the requested information resides in the appellate jurisdiction under Section 19(8)(a). The practical takeaway: a complaint may yield a penalty against a defaulting PIO, but only an appeal can yield the information.

No Power to Adjudicate Disputes or Render Advice

The CIC and SIC are creatures of a narrow statutory remit: they adjudicate access to information, not the substantive correctness of administrative decisions. In Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497, the Supreme Court emphasised that the right is to information held in the records of a public authority, and that the Act does not require a public authority to provide "advice" or "opinion" to an applicant, nor to create or collate information not already held. The reference to "opinion" and "advice" in the definition of information under Section 2(f) refers only to such material already available in the records of the public authority.

It follows that the Commission cannot direct a PIO to answer queries, give reasons, or resolve grievances about the merits of an administrative action; its jurisdiction is confined to whether existing information must be disclosed. Aditya Bandopadhyay also cautioned against an over-expansive use of Section 19(8) that would convert the Commission into an authority redesigning the functioning of public bodies, a caution the commissions are expected to heed when crafting directions.

The Penalty Power (Section 20)

Section 20 is the deterrent edge of the regime. Under Section 20(1), where the CIC or SIC, at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal, is of the opinion that the PIO has, without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application, failed to furnish information within the time specified under Section 7(1), malafidely denied a request, knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, destroyed information that was the subject of the request, or obstructed in any manner the furnishing of information, it shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day until the application is received or information is furnished, subject to a ceiling of twenty-five thousand rupees.

The use of "shall" makes imposition mandatory once the ingredients are found, though two safeguards apply: the first proviso guarantees the PIO a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and the second proviso places the burden of proving that he acted reasonably and diligently on the PIO. Section 20(2) supplies a graver consequence for persistent default: where the PIO has, without reasonable cause and persistently, committed the same defaults, the Commission shall recommend disciplinary action against him under the applicable service rules. The penalty is personal to the PIO and is recovered from his salary, which is what gives the provision its bite.

Quasi-Judicial Character: Namit Sharma and its Review

The juridical nature of the commissions was litigated in Namit Sharma v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 745, where the petitioner challenged the absence of any requirement of legal or judicial experience for commissioners exercising adjudicatory powers. A two-judge Bench held the commissions to be quasi-judicial bodies and, reading the qualification provisions in Sections 12(5) and 15(5), directed that they sit in benches of two, one a judicial member, and laid down further restrictions on appointment.

On review, in Union of India v. Namit Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 411 (decided 3 September 2013), the Supreme Court recalled the earlier directions. It held that the 2013 judgment had effectively legislated by rewriting eligibility criteria and mandating benches, which was beyond the judicial remit. The review judgment clarified that while the commissions discharge quasi-judicial functions, the Act does not require members to be drawn only from judicial backgrounds, and the directions to constitute two-member judicial benches were set aside. The settled position, therefore, is that the CIC and SIC are quasi-judicial authorities whose composition is governed by the eligibility standards in the Act, without a constitutional compulsion of judicial membership.

Filling Vacancies: Anjali Bhardwaj

The effectiveness of the commissions depends on their being fully staffed. In Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2019) 7 SCC 189, decided on 15 February 2019, the Supreme Court confronted chronic vacancies and mounting backlogs of appeals and complaints at the CIC and several SICs. The Court issued a series of directions to make appointments timely and transparent: the selection process for a vacancy, including that of the Chief, must commence at least one to two months before the vacancy arises; the search committee and the criteria for short-listing must be made public; and records of the selection deliberations should be available to citizens consistent with the Act's own transparency philosophy.

The judgment underscored that the right to information is rendered illusory if the very bodies charged with enforcing it are left understaffed or unconstituted. It thus operationalised the structural guarantees in Sections 12 and 15 by compelling governments to populate the commissions and to do so through a process that is itself transparent, closing the loop between the Act's object and its institutional delivery.

Monitoring and Reporting Functions (Section 25)

Beyond adjudication, the commissions perform a systemic oversight role. Section 25(1) requires the CIC or SIC, as soon as practicable after the end of each year, to prepare a report on the implementation of the Act during that year and forward a copy to the appropriate Government, which under Section 25(3) lays it before Parliament or the State Legislature. Section 25(2) obliges each Ministry or Department to collect and provide the information needed to prepare this report.

The report must, under Section 25(3), state the number of requests made to each public authority, the number of decisions where applicants were refused access and the provisions invoked, the number and outcome of appeals referred to the Commission, particulars of any disciplinary action taken against officers, the charges collected, and any facts indicating efforts by public authorities to implement the spirit of the Act. Section 25(5) empowers the Commission to recommend reforms, including changes to the law or other measures, to public authorities not conforming to the Act. This reporting and recommendation function makes the commissions not only courts of appeal but also the conscience-keepers of the transparency regime, feeding back into legislative and executive accountability.

Limits of Jurisdiction and Judicial Review

The commissions' powers, though substantial, are bounded. Section 23 bars the jurisdiction of courts: no court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of any order made under the Act, and no such order may be questioned otherwise than by way of an appeal under the Act. This ouster, however, does not exclude the constitutional remedy of judicial review; High Courts under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 retain the power to examine the legality of Commission orders, as the very stream of litigation from Manipur to Anjali Bhardwaj demonstrates.

The commissions also operate under the substantive exemptions of the Act. Section 8 exemptions, Section 9 grounds, and the Section 24 exclusion for specified intelligence and security organisations all constrain what the commissions can order disclosed, subject to the public-interest override and the proviso protecting allegations of corruption and human rights violations. In sum, the CIC and SIC are powerful but not unlimited: they enforce a right of access, adjudicate within the four corners of the Act, impose personal penalties to deter default, and report to the legislature, but they cannot adjudicate the merits of administrative action, manufacture information, or escape the supervisory jurisdiction of the constitutional courts.

Frequently asked questions

What is the difference between a complaint under Section 18 and an appeal under Section 19?

A Section 18 complaint invokes the Commission's inquiry jurisdiction over the grounds listed in Section 18(1) and can result in a penalty under Section 20, but it cannot be used to obtain the requested information. An appeal under Section 19, by contrast, can direct disclosure under Section 19(8)(a). In Chief Information Commissioner v. State of Manipur (2011) 15 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held the two provisions serve distinct purposes and a Section 18 complaint cannot be used to order supply of the information sought.

What powers of a civil court does an Information Commission have?

Under Section 18(3), while inquiring into a matter the CIC or SIC has the same powers as a civil court under the CPC, 1908 in respect of summoning and enforcing attendance and compelling evidence on oath and production of documents, requiring discovery and inspection of documents, receiving evidence on affidavit, requisitioning public records from any court or office, issuing summons for examination of witnesses or documents, and any other prescribed matter.

What penalty can be imposed under Section 20 of the RTI Act?

Under Section 20(1), where a PIO has without reasonable cause refused or delayed information, malafidely denied a request, given incorrect or misleading information, destroyed information, or obstructed its furnishing, the Commission shall impose a penalty of Rs 250 per day of default, subject to a maximum of Rs 25,000. The PIO must be heard first and bears the burden of proving he acted reasonably. Persistent default attracts a recommendation for disciplinary action under Section 20(2).

How did the RTI (Amendment) Act, 2019 change the tenure of Information Commissioners?

The 2019 Amendment deleted the fixed five-year tenure in Sections 13 and 16 and the salary parity with the Election Commission, replacing them with terms, salaries and conditions "as may be prescribed by the Central Government." The Right to Information Rules, 2019 subsequently fixed the tenure at three years. Critics argued this diluted the commissions' independence by handing the executive control over tenure and remuneration.

Are the CIC and SIC required to have judicial members?

No. In Namit Sharma v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC 745 a Bench directed that the commissions sit in two-member benches with a judicial member, but on review in Union of India v. Namit Sharma (2014) 2 SCC 411 the Supreme Court recalled those directions as amounting to judicial legislation. The settled position is that the commissions are quasi-judicial bodies whose composition follows the eligibility standards in the Act, with no constitutional requirement of judicial membership.

Can an Information Commission direct a public authority to give advice or answer queries?

No. In CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497, the Supreme Court held that the Act gives access to information already held in the records of a public authority and does not require the authority to provide advice or opinion, or to create or collate non-existent information. The Commission's jurisdiction is confined to disclosure of existing records, not to adjudicating the merits of administrative decisions or answering an applicant's questions.