Section 10 is the quiet workhorse of the right to information. It answers a question that public authorities raise reflexively whenever a file is mixed: the record contains some exempt material, so may the whole thing be refused? The statutory answer is no. Where information is rejected because part of it is exempt under Section 8 or Section 9, Section 10 commands the public information officer to release the part that is not exempt and that can reasonably be severed from the exempt portion. It converts exemption from a shield over the entire document into a scalpel that removes only what the law protects. This chapter sets out the bare provision, the mechanics of severance and the speaking-order duty in sub-section (2), and the way the Supreme Court and the Central Information Commission have used severability to keep disclosure as the rule and secrecy the narrow exception.
The bare text of Section 10
Section 10 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 is headed "Severability" and has two sub-sections. Sub-section (1) provides: "Where a request for access to information is rejected on the ground that it is in relation to information which is exempt from disclosure, then, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, access may be provided to that part of the record which does not contain any information which is exempt from disclosure under this Act and which can reasonably be severed from any part that contains exempt information."
Sub-section (2) then imposes a notice duty. Where access is granted to a part of the record under sub-section (1), the Central or State Public Information Officer must give the applicant a notice informing: (a) that only part of the record is being provided after severance of the exempt material; (b) the reasons for the decision, including any findings on material questions of fact and the material on which those findings were based; (c) the name and designation of the person giving the decision; (d) the details of the fee calculated and the amount the applicant must deposit; and (e) the applicant's rights of review, including the particulars of the senior officer under Section 19(1) or the relevant Information Commission, the time limit and the process.
Two phrases carry the legal weight. "Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act" gives Section 10 an overriding character within the statute; it operates even where an exemption has been validly invoked. And "which can reasonably be severed" is the test that the officer must apply on the facts of each record. The provision sits in Chapter II alongside the core duties explored in obligations of public authority.
It is worth noting what Section 10 does not do. It does not create a fresh exemption; it presupposes that one already exists and regulates the consequences. Nor does it apply to a request that is refused for reasons unconnected with exemption, such as a record that does not exist or that is not held by the authority. The trigger words "rejected on the ground that it is in relation to information which is exempt" confine the provision to exemption-based refusals. Where an authority refuses for any other reason, Section 10 is simply not engaged, although the general duty to give reasons under Section 7(8) continues to apply. Candidates should keep this trigger precise: severability is the answer to over-claimed exemption, not to every refusal under the Act.
Why the Act needs a severability clause
The architecture of the RTI Act makes severability indispensable. Section 3 declares that, subject to the Act, all citizens have the right to information. The exemptions in Section 8(1) and the third-party-secrecy bar in Section 9 are carve-outs from that right. Without Section 10, a public authority could defeat the right entirely by pointing to a single exempt sentence buried in an otherwise disclosable file, claiming the record as a whole was "in relation to" exempt information. Section 10 forecloses that move.
The Delhi High Court captured the underlying philosophy in Bhagat Singh v. Chief Information Commissioner (2008) 100 DRJ 63, holding that the RTI Act is a rights-based welfare enactment that must receive a liberal interpretation, while the exemptions in Section 8 are restrictions on a fundamental right and must therefore be strictly construed. The burden of justifying refusal lies on the authority withholding the information, not on the citizen seeking it. Severability is the procedural expression of that burden: an authority cannot discharge its onus by gesturing at the file as a whole; it must identify precisely which portion is exempt and why the rest cannot be separated.
Severability also reflects the constitutional pedigree of the right traced in the introduction, object and scheme chapter. Because the right to information is a facet of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a), any restriction must satisfy a proportionality discipline. Refusing an entire record when only a fragment is sensitive is, by definition, a disproportionate restriction. Section 10 builds proportionality into the day-to-day practice of disclosure.
How Section 10 interacts with Section 8 exemptions
Section 10 is parasitic on the exemptions; it has no work to do until an exemption is validly claimed. The sequence is: first, the officer identifies whether any part of the requested record attracts an exemption under Section 8(1) or the trade-secret bar in Section 9; second, the officer asks whether the exempt part can reasonably be severed from the rest; third, if it can, the non-exempt part is released with the exempt portion redacted.
This relationship is most visible with the public-interest override in the proviso to Section 8(1)(j) and the general override in Section 8(2). In Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner (2013) 1 SCC 212, the Supreme Court held that details of a public servant's service career, assets, liabilities and disciplinary proceedings are ordinarily personal information exempt under Section 8(1)(j) unless a larger public interest is shown. The case is often read as a brake on disclosure, but it equally illustrates the severance discipline: the exemption attaches to discrete categories of personal data, and information that is not personal in that sense, or for which public interest is demonstrated, falls outside the exempt portion and must be released.
The exemptions themselves are explored in detail in the chapters on the definitions and scheme; the practical point for Section 10 is that the officer must map the exempt material item by item rather than treating exemption as an all-or-nothing label on the file.
The "reasonably be severed" test
The operative limitation in sub-section (1) is the word "reasonably." Severance is mandatory only where the exempt part can reasonably be separated from the non-exempt part. This recognises that some records are so integrated that redaction would either reveal the exempt content by inference or leave a meaningless fragment. The Central Information Commission has repeatedly held, however, that the threshold for claiming non-severability is high and must be demonstrated, not asserted. A bare statement that "the document cannot be severed" does not satisfy Section 10; the officer must explain why severance is impossible or would defeat the exemption.
In practice, the test breaks into a few recurring situations. A file containing both routine correspondence and a single exempt security assessment is plainly severable: redact the assessment, release the rest. An evaluated answer-book is severable from the examiner's identity, which the Supreme Court treated as the only protected element in Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 when it directed inspection of answer-books while permitting masking of the examiner's name. By contrast, a record where the exempt and non-exempt content are so interwoven that disclosure of the surviving text would itself disclose the exempt material may not be reasonably severable; even then the burden is on the authority to establish that interweaving.
A useful way to apply the test is to ask three questions of each contested portion. First, is the portion itself independently exempt, or is it being withheld only because it sits near exempt material? Only the former justifies redaction. Second, would releasing the surrounding non-exempt text reveal the exempt content by necessary inference - for example, where a redacted name is the only plausible candidate given the disclosed context? If so, severance of that fragment may not be reasonable. Third, does the residue, once redacted, still convey meaningful information to the applicant, or has redaction hollowed it out? Section 10 protects the right to the meaningful remainder, not to an empty shell. The “reasonably” qualifier is thus a calibrated standard, not an escape hatch; the more an authority leans on it, the heavier its obligation to explain itself in the sub-section (2) notice.
The speaking-order duty in sub-section (2)
Sub-section (2) is not a formality. It converts a partial refusal into a reasoned, reviewable decision. When an officer severs a record, the notice must spell out that only part is being supplied, give reasons including findings on material questions of fact, and identify the decision-maker. This dovetails with Section 7(8), which independently requires that any rejection state reasons, the period for appeal and the appellate particulars. Read together, the two provisions mean that a citizen who receives a redacted document is entitled to know exactly what was withheld, on what statutory ground, and how to challenge it.
The Delhi High Court in Bhagat Singh emphasised that the authority must give cogent, pertinent reasons grounded in material; a vague invocation of an exemption will not survive scrutiny. The speaking-order requirement therefore operates as a check against reflexive over-redaction: an officer who blacks out more than the exemption warrants must justify each redaction in the notice, and that justification is reviewable on first appeal to the senior officer under Section 19(1) and on second appeal to the Information Commission. The mechanics of who receives and decides requests are set out in the chapters on the designation of public information officers and the request for obtaining information.
The notice duty also serves a systemic transparency function. Because each partial refusal must state which clause of Section 8(1) or Section 9 was applied and why, the pattern of redactions across an authority becomes auditable by appellate bodies and the Information Commissions. A reasoned severance order is therefore both a remedy for the individual applicant and a record that constrains future over-redaction by the same authority.
Severability, fiduciary claims and third-party information
Two exemptions generate the most severability litigation: the fiduciary-relationship exemption in Section 8(1)(e) and third-party commercial confidence under Section 8(1)(d) read with the Section 11 notice procedure. In Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal N. Mistry (2016) 3 SCC 525, the Supreme Court rejected the RBI's claim that inspection reports and lists of bank defaulters were held in a fiduciary capacity, holding that the RBI owes its duty to the public, depositors and the economy rather than to the banks it regulates. The decision narrows the fiduciary exemption sharply, which in turn narrows the field over which severance even needs to be debated: where no fiduciary duty exists, there is nothing exempt to sever, and the record is disclosable in full.
For genuine third-party material, Section 10 works in tandem with Section 11. The PIO must give the third party notice and an opportunity to object, then decide whether the larger public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm. Even where part of the third-party information is protected, the non-exempt remainder must be severed and released. The Supreme Court applied exactly this interplay in Central Public Information Officer, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481, holding that personal information under Section 8(1)(j) enjoys only limited protection, that public servants have a reduced expectation of privacy, and that the competing claims under Section 8(1)(j) and Section 11 must be balanced rather than resolved by blanket refusal.
The lesson across these decisions is that the size of the genuinely exempt zone is usually far smaller than authorities assert. Once the fiduciary claim is rejected, as in RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry, or the privacy claim is confined to truly personal fields, as in Subhash Chandra Agarwal, what remains exempt is a narrow residue, and Section 10 then requires the surrounding record to be released. Severability and the strict construction of exemptions thus reinforce each other: the narrower the exemption, the more there is to sever and disclose.
Answer-books, personnel files and the severance scalpel
CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 is the clearest worked example of severability in operation. The Supreme Court held that evaluated answer-books are "information" within Section 2(f) and are not held in a fiduciary capacity by the examining body, so they must be disclosed for inspection. But the Court also recognised that the identity of the examiner who marked the script could attract protection. The solution was severance: release the answer-book, mask the examiner's identifying particulars. The Court thus refused to let a narrow, genuinely sensitive element justify withholding the entire valuable record.
The same scalpel applies to personnel and service files. Following Girish Ramchandra Deshpande, a public servant's pay, postings and routine establishment particulars are frequently disclosable, while medical details, ITR contents and the substance of disciplinary findings may be personal information under Section 8(1)(j). Section 10 requires the officer to separate the two strata within a single file rather than refuse the file as a whole. The recurring CIC practice is to direct disclosure of the non-personal portions with redaction of the protected fields, accompanied by the sub-section (2) notice explaining each redaction.
The Aditya Bandopadhyay reasoning also clarified a point that recurs in severability disputes: an exemption claimed at the level of the document type often dissolves on closer analysis, leaving only a narrow protected element to sever. The examining body had argued that the entire evaluation process was confidential and fiduciary. The Court disaggregated that claim, finding that the answer-book itself carried no fiduciary character and that only the examiner-identity link merited protection. This disaggregation is the intellectual core of Section 10: the officer must resist the temptation to characterise a whole category of records as exempt and must instead locate the precise protected datum, sever it, and disclose the rest.
Burden of proof and the presumption of disclosure
Section 10 reallocates the practical burden in a partial-refusal case. Once a citizen has made a valid request, the public authority that wishes to withhold any part must (i) identify the exempt portion, (ii) anchor it to a specific clause of Section 8(1) or to Section 9, and (iii) justify why that portion cannot reasonably be severed. Bhagat Singh places the onus of justifying refusal squarely on the authority, and the strict-construction rule means doubts are resolved in favour of disclosure.
This has a concrete consequence for over-broad exemption claims. An authority cannot stamp an exemption on a whole bundle and stop there. If even one document, or one paragraph, in the bundle is non-exempt and severable, that portion must come out. The presumption running through RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry and Subhash Chandra Agarwal is that transparency is the default and secrecy must be earned, clause by clause, document by document. Section 10 is the provision that makes that presumption operational at the level of the individual file rather than only at the level of grand principle.
The reallocation also disciplines the appellate process. On first appeal under Section 19(1) and second appeal to the Information Commission, the authority must defend each redaction against the sub-section (2) reasons it recorded. An appellate authority that finds the severance analysis missing or conclusory can direct fresh disclosure, and the Commission may impose penalties under Section 20 where refusal was without reasonable cause. Severability therefore is not merely a drafting nicety; it is enforced through the same accountability chain that backs the rest of the Act.
The limits: when severance is not reasonable
Severability is mandatory only where reasonable, and there are genuine limits. First, where the exempt and non-exempt content are inextricably linked, redaction may either reveal the protected material by context or render the released portion incomprehensible; in such a case sub-section (1) does not compel disclosure of a meaningless residue. Second, the absolute bars sit outside the Section 10 calculus: information whose disclosure would constitute contempt of court, breach of parliamentary privilege, or that is expressly forbidden by a court, is exempt under Section 8(1)(b) and (c) and there is typically nothing severable to release once the protected core is excised.
Third, severability cannot be used to defeat the public-interest override the wrong way round. Where Section 8(2) and the Section 8(1)(j) proviso require disclosure because public interest outweighs protected interests, the officer cannot rely on "non-severability" to refuse; the override operates on the whole record. In each of these situations the discipline is the same: the authority must record, in the sub-section (2) notice, precisely why severance is or is not reasonable, so that the conclusion can be tested on appeal.
A working procedure for the PIO
Putting the provision into a practical sequence, a public information officer faced with a mixed record should: (1) treat Section 3 disclosure as the starting presumption; (2) examine the record and isolate any portion attracting a specific clause of Section 8(1) or Section 9; (3) where third-party material is involved, follow the Section 11 notice-and-objection procedure; (4) apply the public-interest override under Section 8(2) and the Section 8(1)(j) proviso; (5) ask whether the surviving exempt portion can reasonably be severed; (6) redact only that portion and release the rest; and (7) issue the sub-section (2) notice with reasons, decision-maker, fee details and review particulars.
This sequence ties Section 10 back to the rest of the disclosure machinery. The request itself is governed by the chapter on the request for obtaining information; the time limits and rejection-reasons duty live in Section 7; and the appellate remedies that test a severance decision are in Section 19. For a map of how these provisions fit together, see the RTI Act notes hub.
Examination pointers
For judiciary and CLAT-PG candidates, the high-yield points are: Section 10 is titled "Severability" and contains two sub-sections; sub-section (1) opens with a non obstante clause and turns on whether the exempt part "can reasonably be severed"; sub-section (2) requires a reasoned notice with five enumerated particulars (a)-(e). Remember that severance is triggered by a valid exemption under Section 8 or Section 9 and is the procedural answer to the all-or-nothing refusal.
On case law, pair Bhagat Singh v. CIC (strict construction of exemptions; burden on the authority) with CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (answer-books disclosable, examiner identity severable) and RBI v. Jayantilal N. Mistry (narrow fiduciary exemption). For the privacy interface, cite Girish Ramchandra Deshpande and the larger Constitution-Bench balancing in CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal. Distinguish Section 10 (severance of part of one record) from Section 6(3) transfer (sending a misdirected request to the right authority) and from Section 7(8) (general duty to give reasons for rejection) - examiners love that trio of distinctions.
Frequently asked questions
What does Section 10 of the RTI Act provide?
It provides for severability. Where access is refused because information is exempt, the public information officer must still release the part of the record that is not exempt and that can reasonably be severed from the exempt portion. Sub-section (2) then requires a reasoned notice telling the applicant what was withheld, why, who decided, the fee and the review remedies.
Can a public authority refuse a whole file because one paragraph is exempt?
No. That is exactly what Section 10 prevents. If part of a record is exempt under Section 8 or Section 9 but the rest can reasonably be severed, the officer must redact only the exempt part and release the remainder. The Delhi High Court in Bhagat Singh v. CIC placed the burden of justifying any refusal on the authority and required exemptions to be construed strictly.
What does "reasonably be severed" mean?
It means the exempt portion can be separated without revealing the protected material by inference and without leaving a meaningless fragment. The threshold for claiming non-severability is high; an officer must demonstrate, not merely assert, that severance is impossible. In CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay the Supreme Court treated answer-books as disclosable while permitting the examiner's identity to be masked - a textbook severance.
What must the sub-section (2) notice contain?
Five things: that only part of the record is being supplied after severance; the reasons including findings on material questions of fact and the material relied on; the name and designation of the decision-maker; the fee details; and the applicant's review rights, including the senior officer under Section 19(1) or the relevant Information Commission, the time limit and the process.
How does Section 10 interact with the third-party procedure in Section 11?
Where a record contains third-party information, the officer follows the Section 11 notice-and-objection procedure and weighs public interest. Even if part of that information is protected, the non-exempt remainder must be severed and released. The Supreme Court applied this balancing in CPIO, Supreme Court v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal (2020) 5 SCC 481, holding personal information under Section 8(1)(j) enjoys only limited protection.
Are there records that cannot be severed at all?
Yes. Where exempt and non-exempt content are inextricably linked, or where the protected core is an absolute bar such as contempt of court or breach of parliamentary privilege under Section 8(1)(b) and (c), there may be nothing meaningful to release once the protected portion is removed. But the authority must record in the notice why severance is not reasonable, so the conclusion can be tested on appeal.