The State Information Commission (SIC) is the apex statutory authority that polices the right to information within each State. Created by Section 15 of the Right to Information Act, 2005, it sits at the top of the State's information-disclosure pyramid — above every Public Information Officer and every departmental appellate authority — and is the body to which a dissatisfied citizen carries a second appeal under Section 19(3). Modelled on, and structurally identical to, the Central Information Commission, the SIC is no mere recommendatory committee: it is a high-powered, quasi-judicial tribunal armed with the powers of a civil court, the authority to issue binding directions and the teeth to impose monetary penalties on defaulting officers. This chapter unpacks its constitution, composition, tenure, removal, jurisdiction and powers, and threads the leading Supreme Court authorities through the statutory scheme so that an examinee can both state the law and defend it.
Where the State Information Commission Sits in the RTI Architecture
The Right to Information Act builds a three-tier enforcement structure. At the base stands the State Public Information Officer (SPIO) who receives and disposes of requests under Section 6; the middle tier is the departmental First Appellate Authority under Section 19(1), an officer senior in rank to the SPIO within the same public authority; and at the apex sits the State Information Commission, to which a second appeal lies under Section 19(3). The Commission is therefore the final statutory forum within the State for vindicating the right conferred by Section 3, subject only to the constitutional remedies of writ jurisdiction.
This architecture must be read against the Act's preambular object — "to provide for setting out the practical regime of right to information for citizens." As the chapter on the object and scheme of the Act explains, the entire statute is a machinery provision for operationalising the citizen's right; the Commission is the keystone of that machinery at the State level. Without an effective, properly-staffed Commission, the right to information becomes, in the language repeatedly used by the courts, a paper right.
Two Information Commissions exist under the Act: the Central Information Commission, constituted by the Central Government under Section 12 to hear matters concerning Central public authorities, and the State Information Commission, constituted by each State Government under Section 15 for State public authorities. The two are parallel and co-ordinate — neither is appellate over the other — and the demarcation of jurisdiction follows the public authority concerned, not the territory of the applicant.
Constitution of the Commission — Section 15
Section 15(1) directs that every State Government "shall, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a body to be known as the (name of the State) Information Commission to exercise the powers conferred on, and to perform the functions assigned to, it under this Act." The word "shall" makes constitution mandatory; a State cannot decline to set up a Commission, and prolonged failure to fill it has been treated by the Supreme Court as a justiciable default (discussed below in Anjali Bhardwaj).
Under Section 15(2), the Commission consists of the State Chief Information Commissioner (SCIC) and "such number of State Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary." The cap of ten Information Commissioners is a ceiling, not a floor: a State may function with the Chief Information Commissioner alone, or with any number up to ten, depending on caseload. This flexibility was a deliberate design choice so that smaller States need not maintain a full bench.
Section 15(3) prescribes the appointing mechanism. The SCIC and the State Information Commissioners are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a high-powered committee comprising (i) the Chief Minister, who is the Chairperson of the committee; (ii) the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly; and (iii) a Cabinet Minister to be nominated by the Chief Minister. The presence of the Leader of Opposition is the statutory guarantee of bipartisan, non-partisan selection — a feature the Supreme Court has insisted must operate substantively and not merely formally.
The explanation to Section 15(3) clarifies that where the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly has not been recognised as such, the Leader of the single largest group in opposition to the Government shall be deemed to be the Leader of Opposition. This prevents a State from defeating the bipartisan requirement merely because the technical office of Leader of Opposition is vacant.
Eligibility and Disqualifications — Sections 15(5) and 15(6)
Section 15(5) lays down the qualifications: the State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners "shall be persons of eminence in public life with wide knowledge and experience in law, science and technology, social service, management, journalism, mass media or administration and governance." The catalogue is illustrative of the breadth Parliament intended — the Commission was conceived as a multi-disciplinary body, not a court staffed exclusively by lawyers.
This very breadth was litigated in Namit Sharma v. Union of India. In its first judgment dated 13 September 2012 the Supreme Court read judicial qualifications into Sections 12(5) and 15(5) and directed that Commissions sit in benches of two, one of whom must be a person with a legal background. That ruling was recalled on review in Union of India v. Namit Sharma, (2013) 1 SCC 745, where the Court held that Sections 12(5) and 15(5) are not ultra vires the Constitution and that the eligibility categories enacted by Parliament could not be judicially rewritten; it withdrew the directions on judicial membership and two-member benches while emphasising that Commissioners, being holders of quasi-judicial office, should preferably possess relevant experience and that appointments must be made transparently from amongst eminent persons in the enumerated fields.
Section 15(6) imposes disqualifications by way of an office-of-profit and conflict-of-interest bar: the SCIC and a State Information Commissioner shall not be a Member of Parliament or Member of the Legislature of any State or Union territory, shall hold no other office of profit, shall not be connected with any political party, and shall not carry on any business or pursue any profession. This insulation from political and commercial entanglement is what underpins the Commission's claim to independent, quasi-judicial functioning.
Term of Office and Conditions of Service — Section 16 (and the 2019 Amendment)
As originally enacted, Section 16 was a self-contained code: the State Chief Information Commissioner and every State Information Commissioner held office for a term of five years from the date of entering office or until attaining the age of sixty-five years, whichever was earlier, and were not eligible for reappointment as such. The fixed five-year tenure and the age ceiling were statutory guarantees of security of tenure, a hallmark of the independence the Act sought to confer.
The Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019 fundamentally altered this. The amendment deleted the fixed statutory term and instead provided that the term of office shall be "for such term as may be prescribed by the Central Government." The same technique was applied to salaries, allowances and other conditions of service, which are now also "as may be prescribed by the Central Government" — a striking centralisation, given that State Information Commissioners are appointed by, and serve within, the States.
Pursuant to the amendment, the Central Government notified the Right to Information (Term of Office, Salaries, Allowances and Other Terms and Conditions of Service of Chief Information Commissioner, Information Commissioners in the Central Information Commission, State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners in the State Information Commission) Rules, 2019 on 24 October 2019. Under these Rules the term of office was fixed at three years (reduced from the earlier five), and the salary of the State Chief Information Commissioner was pegged at ₹2,50,000 per month and that of a State Information Commissioner at ₹2,25,000 per month. The reduction of tenure and the transfer of these levers to the Centre were widely criticised as diluting the autonomy of the Commissions; for an exam answer the critical points are (a) the shift from a statutorily-fixed term to a Centrally-prescribed term, and (b) that the prescribing power now vests in the Central Government even for State Commissioners.
Section 16(5) preserves a key dignity guarantee that the 2019 amendment left intact: the salary, allowances and conditions of service of the SCIC and State Information Commissioners shall not be varied to their disadvantage after appointment — a protection borrowed from the constitutional scheme for higher judicial and quasi-judicial offices.
Removal of Commissioners — Section 17
Security of tenure is reinforced by a stringent removal procedure modelled on the removal of superior court judges. Under Section 17(1), the State Chief Information Commissioner or a State Information Commissioner shall be removed from office only by order of the Governor on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, and only after the Supreme Court, on a reference made to it by the Governor, has on inquiry reported that the officer ought, on such ground, to be removed. The reference must go to the Supreme Court — not a State High Court — underscoring the seriousness of the safeguard.
Section 17(2) empowers the Governor, pending the Supreme Court's inquiry, to suspend the Commissioner and, if necessary, prohibit attendance at office. Section 17(3) sets out the grounds on which the Governor may remove a Commissioner without a Supreme Court reference — namely if the Commissioner is adjudged insolvent; is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; engages in paid employment outside the office; is in the Governor's opinion unfit by reason of infirmity of mind or body; or has acquired a financial or other interest likely to prejudicially affect official functions. Section 17(4) deems a Commissioner who is connected with any political party, carries on business or pursues a profession to be guilty of misbehaviour, dovetailing with the Section 15(6) disqualifications.
The cumulative effect of Sections 16 and 17 is to clothe the Commissioner with a tenure and removal protection comparable to a judge of a constitutional court — the institutional basis for the courts' description of the Commission as a quasi-judicial authority that must be free of executive pressure.
Headquarters, Autonomy and Administrative Set-up
Section 15(7) fixes the headquarters of the State Information Commission at such place in the State as the State Government may, by notification, specify, with offices at other places permitted with the State Government's previous approval. Section 15(8) provides that the Commission shall exercise its powers without being subjected to directions by any other authority under the Act — the textual anchor of the Commission's functional autonomy. Section 4 of the Act's general scheme and the staffing provision under Section 15(8) read with the financial arrangements ensure the Commission has officers and employees, provided by the State Government, to discharge its functions.
The autonomy guaranteed by Section 15(8) is not merely decorative. In the Namit Sharma review, (2013) 1 SCC 745, the Supreme Court repeatedly characterised the Information Commission as discharging important quasi-judicial functions, holding that it adjudicates upon the competing claims of citizens to information and of public authorities to confidentiality, and that the institution must accordingly be manned and run in a manner befitting an adjudicatory body. The combination of fixed (now prescribed) tenure, protected service conditions, judicial-style removal and statutory freedom from direction is what the courts rely on to treat Commission orders as binding adjudications rather than executive recommendations.
Jurisdiction: The Second Appeal under Section 19
The Commission's principal adjudicatory jurisdiction is appellate. Section 19(3) provides that a second appeal against the decision of the First Appellate Authority lies to the State Information Commission within ninety days from the date on which the decision should have been made or was actually received; the Commission may admit a delayed appeal on sufficient cause. Section 19(5) places the onus of justifying a refusal of a request squarely on the PIO — "the burden of proving that a denial of a request was justified shall be on the Public Information Officer" — a reverse-onus rule of great practical significance for applicants.
Section 19(7) makes the Commission's decision "binding," and Section 19(8) confers wide remedial powers, examined in the next section. Crucially, the appeal mechanism under Section 19 must be distinguished from the complaint jurisdiction under Section 18. In Chief Information Commr. v. State of Manipur, (2012) 15 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that the powers under Sections 18 and 19 are distinct and operate in different fields: Section 18 deals with the Commission's inquiry into complaints about the working of the Act, whereas Section 19 is a proper appellate remedy for a person aggrieved by denial of information. The Court held that a person who has been refused information must pursue the appellate route under Section 19 rather than seek the substantive relief of disclosure through a Section 18 complaint, the Section 19 procedure being the one specifically tailored to secure access to the information withheld.
Complaint Jurisdiction and Civil-Court Powers — Section 18
Section 18 confers on the State Information Commission an original jurisdiction to receive and inquire into complaints from persons who, among other grievances, have been unable to submit a request because no PIO was appointed, have been refused access, have not received a response within the prescribed time, have been required to pay an unreasonable fee, or believe the information given is incomplete, misleading or false. Where the Commission is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds, it may initiate an inquiry.
For the purpose of such inquiries, Section 18(3) clothes the Commission with the powers of a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — namely the power to summon and enforce the attendance of persons and compel them to give oral or written evidence on oath and to produce documents; to require the discovery and inspection of documents; to receive evidence on affidavit; to requisition public records from any court or office; to issue summonses for examination of witnesses or documents; and any other matter that may be prescribed. Section 18(4) is particularly potent: notwithstanding anything inconsistent in any other Act, the Commission may, during the inquiry, examine any record to which the Act applies, and no such record may be withheld from it on any ground — a clause that overrides departmental claims of secrecy at the inquiry stage. These civil-court powers, mirrored in the duties of a public authority to maintain and disclose records, give the Commission genuine investigative muscle.
Remedial and Directory Powers — Section 19(8)
Once an appeal or complaint is decided in the applicant's favour, Section 19(8) arms the Commission with a powerful menu of remedies. Under Section 19(8)(a) the Commission may require the public authority to take any steps necessary to secure compliance with the Act, including by providing access to information in a particular form; by appointing a PIO; by publishing information or categories of information; by making necessary changes to records-management, retention or computerisation practices; by enhancing training provision for officials; and by requiring an annual report in compliance with Section 4(1)(b). Under Section 19(8)(b) the Commission may require the public authority to compensate the complainant for any loss or other detriment suffered. Under Section 19(8)(c) it may impose the penalties provided under Section 20. And under Section 19(8)(d) it may reject the application.
The compensation power under Section 19(8)(b) is a distinctive feature: the Commission can direct payment of monetary compensation to a citizen who has suffered loss, detriment or harassment by reason of the public authority's default. Combined with the binding character of decisions under Section 19(7), these provisions establish that Commission orders are enforceable adjudications, not advisory opinions — the practical expression of the institution's quasi-judicial status affirmed in Namit Sharma.
Penalty and Disciplinary Power — Section 20
The sharpest tooth of the Commission is the penal power under Section 20. Under Section 20(1), where the Commission at the time of deciding any complaint or appeal is of the opinion that the State Public Information Officer has, without reasonable cause, refused to receive an application, or has not furnished information within the time specified, or has malafidely denied a request, or knowingly given incorrect, incomplete or misleading information, or destroyed information that was the subject of a request, or obstructed the furnishing of information in any manner, the Commission shall impose a penalty of two hundred and fifty rupees each day till the application is received or information is furnished, subject to a ceiling of twenty-five thousand rupees in the aggregate.
The structure of Section 20(1) is significant for exam purposes: the word "shall" makes imposition mandatory once the threshold of culpability is crossed, and the burden of establishing reasonable cause and bona fides rests on the PIO. Section 20(2) goes further and empowers the Commission to recommend disciplinary action against the SPIO under the service rules applicable to that officer, where the officer has persistently failed without reasonable cause to comply. Together, Sections 19(8)(c) and 20 convert the Commission from a mere adjudicator of disputes into an enforcement authority capable of imposing personal financial and career consequences on defaulting officers — a deterrent at the heart of the Act's design and one that distinguishes a well-designated Public Information Officer regime that takes its statutory duties seriously.
Overriding Effect and Bar on Civil Courts — Sections 22 and 23
The Commission's authority is buttressed by two structural provisions. Section 22 gives the Act overriding effect: its provisions take effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent in the Official Secrets Act, 1923, or any other law for the time being in force, or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. The Supreme Court applied this clause decisively in Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay, (2011) 8 SCC 497, holding that an examinee has a right to inspect his evaluated answer-books, which constitute "information," and that bye-laws or regulations of an examining body cannot defeat the right because Section 22 makes the RTI Act prevail over inconsistent rules, regulations and instruments. This overriding clause is what allows the Commission to direct disclosure even where a sectoral statute or regulation appears to forbid it, subject only to the exemptions in Section 8.
Section 23 ousts the jurisdiction of civil courts: no court shall entertain any suit, application or other proceeding in respect of any order made under the Act, and no such order shall be called in question otherwise than by way of an appeal under the Act. The result is that the statutory appellate ladder culminating in the State Information Commission is the exclusive in-statute route, and a litigant cannot bypass it by a civil suit; the only avenue outside the Act is the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court and Supreme Court, which the bar in Section 23 does not (and cannot) exclude.
Filling Vacancies and Institutional Accountability — Anjali Bhardwaj
A Commission that exists on paper but lies vacant cannot vindicate the right to information. In Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India, (2019) 11 SCC 217, the Supreme Court confronted chronic delays in appointing Information Commissioners at both the Central and State levels, with thousands of appeals and complaints pending for want of a functioning bench. The Court treated the timely filling of vacancies as integral to the right and issued a series of directions: that the process of filling a vacancy be initiated well before the post falls vacant, ideally one to two months in advance; that selection be made from a wide and properly-constituted zone of consideration; and — of lasting importance for transparency — that the names of the members of the Search Committee, the names of the shortlisted candidates and the criteria adopted for selection be placed in the public domain. The Court also directed the States to file affidavits disclosing vacancy positions, pendency and steps taken.
The decision is doubly instructive. First, it confirms that the constitution of the Commission under Section 15 is a continuing mandatory obligation, not a one-time act — a State cannot allow the body to wither through inaction. Second, it injects a transparency discipline into the very process of appointing the adjudicators of transparency, recognising the obvious risk that opaque selection undermines public confidence in the Commission's independence. Read together with Namit Sharma, Anjali Bhardwaj completes the judicial portrait of the Information Commission as a quasi-judicial institution whose composition, independence and accessibility the courts will actively protect.
Monitoring, Reporting and the Section 25 Annual Report
Beyond adjudication, the Commission performs a monitoring and reporting role. Section 25 requires the State Information Commission, as soon as practicable after the end of each year, to prepare a report on the implementation of the Act in the State, which the State Government lays before the State Legislature. The report records, among other particulars, the number of requests made to each public authority, the number of decisions where applicants were not entitled to access, the provisions invoked for such decisions, the number of appeals referred to the Commission, particulars of disciplinary action taken, the amount of charges collected, and recommendations for reform including the development, improvement, modernisation and reform of public authorities' record-keeping. Section 25(5) empowers the Commission, if it is of the view that a public authority's practice does not conform with the spirit or provisions of the Act, to recommend to that authority the steps to be taken to promote conformity.
This reporting function complements the obligations of proactive disclosure that bind every public authority under Section 4, and it situates the Commission not merely as a dispute-resolver but as the institutional conscience of the transparency regime within the State — surveying systemic compliance, naming defaulting practices, and feeding recommendations back into governance.
Exam Takeaways and Comparative Points
For revision, fix the following load-bearing propositions. The SIC is constituted by the State Government (Section 15), but its Commissioners are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee chaired by the Chief Minister, with the Leader of Opposition and a Cabinet Minister — distinguish this from the Central Commission, where the President appoints on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Opposition in the Lok Sabha, and a Union Cabinet Minister nominated by the PM. The composition cap is the Chief plus not more than ten Commissioners.
On tenure, contrast the pre- and post-2019 positions: originally five years or sixty-five years of age (whichever earlier) fixed by statute; after the Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019, the term and conditions are "as prescribed by the Central Government," and the RTI Rules, 2019 prescribe a three-year term — a frequent objective-question point. Removal under Section 17 is judge-like, requiring a reference to the Supreme Court. On powers, remember the triad: civil-court powers in inquiries (Section 18(3)–(4)); binding directions and compensation (Section 19(7)–(8)); and mandatory penalty of ₹250 per day up to ₹25,000 plus disciplinary recommendation (Section 20). On case law, anchor four authorities — Namit Sharma (2013) 1 SCC 745 (quasi-judicial nature; 12(5)/15(5) intra vires), Chief Information Commr. v. State of Manipur (2012) 15 SCC 1 (Section 18 versus Section 19), CBSE v. Aditya Bandopadhyay (2011) 8 SCC 497 (Section 22 overriding effect), and Anjali Bhardwaj v. Union of India (2019) 11 SCC 217 (vacancies and transparency in appointment). For the broader statutory context, revisit the chapters on the right to information itself and on the key definitions that delimit the Commission's reach.
Frequently asked questions
Who appoints the State Chief Information Commissioner and State Information Commissioners?
Under Section 15(3), they are appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of a committee consisting of the Chief Minister (Chairperson), the Leader of Opposition in the Legislative Assembly, and a Cabinet Minister nominated by the Chief Minister. The Commission itself is constituted by the State Government by notification in the Official Gazette under Section 15(1).
How many State Information Commissioners can there be?
Section 15(2) provides for a State Chief Information Commissioner and such number of State Information Commissioners, not exceeding ten, as may be deemed necessary. Ten is the ceiling; a State may function with fewer, even with the Chief Information Commissioner alone.
What is the term of office of a State Information Commissioner after the 2019 amendment?
Originally Section 16 fixed the term at five years or until the age of sixty-five, whichever was earlier, with no reappointment. The Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019 replaced the fixed term with one "as prescribed by the Central Government," and the RTI Rules, 2019 (notified 24 October 2019) prescribe a three-year term. Salaries and other conditions are now likewise Centrally prescribed.
How is a State Information Commissioner removed?
Under Section 17, removal is by order of the Governor on the ground of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, but only after the Supreme Court, on a reference by the Governor, reports on inquiry that the officer ought to be removed. The Governor may also remove a Commissioner on the specific grounds in Section 17(3) (such as insolvency, conviction for an offence involving moral turpitude, or paid outside employment) without a Supreme Court reference.
Is the State Information Commission a court or a quasi-judicial body?
It is a quasi-judicial body, not a court. In Union of India v. Namit Sharma, (2013) 1 SCC 745, the Supreme Court recognised the Information Commission as discharging important quasi-judicial functions while holding that Sections 12(5) and 15(5) are not unconstitutional and declining to rewrite the eligibility criteria. Its decisions are binding under Section 19(7), and the civil-court jurisdiction is barred by Section 23, but its orders remain amenable to writ jurisdiction.
What penalties can the State Information Commission impose on a defaulting PIO?
Under Section 20(1), where a PIO has without reasonable cause refused an application, delayed information, malafidely denied a request, given false or incomplete information, destroyed information or obstructed disclosure, the Commission shall impose a penalty of ₹250 per day, subject to a maximum of ₹25,000. Under Section 20(2) it may also recommend disciplinary action under the officer's service rules for persistent default.